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Foreword 
Ben Burt and Christian Clerk 
This book is intended to promote Europe-Pacific Islands relationships 
in support of environmentally appropriate human development, and its 
publication has been made possible by several organisations concerned 
for this purpose. Most of the chapters derive from a conference 
organised in 1995 by the Pacific Islands Society of the United Kingdom 
and Ireland (PISUKI) and the United Kingdom Foundation for the 
South Pacific (UKFSP), with funding from the European Centre for 
Studies, Information and Education of Pacific Issues (ECSIEP). An 
important theme running through the book is the way Pacific Islands' 
links with the wider world, the cause of so many problems for its 
peoples and environments, may also assist in solutions. But there are 
many areas of contention and, to do justice to the complexity of the 
issues, several chapters are complemented by short responses from 
alternative perspectives, reflecting debates raised at the conference. 
The cost of publication has been supported by ECSIEP and PISUKI, 
with the particular intention of making the book available to people 
and organisations in the Pacific Islands. We would like to thank Roger 
Barltrop, Chairman of PISUKI, Dorothy Mcintosh, Director of UKFSP, 
and Madeleen Helmer, Co-ordinator of ECSIEP, for their personal 
support for both the conference and the book. Special thanks go to 
Akuila Yabaki, a prime exponent of Pacific Islands-Europe links, 
whose roles in these organisations and several others made the project 
possible. Colin Filer also provided important support beyond the 
chapters he contributed, and Kate Evers dealt with the task of editing 18 
disparate chapters. We are grateful to to the National Centre for 
Development Studies for its financial and professional support for the 
publication of the book. 
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Environment and development in 
the Pacific Islands: introduction 
Ben Burt and Ch ristian Clerk 
This book looks at the problems and potential of a region of the world 
remote from the main centres of economic development and environ­
mental crisis, yet sharing common experiences with other regions of the 
Third World. Like anywhere else, the Pacific Islands have their own 
peculiar problems and, more importantly, their own distinctive 
contribution to make to the never-ending debate on the meaning of 
development and how people may obtain its benefits without 
degrading the environment on which their lives depend. The chapters 
of this book raise questions about the development of particular kinds 
of resources. 
Ancient economies 
Since islanders first arrived in the Pacific, the foundation of their lives, 
and their main contribution to the ecosystem, has been an economy of 
farming, foraging and fishing, in a tropical environment of forest, reef 
and ocean. T his way of life originated in Southeast Asia and was 
modified during centuries of exploratory migration eastwards, via the 
great island of New Guinea to smaller and ever more isolated islands 
with less diverse biological resources in Melanesia and Polynesia. On 
most of these islands, forests maintained the soil and water for 
cultivating staple root crops, vegetables, trees and palms. Where and 
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when the forest was uncultivated, it provided wild plant and animal 
foods, wood, fibre and other essential raw materials, fresh water, fuel 
and herbal medicines. Forest streams and rivers fed the coastal 
ecosystems of mangroves and coral reefs which provided a large 
proportion of the fish and shellfish of the marine economy, under­
pinning productive but less reliable fishing on the open seas. 
Such ecological and economic systems still ensure the livelihood of 
most Pacific Islanders, as the subsistence sector which supports the 
commercial economies of most Pacific countries. Compared with the 
economic and technological transformations of the last 200 years, and 
especially with the impact of the global economy since the Second 
World War, these systems have been relatively stable, maintaining 
habitable environments for many hundreds or even thousands of years 
in some areas. Not that this has left Pacific environments unchanged: 
from the outset, human settlement created cultural land and sea-scapes 
as territories were claimed, adapted to human needs and given human 
histories. Even forest which islanders, or outsiders, have regarded as 
natural or wild was modified by the effects of shifting cultivation, agro­
forestry and selective conservation of useful and symbolically 
important wild trees, plants or places. Some areas were transformed 
into intensive agricultural systems through irrigation and drainage, 
especially in parts of the New Guinea Highlands and Polynesia. Some 
suffered severe environmental degradation from over-exploitation of 
resources, with deforestation to grassland in New Guinea Highland 
valleys, parts of islands in the Solomons and Fiji and, in an extreme 
case, the whole of Rapa Nui (Easter Island). In the past the conse­
quences of such loss of resources would have included starvation, war 
and emigration to uncertain destinations, but the continued viability of 
forest ecosystems in most areas shows that economic and technological 
limitations must also have restrained population and consumption 
levels in less drastic ways. In the long term, most Pacific economies 
proved themselves ecologically far more sustainable than the 
increasingly precarious economies of the islands today. And since this 
instability is a central concern of environment and development 
debates, it is worth considering how the economies which Pacific 
peoples developed for themselves and maintained over many 
generations compare with the capitalist economy and culture of 
development which began to draw them into regional and global 
economic systems no more than 200 years ago. 
2 I Environment and development in the Pacific Islands 
One essential difference is that most Pacific Island economies were 
based on communal control of land and its resources, including the 
submerged land of productive reefs. Tenure in particular areas was 
generally inherited collectively by the descendants of those who had 
held it in the past, and sometimes validated through long and complex 
genealogical histories. The right to manage the resources of these areas, 
usually claimed by men on the basis of genealogical seniority, was 
exercised on behalf of these family or clan groups, rather than as 
ownership in the Western sense. Production of food and goods was 
generally in the hands of families and households, but there were only 
limited opportunities to store wealth or use it to improve a basic 
material standard of living. People exchanged goods and resources by 
sharing, giving and lending, as much for social as material benefits, 
maintaining the strength, integrity and prestige of their local 
communities. Such communities defended themselves against each 
other in often bloody feuds, but also linked themselves in networks of 
intermarriage and exchanges of goods. They traded in the local produce 
of coastal and inland districts and in the products of specialised local 
industries, of symbolic as well as practical value. 
Some of these economic and ceremonial relationships linked people 
directly over vast distances of ocean, or indirectly through extensive 
networks on land in the larger islands. But most island communities 
remained relatively self-sufficient and autonomous, at the level of 
neighbourhoods rather than islands, lacking the political integration 
required for further economic development until the colonial period. 
Community leaders claimed authority in a variety of ways: by seniority 
of descent, by assisting and indebting their relatives, by organising 
communal enterprises such as festivals or trading expeditions, by 
mediating the powers of ancestral spirits or sorcery, by controlling 
exclusive ritual institutions, or by military leadership. But as long as 
each local family or clan retained control of its own essential economic 
resources, the possibilities for larger and more complex political and 
economic organisation were limited. Only in some Polynesian societies, 
where seniority of descent carried special prestige, did aristocratic 
leaders manage to unite large populations under central authority. In 
Hawaii, Tonga and Tahiti they claimed and allocated their peoples' 
natural resources and goods for the economic and political 
development of strong expansionist kingdoms. But in general, Pacific 
Islanders had the kind of culture and social organisation which 
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European colonial administrators, and the Western advisers who 
succeeded them, have regarded as impediments to economic 
development. What these critics have been slower to recognise is that 
such institutions can also be safeguards against excessive exploitation 
of resources, unequal distribution of the benefits, and against the 
environmental and social problems which now concern both islanders 
and development experts. 
The colonial  legacy 
In settling the Pacific, islanders voyaged well beyond the sphere of 
interest of their Southeast Asian lands of origin, and as that region was 
drawn into wider economic and political relationships with the 
growing civilisations of China, India and beyond, the Pacific Islands 
remained a peripheral region of mainly small and fragmented societies. 
The islands were only introduced to the developing global economy 
with the expansion of European trade into the Pacific, or rather across it 
between the Americas and Asia, from the eighteenth century onwards. 
The impact of this trade was very uneven, with some small islands of 
Polynesia which had once been the most isolated becoming the most 
accessible to long-distance shipping, while large areas of island 
Melanesia, with their own regional networks, remained inaccessible to 
colonial interests until the second half of the nineteenth century, and 
the New Guinea Highlands until the mid-twentieth century. 
Europeans first exploited the islands to supply their trading and 
whaling ships and as convenient sources for a few high value raw 
materials, then as sources for cheap migrant labour. By the mid­
nineteenth century some islanders were acquiring regular supplies of 
manufactured goods in return for local produce, and then for work on 
land appropriated by Europeans for plantations on certain islands, and 
also in Queensland. Sugar from Fiji and Queensland and phosphates 
mined on a few small Polynesian and Micronesian islands made 
significant contributions to world trade, but when various European 
powers annexed the islands in the late nineteenth century, they did so 
largely for strategic political reasons rather than for commercial 
purposes. In many areas trade hardly compensated for the costs of 
colonial administration and European enterprises often contributed 
more to their fantasies than their fortunes. The strategic value of the 
islands was demonstrated during the Second World War, but it is only 
since then that economic and technological developments have given a 
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significant commercial value to their natural resources. Improved 
transport and communications in the last few generations have opened 
the most remote areas of the Pacific Islands, even the interior of New 
Guinea, to commercial exploitation of timber, fish, minerals and 
agricultural produce to supply global markets. 
The history which has drawn the autonomous societies of the 
Pacific Islands into the global economy is one of external exploitation, 
first from the metropolitan regions of Europe, North America and 
Australasia, then from the resurgent economy of Japan and most 
recently from the newly industrialised centres of East and Southeast 
Asia. This has driven the economic development of the islands in 
directions which reflect foreign rather than local priorities and 
interests, an experience which the Pacific Islands shares with other 
regions of the Third World. During the colonial period, European 
claims to be civilising colonised societies in the process of promoting 
commerce gave a gloss of benevolent paternalism to relations of 
economic exploitation which, for all the altruism of some colonial 
agents, were designed primarily to enrich the industrial economies of 
Europe and America. Following the Second World War, with the 
disintegration of colonial empires and the eclipse of European power 
by the United States, the new Western vision of world order which 
emerged was based not on continuing political dominion but on 
economic interdependence. Now it was international financial and 
commercial agencies which mediated the continued domination of 
much of the world by industrialised countries, with the United States in 
the leading role. In a new version of the colonial view that human 
progress had culminated in the civilisation of Europe, the post-war 
view promoted by powerful Western agencies of government, commerce 
and finance represented Western industrial society as a model for the 
development of everyone else, now with a focus on increased 
commodity production and ' growth' as measures of economic 
development and social wellbeing. 
This model of development serves the interests of its exponents well 
enough, and has been largely adopted by the indigenous governing 
elites of the Pacific Islands, despite some reservations deriving from 
anti-colonial critiques of the West. Its influence remains strong in 
Pacific Islands countries, still heavily dependent on Western aid and 
training, where national independence came as recently as the 1970s in 
much of Melanesia and a number of countries are still under colonial 
administration. But the situation of the Pacific Islands is changing ever 
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more rapidly. A region which had previously been at the margins of the 
great economic developments shaping world history now ironically 
faces the challenge of being surrounded by the new centres of the global 
economy developing on the Pacific rim. There are many questions over 
the costs and benefits of existing economic development for ordinary 
Islanders, and to these must be added the question of how well such 
development will enable them to face a future of even more dramatic 
change. 
What is development? 
Since the end of the 1960s, as the effects of conventional Western 
development policies have been seen and felt, controversy over their 
direction and purpose has thrown doubt on the very notion of 
development, and its converse, 'underdevelopment'. Depending on 
your perspective, underdevelopment may represent problems to be 
addressed by development, or problems caused by it, in what has been 
called 'the development of underdevelopment'. It has been argued that 
as programs undertaken in the name of development have proven 
unable to deal with commonly acknowledged problems like poverty 
and environmental degradation, and have been repeatedly revised and 
reformulated, the concept has come to represent whatever a particular 
interest group wishes to promote in the name of progress towards its 
own vision of a desirable future. The result is that the basic assump­
tions which have driven national and international development 
policies are now being questioned more widely than ever. 
The conventional capitalist view of world development as 'modern­
isation', which assumes that Western industrial prosperity and 
continued economic growth is environmentally sustainable and can be 
reproduced worldwide through policies economically beneficial to the 
West, has been challenged repeatedly by neo-Marxist academic theories 
since the 1960s. The First World industrial economies and the rural, 
labour-intensive Third World economies were recognised as 
interdependent parts of a global capitalist economy, dominated by 
industrial centres which created dependency in peripheral regions 
through the agency of transnational commercial and financial 
organisations. For some regions, especially Africa and Latin America, 
this was seen to be actually promoting the impoverished 
'underdevelopment' which development policies were claiming to 
address. For others, particularly East and Southeast Asia, the theory 
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may appear to be contradicted by the growth of new industrial centres. 
But regions like the Pacific Islands which remain peripheral find 
themselves in a similar relationship to these new centres as to the old. 
During the 1980s, while neo-liberal economic policies of 
privatisation, deregulation and structural adjustment were prescribed 
by international financial organisations to often compliant Third World 
governments, the growing human and environmental crises in poorer 
regions of the world confirmed widespread doubts over the 
consequences, and possibly the intentions, of capitalist theories of 
development. At the same time America was winning the Cold War for 
its vision of world order, as Marxist-inspired alternatives were 
collapsing under internal contradictions generated by totalitarianism 
in the Second World of the Soviet bloc and by American attrition in the 
Third World of Africa and Latin America. There was a corresponding 
crisis in confidence in the competing grand theories of development, 
with their reliance on global generalisations and politically-driven top­
down solutions. Many of those involved in development practice 
turned instead for direction to the experience of local communities and 
voluntary or non-government organisations (NGOs) actually involved 
in development programs on the ground. The shift of focus has led to 
attempts to redefine development in opposition to the parallel shift of 
capitalist theory towards neo-liberal deregulation. The NGO approach 
now tends to emphasise change from the 'bottom up' through measures 
which enable the poor and powerless to take control of their own lives 
and to enrich themselves, not in terms of material wealth alone, but 
through processes they can participate in and which are accountable to 
them. The role of government and intergovemment intervention is seen 
as facilitating these processes, moderating the effect of the market 
which serves as the neo-liberal panacea. 
Although the political and academic struggles between Marxist and 
capitalist ideologies have informed the policies of external development 
agencies in the Pacific Islands, islanders themselves have been more 
inclined towards alternative approaches building on counter-colonial 
notions of tradition which have often had populist overtones. 
Particularly influential was the 'Pacific Way' perspective which spread 
through the University of the South Pacific, reflecting an emerging 
regional identity in the 1970s. With a focus on the needs of the rural 
majorities and on the value of self-reliance founded on local culture, 
this anticipated the growing Western concern for appropriate eco­
logically sustainable development and contributed a valuable Pacific 
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Islands' perspective to the development debate. In particular, 
experiences of rural development by Pacific Islanders, supported by 
national and international NGOs, show the possibilities of a kind of 
'bottom up' development which empowers people to take control of 
their own futures as communities, building upon their own cultural 
resources. 
This experience is reflected in many of the contributions to this book, 
but so is the fact that the recent economic and environmental history of 
the region has been directed by very different notions of development. 
Despite a growing awareness of the vulnerability of island environ­
ments and societies and the ecological constraints on possible futures, 
in practice economic interests and pressures have worked against local 
self-determination and ecological sustainability, even loosely defined, 
revealing contradictions at many levels from international agencies to 
national governments, local communities and individuals. These 
contradictions are a theme of this book, as they affect some of the major 
areas of concern in the Pacific Islands at the end of the twentieth 
century, and some of the ways Pacific Islands peoples and development 
agencies are responding to them. 
Issues i n  Pacific Islands devel opment 
The contributors to this book agree that conventional development 
policies are failing the Pacific Islands, creating problems for which they 
do not also have solutions. One Pacific Islands perspective is provided 
by Siteveni Halapua (Chapter 2), in terms of a need to 'harmonise' the 
development process. Halapua sees development in terms of guided 
change in the production and allocation of material, social and cultural 
resources and he identifies the agents of change as governments, 
markets and culture, that is as political and economic forces modified 
by local value systems. These he deals with at the level of Pacific 
Islands states, acknowledging that development has been directed by 
their governments primarily towards increasing the production of 
goods and services. Halapua' s criticism of this conventional policy is 
that it focuses on balancing income and expenditure at the expense of 
balancing the right to use resources against the obligation to ensure 
their continuity. In his view these objectives must be harmonised 
through national institutions to plan, implement and evaluate policy 
according to the priority of managing resources for sustainable 
economic development. 
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But, in a critique of Halapua's paper, John Cameron (Chapter 3) 
questions how far governments actually have an interest in promoting 
the sustainable utilisation of resources, rather than responding to a 
variety of contrary pressures. While tracing Halapua' s views on 
sustainability to the earlier 'Pacific Way' emphasis on local culture and 
values, Cameron also perceives a Western background to Halapua's 
acceptance of market forces and economic growth as processes which 
can be modified by government in the interests of sustainability. 
A different Pacific Islands perspective, more sceptical of the role of 
government, is given in Chapter 4 by Suliana Siwatibau, whose 
approach to the question of who controls development also develops 
from the 'Pacific Way' approach. She describes a widespread 
disillusionment with conventional policies of development as defined 
and controlled by Pacific Islands governments, international aid 
agencies and foreign commercial interests. Aid has been invested in 
large public infrastructure projects and expensive bureaucracies, 
corrupting governing elites which now sometimes seem more con­
cerned to enrich themselves than to regulate commercial exploitation of 
natural resources or to maintain and improve the livelihood of local 
people. Siwatibau advocates the democratisation of development by 
informing, empowering and supporting local communities in defining 
their own development priorities. As she makes clear, these 
development issues are also environmental issues. In a region like the 
Pacific Islands, where people depend on the primary products of their 
lands and seas for both subsistence and commerce, the conventional 
economic theory which disregards environmental costs in economic 
calculations is even less defensible than it is in the industrialised 
countries which export these costs by exploiting the environments of 
other regions of the world. 
These costs are most obvious in Papua New Guinea and the larger 
islands of Melanesia, countries which are heavily dependent on the 
sale of natural resources and particularly vulnerable to damage from 
large-scale extractive industries. The exploitation of forest resources is 
of particular current concern, as a threat both to the subsistence base of 
many local communities and to the economies of their countries. 
Deforestation, long an occasional consequence of human settlement in 
the Pacific Islands, accelerated with colonial plantation agriculture and 
now seems to be running out of control with commercial logging. The 
effects include soil degradation and erosion, damaged watersheds and 
loss of subsistence resources and, in a region of great species diversity 
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and high rates of endism, also the almost inevitable loss of species. 
The bleak future of Papua New Guinea's forests, threatened by 
large-scale logging careless of its environmental impact, is the concern 
of Max Henderson (Chapter 5) . Local communities, enticed by promises 
of ' development' to open their forests to exploitation, receive little of the 
wealth generated and all of the adverse environmental consequences. 
Henderson' s paper is a harsh indictment of the unrestrained greed of 
foreign timber enterprises and their contribution to the corruption of 
Papua New Guinea's politicians and public officials, a particularly 
serious example of the problem identified by Siwatibau. It is also a 
reminder of the limitations of even the best government regulations in 
safeguarding the public interest against the consequences of ill­
conceived national development strategies devised under international 
economic pressure and advice, like those which lie behind the pressure 
on Papua New Guinea's forests. Henderson's answer is change from 
the opposite direction, which he illustrates with his experience of a 
community-based sustainable timber project in New Britain, one of the 
areas worst affected. 
But assessing the damage of logging, its causes and remedies, is by 
no means simple, as Colin Filer shows in a critical response to 
Henderson (Chapter 6). While confirming that Papua New Guinea's 
timber is being exploited at an unsustainable rate, Filer questions some 
of the statistical calculations and the degree to which the situation is 
still deteriorating, at least in terms of the financial losses to the country, 
locally and nationally. The debate over levels of timber extraction and 
revenues demonstrates the complexity of the problem faced by govern­
ments attempting to regulate the industry even when there is the will to 
do so. But equally important is the question Filer raises of how far the 
people of Papua New Guinea actually recognise the problem, or 
whether many of them are conniving in the destruction of their own 
forests for short-term gain, under the kind of political leaders they 
deserve. This adds another dimension to the question of who controls 
development, raised by Siwatibau. Those who are concerned by 
destructive logging in Papua New Guinea appear to share the problem 
of environmentalists in Western countries, having to demonstrate the 
case for more modest long-term sustainable development to local people 
who are no more clear-sighted or idealistic than most people in the 
world, and rather less so than some Western idealists imagine 
indigenous rainforest peoples to be. 
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Mobilising local communities behind sustainable alternatives to 
industries like logging depends on enlightening the self-interest of local 
communities: not a hopeless task as Henderson shows, but not an easy 
one either. Among other things this involves assuring a market for their 
products, Jaap Schep's theme (Chapter 7). Schep describes a community 
forestry project in the other Pacific Islands country currently suffering 
massive forest damage, Solomon Islands, where logging serves to prop 
up a teetering national economy while it corrupts the country's political 
life and devastates its subsistence resources. He outlines some of the 
economic considerations involved in developing a timber project from a 
local church initiative into a transnational fair-trade organisation to 
supply the specialised European market for certified eco-timber. There 
are evidently valuable lessons in development to be learnt from such 
community projects, but their achievements are inevitably small and 
modest relative to the scale of the problem. Although the question of 
how to arrest logging long enough for such alternatives to become 
widespread remains unanswered, as part of the more general economic 
problems of the Pacific Islands, it undoubtably involves the kind of 
international trade reforms attempted by the eco-timber movement. 
But beyond challenges to the destructive impact of foreign 
companies operating in global markets are questions about the respon­
sibility of Pacific Islanders themselves. This is a question which Colin 
Filer raises again (Chapter 8) when he analyses another high-profile 
environmental issue, mining in Papua New Guinea. Rather than 
attempt to assess the environmental costs and economic gains of 
mining, much publicised and debated elsewhere, he looks at how the 
prospects of the industry are affected by relationships between local, 
national and transnational interests. Government policy in Papua New 
Guinea has been for the state to mediate with foreign companies in 
order to build national economic development on mining revenues. As 
Filer shows, this aim is repeatedly frustrated by dissenting local claims 
to the economic benefits, which national institutions proved incapable 
of resolving before they erupted in the Bougainville rebellion and other 
somewhat less violent disputes at Porgera, Ok Tedi and Mount Kare. He 
attributes the disruption, in part, to inflated local expectations of 
development, a cultural expression of economic dependency which can 
be blind to the environmental consequences of selling the valuable 
resources of the land, whether minerals or timber. With competition for 
the benefits of mining among local communities matched by the 
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political opportunism of their elected representatives, under a political 
morality which prioritises interpersonal and parochial obligations over 
broader public or national interests, Melanesians often seem to 
constrain environmental damage less by intention than by equivocation 
and internecine conflict. While this obstructs the mining industry, it 
also inhibits a coherent national policy on environment and 
development issues, including concerted measures against the ravages 
of logging already discussed. Filer 's analysis is a caution both to 
Melanesians who accuse environmentalists of denying them the 
benefits of economic development through neo-colonial interference, 
and to campaigners who imagine Melanesians to be inherent 
environmentalists betrayed by their political leaders. 
However, it is also at the level of their often parochial local 
communities that Pacific Islanders have had most success in realising 
their visions of sustainable development. As in the forestry projects 
mentioned above, the expertise and influence of links with industrial 
countries may contribute most when it helps people build on local 
experience of resource management, based on traditions of community 
participation and control. 
Edvard Hviding (Chapter 9) looks at this experience in another 
crucial sector of the Pacific Islands economy, fishing. He deals not with 
the issues of industrial tuna fishing which are already a focus of 
international awareness, but with the management of coastal resources 
under customary marine tenure, particularly important in the local 
subsistence economy. In contrast to Western models of resource 
management employed for ocean fisheries in the Pacific (which allow 
fish stocks to be exploited competitively under largely ineffective 
government regulation), under many Pacific Islands coastal systems 
rights and regulations are negotiated by local communities from an 
intimate knowledge of local ecosystems and local needs. As Hviding 
indicates, they are in fact part of wider land management systems, 
including those under which community forestry programs have been 
organised. Customary marine, and land, tenure systems have ensured 
continued livelihood for countless generations under pre-capitalist 
economies. Hviding's point is that they have also enabled islanders to 
deal constructively with outside commercial interests, as well as 
facilitating the kind of small-scale, community-controlled innovations 
favoured by advocates of sustainable development. Although Pacific 
Islands ecological knowledge and Western science approach 
environmental management from different perspectives, they sometimes 
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come independently to very similar management solutions, and can 
complement one another in appropriate development programs. 
But beyond regulating the exploitation of natural resources, whether 
of seas, forests or minerals, the development of sustainable economies 
in the Pacific Islands also requires investment in the agricultural 
productivity of the land. As Tim Bayliss-Smith argues (Chapter 10), 
islanders have long been investing in land as productive capital 
through systems of irrigation, drainage and agro-forestry. As 
environmental concern has shifted from the protection of supposedly 
'natural' environments to the sustainable management of human ones, 
the experience of Pacific Islanders in enhancing the productive value of 
their land should itself be recognised as a valuable resource for 
planning the future of their islands. This might benefit from an under­
standing not only of the economic and political circumstances under 
which they developed these systems, but also of the pressures and 
opportunities which led them subsequently to transform or abandon 
them, particularly those introduced by colonial rule and the commercial 
economy. If further investment in agricultural productivity does not 
promise to realise islanders' dreams of easy money, neither does it 
threaten the environmental degradation of mining and logging or the 
economic dependency and cultural subjugation of other forms of 
capital investment, such as large-scale tourist businesses. 
However, Bayliss-Smith's theoretical approach is questioned by 
Paul Sillitoe (Chapter 11), who contends that the whole notion of land 
as productive capital derives from Western assumptions about property 
relations which are not shared by Pacific Islands societies. In contrast 
to the economic motivations of capitalist society dealt with by Western 
economic theories, Sillitoe sees Pacific Islands local economies as 
maximising social and political rather than material values. Land is 
valued as the basis of community and identity, beyond its productive 
utility for subsistence or exchange, and this tends to diffuse rather than 
concentrate economic and political power. The kind of land tenure 
which this entails, being fluid and inclusive, is commonly seen as an 
impediment to Western policies for capital investment, which are based 
on more individualistic and exclusive forms of resource management. 
In drawing attention to these essential characteristics of Pacific Islands 
land tenure, Sillitoe warns that proposals to improve land as 
productive capital should consider carefully their consequences for 
Pacific Islands social and cultural systems. The traditional 
relationships between people and their land which he describes are an 
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integral part of these systems, which underpin the successes of the 
community forestry and fisheries developments as well as the frus­
trations experienced by the mining industry. 
Such debates over the interpretation of Pacific Islands cultures and 
the social as well as environmental impacts of development lend 
support to the case for bottom up initiatives sensitive to local circum­
stances. But as Hugh Govan argues (Chapter 12), attempts by develop­
ment professionals to build on local experience and institutions may 
still suffer the paternalism of top-down approaches if they do not 
enable local people to participate fully in the planning and imple­
mentation of development projects. Through further case studies of 
community-based development projects which complement those in the 
forestry and fisheries chapters, he emphasises that community 
participation can not only enable development to benefit from local 
knowledge, but also empower the community itself to take control of its 
own future. This may require a cultural shift towards increased local 
awareness of the possibilities and problems of participation in develop­
ment processes, as promoted by some of the indigenous NGOs which 
are putting into practice insights deriving from the 'Pacific Way' 
approach. It also requires that external agents of development, national 
or international, however vital their role, be prepared to relinquish 
control of the process to local people. 
But 'bottom-up' development cannot simply replace the top-down 
approach, and community development policies benefit from, or even 
depend on, the support of government agencies, which have to be 
persuaded of the benefits to national as well as local interests. Peter 
Bums' discussion of tourism (Chapter 13) illustrates this point in an 
exploration of the kind of alternatives open to development planners at 
the national level. He contrasts the conventional economic approach to 
planning the development of tourism as an industry, from which 
Pacific Islands peoples may benefit, with a more holistic approach 
which considers the contribution tourism can make to the development 
of Pacific Islands countries, taking account of the social and environ­
mental costs. Bums focuses on the possible mitigation of these costs by 
eco-tourism, through which visitors aspire to experience and support 
the way of life and environments of local people. This aspiration has its 
own contradictions and attempts to realise it has costs as well as 
benefits for Pacific Islands economies at local and national levels. Yet 
_eco-tourism can be used to promote environmentally sustainable 
development of direct benefit to local communities, with the greatest 
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potential for them to control their own part in this increasingly 
important economic sector. 
The essential role of government planning is demonstrated again in 
John Cameron's discussion (Chapter 14) of the nutritional problems 
associated with increasing reliance on imported foods and declining 
local food production in the Pacific Islands. This is a problem 
especially for some smaller islands of Micronesia and Polynesia, but 
also for the growing urban populations of larger Melanesian countries. 
A reduction in food imports seems desirable for economic as well as 
nutritional reasons, if complemented by policies to promote local food 
production, and Cameron goes on to consider the public policy 
implications. While recognising the need to involve local communities 
and encourage subsistence production, he shows the necessity for 
government institutions to take a holistic planning approach which 
recognises that nutrition is affected by policy on matters such as 
agriculture, fishing and the national commercial economy. 
While Pacific Islands governments still need persuading of 
Cameron's holistic approach, Andrea Tuisovuna (Chapter 15) argues it 
is open to criticism in its tum, for overlooking persistent cultural 
patterns which can have unfortunate effects on the way Pacific Islands 
peoples respond to imported foods and dietary practices. Tuisovuna 
calls particularly for improved health education to translate what are 
essentially Western messages about imported health problems into 
local language and culture. 
For all the environmental and development issues affecting the 
Pacific Islands which demand local responses to global pressures, one 
process which seems least amenable to local control is the effect of 
climate change. Tom Spencer (Chapter 16) examines recent scientific 
assessments of this problem, particularly in relation to rising sea-levels 
and the ability of coral reefs to keep up with them; issues of crucial 
importance for the future of the islands, especially countries of low­
lying atolls. But Spencer suggests that local factors can also be 
significant in charting the future of reefs, when global changes act upon 
corals which have been 'pre-stressed' by local human activities. Apart 
from the treatment of the reefs themselves, onshore processes such as 
the run-off from agricultural fertiliser, silting due to deforestation or 
pollution from waste disposal, affect the health of lagoons and reefs 
and the ability of corals to keep pace with changes in sea levels. While 
the range of uncertainty about the extent of likely sea-level rising has 
narrowed in the last ten years, Spencer points to considerable 
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continuing uncertainty about the broader patterns of environmental 
change in the coming century, which he describes as a challenge for 
environmental scientists. 
But, as Christian Clerk points out (Chapter 17), uncertainty is also 
the condition under which policy has been, and will continue to be 
made. Pacific Islanders, who have made minimal contributions to 
greenhouse gases but may face some of the most serious consequences 
of climate change, necessarily view that uncertainty rather differently 
from the industrialised countries they must persuade of the urgency for 
action. Clerk suggests that Spencer 's data, while it dispels some of the 
worst-case scenarios of the imminent inundation of reefs, reinforces the 
need both for effective local coastal zone management plans and for 
continued pressure by Island states and their supporters in interna­
tional fora. A range of international links are significant in mobilising 
support for Pacific Island concerns. 
The book concludes with a review by Akuila Yabaki (Chapter 18) of 
some of the international networks linking the Pacific Islands to one 
another and with metropolitan countries, particularly in Europe, at the 
level of government, churches and NGOs. These parallel the First­
Third World relationships which critiques of conventional 
development policy identify as the cause of many of the Pacific Islands' 
problems, but they also provide opportunities to press for changes and 
suggest alternatives. The kind of Pacific Islands-Europe links described 
in the contributions to this book should help debates over the nature 
and purpose of development in the Pacific Islands to inform the 
Western agencies which still influence the future of this region which 
their own countries once colonised. Yabaki' s hope is that continuing 
regional and global relationships may lend support to Islanders' own 
aspirations towards sustainable development. (An index of Pacific and 
Pacific-Europe organisations is given in the appendix). 
Can development be environmental ly sound? 
Sustainable development is a phrase much used in this book, as it is in 
discussions of the future of the peoples and environments of the world 
in general, and it is so much part of today's language of debate that it 
risks being reduced to the status of catch-phrase. But a certain 
vagueness in the concept can be a strength as well as a weakness, if it 
unites a wide range of interest groups in a common objective without 
stalling on the more difficult task of committing them to a single theory 
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or policy for its achievement. The concept of sustainable development 
arises from a convergence between attempts by reformist environ­
mentalists to make an economic case for conservation and recognition 
by development economists of the need for continuity in the utilisation 
of natural resources. This consensus was reflected in the World 
Conservation Strategy of 1980 and became central to the Brundtland 
Report of 1987, Our Common Future, which saw sustainable 
development as meeting the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their needs. This was presented 
as a global imperative, with a shift of emphasis towards proposing 
solutions to environmental problems by dealing with human ones in a 
sustainable way. While this involved the conventional strategy of 
increased economic growth, Brundtland argued for changes in the 
quality of growth towards forms which were more material and energy 
efficient, and more equitable in their impact. 
However, attempts to compromise between economic and 
environmentalist values can have their limits. These approaches to 
sustainability still do not resolve the contradictions between modern­
ising development based on conventional materialistic values, and 
stable, continuously productive ecosystems which this kind of 
development has historically undermined. In an attempt to clarify the 
issues, green economic thinkers have argued for reconsideration of the 
links between growth and development. For instance Ekins (1993) 
makes a distinction between the production growth of conventional 
economic theory, expressed in terms of increase of GDP and GNP; 
environmental growth which increases the stock of environmental 
resources for consumption and environmental services (such as the 
forests influencing climate); and welfare or utility growth involving a 
whole range of social values. These last include production, em­
ployment, conditions of work, environmental conditions, income 
distribution, leisure time and health and safety. Seen in these terms, 
negative environmental and social feedback from production growth 
may undermine environmental growth while not necessarily 
contributing to welfare growth. He accepts a need for GNP growth in 
the countries of the South, but argues that this must be based on 
environmental regeneration. Development is seen here as qualitative 
improvement closely linked to welfare growth and as the achievement 
of potential, which depends heavily on access to resources-ecological, 
organisational, human and manufactured. 
The idea of welfare-oriented development based on popular 
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participation is now having an influence on mainstream development 
thinking. The Pacific Human Development Report (PHDR; UNDP 1994) 
called for a focus going beyond pure economic growth to consider 
contributions to productive and satisfying lives. It was followed by the 
Suva Declaration on Sustainable Human Development in the Pacific (UNDP / 
South Pacific Forum 1994) in which the representatives of fourteen 
South Pacific Forum states addressed issues of human welfare 
development, including the promotion of participatory and community­
based development. Yet both these documents reveal a tension between 
pressures for production growth to meet welfare and other material 
demands and the commitment to broader welfare issues and 
community empowerment. 
This tension can be seen, for instance, in the PHDR discussion of 
land tenure. Control of land resources (including reef) is central to the 
empowerment of local communities in economic and environmental 
terms and has long been a theme of the development debate in the 
Pacific Islands. The conventional development approach focuses on the 
constraints which traditional systems of land tenure, and the disputes 
which stem from them, place on the maximisation of economic value 
from the resources of the land. The PHDR recognises the integration of 
land tenure with social structure and the effect this has in preventing 
general poverty. It suggests that 
While an increase in the supply of tradeable land would free up one 
important constraint to economic growth, it would at the same time, 
bring with it increasing social costs, including the possibility of the 
emergence of significant poverty as land ownership became more 
concentrated (UNDP 1994:48). 
Nonetheless, the Report goes on to speak of a trade-off between 
faster income growth and more rapid dislocation of traditional social 
systems, this balance to be decided by conscious decisions about 
development aims. Elsewhere, it also expresses concern that lack of 
clearly defined property rights in shared resources can, with the 
emergence of the monetary economy, lead to over-exploitation, 
following the "tragedy of the commons' argument that people will be 
tempted by new cash markets to over-use shared resources on the 
grounds that if they do not, others will. So acknowledgment of the 
welfare role of traditional resource management is presented alongside 
economic and environmental arguments which could be used to 
change it fundamentally. However subtle and studied the Report's 
treatment of these issues, it cannot resolve the tensions between the 
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conflicting interests which these arguments represent. 
The wider setting within which Pacific Islands peoples seek to 
balance their local environmental imperatives and development needs 
is equally complex and fraught with difficulties. For some nations 
levels of debt have significantly increased in the 1990s, while GAIT has 
given way to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in a process of 
increasing trade liberalisation. As privileged market access agreements 
are removed, Pacific Islands countries find themselves increasingly 
competing against experienced larger players in global markets. The 
risk is that increased economic pressure will undermine even the 
limited vision of sustainability which their governments hold. While 
some environmentalists continue to press for revision of WTO rules to 
embrace notions of common environmental standards, the historical 
experience of GAIT has been that the rules of international trade act 
against national measures to distinguish between goods with differing 
environmental impacts of production. 
Given the lack of agreed environmental standards and global 
disparities in economic power, it is not surprising that Third World 
states have sometimes challenged bans and regulations on imports of 
'environmentally less friendly' produce under GAIT rules, presenting 
them as unfair restrictions on their export trade. This reaction is a way 
of prioritising immediate national economic and political interests, but 
it may also reflect deeper concerns over the direction being taken by the 
politics of environmental protection. It is not surprising if exhortations 
to conserve environments for the future are greeted with accusations of 
'green imperialism' when poorer countries are expected to bear costs 
which high-consuming wealthy countries have managed to avoid or 
defer in the course of their own development. Being told to 'do as I say, 
not as I've done' on environmental matters tends to rankle with Third 
World peoples and governments. At the same time, the more insistent 
and agreeable messages of increased consumption in pursuit of exotic 
lifestyles which reach them through so many other channels are 
received less critically. The Pacific Islands cannot escape the 
blandishments and pressures of a global market that thrives on the 
continual escalation of material aspirations. 
On the other hand, the small scale of many Pacific Islands societies 
and their traditions of communal resource control do seem to offer 
opportunities for alternative kinds of development, where 
sustainability derives from bottom-up processes under the control of 
local communities. As many of the contributors to this book argue, this 
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requires building on local culture and experience, working through 
existing social institutions and ensuring local participation by shifting 
control of development policy and process from governments and 
external development agencies to the people who have to live with the 
consequences. This approach encourages attempts to integrate theory 
with practice in recognition of moral responsibilities to the objects of 
research and policy at the local level. It is close to the position argued 
by Edwards as offering one positive route forward from the .(impasse' in 
development theory described by Schuurman (Edwards 1993, 
Schuurman 1993) . Attention is focussed on the diversity of local and 
regional circumstances and the historical and cultural peculiarities of 
social institutions, from households to local communities and state 
polities. While this may not offer a grand theory, it has a power which 
rests on real experience. 
Pursuing 1mttom-up' development does not mean idealising the 
wisdom or values of Pacific Islands societies, some of which had 
developed in environmentally-damaging ways long before they 
experienced the additional pressures of colonialism and world markets 
which underpin many of their present problems. Nor does it mean 
neglecting the essential role of government and international 
institutions in supporting and coordinating development processes. 
But at both levels, Pacific Islanders are well aware of the contradictions 
and trade-offs between short-term material benefits and long-term 
assurance of subsistence and social integrity, even if they do not always 
find it easy to choose between them. So it is important that their choices 
be well-informed, and this is where the kind of debates raised in this 
book may make a useful contribution. The flow of information needs to 
involve a broader public than just the government and financial 
institutions which make so many crucial development decisions. 
Pacific Islands peoples have a variety of links through which 
experience can be exchanged across the world to promote informed 
discussion on environmental and development issues, by way of trade 
and aid, churches and missions, NGOs and campaigning organi­
sations, academic research and tourism. This flow of information may 
be slow to influence the agenda for .(top down' decisions affecting local 
communities on a grand scale, made by national and international 
organisations of government, finance and commerce. But Pacific 
Islands societies, with their strong and continuing traditions of 
communal resource management and local autonomy, do suggest 
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alternatives for the sustainable management of their own human 
environments, with lessons also for those regions of the world which 
have presumed to bring development to the Pacific Islands. 
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Harmonising resources for 
sustainable economic development 
in the Pacific Islands context 
Sitiveni  Halapua 
Reframing the approach to economic development 
This paper is based on the view that the conventional development 
model, followed by governments in our shared Pacific Islands region, is 
fundamentally inadequate for addressing the broad social, economic, 
environmental, political, and cultural development needs confronting 
the Pacific Islands today (see Halapua 1993). Hence the present 
approach to development in the Pacific Islands requires a fundamental 
reframing and redirection. 
It will be demonstrated that the kind of framework needed to 
provide insights and meet the needs of the Pacific policymakers must be 
able to harmonise the interactions of all the major forces of development 
within the Pacific Island countries and between them and their 
overseas partners. 
Economic development as a sustai nable process 
In our framework, development is defined as the process of guided 
change directed toward preferred goals. Today the preferred goals of 
development vary from country to country depending on the historical, 
social, economic, and political circumstances in each country. One of 
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the most common preferred goals, as expressed by governments in the 
region, is the desire to foster a steady expansion in the supply, as well 
as improvement in the distribution, of goods and services. At the same 
time the cultural values and some of the traditional institutions, in 
addition to the quality of population, environment, and natural 
resources, must be maintained over time. 
These are not, of course, the only preferred goals of development in 
Pacific Island countries. Some governments emphasise self-sufficiency 
in the provision of basic goods and services. Many governments seek to 
achieve some form of self-determination with respect to the issue of 
control over the use of the resources available to them. A great many 
Pacific Islanders feel that there is a need to balance the preference for 
material goods and services with our spiritual and cultural values. 
An integral part of the means of pursuing the preferred goals of 
development consists of the processes of government policy, market 
rules and arrangements, and cultural principles that determine the 
direction of quantity, quality, and distribution of resources available to 
the people. More importantly, the term 'sustainable' conveys the need 
for stability and continuity in each process. And the guided change or 
the 'guidance' is provided jointly by the government policy, the market 
forces, and the cultural values and beliefs of each society. 
The value-types of resources 
The types of resources that support the mode of life of a people 
encompass more than natural physical resources and man-made tools 
(capital). Each society determines what is important (value) for its way 
of life. 
In this connection, resources are defined as those quantities and 
qualities that people value or consider to be important in association 
with their labour, in the pursuit of their preferred way of life. Thus a 
person values not only his or her work and knowledge but also its 
product and the purpose it serves. In addition, the person has the right 
to continue to value them. 
In the literature of political economy, the value of a resource refers to 
its capacity to satisfy a desire or serve a purpose. It stresses the use­
value of a resource. In this sense, historical myth or knowledge itself is 
but one type of value that serves the imagination or political will of a 
community of people. Based on the modem principle of government by 
consent, for example, the leading western scholars of the social-contract 
Harmonising reso u rces for sustainable economic development I 23 
theory stressed the importance of government with limited power and 
authority to serve a purpose, namely, the protection of the rights of 
individuals, especially their property rights. Thus the government is 
granted as much power as the people are willing to give up in exchange 
for guaranteed property rights and for protection of their lives. This 
western notion of a government has come to be conceived as the will of 
the people. 
The government made the laws that define the property rights of 
individuals. The government process of defining and enforcing 
property rights and rules of exchange uses resources (labour, skills, 
knowledge, materials, tools, beliefs, etc.), and this is crucial for the 
existence of a market economy. It is affected and impacts upon, the 
existence and interactions of markets and cultural beliefs. 
Therefore resources in the context of a Pacific society include the 
physical environment, government power and authority, man-made 
capital, skills, knowledge, and cultural beliefs. This conceptualisation 
of resources stresses the environmental, governmental, technological, 
and cultural values that serve the general well-being and promote the 
continuity of the preferred way of life of a Pacific Island society. But 
despite the diversities in emphasis in all these value-types in the Pacific 
Island countries, there is still an underlying identity that they have in 
common: people are obliged to express the value they give to a resource 
by conferring the rights to promote the continuity of that resource. For 
example, the culture of a community expresses the value it attaches to 
land by defining the rights that control the continuity in the use of land. 
From the broad definition of value-types of resources, we identify 
seven dimensions of sustainable economic development in the Pacific 
Islands 
economic growth 
population 
environment 
technology 
culture 
government 
international relations. 
Each of these dimensions reflects a certain type of value and serves 
an obligation that constitutes a compelling force for the common action 
of a society. Therefore each dimension gives policymakers a signpost as 
to where the country is going-the direction of sustainable 
development. 
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The dual character of the resou rces 
Two forces are present in all value-types of resources in all situations 
the rights to use the resources or the services that flow from 
them to satisfy a desire or serve a purpose 
the obligations that serve as the compelling (rallying) forces 
for common action to promote continuity of the resources. 
The former leads to the accumulative deterioration both in the quantity 
and quality of the resources. But the latter results in the productive 
reinvestment and creative preservation of the resources. For example, 
the rights to use a tuna resource to serve a commercial pur-pose of 
accumulation of monetary profits can result in the depletion of that 
resource over time. But reinvestment in the productive control over the 
rate of exploitation preserves the value of continuity of the resource. 
The challenge of sustainable economic development in the Pacific 
Islands can be resolved and the process can be understood only by 
recognising that both the rights to use and the obligations to the 
continuity of resources are inherently inseparable. They are two sides of 
the same coin. Once the dual character of the value-types of resources 
and the interaction of these forces are understood and appreciated, the 
need for reframing our approach to economic development in the 
Pacific Island countries is obvious. 
Interactions of d i mensions of sustai nable development 
An analytical framework is needed for investigating the interaction of 
the value-types of resources in the process of economic development. 
Here, the critical issue is the value in continuity of the resources that 
support the direction of change in the way of life from the present 
generation to the future generation. Practical reasoning is central to our 
framework of analysis of the seven dimensions of sustainable 
development. Specifically, it does not allow the evaluation of the 
interaction of obligations to the value in continuity of the resources. 
The continuity in economic production is conditioned by the 
interaction of the forces of economic growth, population, environment, 
technology, government and international relations. Thus we cannot 
isolate the evaluation of the rights of the factors of production from the 
evaluation of the obligations to the value of continuity of those factors. 
For example, the effect of market forces on the supply of and demand for 
labour resources cannot be clearly separated from the evaluation of the 
effect of cultural values. 
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It is the task of government policy for sustainable economic 
development to effect two sets of adjustments 
the adjustment between income (or domestic savings) and 
expenditure (or total investment), and 
the adjustment between obligations to the value of continuity 
of the resources needed for development. 
The kind of adjustment associated with the first set is the familiar 
conventional approach to economic development in the Pacific Islands. 
This conventional approach, which is adopted by the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
focuses on the adjustment between aggregate income and expenditures 
in the economy. It is sometimes known as the 'resource gap' approach. 
Therefore it is the typical task of recommended economic policy to 
adjust the difference ('the gap') between planned investment 
requirements and savings. 
There are three basic conventional methods or main sources of 
financing such 'gaps' known as deficits. First, there are additional 
resources obtained by external borrowing. Second, there are additional 
resources provided by the inflows of foreign capital or investment. In 
addition, the supporting policy measures include control of price 
inflation, government expenditure and direct subsidy, tariff and non­
tariff protection, taxation, interest rate settings, and the foreign 
exchange rate. 
All these policy measures tend to concentrate on the issue of 
redistribution of rights--especially the exchange of rights-to use 
resources. In fact, they do not address the question of obligation to the 
value of continuity of resources, which is essential to sustainable 
development in the islands. 
Take tourism development for example. A reduction in or removal of 
the interest rate on loans for and income taxes on tourist facilities will 
redistribute the rights to use resources from the financial intermediaries 
(hence, the owners of savings held by financial institutions) and 
government to the private owners of such investment projects. But this 
policy in itself is not adequate to address the obligation to the value of 
continuity of resources such as the quality of the physical environment 
and the traditional culture upon which the growth of the tourism 
industry is also dependent. 
Therefore it is prudent for policymakers to take stock of not only the 
exchange of rights to use resources but also the obligations to the value 
of continuity of the resources. In order for economic development to be 
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sustainable in the context of the Pacific Islands, the two sets of 
adjustments, stated above, must be combined and integrated in the 
planning, implementation, and evaluation process of government 
policy. This integrated approach needs the interactive exchange 
framework outlined above as its analytical tool. 
Harmon ising the development p rocesses 
Harmonisation in the context of our framework refers to the process of 
balancing the rights to use and the obligations to the continuity of the 
value-types of resources. It is conceived as an interactive exchange 
process in which the input is the preference for value-types of re­
sources. The process itself is the means through which the differences 
in the value-types of resources are combined by practical reasoning into 
a decision or a policy. Therefore, the attention of policymakers should 
be drawn to the interactive process of the value-types of resources itself 
rather than to some planning exercise in setting and evaluating 
targeted goals-such as the planned rate of investment-of economic 
development. 
As the Nobel Prize Winner James Buchanan once put it: 'How does 
one improve a market? One does so by facilitating the exchange 
process, by reorganising the rules of trade, contract, or agreement. One 
does not improve or reform a market-like exchange process by an 
arbitrary rearrangement of final outcomes.' 
The practical reason for balancing the differences in the value-types 
of resources is performed by individuals of the society via 
the government process, which constitutes a procedure for 
defining and enforcing rules of exchange and property rights 
the market process, which consists of an arrangement 
whereby the rights to use resources are voluntarily exchanged 
among individuals, government, and business firms 
the cultural process, which defines the broad principles and 
set of rules by which kinship, inter-tribal, clan, and spiritual 
relationships with respect to the rights to use and exchange 
resources are expressed and reciprocated. 
Clearly, these fundamental processes are not necessarily compatible 
in every Pacific Island country. The lack of willingness or inability to 
resolve the form of incompatibility in the interaction of these funda­
mental processes can generate a destructive or negative effect on the 
sustainable use of resources for economic development. Therefore a 
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mechanism is needed for the interactive process of resource 
management designed to minimise if not avoid destructive or negative 
deterioration in the rights and obligations to use resources in the Pacific 
Islands context. 
An i nstitutional mechanism for resources management: 
The National I nteractive Development Counci l  (NIDC) 
The NIDC is conceived of as the institutional mechanism through 
which the diverging government, market, and cultural processes are 
amalgamated into the policy of the interactive process of resource 
management. It offers a 'multidimensional window' for managing the 
value-types of resources for sustainable economic development in the 
Pacific Islands. 
The NIDC models the approach to managing resources for 
sustainable development ultimately on the exchange paradigm-the 
exchange of an analytical information service to minimise if not prevent 
negative conflict in the rights to use and the obligations to continuity of 
the value-types of resources in specified ways. There are equity, 
technical and economic efficiency arguments for the role of the NIDC in 
the management of principles and rules of using resources to serve a 
purpose, namely, economic development in a sustainable way. 
There are three principal functions of the NIDC 
to provide the analytical information service needed by 
policymakers in the planning and formulation of policy and 
strategy 
to promote complementarity in the implementation of policies 
through the exchange of analytical information 
to evaluate the responsiveness of policies in relation to the 
preferred goals. 
In fact, the interactive framework of the seven dimensions of 
sustainable development provides the analytical tool for the NIDC. In 
addressing the practical issues of economic development, the 
government can rely on the NIDC to ensure that the processes of 
planning, implementation, and evaluation of the efficiency of projects 
are not divorced from the processes pertaining to the continuity of the 
flow of resources. Thus the NIDC plays the dual role of providing the 
analytical information service to the policymakers and serving as the 
institutional catalyst for implementing the economic development 
policy in a unifying and sustainable way. 
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Sustainability and the limitations of 
government: a response to Halapua 
John Cameron 
There have been a number of differing contributions to the development 
discourse on the specific potentials and problems of the less populated 
islands of the South Pacific. Many of the islands came relatively late 
and unevenly to the global economy and polity and its associated 
cultural influences. Most also gained an element of greater autonomy 
after 1970 through varying processes of de-colonisation (Cameron 
1991) .  The implications of this experience for development thinking 
have been complex. The global competition between Marxism-Leninism 
and Liberal-Individualism touched the islands' intellectuals but did 
not take root in popular consciousness. Both trade unionised workers' 
and indigenous enterprising capitalists' interests tended to be 
ideologically and politically marginalised by more populist ideas 
claiming legitimacy on the grounds of representing 'tradition' 
(Tupouniua et al. 1980) . 
Such 'Pacific Way' thinking in its various local formations in the 
early 1980s was concerned with ecological sustainability as an aspect 
of people's whole quality of life well before such thinking became 
fashionable in the West. Ecological sustainability has had a significant 
place on the intellectual agenda of the University of the South Pacific 
(Thaman 1983) and found sympathetic resonances in regional bodies, 
some government ministries and non-governmental organisations, as 
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well as influencing some external donor and lending programs. But the 
driving forces of the 1980s and 1990s in the Pacific Islands have not 
been these agencies. Trans-national economic interests, usually 
operating through trans-national corporations in the extractive and 
tourism sectors supported by the international financial institutions 
(global and regional) have set the pace and values of ' development' in 
the Pacific Islands, as elsewhere (Cameron 1993). The unhealthy 
MIRAB (Migration, Remittances, Aid and Bureaucracy: Bertram and 
Watters 1985) pattern of change identified for the smaller Polynesian 
islands might now be generalised for the whole Pacific Islands region 
to a MERAB pattern, where the 'E' stands for Extraction of natural 
resources. 
Sitiveni Halapua has been a leading intellectual throughout this 
period of generally accelerating ecological degradation and rather 
piecemeal local resistance. His paper aspires to recover and more 
rigorously develop many of the sustainability ideas that were 
immanent in the earlier Pacific Way literature. But to those ideas he 
adds, even prioritises, the need for a steady expansion of productive 
activity. There is merit in this additional 'realism' -in accepting 
widespread aspirations to higher consumption levels the people of the 
Pacific Islands are choosing through their own day-to-day decisions 
against being a nature reserve or anthropological zoo. Much more 
recognisable from a Pacific Way perspective is the stress on social 
harmony and the possibility of identifying preferred goals appropriate 
to each society. While the precise pattern of goals will differ, Halapua is 
confident that consensus can be achieved on changing the distribution 
of consumption opportunities and sustaining quality in human and 
ecological resources, drawing significantly on cultural values and 
institutions with origins in pre-European contact history, especially on 
those relating to the control and use of land (including reef) . 
But the model of the underlying policy process to guide 
development strategy is very recognisable to people schooled in Euro­
pean Enlightenment culture, especially that strand which comes from 
Immanuel Kant rather than Adam Smith. Formal government has a 
central role in determining the limits of market exchange as a deter­
minant of values in the context of local cultural rights and obligations 
and has sovereignty in these decisions with respect to external cultural 
values. More by implication than explication, Halapua appears to be 
arguing that the burden of proof lies on government to demonstrate 
market forces are damaging to sustainability rather than on advocates 
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of market forces to demonstrate positive gains in terms of sustainability. 
In the spirit of practical reason, Halapua models sustainability as 
rights and obligations into seven dimensions of socioeconomic change. 
Each dimension involves claims and rights to resource use, claims and 
rights to income from resource use, and obligations to ensure continu­
ity. The dimensions are not prioritised explicitly, but economic growth 
is placed at the head of the crucial, central table. Thus this model might 
be seen as encouraging maximum economic growth subject to the 
constraints of continuity in the other dimensions-not the most 
imaginative sustainable development strategy. 
Certainly the seven dimensions are usefully exhaustive in coverage 
and take the development debate beyond economistic development 
planning and narrowly defined economic globalising liberalisation. 
Also introducing the notion of obligations (presumably to future 
generations) is very much in tune with more radical thinking on human 
development looking towards the new millennium (O'Neil 1986). But 
the reader is left wondering at the actions in practice of so many 
governments in the Pacific Islands, exercising as much formal 
sovereignty as the global system permits any government today with 
economic room to manoeuvre in terms of external debt. Most govern­
ments are presiding over policy regimes which have not accepted the 
obligation to guarantee ecological continuity or, arguably, any other of 
the obligations to continuity that Halapua identifies (Shiva 1989). Even 
continuity of production as the cornerstone to economic growth has not 
been guaranteed under regimes giving rights to natural resource 
extraction with little or no effective obligation to replenishment of the 
degraded ecology. 
Given that Halapua' s development ethics rest on the rational 
imperatives of a representative state, he is naturally led to conclude that 
there must be an institutional lacuna in the machinery and representa­
tiveness of government, requiring an additional institution to augment 
the overall rationality and accountability of decision-making. The 
National Interactive Development Council is meant to fulfil this role. 
But what if environmental degradation is not a matter of a lacuna in 
government rationality, hindering action in the interests of present and 
future local, multi-dimensional sustainability? What if most govern­
ment decisions are recognised as the outcome of a complex interplay of 
powerful internal and external interests calculating economic gain to 
themselves? Certainly the latter position is more consistent with the 
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facts as we know them fifteen years after ideas on a sustainable Pacific 
Way emerged around 1980. 
Halapua' s comprehensive framework is valuable for monitoring 
human and ecological development processes. It also has a special 
relevance to the Pacific Islands as a region, given its peculiar history 
and current potential and constraints. But experience suggests that 
augmenting existing government machinery is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for sustaining, recovering and enhancing either the ecological 
or the human quality of existence (Lyotard 1991). Much wider questions 
of governance cannot be avoided. 
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Who controls development in the 
Pacific? 
Sul iana Siwatibau 
I wish to begin with the word 'development'. Who defines what 
development is? Since the independent states of the Pacific gained 
political sovereignty, development has been the key process driving 
each government. Each of them produced regular development plans 
that set out the goals towards which they strive and the means for 
achieving these. All of them expressed high ideals for improvement in 
the standard of living and increased prosperity for their peoples and 
countries. However the degree to which these good intentions have 
materialised has been very different for different people, with an 
increasing majority missing out. 
I think that one of the many reasons that so many people miss out is 
because they had no say in defining development in the first place. In 
most of our countries, development is defined for us by our politicians 
on the advice of development planners and those who in tum advise 
them from the international development network. The United Nations 
agencies, the World Bank, and other official technical assistance 
services all contribute to defining for us how best we could or should 
develop. They measure development largely in economic terms, by 
indicators of GDP and GNP. They are primarily concerned with 
creating national wealth. The idea is to increase the national cake so 
that everyone can have a piece. I think this is logical, but unfortunately 
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it has some inherent weaknesses. Contributions to GDP do not take into 
account whether the activity is or is not sustainable and unutilised 
natural wealth is not valued. Positive and negative impacts on human 
wellbeing are undifferentiated. There is no accompanying indicator of 
the distribution of the national cake. Hence, increasing GDP or GNP 
often masks the fact that economic development has been highjacked 
for the benefit of a few, who have more than their fair share of this cake. 
Another influential group in defining development is the private 
business sector. They define development largely in terms of investment 
opportunities and profits made. To them development means setting up 
sufficient infrastructure and a favourable legal and financial environ­
ment for private sector investment where maximum profits can be 
made. This is also commendable, but unfortunately, the system is often 
exploited by more powerful international commercial concerns to the 
detriment of small-scale local entrepreneurs. 
The third large group whose definition of development we need to 
consider is the populace themselves. I cannot claim to represent the 
perception of development held by the majority of Pacific Islanders, but 
I do believe that given the chance, they would define development quite 
differently from our government planners and large-scale commercial 
interests. I have been fortunate to work closely with a few communities 
to facilitate community development planning. During this exercise, of 
course, community priorities for development have been set, and in all 
cases they have been ide�tified by the communities themselves as 
having to do with social development issues such as water supply, 
community cooperation, or women's workloads. Economic develop­
ment in terms of improved cash income has not been at the forefront of 
concerns and seems to be perceived only as a means to achieving the 
necessary social gains, not an end in itself. This probably explains why 
many rural Pacific Islanders will only work for cash as and when they 
need it, which makes it difficult to expect regular supplies of produce 
from individual rural producers. 
The concept of development I think most communities would choose 
is what several NGOs working at community level are now promoting. 
It involves appropriate technology, small-scale entrepreneurial develop­
ment and sustainable utilisation of resources. It supports and enhances 
life at the subsistence level for the majority of our peoples. But the 
prevailing concept of development of our governments, and the large­
scale commercial concerns that invest in our countries, is that natural 
resources are there to be harvested as soon as possible to bring in 
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wealth to the government and to attract large overseas investors. Large­
scale logging, commercial fishing contracts, and large-scale mining 
activities, are encouraged in the name of development. In the meantime, 
the resource owners have lost the basis of their subsistence livelihoods 
and any potential for cash income in the long term is diminished with 
the loss of their forests, soils and fisheries. With royalties, compensa­
tions and lease monies they have become dependent on cash income 
that they do not have to work for. They lose their ability to live off the 
land and be self sufficient. They will most likely end up migrating to 
urban centres to find paid employment. There they will join the 
swelling unemployed inhabiting mushrooming squatter settlements. 
Unfortunately the perception of development that quite a few aid 
agencies hold is that to give money to people is to develop them. This is 
a real temptation regularly faced by those who work closely with 
communities. It is so easy to give away money or goods and create a 
cargo cult mentality, but as everyone knows, this is like giving a man 
fish instead of teaching him how to catch fish and giving him a line 
and hook. 
Just as definitions of development are contributed to by several 
different interest groups, so is the control of development shared 
amongst several parties. However, the influence of some far outweigh 
that of others in a way that skews the distribution of benefits of 
development. I shall now itemise the major parties that control 
development in the Pacific, and briefly explain the roles they play. 
Development aid agencies 
While our government development planners write and formulate our 
development plans, they are under great pressure from aid agencies to 
utilise aid monies annually proffered to their governments. Several 
times I have gone around the Pacific talking both to planners and to aid 
agencies and found that the performance of planning offices is often 
measured by the degree and speed with which they use up aid monies. 
Therefore despite the intention for long-term self sufficiency in their 
plans, they find themselves planning and coordinating management of 
short-term projects that satisfy aid agencies' conditions rather than 
follow their planned priorities. 
Aid has been a mixed blessing for the Pacific. Our heavy depen­
dence on aid brings to question the degree of control we have on the 
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direction of our development. There are several reasons for this. As a 
region we receive the highest aid per person in the world. Our cur­
rencies generally remain artificially buoyant because of heavy inflows 
of aid monies in foreign currencies. The public sector of our countries 
dominate our economies and the bulk of our governments' development 
expenditures are funded through aid. In most of our countries, the 
public sector is by far the greatest employer. Government investments 
also make up the bulk of our national investments. In fact the ratios of 
national investments in our countries are higher than the average 
observed for all developing countries. 
Normally, one would expect favourable economic growth rates with 
such high investment ratios, but this expectation has not materialised 
in the Pacific. The World Bank referred to this in its 1992 report as the 
'Pacific paradox'. The explanation offered by some experts is that we 
are small, resource poor, and far away from major world markets, but 
according to other experts this is not entirely valid. The Caribbean, 
Mauritius, and the Maldives, are also small and resource poor and 
Mauritius is additionally also far away from major world markets. Yet 
all of them have performed much better than the Pacific Island coun­
tries with relatively lower aid inflows. Part of the reason for our 
countries' poor performance is the inefficient use of aid funds. 
It is not unreasonable to question the possible role of high aid 
inflows in deterring development in the Pacific. The differing demands 
and conditions of the numerous aid agencies that service our small 
countries often take up a disproportionately large segment of our 
politicians' and officials' time and attention. This distracts them from 
examining in a more holistic way the direction and progress of the 
countries' overall development and therefore takes the control of that 
direction out of their hands. I will take a few examples for illustration. 
French Polynesia receives the highest aid per capita in the Pacific. 
Papeete, the capital looks highly prosperous compared to other Pacific 
cities. People throughout the group live well and their standard of 
housing, public services and physical infrastructure is high by Pacific 
standards. However, all this is dependent on a heavy French military 
presence and the use of the country for nuclear bomb tests. The native 
maohis who used to be so productive before, now produce at much 
reduced levels for export. If the military moves out, their economy is 
threatened with collapse, they are so dependent on military 
expenditure. The control the maohis have of their own development 
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under such a situation is obviously very small. This is manifest even in 
simple everyday life issues. I talked to some women on an island 
outside of Tahiti, the main island of the group. They complained of 
suspected pollution of their lagoon, the only source of daily protein for 
their families. The most common shellfish they collect used to be a nice 
pink, now it is grey. The authorities come and take samples of water 
regularly but never tell them anything. I took a small sample of the 
shellfish for analysis and it showed an extremely high level of lead 
content. The shellfish they eat every day is not fit for human consump­
tion but, being uninformed, they had no knowledge of the nature of the 
danger to which they were exposing their families. When informed, 
they have little outlet for voicing concerns or influencing the kind of 
development activities that take place on their island. This is only a 
single story out of so many. The people seem helpless to take control. 
The other illustration is a more general one about the influence of 
development aid on the main direction of development in our countries. 
The main investor in the majority of our countries is the public sector, 
which receives grants from donors and loans from international 
banking concerns such as the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank. Understandably, these banks will only consider large-scale 
projects, which are easier and more economical to administer than a 
whole series of small projects. This focuses public sector investments on 
things like large international airports, main highways, major ports, 
large power generation plants, big showy buildings and so on. While 
these are useful, they tend to serve more the needs of urban dwellers 
and the economically better off. Furthermore they divert attention from 
small-scale infrastructure projects that would more usefully serve the 
majority of the people and local communities. Women's income­
generating projects, for example, only need credits of a few hundred 
dollars to make so much difference to the lives of ordinary families. 
Building Irish crossings, small boat landings, rural roads, and even 
outer island air strips take much less money, yet make so much 
difference to meeting the development needs of the majority of our 
peoples. Such small projects are usually picked up by minor donors, 
often on an ad hoe basis . Because of the nature of the conditions of 
assistance from major development agencies, our countries' develop­
ment efforts tend to favour large-scale rather than small-scale projects, 
tend to favour urban dwellers rather than rural communities, and tend 
to service those who already have more rather than those who do not 
yet have enough. 
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Private sector investors 
Most Pacific countries, following advice from international technical 
assistance agencies, are encouraging greater private sector investment 
and development. This is generally good advice as it would reduce the 
heavy reliance on the public sector. Unfortunately, instead of develop­
ing an indigenous private sector, this has encouraged the inflow of 
foreign investors who are increasingly taking control of our countries' 
development. 
One way they do so is through corruption, which is spreading and 
increasingly becoming blatant in many of our countries. Some of our 
most influential politicians thrive on bribes and occasionally 
government officials have succumbed to bribery too. Increasingly, our 
politicians vote in cabinet and in parliament according to the interests 
of those who line their pockets. The priorities of our countries and the 
urgent needs of our peoples are brushed aside as the individual greed 
of some of our politicians take control of their judgements. This is a 
phenomena that is worldwide but in the Pacific, where the countries 
are so small, the influence of one or two corrupt individuals has much 
more impact on the development of a country than it would in a larger 
country. Much needed development funds are siphoned away into the 
overseas bank accounts of private sector investors and into the pockets 
of a few corrupt politicians. 
I wish to illustrate with a typical example from one of our countries, 
Solomon Islands, which has a substantial resource of tropical 
hardwood timbers. It received assistance from a metropolitan donor 
country for an inventory of its timber resources and advice on how to 
log it sustainably. A foreign-controlled timber company came along, 
talked to senior politicians and received extensive concessions to log at 
rates that would deplete the resources in ten years. The government 
wanted money quickly to fund its widening budget deficits. Taxes from 
the export of logs would provide needed funds, while export receipts 
would supplement the country's rapidly dwindling foreign exchange 
reserves. On paper the company sold timber at a low price to a 
subsidiary company in Hong Kong where company taxes are low, but 
the logs were shipped directly to Ja pan. The Japanese buyer paid a high 
price for each log to the Hong Kong subsidiary company and, with low 
taxes, the Hong Kong company makes a large profit. The logging 
company in Solomon Islands was heavily engaged in transfer pricing 
and was shifting profits out of the country. Solomon Islands was losing 
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out on tax revenue, on foreign exchange receipts, and on royalties to 
landowners. 
When the government of Solomon Islands changed, tax on logs was 
substantially increased to ensure a fairer return to the country and 
reduce logging rates to sustainable levels. But the company stopped 
exporting logs to avoid paying the increased taxes and the government 
had to give in as it was heavily dependent for revenue and foreign 
exchange receipts on the logging industry. Efforts of the new govern­
ment to clean up corruption and get a fairer price for the country's 
resources evidently worked against it. Its life was short and the old 
party regained control. The company representative is boasting that he 
brought the old party back to power because its ministers can be 
controlled to do as the company wishes. 
Undue influence on our decision-makers does not only come from 
outside investors. As elsewhere, local business concerns have their own 
means of influencing our legislators. Free drinks or meals, Christmas 
gifts, supplies of building materials, grants of pieces of land or outright 
payments of sums of money under the table, are some of the common 
ways used to influence the policies, programs and priorities of our 
countries' development. Those who have no money or gifts to offer get 
forgotten. Instead they are given crumbs in return for their votes at 
election time. 
O u r  'brown masters' 
When we gained independence, our colonial white masters were of 
course replaced with our own people. These are our 'brown masters' .  
I borrow this term from Peter Ryan who used it to describe the 
unfortunate and blatant exploitation by some Papua New Guinea 
leaders, both of their own people and of their government system, to 
further their own ends. 
The PNG parliament has 109 members, of whom more than ninety 
are, or recently were, under investigation for corruption. Bribery and 
speculation are now state-sanctioned and institutionalised by the 
outrageous Electoral Development Fund (or 'slush fund'), whereby 
annually an aggregate K32 million is made available to members to 
dispense more or less at will. This equals about 10 per cent of the aid 
funds supplied each year by the docile Australian taxpayers. 
Mount Kare, high in the desolate mountains of Enga Province, was 
recently an astoundingly rich alluvial goldfield-a PNG version of 
40 I E nvironment and development in the Pacific Islands 
Ballarat or the Klondyke, attracting perhaps 10,000 indigenous pick­
and-shovel miners in a wild stampede. Here, on several visits, I 
watched PNG corruption in naked action. Politicians (including cabinet 
ministers) were active illegal gold-buyers, and swindling the miners 
into the bargain, with rigged scales and unfair prices. They then 
smuggled their illegally bought gold out of the country for sale in 
Singapore, Kuala Lumpur or Australia. This evaded the government's 
modest five per cent tax on alluvial  gold .  Much of it travelled in 
Members' personal suitcases, which customs officers dared not search 
(Ryan 1995:9-17) . 
Papua New Guinea is not exceptional. Fiji was only recently rocked 
by a scandal involving the government guaranteed National Bank of 
Fiji. It lost something between F$80 and F$120 million in bad debts to 
politicians, bank management staff, and their friends, relatives and 
business associates. The bank management approved loans with com­
plete disregard for responsible banking procedures. The National Bank 
is supported by thousands of ordinary people who are small savers 
and depositors in the bank, most of whom live in rural areas where the 
most common banking facility is through the government post office 
and other agencies of the National Bank. Currently the Fiji government 
is wrestling with the problem of stopping the bank from collapsing. In 
Western Samoa, the politicians sacked the Auditor General for doing 
his job and revealing large irregularities in the use of public funds. 
Where our brown masters exploit the system so blatantly, their 
influence is two-fold. First, as is obvious, by diverting public funds to 
their own and their friends' pockets, they rob the populace of finances 
and services intended for their development. Instead, these brown 
masters channel funds for the benefit of a few and create a new small 
elite of wealthy locals. Wealth is in tum used to entrench their position 
of privilege. They influence development policies by paying corrupt 
politicians and thus encourage development that favours the rich and 
widens the gap with the poor. 
The second influence is more insidious and so much more difficult 
to control. This is the impact the brown masters have on the morality 
and morale of those who provide services to the public. When top 
leaders are corrupt, lower officials are less likely to be deterred from 
bribery and corrupt practices. Similarly, the private sector and the 
public increasingly accept bribery as the means of getting services 
when needed. The process, once begun, feeds upon itself and becomes 
very difficult to stop. Again those without the means to influence miss 
out, and find it difficult to control their own development. 
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The way forward 
I think that most of us believe in democracy. This has been popularly 
defined as government of the people, by the people, for the people. 
Development too has to be for the people, by the people. Without 
meaningful participation by the people, development of a country will 
remain partial and highly skewed in terms of the distribution of 
benefits. This requires that democratic structures are in place and that 
democratic processes are respected and functional. 
Our leaders in the Pacific often appeal to culture when democratic 
procedures threaten their positions of privilege. Often they use culture 
to enhance their elevated situation and render them immune to 
questioning. Let me give you an example. There was a person of 
privilege in another of our countries. This person was the sole trustee 
for funds earned from a lucrative business of a landowning unit and 
she misused a substantial amount of the trust money for personal gain. 
The landowning unit took the trustee to court which found that the 
trustee had much to answer for but, although millions of dollars were 
allegedly involved, the matter was effectively glossed over because of 
the traditional role of the trustee in relation to the landowning unit. 
Although development must take place in adaptation to the cultural 
context, abuse of culture must be clearly recognised as such. Democratic 
processes are needed if people are to control their own development. 
Several conditions are necessary for development by the people for 
the people, assuming democratic structures are in place. First, there 
must be an informed populace. The people must be informed of what is 
going on in their countries and they must know what the implications 
are for their lives of decisions made by their politicians. This requires 
that the population must be literate and politically aware, and the 
teaching of functional literacy in this context is very important. NGOs, 
churches, and trade unions, although active in this area, need to 
increase their efforts to increase literacy and raise awareness. The 
media also play an important role in raising people's awareness. 
Leaders of these agencies need to have the courage to speak on policies 
which promote equity, contain the excesses of the powerful, and 
address the needs of the weak in society. 
Second, there must be an empowered populace. While the people 
may be informed, too often many will not exercise their rights for 
various reasons, including culture and lack of confidence. Culture is 
often used as an excuse. For example, women may be barred from 
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important meetings of the community or from standing in political 
elections because it is not accepted culturally. People need to know their 
basic rights and be supported to have the confidence to assert these for 
themselves. Again NGOs and churches have an important role to play 
in this area. 
Often people will gain confidence to speak out only with improved 
status of education and economic activity. What is of concern in the 
Pacific is the swelling numbers of young people leaving the formal 
school system with neither adequate education for employment or 
adequate knowledge and skills to fend for themselves in the subsistence 
sector. Just as the economic systems are marginalising an increasing 
number of people, so our education system is producing too many 
'push outs'. Without the means to understand the implications of 
events on their lives and the opportunity to become economically active 
and useful members of their societies, these people will have little 
chance of sharing control of development in their countries. With our 
predominantly young populations and high population growth rates, 
such a situation is of great concern for the future well being of our 
societies. Traditional structures of discipline are breaking down and 
violence in urban centres is increasing, as more and more young people 
feel frustrated with the status qua. Some form of appropriate com­
munity-based education urgently needs to be developed for the majority 
of our youth who are leaving school early. Again NGOs, churches and 
community groups have worked for years in this area with little if any 
government support. The results are highly inadequate and need to be 
urgently expanded upon. 
Third, there must be a supportive network. The efforts of people at 
local community level to democratise development need the support of 
international networks in order to counter powerful forces against it 
from within their own countries. This is where development NGOs and 
the churches can play such important roles. Several NGOs are now 
working closely with local communities in Melanesian countries to 
help them determine their own development. 
These communities identify and prioritise their own needs, assess 
their own resources and plan how they can utilise and manage those 
resources for sustainable development. Several communities have 
begun sustainable harvesting of their own resources for direct export to 
overseas buyers without going through large multinational companies. 
NGOs have helped in this kind of development. Forest products, both 
timber and non-timber, are being developed this way. Individual local 
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entrepreneurs are establishing themselves despite the lack of 
encouragement from governments. Many of them run small-scale 
family-owned ecotourism concerns, that enable them to earn some cash 
yet preserve their resources for their usual subsistence needs. In urban 
centres there is a growing informal economy where the people have 
taken control in the absence of inhibiting government regulations. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I wish to emphasise that while the control of develop­
ment in our countries to date has been largely in the hands of national 
government institutions and a powerful elite, influenced or supported 
by multinational structures, there is now a growing movement of 
people working to have that control more widely shared. This 
movement needs the support of an international network for the growth 
of civil society, and books like this should contribute to strengthening 
that supportive network. 
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Forest futures for Papua New 
Guinea: logging or community 
forestry? 
Max Henderson 
Papua New Guinea occupies the eastern half of the second largest 
island in the world and extends to include 600 other islands and 
archipelagos. The mainland is dominated by a central mountain spine 
nearly 2,400 kilometres in length with heights from 2,000 to 4,000 
metres, continuing eastward to form the island of New Britain. 
Outwash from these mountains has formed large alluvial flood plains. 
The climate is tropical, the vegetation is mainly forest, and the future of 
this forest is now the focus of an economic and environmental crisis. 
The national economy 
Economic development imposed by the outside world commenced 
relatively late in Papua New Guinea. The German colony of New 
Guinea came under Australian administration after the First World War 
and was combined with the British colony of Papua after the Second 
World War to form the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, which 
gained independence in 1975. While the Australian administration 
pursued a policy of gradual and uniform development from 1951 to the 
mid-1960s, there then followed a strategy of rapid economic growth in 
areas with the greatest potential as recommended by a World Bank 
study in 1965. Dependency on Australian aid funds, then 66 per cent of 
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Administration receipts, was to be decreased and government spending 
on agriculture, forestry, transport and education increased. Besides 
stressing the need for higher education and more responsibility for 
Papua New Guineans, emphasis was given to overseas investment and 
continued expatriate participation in private enterprise such as gold 
mining and agriculture as well as in public extension services. 
Small-holder agricultural production increased steadily but cash 
crops were subject to normal variations in international prices. Imports 
grew and the trade gap widened from 1960, when exports were 90 per 
cent of imports, to 1970, when exports were only 44 per cent of imports. 
During this period the Australian aid grant almost quadrupled and 
there was growing pressure within both Australia and Papua New 
Guinea for self-government and independence, resulting in a de facto 
National Government in 1972. But the unbalanced growth of the 
economy, unable to keep pace with the Administration's expenditure 
and increasing imports, led to intensified political demands to exploit 
the country's forests as a source of national export income and a vehicle 
for local rural development. This was the first major wedge jamming 
open the door to the forests. The second wedge resulted from the Private 
Dealings Act of 1971, which for the first time allowed foreign timber 
companies to deal directly with local landholders, bypassing official 
regulation or supervision. Unsophisticated and inexperienced villagers 
had to negotiate without any outside assistance against some very 
experienced international operators. 
On paper the economy of Papua New Guinea appeared healthy and 
dynamic up to 1995. GDP was US$3.2 billion in 1990 and US$5.8 
billion in 1995. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries were the main 
contributors, followed by mining, industry, construction, commerce, 
transport and other services, although 1993 figures indicate an increase 
in the mining and forestry sectors. The population totalled 4.2 million 
in 1996 and had a growth rate of 2.3 per cent per annum. The GDP per 
head was US$904 in 1990 and increased to US$1641 in 1996. The 
average real economic growth rate from 1984 to 1990 was 1 .5 per cent. 
The average inflation rate from 1987 to 1992 was 9.6 per cent, but in 
1992 it was as low as 4.7 per cent. Since the beginning of the economic 
crises in mid-1994 inflation has risen dramatically and, while official 
figures are generally discarded, it is commonly accepted that the rate in 
1995 was between 25 and 30 per cent. The currency exchange rate floats 
against major currencies and, following an effective devaluation of 30 
per cent in 1995, it is currently almost at par with the Australian dollar. 
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The economy is highly dependent on export commodities, such as gold 
(54.6 per cent in 1991), copper (26.5 per cent), forest products (7.4 per 
cent) and coffee (3.0 per cent). The export value was US$1 .5 billion (53 
per cent of GDP) in 1991 and US$1.8 billion (59 per cent of GDP) in 
1992. The trade balance was positive: imports accounted for 73 per cent 
of exports in 1992. 
But these figures do not account for the economic base of the 
majority of Papua New Guineans. Population density is low at 8.4 
persons per square kilometre, and 85 per cent live in rural villages or 
hamlets, depending on various forms of subsistence agriculture. Papua 
New Guineans have an incredibly strong attachment to their land and, 
significantly, 97 per cent of the total land area is under customary land 
tenure, protected by state law. The forest trees and plants on this land 
and the wild creatures they support provide a significant proportion of 
the food supply, together with raw materials for building, tools and 
weapons, clothing and ornament, ritual and magical practices and 
medicines. But although the people share a similar economic base, the 
country is socially and culturally diverse, with as many as 800 distinct 
languages, one third of the world's total. Life centres on local 
communities, which have a strong ethos of solidarity and mutual 
support. 
Forest resou rces and pol icy 
Estimates of the area covered with closed forest in Papua New Guinea 
vary between 32 and 36.4 million hectares, representing about 70 to 77 
per cent of the total land mass. There are 12 different vegetation types of 
classified primary forests, ranging from mangrove at sea level to alpine 
forests in high altitudes. The forests are extremely rich in biodiversity, 
with between 11,000 and l 9 ,000 vascular plants and more than 2,000 
tree species, including more than 1,200 in the lowland rainforests, 
which constitute 43 per cent of the total forest area. Many plant species 
are endemic to Papua New Guinea and so are many of the native birds, 
mammals, fresh-water fish, amphibians, reptiles and insects. There are 
distinct regional differences in the distribution of forest cover, with 
some ancient deforestation in the Highlands resulting from subsistence 
gardening, whereas the lowland provinces had largely intact forest 
cover until recently. 
Out of the total forested area, about 15 million hectares are classified 
as accessible production forests, containing an estimated volume of 
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approximately 500 million cubic metres of commercially valuable 
timber, valued at US$100 billion. But some recent estimates put 
remaining productive forests at only 7.2 million hectares, with a 
commercial timber volume of 170 cubic metres. The bulk of this is lower 
altitude-type of forest, easily accessible with a high concentration of 
desirable species, 50 per cent being lowland rainforest. The annual 
decline of forests is estimated by one authority at 1 per cent, due to 
shifting agriculture, mainly in the densely populated Highlands, 
followed by mineral exploitation and logging. However if the 
moonscapes left by most export logging operations are anything to go 
by, these figures are absurdly low. 
Forestry in Papua New Guinea is undergoing a major transition. In 
1991 a new Forest Policy and Fores try Act was passed by Parliament, 
designed to remedy shortcomings in the previous legal framework 
revealed in the Barnett forest industry inquiry (1989) and the World 
Bank Tropical Forest Action Plan Review (1990), and consistent with the 
fourth goal of the Papua New Guinea Constitution: that Papua New 
Guinea's natural resources and environment should be conserved and 
used for the collective benefit of all and should be replenished for future 
generations. The main objectives of the new National Forest Policy were 
the management and protection of the nation's forest resources as a 
renewable asset and their utilisation to promote economic growth, 
employment, participation in the forest industry and increased viable 
onshore processing. It stresses that all transactions affecting forest 
resources shall fully recognise and respect the rights of customary 
landholders, without whose consent no operation shall be permitted. 
The acquisition of forest resources from landholders is effected by 
Forest Management Agreements, replacing Timber Rights Purchase 
Agreements under the previous Forestry Act (1976) . In both cases the 
Papua New Guinea Forest Authority (formerly Department of Forests) 
purchases the rights to exploit timber from the landholders for a certain 
period, usually 40 years, and allocates it to a logging company or 
sawmill (by a Timber Permit), without affecting tenure of the land. Small 
forestry projects are permitted under Timber Authorities, granted for 
one-year periods or 5,000 cubic metres, whichever occurs first, with the 
logs to be used only for domestic processing, not exported. A Timber 
Authority may be obtained without the feasibility study and tender 
procedure required for larger projects. Before any company (including 
landholder companies) or person can apply for a permit or authority 
under the Forestry Act, they must first register as a Forest Industry 
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Participant. Sustained yield management of production forests is 
stressed as the guiding principle, with selective logging as the 
prescribed method for natural forests. Overall responsibility for sound 
forest management is vested in the State, which should formulate a 
National Forest Plan based on a National Forest Inventory. 
Unfortunately the Government gagged the August 1996 sitting of 
Parliament and passed Amendments to the Forestry Act which had the 
effect of giving the Cabinet power to appoint or sack members of the 
National Forest Board. There has been widespread alarm amongst 
NGOs in particular at these amendments as they pave the way for a 
return to the pre-Barnett ministerial excesses. The World Bank has also 
taken a dim view and at this stage has withdrawn further funding 
support for the Government. 
The promotion of onshore processing and value-added forest 
products was a major change from previous legislation. The National 
Forestry Development Guidelines further specify that the Government 
will decrease log exports, although not ban them. As a first step log 
exports were restricted to 3.5 million cubic metres during 1994. This 
volume was more than 250 per cent of the officially scaled log exports 
in 1991 (1 .4 million cubic metres) and more than 140 per cent of a 
commonly accepted sustainable harvest level of 2.5 million cubic 
metres. The Government figures rely totally on loggers' submitted 
tallies, which may be credible if you still believe in Santa Claus and the 
Tooth Fairy. Raw logs exports increased dramatically (Table 5 .1) .  
Table 5.1  
1 9 87 
1 988 
1 989 
1 990 
1 99 1  
1 9 92 
1 993 
1 994 
1 995 
Raw log exports from Papua New Guinea 
(million cubic metres) 
1 .9 
1 .6 
1 .5 
1 .4 
1 .5 
1 .6 
3.2 
2.9 
2.4 
Source: National Centre for Development Studies, 1 995. Papua New Guinea 
Handbook, The Austral ian National University, Canberra. 
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Further reductions in log exports were proposed in future years to 
encourage the development of a domestic forest industry, supported by 
incentives such as relief from tax and import duty on processing 
equipment. Furthermore, domestic industry will have first refusal on all 
species and grades of permitted log exports to secure its raw material 
supply. The Guidelines also stress that the development of forest 
industries should be dispersed throughout Papua New Guinea as 
much as possible and that landowners should be encouraged and 
assisted by the Forest Authority to participate in them. Community 
Forestry is a stated objective of the new Forest Policy, as a strategy for 
sustainable forest management. 
Under the Customs (Tarif!J Act, logs for export were subject to an 
export levy, fixed at progressive rates on the free-on-board prices (after 
all local costs have been met) of the different timber species, but this 
was removed in 1994. The export tax receipts had made a significant 
contribution to the Government coffers, compromising its decisions. 
Under the Environment Planning Act of 1978, all Timber Permit holders 
prepare an Environmental Plan for the project area, covering 
the purpose of the forest project 
sustainability of the yield 
harvesting and replacement techniques 
social and economic benefits to landholders 
proposed infrastructual developments 
viability of the project 
a detailed description of the existing biophysical environment 
environmental impacts and measures to mitigate them. 
It should also provide a detailed land-use plan, showing the project 
area under the proposed ultimate land uses, including conservation 
sites for environmental, cultural or historic reasons. In practice, most 
Environmental Plans in the forestry sector appear to result from a 
search and replace exercise on the word processor. 
A National Forestry and Conservation Programme was adopted in 
1990 to implement the new Forest Policy and improve both forest 
conservation and sustainable forest management for the social and 
economic benefit of the people. The national lead agency is the Forest 
Authority, with the World Bank as lead donor agency. More than 
twenty major projects have been approved for the Public Investment 
Programme of 1993-98, plus a number of small projects. The overall 
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budget is estimated at 40 to 50 million kina, with the Government 
committing more than 5 million kina to date. These projects include 
landholder awareness campaigns through local NGOs, resource 
appraisal, human resource development, preparation of a National 
Conservation Strategy, and a Community Forestry Program for Rural 
Development. Certain projects are already completed, such as the 
review of forest policy and legislation, the establishment of a new 
administrative structure, and the Forest Industry Development Study. 
A special Ecoforestry Committee has been established to promote small­
scale, sustainable forestry projects, comprising representatives from 
Government Agencies and NGOs. 
One of the major legislative changes has been the creation of a 
unified National Forest Service (NFS) under the National Forest 
Authority, which in tum is directed by the National Forest Board, 
which also oversees the Provincial Management Committees and 
Special Advisory Committee. The National Forest Service replaced and 
absorbed all the functions (extension, research, training and education, 
resource assessment, policy and planning advice, monitoring of forest 
development projects) of both the National Department of Forests and 
the Provincial Forest Divisions. The system whereby the Forest 
Department granted Timber Rights Purchase and Timber Permits at the 
provincial level is said to have undermined control of the export 
logging industry, although most of the major scandals occurred at 
national level. 
The NFS is trying to impose tougher checks on logging and has the 
ambitious aim of placing a minimum of two Forest Officers with every 
commercial logging operation. This would be a considerable 
improvement on the present system where a Forestry employee 
normally depends on the logging company for transport, communi­
cations and probably a bed and meals, but it is still insufficient, 
especially in terms of housing and trained personnel. The priority of the 
NFS at present is clearly to regain control of the large-scale 
concessionaires by implementing the Forest Development Guidelines. 
Although its mandate also includes rural extension, the lack of funding 
and staff does not allow for active extension programs, given the scale 
of the task of monitoring the large scale logging projects. Small-scale 
operations below 5,000 cubic metres annual cut are presently of minor 
concern. 
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Figure 5.1  Yearly export of logs and other forest products 
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The growth of logg ing 
Until the mid-1970s the great diversity of  species and relatively difficult 
access to Papua New Guinea's forest resources limited timber 
production and exports. The Pacific Rim markets were mainly supplied 
with tropical hard woods from countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand and the Philippines, which possessed vast and more 
homogenous (Dipterocarp dominated) forest resources. In 1979 log 
exports from Papua New Guinea were liberalised and most logging 
companies geared their activities to overseas markets. When previous 
sources of South Sea logs dwindled owing to severe export restrictions, 
the timber industries of Ja pan, Korea and Taiwan, almost exclusively 
designed for the processing of round logs, turned increasingly to Papua 
New Guinea timber species, leading to dramatic price increases. 
Whereas the average free-on-board price per cubic metre was below 
US$70 in 1991, it had increased to US$160 by September 1993 with 
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Figure 5.2 Export log price trend in Papua New Guinea 
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Figure 5.3 Papua New Guinea log exports by country of 
destination 
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relatively abundant species such as Taun reaching a peak of US$350. 
The dominant position of Japan as a buyer should not be 
underestimated. The machinery and the market is Japanese, hence so is 
the finance. Whilst the Malaysian Chinese are on the ground doing the 
dirty work as the target of criticism and supposed control, the Japanese 
are able to assure their raw log supply and remain in the background. 
Domestic processing has declined dramatically since the mid-1970s, 
from 63 per cent of all logs produced, equalling 830,000 cubic metres, in 
1977, to less than 15 per cent by 1991, including the volume converted 
to pulp chips by the Japanese company J ant. In 1993 the approved 
volume for log exports totalled 6 million cubic metres. Even though it is 
unlikely that the export loggers were able to harvest this quantity, 
another dramatic increase can be expected, worsening the above trend. 
At present it can be assumed that the domestic processing share is well 
below 10 per cent. Figure 5.4 illustrates this point, with the interesting 
anomaly that in 1992 more logs were exported than produced. 
About 20 years ago portable sawmills were introduced to Papua 
Figure 5.4 Total production and log exports 
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New Guinea, the first being Dolmars from Germany and later circular 
saws from Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Since 1986 
wokabout somils have been produced locally by NATEQUIP, a private 
company in Lae, producing 75 units a year with a total of close to 500 to 
date. The total number of portable sawmills in Papua New Guinea is 
estimated at approximately 700, no more than 30 per cent of which are 
believed to be in operation. One result of this high attrition rate is that 
the banking system is very wary of lending for community-based 
sawmill projects. Thirty-eight mills are said to practice some kind of 
sustainable yield forest management. 
There are two main reasons for the failure of portable sawmills in 
Papua New Guinea. First, operators usually have neither technical 
expertise in equipment maintenance and repair nor an efficient 
technical and spare parts back-up service, particularly in very remote 
areas. The second bottleneck is the lack of accessible markets. In 
addition, many mills are not operated commercially but for the sole 
purpose of providing village communities or individuals with 
construction timber as the need arises, for example for schools, 
churches or domestic houses. Some operations are surviving as salvage 
mills, using the roads constructed by industrial loggers and converting 
logs that were too small, defective, or simply forgotten by the large 
companies. 
Portable sawmills might also pose a threat of increased forest 
destruction if they are not operated under controlled environmental 
and silvicultural guidelines. Operators may be tempted to increase the 
harvesting rates to unsustainable levels ('creaming' all specimens of 
desirable species and good shape) or completely clearing forest stands 
to give way for gardens. However, this negative impact will be confined 
to a small area, if only for logistic reasons. One study calculated an 
impact of less than 5 hectares per year for each sawmill. There is 
currently little or no Government policy or guidelines on the use of 
portable sawmills and even their registration is not enforced. By 
comparison, export harvesting is estimated at 90,000 commercial trees 
per week at present levels, but because of the destructive harvesting 
methods practised by the loggers maybe a million commercial trees 
above 10 cubic metres (diameter breast height) are destroyed per week. 
At an average of two trees per week for a portable sawmill, it would 
take 45,000 portable mills to equal present commercial extraction rates, 
and many more to equal present destruction rates. 
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Logging for export 
The domestic market for sawn timber is growing by 10 per cent per 
annum, but could easily be swamped if the export loggers processed 
even a small amount of their allocations locally. For this reason any 
serious community-based projects must aim for the export market, 
which is dominated by commercial logging, the cause of the forestry 
crisis. Harvesting rights for more than 6 million hectares of forests have 
been allocated to industrial logging operations, mainly by means of 
Timber Rights Purchases, but the allocated area could be as high as 7.5 
million hectares, equalling 50 per cent of the total production forests. 
Harvesting periods from 5 to 20 years further discourage a long-term 
outlook. The sector is entirely controlled by foreign-based companies, 
and a single Malaysian company is thought to control in excess of 70 
per cent of all export logging operations in Papua New Guinea. Other 
operators are based in Japan, Korea and China. Not one Papua New 
Guinean company is directly involved in harvesting and export of raw 
logs. 
The level of damage to the forest may be even greater than 
previously estimated. The figures below resulted from a survey 
immediately after logging in various areas in 1983, and again in 1993. 
The author of this survey comments that the practice of selected 
logging is designed to remove the commercially-sized trees from the 
forest, leaving the smaller trees to grow for the next harvest. However, it 
is apparent from the stand tables that many such trees are destroyed by 
Table 5.2 Post-logging survey 
O rig inal  After % Re-su rvey Total % 
no. of trees logg i n g  destroyed 1 993 destroyed 
KAP 1 366 1 62 55 1 06 7 1  
KAP 2 420 1 52 64 1 1 2 73 
VAN 1 534 290 46 252 53 
VAN 2 526 1 52 7 1  1 1 2 79 
Note: Figures represent number of trees per hectare 1 O cubic metres diameter breast 
height. 
Source: Tom Vigus, 1 993. Forest Regeneration and Stand Development, Kandrian­
Gloucester I ntegrated Develpment Project, Papua New Guinea. 
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intense logging activity, particularly where large commercial trees are 
located quite close together. It is not possible for assessors accurately to 
evaluate immediately after harvesting the damage that has been 
inflicted on residual trees, but this probably causes the great majority of 
post-harvest deaths. And whereas to the casual observer there appears 
to be rapid forest re-growth, this is frequently dominated by non­
commercial species. 
So the reality is a colossal social, environmental and financial 
disaster. Justice Tos Barnett conducted a far-reaching enquiry into the 
timber industry from 1987 to 1989, resulting in a 20-volume report that 
highlighted the massive corruption, greed, economic, environmental 
and social disasters that had occurred. The report was never officially 
released, and no serious attempt was made by the Government to either 
prosecute those responsible or to curb the existing practices. In 
Barnett's words 
It would be fair to say of some of these companies, that they are now 
roaming the countryside with the self-assurance of robber barons; 
bribing politicians and leaders, creating social disharmony, and 
ignoring the laws in order to rip out and export the last remnants of 
the Province's timber. These companies are fooling the landholders 
and making use of corrupt, gullible and unthinking politicians. It 
downgrades Papua New Guinea's sovereign status that such a 
rapacious foreign exploitation has been allowed to continue with such 
devastating effects to the social and physical environment, and with so 
few positive benefits (Asia Pacific Action Group 1990) . 
Those were the good times. The situation has deteriorated 
dramatically since then. Checking and monitoring of logging 
operations has been woefully inadequate and the forests are suffering 
severe degradation, as can be witnessed by even the most casual 
observation. Operational standards stated in the Timber Permits are 
broadly and constantly violated by cutting trees below the minimum 
diameter (50 cm), by felling to the edge of watercourses, skidding logs in 
river beds, constructing roads of excessive width and with gradients 
greater than 15 per cent, harvesting on slopes with gradients greater 
than 30 per cent and by inflicting excessive damage to remaining 
stands and soil (estimated 30-40 per cent impacted). Villagers complain 
of the pollution of rivers and reckless destruction of gardens, houses 
and cultural sites. Promised infrastructural developments, such as 
permanent roads, bridges, schools and aid posts are usually far behind 
schedule or never materialise. 
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The royalties accruing to the landholders are only marginal and in 
most cases not more than US$5 per cubic metre, compared to the profits 
of the logging companies of approximately US$75 per cubic metre. The 
employment generated is usually only of a temporary nature and often 
filled by Asian foreigners. Practices like transfer pricing, short scaling, 
down-grading of species, and all kinds of false record keeping were 
revealed in the Barnett Inquiry, and are now general practice, enabling 
logging companies to transfer all the economic rent outside the country. 
Our information indicates that no logging company has declared a 
profit in Papua New Guinea over the last 26 years although calcula­
tions show that current combined profits are in the region of US$450 
million per year for the export logging industry. However, information 
from other sources often contradicts local data. 
How things can go wrong 
As a step to regaining control of the industry, the Government 
contracted Societe General de Surveillance (PNG), a subsidiary of SGS 
Switzerland, early in 1994 to monitor the logging industry in general 
for an initial period of 17 months. They have a mighty task, as a few 
examples will indicate. 
Shin Asahigawa, a Japanese company, operated an export logging 
and sawmill concession at Bialla in West New Britain for over 20 years, 
from a depot on land sold by landholders to the Government for an oil 
palm plantation. Hostility from landholders over frustrated attempts to 
regain the land from the Government promoted the Japanese to pull out. 
They had paid landowners from another area a total of US$600,000 in 
timber royalties, which they borrowed back, then declared bankruptcy 
and hopped on the jet home. The landowners lost their timber, their 
US$600,000, and another US$200,000 due in income tax. 
In Lassul Bay, East New Britain, New Guinea Lumber, a subsidiary 
of Rimbunan Hijau, dug up live reef to use as road base within sight of 
a government office and allegedly with the permission of the local 
Member of Parliament. Villagers complained not only of the destruction 
of the reef but also of polluted rivers devoid of fish and the destruction 
of property and historic sites. An investigation by the Department of 
Environment and Conservation recommended prosecution, but even if 
successful the level of fines would be insignificant compared to the 
offence. New Guinea Lumber had also been harvesting in another 
concession for eighteen months on New Britain without being 
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registered. They were fined US$30,000 by the National Court, but in the 
meantime they had exported an estimated US$48 million worth of logs. 
Then there is the case of the Agriculture Minister, Roy Evara, 
attempting to bulldoze three so-called oil palm projects through the 
system, affecting a total area of 620,000 hectares. Evara claimed that the 
projects are agricultural, hence not subject to the Forestry Act. The 
development company, Singapore-based, is not only prepared to 
undertake the necessary clear-felling: they have also generously 
promised to remove the felled trees to a dump in Japan so as not to 
clutter up the cleared land, all this at no cost! 
An extract from an internal memo to the Prime Minister states that 
The Lianyi company proceeded to import second hand machinery and 
equipment 
without Customs clearance 
without company registration 
without Forestry registration 
without submission of an environmental plan, a working 
plan, or any similar documentation. 
The company then commenced field operations in total defiance of the 
law and in total disregard of the landholders. 
Such incidents raise other queries. Decisions are made involving 
tens or hundreds of millions of dollars that do not appear reasonable 
for high flying businessmen. In circumstances like this, with the 
equipment at risk of seizure, it is not rational to risk those amounts, 
unless of course the funds involved are derived from other sources than 
normal business profits or loans. The major loggers operate through a 
tangled web of locally-incorporated subsidiaries. In many cases these 
have a total paid up capital of US$2.00, with all the equipment leased, 
no real estate and no other tangible assets. If and when they are hauled 
before a court either by the Government or the landholders, there is 
nothing to sue. The company that offered to carry out the development 
of the oil palm plantation mentioned above, at our estimated cost of 
US$750 million, was capitalised at US$100. 
It is obvious that the loggers are making substantial profits. We can 
assume US$40 to US$45 per cubic metre to harvest and deliver a log to 
the beach, plus Government levies and taxes, to a total of say US$105 
costs per cubic metre, free on board. Average selling prices are around 
US$180, leaving a profit in the region of US$75 per cubic metre. At 
harvest rates averaging 25 cubic metres per hectare, that gives loggers 
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profits of US$1875 per hectare. This is substantially higher than can be 
realised from cocoa, coffee, oil palm or cattle ventures on cleared forest. 
However, in calculating the potential benefits to Papua New Guinea, 
we must take into account the fact that this is a once-only. No-one 
knows whether the forest will recover in 100 years or 1,000 years, but 
given the moonscapes created it will take at least 50 years for any 
reasonable commercial harvesting. If the actual profits are calculated 
more realistically, at US$1,875 for 50 years, they come to US$37 per 
hectare per annum, miserable by any standards. 
May 13, 1994: 
The Managing Director 
Metlak Development Corporation Pty. Ltd., 
KAVIENG, NEW IRELAND 
Dear Sir, 
Our reference 
Negotiated under 
Date 
Vessel 
Cubic metres loaded 
Amount (US$) 
Amount (PNG kina) 
Invoice No: LAOl /94 
LC G /J-6512231 
May 09, 1994 
MV SASA SEBELAS 
6025 .16  
1, 157,210.90 
1,110,034.44 
LANDOWNER SHARE 
Less: export duty 374,916.76 
Total landowner share 
Less royalties 24,683.53 
Net amount 
Less agricultural levy 4,51 8.88 
Less infrastructural levy 3,012.58 
General Fund Available 
Less Withholding tax (3806.67) 
NET PREMIUM TO LANDOWNERS 
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333,01 0.33 
(41,906.43) 
(68,598.96) 
(76,121 .42) 
(72,315.35) 
But the US$1875 is in any case not a profit for Papua New Guinea. 
Foreign logging companies make sure of this by manipulating their 
accounts to ensure they declare a loss. Take for example the 
reconciliation account between a logging contractor (New Guinea 
Lumber Merchants) and a landowner company (Metlak Development 
Corporation) covering a shipment of 6,000 cubic metres of logs from the 
Metlak concession in New Ireland, which is reproduced opposite. The 
bottom line is that the landholders lost forest assets valued at a 
minimum of US$1.2 million, and were in debt for US$72,000 as a result. 
To this financial scam can be added the environmental, social and 
cultural problems caused. The value of the logs is almost entirely 
transferred overseas and, taking account of the time and costs for 
government departments, it is quite likely that Papua New Guinea as a 
whole makes an overall loss from operations such as this. 
There has also been a growing alliance between the loggers and 
local police units, fostered by donations of food, equipment, housing 
and even vehicles to the police, compromising their impartiality. When 
landholders protest at loggers' illegal activities, the police are flown in 
by charter paid for by the loggers to arrest the landholders, on charges 
which, in some well-documented cases, were subsequently dismissed 
by the courts. 
G overn ment 
It is reasonable to ask why the Government is not dealing with these 
problems. It is not necessarily a matter of changing the legislation, 
which has been quite adequate for a long time, more a matter of 
implementation and commitment. The inroads of the loggers are largely 
a result of Government's inability to develop the rural areas while 
spending 48 per cent of the national budget in and around Port 
Moresby. Then there is corruption and a carpetbag mentality amongst 
the new fat cats of the capital, a town which is crime-ridden and razor­
wired but accessible by direct flights to Asia and Australia. We must 
also accept that there are some villagers who will sell their heritage and 
deceive their own communities for short-term gain. 
On the other hand there are dedicated public servants and 
politicians, whom the explosion in logging in particular has caught 
totally flat-footed. The responsible departments, including taxation, 
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environment, labour, forestry and finance, simply do not have the 
experience and the resources to administer and police the massive 
upsurge in activity. Serious efforts are being made to catch up, but there 
is a real danger that the forests will have disappeared before they do. 
The plight of the Forest Minister and his senior officials is illustrated by 
a recent press release. 
Port Moresby, June 24, 1994. 
Papua New Guinea was losing more than US$1 million per 
day in illegal log exports, the coun try's Forest Minister, Tim 
Neville, said yesterday. 
'Some of the richest and most prized rainforest in the world 
was being secretly shipped out of the country by logging 
companies, mostly Malaysian, despite Government attempts to 
control the industry', the Minister told AAP [Australian 
Associated Press] in an interoiew yesterday. 
These attempts have already seen death threats issued to Mr 
Neville and his family, and a recent devastating fire at the Forest 
Authority's records office, which destroyed thousands of crucial 
files on the industry. 
Forestry sources were convinced that the fire was an arson 
attack, although authorities were still waiting for a report from 
Melbourne fire investigator, Peter Thatcher. 
Mr. Neville said that monitoring logging companies in such a 
vast coun try had been largely impossible, where many of the 
concessions were remote and none of the sites had telephone 
contact. 
'Not only that, but the loggers are totally organised and we 
haven't been able to compete against that until now. Even though 
things have been tightened up I would estimate about a million 
dollars per day is still disappearing. ' 
This is quite clearly a cry for help. 
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Pacific Heritage Foundation 
So what is to be done? One possibility is the local initiative in which I 
am involved. Driven by a deep frustration a number of concerned 
people formed the Pacific Heritage Foundation early in 1992. Its prime 
aims are 
to promote an increased awareness amongst all people of the 
wealth and diversity of the natural heritage of the Pacific area 
to improve the welfare of the peoples consistent with 
improved conservation and managed economic programs 
to provide moral, technical and legal support to prevent the 
destruction of this heritage 
to provide education and assistance to communities to enable 
them to understand and preserve their heritage 
to provide practical working examples of environmentally 
sound methods of earning income from the natural resources 
without unnecessary destruction 
to establish a Conservation Botanical Garden aimed at 
representing the widest possible collection of plant material 
to support Government policies and practices aimed at the 
preservation of this heritage. 
We recognise that the landholder has a right to use the forest as a 
source of income. If that means cutting down trees, then we aim to 
demonstrate that this can happen without destroying the forest, and yet 
yield a satisfactory income level. We promote new community projects 
only under strict criteria, which include 
that a resource survey indicates that the project can be 
economically viable and that the harvesting cycle will be 
sufficiently long to enable satisfactory regeneration whilst 
protecting the ecosystem 
that the landholders understand the land and the trees are 
their asset, protected by the Constitution and the Law 
that the overwhelming majority in the village or villages agree 
with the proposal, and that the land area to be set aside for 
the project is without dispute 
that the village as a whole, not just selected leaders, 
understand the implications and benefits of the project, and 
that it will require substantial loans and hard work to make it 
successful 
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that strict forest management guidelines must be followed if 
they wish to sell into the specialist export market, and that the 
projects will be inspected and certified by an outside agency 
at regular intervals 
that they understand their decision to reject export logging 
will lead to coercion, bribery, intimidation and even violence 
from various foreign and local interests. 
The village must be of one mind. 
Because it was close to home and fairly typical, an approach was 
first made to villagers in the Bainings area of New Britain to start a pilot 
project. Although they were the original inhabitants of the Gazelle 
Peninsular, they have moved back from the coastal areas as a result of 
population and commercial pressures exerted by their Tolai 
neighbours, and are under constant pressure from entrepreneurs and 
carpetbaggers of all breeds and inclinations. Recognising that it would 
be self-defeating to preach a total ban on tree-felling, we selected 
community-based portable sawmilling as the simplest and quickest 
project to promote. The banks responded with expressions ranging 
from horror to ridicule. It was decided that the first mill would have to 
be owned privately in the hope that it would convince the banks as well 
as the villagers. After 15 months of operation we were able to borrow 60 
per cent of the cost of a portable saw for the first village group and the 
operation proved successful enough to enable their total loan to be 
repaid within 15 months. We were also fortunate in gaining support 
from B&Q Pk, the major do-it-yourself chain in the United Kingdom, 
and this translated into some funding assistance for necessary survey 
and awareness programs, as well as providing a market for the first 
grade sawn timber. 
The Bainings Project has since expanded to three sawmills, with 
two additional villages awaiting finance approval. These five mills will 
operate in a total area exceeding 12,000 hectares, ensuring a cycle in 
excess of 50 years. The average harvest rate is less than 30 per cent of 
commercial harvesting, and the overall management plan is based on 
the guidelines established by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).  We 
estimate that up to 70 per cent of the ground area is trashed by machin­
ery in the average export logging operation, whereas our measured 
results show that less than 9 per cent is damaged. An independent 
inspection confirms that we are generally following the FSC guidelines 
with some variations for local conditions and some areas for 
improvement identified. Training is carried out on site, enhanced by 
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attendance at various workshops conducted by other organisations to 
promote land rights and environmental issues. We work closely with a 
range of NGOs within Papua New Guinea and overseas. 
Principal benefits of the direct participation of local communities 
include involving landholders in the use of their forest resource and the 
promotion of environmentally sound harvesting practices. They gain 
opportunities for reasonable economic returns, permanent employment 
close to the village (which encourages villagers, particularly young 
adults, to remain in rural areas), a lower demand for large-scale 
destructive projects, and self-sufficiency in construction timbers. This 
did not happen without some major effort. It was eighteen months from 
the beginning of the discussions until the saw was in operation, 
approximately half this period needed for a decision by the village, and 
the remainder for the financial and bureaucratic shuffling. And the 
temptation of easy money remains, especially to older men. It is the 
women and the younger men who see value in preserving their natural 
heritage, and using it in a sustainable way. Sometimes the loggers' 
plans backfire, but the following case illustrates the power they wield. 
A bargeload of equipment landed on the south coast of New Britain 
(without authority, but that is another story) . One of the Malaysians 
approached the villagers on the beach and asked whose land it was. 
An old fellow replied and was asked how much it would be to rent the 
land as a log dump. A little deliberation amongst the group and the 
answer was 'a hundred'. Without blinking the Malaysian whipped 
open his briefcase and counted out 100,000 kina in new 50 kina notes. 
That focused the minds of the on-lookers somewhat. The barges were 
unloaded and after various checks and surveys, the drivers started to 
move the equipment inland a couple of days later. They got to the first 
village, where they found the road blocked and a group waiting; 'Can't 
come across our land without compensation.' 'How much?' asked the 
bossman. Quick as a flash '100,000' came the reply. A quick trip back to 
the barge and another 100,000 kina was counted out to the group 
desperately trying to remain sombre-faced. Strange to say, the same 
thing happened when they arrived at the actual forest edge. They paid 
again, but refused the fourth demand the next day when they started 
cutting down the trees. Over the next few weeks they were so harassed 
by the now angry villagers that they pulled out completely, having 
spent 300,000 kina in cash alone without shipping a log. 
Against all this we have to fight with logic, reason, experience and 
hopefully sincerity, but some progress is being made. Our nation-wide 
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and international campaign with other concerned NGOs is raising 
awareness of the issues. The national press has responded with 
increased coverage while recent overseas television documentaries 
together with major newspaper and magazine articles have highlighted 
the problems. We are aware of other diplomatic and finance efforts to 
assist the Government and there is a growing awareness by aid donors 
that NGOs can be the most effective communications and education 
route. Increasing numbers of village groups from other areas are coming 
to the Project for guidance and requesting assistance to establish 
similar projects in their own areas. To date we have 14 additional 
projects in various stages of progress through the bureaucratic system, 
including several that have rejected overtures by Asian loggers despite 
hundreds of thousands of dollars of bribes. 
Basically landholders want some cash and some development, but 
without the destruction of their forest, through projects which are under 
their control and employ their labour. We are not restricted to sawn 
timber as a commercial forest product. Other potential earners include 
galip nuts, orchids, rattan, traditional herbs and medicinal products, 
and crocodile and bird breeding. The various projects that are either up 
and running or close to operation will result in over 100,000 hectares of 
prime rainforest being denied to the loggers. The figure could increase 
dramatically if we had reasonable funding. 
Where next? 
For our work, the way forward depends on increased education and 
awareness activities. We believe that we can force the greatest change 
from the bottom, not the top. On this basis we intend to continue 
establishing community-based projects in place of export logging, and 
to be in a stronger cash flow and marketing position with increased 
volume. We also plan to set up a Community Justice Centre with in­
house legal staff to handle landholder problems, having successfully 
assisted a number of village groups in court actions against loggers. 
Commercial lawyers are unfortunately either compromised by 
relationships with logging companies, far too busy, or far too expensive. 
A village group without access to substantial cash reserves cannot 
sustain an action against a cash-rich logger, but the laws to protect the 
landholders are there, the courts appear to be above corruption, and the 
use of legal challenges can be the quickest and most cost-effective way 
of obtaining results. We are further hoping to set up a central unit to 
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process the timber from the projects into higher value products. The 
greatest constraint is simply the availability of funds. So far private 
sources have met our monthly running costs of about US$8,000. 
Sceptics may query this project but we make no claims to perfection, 
merely trusting that our approach is a better alternative than the 
present situation. Although a large number of portable sawmills would 
cause less damage than the levels of destruction in Papua New Guinea 
today, they do require strict adherence to management plans and 
regular supervision and inspections. There is also a limit to the volume 
of timber that can be harvested and processed by a local village 
community with limited labour and a need for cash conditioned mainly 
by their concerns for the education of their children, health care, food 
supplies, communications, transport and decent housing, together with 
a reasonable range of consumer items. On the other hand, can the 
market accept ever-increasing volumes of sawn timber and timber 
products from community projects? In the United Kingdom the changes 
have been driven by retailers such as B&Q, reacting to consumer 
concerns, particularly from the younger generation and school 
children, but the trade will only continue to respond if consumers keep 
up this pressure. They may need to write to the Papua New Guinea 
Government, ask importers to declare the source of their timber and the 
conditions under which it is harvested, and make others aware of the 
issues involved. 
Concl usions 
We don't pretend to have all the answers, but we do claim that 
community-based projects are better than the almost uninhibited 
destruction of Papua New Guinea's prime natural asset and the 
corruption of the people's morality, lifestyle, history and culture. The 
problem may appear to be environmental, but it really is a human rights 
issue. The landholder 's assets, their food sources, their medicinal 
supplies and their sacred sites are being trashed. In asset terms they are 
wealthy people. An average coastal village with a population of 150 
owns 25,000 hectares of forest, valued at US$200 million, but they have 
few of the things such money can buy. The way their assets are being 
exploited at present, in five years their forest may be turned into a 
wasteland, and they still won't have any shoes. These peoples' 
contribution to the world's environmental and political problems is 
minimal. They are not creating pollution or over-consuming energy or 
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raw materials. But because they are isolated and inexperienced in such 
things, they are the unknowing partners in a global problem. Only 
when the last tree has been cut, the last river polluted and the last reef 
killed, may we understand that we cannot eat money. 
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Logging and resource dependency 
in Papua New Guinea: a response 
to Henderson 
Col i n  Fi ler 
Max Henderson (Chapter 5) provides us with a general historical 
account of the forest industry and forest policy in Papua New Guinea, 
followed by some indications of the way that NGOs like his own Pacific 
Heritage Foundation are seeking to establish some alternatives to the 
present system of exploitation. In these comments I shall restrict myself 
to a discussion of three contentious issues-the definition of 
'sustainable forest management', the distribution of economic rent from 
large-scale logging operations, and the nature of community attitudes 
to the choice between sustainable and unsustainable forms of 
development. 
Sustai nable harvests 
Henderson offers us several numbers which relate to the biophysical 
and economic significance of large-scale logging in Papua New 
Guinea. These numbers have rather different relationships both to 
reality and to the vexed question of 'sustainability' .  According to 
Henderson, it is commonly 'accepted' that Papua New Guinea's forests 
can only sustain an annual timber harvest of 2.5 million cubic metres. 
But the PNG Forest Industries Association maintains that the corn-
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monly accepted level is twice this amount. How can we tell who is 
right? 
Back in 1993, a team of Australian scientists estimated that Papua 
New Guinea might have as much as 7-8 million hectares of 
'productive' forest containing a total of about 160-170 million cubic 
metres of commercial timber. If it were assumed that the same volume of 
timber could be harvested from the same piece of forest once every forty 
years, this area had the potential to produce a maximum annual 
harvest of more than 6 million cubic metres of timber, well above the 
current volumes of log exports. There are two problems with this kind 
of calculation. 
First, we do not really know how long it takes the average stretch of 
Papua New Guinea forest to regenerate its timber values once it has 
been 'selectively' logged. But we do know that current logging practices 
in most timber concessions are likely to prolong this period, because the 
loggers either cut down or critically damage something between 30 and 
80 per cent of all existing trees. Those trees which are critically 
damaged include many younger members of the commercially valuable 
species which will not live long enough to become part of the next log 
harvest. 
Second, we do not know what proportion of existing ' operable 
forest' will actually be left to regenerate as best it can, or will still be 
available for logging in forty years' time. Large parts of this forest will 
probably be converted to 'inoperable' uses, either because they will 
become 'conservation areas' or (more likely) because they will be 
cleared permanently for agricultural or other economic activities. 
Taking this factor into account, one Australian forestry consultant 
estimated that there might only be 3 million hectares of forest available 
for 'sustainable timber production' with an annual harvest of 3 million 
cubic metres of timber. 
According to the latest sets of figures produced by the PNG Forest 
Authority, the country exported 2.9 million cubic metres of logs in 1992, 
3 million in 1994, and 2.4 million in 1995. 1  Should we therefore 
conclude that timber production volumes are still within the limits of 
sustainability? There are several reasons why this conclusion is not 
warranted. 
First, as Henderson points out, the official export figures almost 
certainly underestimate the actual export volumes, though not perhaps 
by quite as much as he suggests in his remarks on Santa Claus and the 
Tooth Fairy. The volume of ' concealed' exports may be less significant 
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than their value, because they are likely to comprise those species (like 
rosewood) which are presently subject to an export ban. 
Second, the level of harvest will always be greater than the level of 
exports. Over the last few years, the difference has been officially 
estimated at between 600,000 and 1 million cubic metres per annum. 
This figure is understood to apply to timber which is subject to further 
processing before being exported or consumed by the domestic market. 
Third, as noted above, the volume of timber which is 'officially 
harvested' may not include a substantial number of full-size logs which 
are wasted in one way or another, and certainly does not include those 
very substantial volumes contained in the (mainly immature) trees 
which are critically damaged by careless logging practices, even though 
this second form of wastage represents a substantial detraction from 
some future harvest. 
Finally, there is a very wide variation in levels of harvest between 
different parts of the country. In recent years, for example, one of Papua 
New Guinea's 19 provinces (West New Britain) has accounted for 
roughly half the logs exported from the country, even though it 
contained less than 14 per cent of the balance of commercial timber 
volumes estimated to exist in 1993. Under the National Forest Policy, 
each province is supposed to be practicing sustainable timber 
production, but this is clearly not happening, and those provinces in 
which harvest levels are obviously unsustainable will also be those in 
which logged-over forests are more likely to be cleared for other uses. 
For these various reasons, it seems very unlikely that sustainable 
timber production will be possible if the country officially exports more 
than 2 million cubic metres a year for any significant period of time. 
Revenue distri bution 
From a strictly economic point of view, I find it difficult to agree with 
Henderson that the situation in the forestry sector has 'deteriorated 
dramatically' since the conclusion of the Barnett Inquiry in 1989, unless 
one measures deterioration entirely by reference to the concept of 
sustainability which I have just discussed. Although Barnett himself 
declared that transfer pricing was amongst the worst of the scandals 
exposed by his inquiry, it is simply not true, as Henderson claims, that 
this practice has consistently enabled the logging companies to 
'transfer all the economic rent outside the country', for the simple 
reason that logging companies pay an export tax, not a profit tax, and 
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while it might be argued that landowners do not get a fair return in 
their royalty payments, these payments do still represent a share of the 
economic rent. 
Indeed, the relative share of the resource rent which is captured by 
government and landowners has grown significantly since 1989 as a 
result of changes to the fiscal regime which have been introduced as 
part of a wider package of legal and institutional reform in the forestry 
sector. In 1989, log exports were valued at 80 million kina (8.6 per cent 
of all domestic exports) and the government collected about 11.4 million 
kina in log export taxes (1 .4 per cent of all non-grant revenues). 2 In 
1994, log exports were valued at 483.1 million kina (18. 1 per cent of all 
domestic exports) and the government collected about 131 .3 million 
kina in log export taxes (10.2 per cent of all non-grant revenues). The 
rates were raised substantially in two successive national budgets, first 
in November 1993 and then again in the 'mini-budget' of March 1994, 
when the country was already facing the fiscal crisis which caused a 
major devaluation later that year. 
In November 1995, the government finally announced the 
introduction of a new revenue system which is more 'progressive' than 
the old fiscal regime because the rate of tax is tied directly to the export 
value of the timber, so the government's share of the economic rent 
increases with the market price of the commodity.3 Under the new 
revenue system, landowners in all logging concessions are due to 
receive a flat rate royalty of 10 kina per cubic metre (double the average 
royalty paid under the old system), while landowners in new logging 
concessions, or those whose permits are renewed, are also due to 
receive a '  development premium' which, like the log export tax, will 
vary with the value of the logs being harvested. At a log export price of 
US$130 (175 kina) per cubic metre, which is close to prevailing market 
prices in 1995 and 1996, the new system has the effect of reducing the 
logger 's share from 62 to 55 per cent of the gross revenue while 
increasing the government's share from 32 to 34 per cent and the 
landowner 's share from 6 to 11 per cent. These figures show very 
clearly why the national government and landowning communities 
both have a short-term economic interest in the continuation of what 
may tum out, in the longer term, to be an unsustainable level of timber 
production. 
It is certainly true that the loggers made a substantial 'windfall 
profit' during 1993 and 1994, when prices were hovering around 
US$170 per cubic metre. One economist estimated the size of this 
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windfall profit to have been about 225 million kina, compared to 
government revenues of about 200 million kina over the same period. 
Another economist estimated that the government would have made an 
extra 200 million kina in log export taxes over the four years from 1992 
to 1995 if the new revenue system had already been in place during that 
time. Henderson' s own method of calculating logging company profits 
appears to relate to the boom years of 1993-94, when log prices did 
sometimes reach US$180 per cubic metre, but it would certainly not be 
valid under the new revenue system, even if we accept Henderson' s 
assertion that the average cost of production is as low as US$40-45 per 
cubic metre. 4 
Since the logging companies are not public companies, the average 
cost of production has to be estimated by various indirect methods, and 
it is hardly surprising to find a wide discrepancy between the estimates 
made by industry spokesmen, which average around 90-100 kina per 
cubic metre at current prices, and those made by economists in the 
World Bank and the PNG Forest Authority, which average around 60-
70 kina per cubic metre. The loggers have been threatening a 'capital 
strike' if they are forced to pay the new royalty rates as well as the new 
levels of export tax, and have based this threat on the claim that the 
new revenue system will prevent them from ever making a 'windfall 
profit' of any kind, and will therefore discourage further investment in 
the industry. The World Bank, for its part, has announced that it will 
fund a special study of this issue, while the Prime Minister and Forests 
Minister have been making ambivalent noises about the new revenue 
system for the better part of 1996. 
It is in this light that we need to consider the national government's 
recent decision to thumb its nose at the World Bank by passing an 
amendment to the 1991 Forestry Act which would enable Cabinet to 
stack the National Forest Board with members of its own choosing. This 
was seen in many quarters as a return to the bad old days of the 1980s, 
when ministerial control over the allocation of timber permits was the 
key which opened the door to massive corruption. The only defence 
which the Forests Minister could offer against this charge was that the 
government had decided to speed up the allocation of new timber 
permits in order to raise the annual timber harvest to 5 million cubic 
metres and thus help to plug the holes in its budget. But the Bank had 
already made it very clear that it did not regard this as a sustainable 
level of harvest, nor did it approve of the government's persistent 
attempts to erode the autonomy of the National Forest Board. The 
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amendment has therefore caused the Bank to withhold the second 
tranche of a loan negotiated in 1995 as part of a wider 'structural 
adjustment' program to which the government had otherwise given its 
assent. From a strictly economic point of view, we may therefore ask 
whether the value of the additional revenue raised by the extra timber 
concessions will outweigh the opportunity cost of the financial 
assistance which will no longer be forthcoming from the Bank and 
other donors. If the answer is negative, and if the government now 
makes any moves to reduce the impositions of the new revenue system, 
then its claim to be acting in the interest of national sovereignty and 
fiscal responsibility will look remarkably hollow. 
Community attitudes 
One of the reasons why the World Bank and other donor agencies have 
consistently underestimated the difficulty of establishing a regime of 
'sustainable forest management' in Papua New Guinea is because they 
have tended to assume that the vast mass of the rural population has a 
natural interest in the conservation of natural resources. They have 
been encouraged to make this assumption because they are seeking to 
please the Green constituency in their own countries of origin, and this 
constituency subscribes to a romantic vision of 'indigenous rainforest 
peoples' which is hardly more than the myth of the noble savage 
dressed up for post-colonial discourse. Since the vast bulk of Papua 
New Guinea's forest resource remains under customary tenure, this 
vision encourages the belief that the goal of sustainable management 
can readily be achieved by clearing away the undergrowth of 
misconceptions generated by a corrupt and unrepresentative political 
elite which lives in the pockets of the logging industry. But this belief 
does not sit well with the practical experience of government and non­
government agencies engaged in the pursuit of this gc:>al. 
Henderson is perfectly right to say that villagers are only interested 
in conservation if it is the by-product of an alternative form of 
development of the kind promoted by his own organisation, and small­
scale ecoforestry is indeed one of the few alternatives which seems to 
make much economic sense in those parts of the country where the 
natural forest is under immediate threat from large-scale industrial 
logging. On the other hand, the viability of this alternative is not only 
dependent on the development of a mutually beneficial relationship 
between domestic producers and foreign consumers of eco-timber, 
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which has not been an easy thing to accomplish, but also depends to a 
great extent on the leadership and enthusiasm of ' charismatic 
entrepreneurs' like Max Henderson, who are themselves in short 
supply. The basic problem here, which is both a political and an 
economic problem, is to persuade rural villagers to forsake a form of 
'resource dependency', in which they receive a substantial short-term 
windfall without having to lift a finger, and opt instead for a form of 
'self-reliance' which will eventually yield them a higher income in 
return for a substantial labour input. Fighting the loggers on this terrain 
is not an easy business. 
Henderson acknowledges 'that there are some villagers who will 
sell their heritage and deceive their own communities for short-term 
gain', but he fails to point out that these people are often in the majority, 
and it might therefore be more accurate to say that they are deceiving 
themselves-if indeed their preference for 'free money' counts as an 
example of self-deception. Henderson suggests that the Forestry (Private 
Dealings) Act forced or obliged local villagers to enter into contractual 
relationships with foreign logging companies. Experience in various 
parts of the country, and especially in West New Britain, where the 
provisions of this act were most extensively applied, suggests that 
villagers are only too eager to enter into these relationships. As a 
consequence there has been widespread popular resentment of recent 
government efforts to prevent them from doing such deals by repealing 
the act in question and then by seeking to undermine the political 
influence of landowner company executives who regarded themselves 
as natural leaders of their own communities. In Papua New Guinea, 
where democratic forms of political competition are flourishing as 
never before, it is sometimes hard to avoid the conclusion that people 
get the leaders they deserve. 
According to Henderson, rural communities in Papua New Guinea 
have 'a strong ethos of solidarity and mutual support' .  This may be true 
of some communities, but there is plenty of evidence to suggest that 
many rural communities are riddled with exactly the same kind of 
factional politics that dominates the national political arena. This lack 
of cooperation at the village level poses a problem for all outsiders who 
wish to secure popular support for some kind of 'project' -whether it 
be a large-scale logging project, a small-scale ecoforestry project, or an 
'integrated conservation and development' project. Although it may 
seem at the outset that all sections of the community support 'the 
project', some individual leaders will sooner or later seek to 'capture' it 
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by claiming personal responsibility for its existence or a dispropor­
tionate share of its benefits. This will then prompt other leaders to 
oppose it and seek alternative avenues to secure their own power and 
influence in the community. When it is the loggers who suffer the 
disruptions caused by this kind of conflict, we may not feel too much 
sympathy for them.5 On the other hand, the difficulty of maintaining 
community support for a large-scale logging operation over a long 
period of time is one of the reasons why the loggers are so careless and 
wasteful in their search to extract the maximum volume of logs in the 
shortest possible time. 
It would, of course, be foolish to deny the existence of a wide variety 
of community attitudes in a country which contains literally thousands 
of traditional political communities. On the other hand, if we can learn 
to qualify the romantic vision of 'indigenous rainforest peoples' with a 
serious dose of social realism, we shall be in a better position to see that 
the limited financial and human resources currently being devoted to 
the business of sustainable development in Papua New Guinea need to 
be directed to those particular areas where community attitudes are 
most likely to favour some form of self-reliance against the general 
preference for rental incomes. In that case the efforts of international 
donor agencies and local NGOs alike will not be so frequently wasted 
in the swamps of local 'politics'. 
Notes 
The Forest Authority figures on log export volumes and values do 
not match those produced by the Internal Revenue Commission and 
reproduced in the Bank of Papua New Guinea's Quarterly Economic 
Bulletin . This is because the Authority's figures apply to the logs 
actually shipped in a particular year, while the Commission's 
figures apply to the logs on which taxes are collected, and some of 
these are logs which were actually shipped in the previous year. 
This explains the 'anomaly' which Henderson has discovered in the 
1992 figures, where it appears that log exports (as measured by the 
Commission) exceeded the log harvest (as measured by the 
Authority). 
These figures are taken from the Bank of Papua New Guinea's 
Quarterly Economic Bulletin . It is normally assumed that log export 
taxes account for roughly 96 per cent of all export taxes as shown in 
these bulletins. 
Under the old fiscal regime, different species of timber attracted 
different rates of tax. 
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At a log export price of US$170 (225 kina) per cubic metre, the new 
system has the effect of reducing the logger 's share from 63 to 49 per 
cent of the gross revenue while increasing the government's share 
from 32 to 41 per cent and the landowner 's share from 5 to 10 per 
cent. 
It is not entirely clear to me why Henderson thinks that 'we have to 
fight' against a situation in which one group of villagers was 
apparently able to relieve a group of loggers of 300,000 kina in cash 
bribes without actually losing any of their logs. Should we not 
rather applaud them for their brilliance? 
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International trade for local 
development: the case for western 
Solomon Islands fair trade 
J aap Schep 
This paper is a case study on the use of forest resources. In the Pacific 
region the Melanesian countries, especially Papua New Guinea and 
Solomon Islands, are experiencing large-scale logging operations in 
their rainforests, mainly implemented by East Asian companies. The 
social, economic and environmental impact of these operations will be 
briefly mentioned here, but the emphasis of this chapter will be on 
possibilities to counteract the undesirable effects of these overseas 
economic interests. I will introduce a local initiative, the Solomon 
Western Islands Fair Trade (SWIFT) project, which aims to transport 
and market sustainably produced sawn timber as an effort to develop 
and manage natural resources for the benefit of the local society. We 
hope SWIFT will demonstrate that the export of sawn timber and 
improvement of marketing opportunities at the local level promotes 
local development. When natural resources are managed under Forest 
Management Plans as proposed by SWIFT this local development is 
also sustainable. 
Local development means the improvement of living conditions and 
income opportunities at the village level. Sustainable local development 
adds ecological, social and cultural appropriateness to the common 
socioeconomic parameters of development. Although Solomon Islands 
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is mainly rural, with some 2,000 small villages, development in 
Solomon Islands-at the national level, especially in terms of economic 
growth or GDP-does not mean simply multiplying 'development' at 
the local village level by 2,000. Development parameters at the national 
level reflect another type of economy, which is unfortunately hardly 
related to village level development, let alone the improvement of living 
conditions on remote islands. National development data refer mainly 
to the small urban and formal economic sector and national 
infrastructure development hardly reaches the village level. It must be 
noted that the SWIFT model so far does not provide answers at the 
national level which can be expressed in national development 
parameters. However, if forest resources throughout the Solomons were 
to be managed in a sustainable way with maximum economic returns 
produced for and by village people, it would definitely provide an 
avenue for development which would support the national budget. 
The international context of our case reveals the standard pattern of 
international economic relations between strong and vulnerable 
economies, characteristic of small island countries. We can easily 
observe the disadvantages of dependency, increasingly adverse terms of 
trade, poor negotiating power and serious damage to natural 
environments. This paper will not attempt to describe and analyse 
these weaknesses at the national economic and political level; it 
focuses on the opportunities and challenges of the private, non­
govemmental level, organised to promote local village development. 
The SWIFT project and concept, as a so called 'fair trade' initiative 
focussing on sustainable management of forest resources, may be an 
alternative non-government initiative that does not suffer from these 
national disadvantages. We will see that control over trading structures 
is crucial for the success of this approach. If village producers were to 
produce timber, whether or not in a sustainable way, and were to sell it 
on an existing local, national or international market, they would again 
suffer from adverse terms of trade, poor negotiating power, high costs of 
transport and so on. 
Solomon Islands in the i nternational context 
In terms of international economic relations, Solomon Islands is seen as 
a supplier of raw material, with certain natural resources of interest to 
private companies from other countries. There is exploitation of marine 
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resources, of mineral resources (gold, bauxite and nickel deposits) and 
forest resources. Solomon Islands has experienced a rather late 
flowering of interest in its resources, mainly because earlier colonial 
economic ventures by private enterprises faced high costs and only 
moderate returns. For example, Lever Pacific Timbers, which conducted 
the first logging operations in the western part of the Solomon Islands, 
was concerned about the corporate image of the parent company 
Unilever but unable to resolve cultural and environmental objections to 
its operations due to cost factors, so decided to withdraw, transferring 
its licences to Asian operators. Now with the Asian economic �tigers' 
running to secure their increasing need for raw materials there is a new 
interest in the Pacific region with exploitation becoming economically 
viable mainly because of the lower cost levels borne by Asian 
companies. As a small island country, Solomon Islands has 
experienced within a few years clear negative impacts on social, 
political, economic and environmental conditions. 
In the second half of the 1980s Solomon Islands received many 
Asian combined government and private company delegations offering 
aid packages and looking for investment opportunities and access to 
marine and forest resources. The Solomon Islands government had few 
options for economic development, since the domestic market is small, 
without strong buyers and faces high distribution costs. It is no 
surprise that the government turned to natural resource development 
(more accurately, exploitation) as a means to increase national income. 
With decreasing funds for essential government services such as health, 
education and infrastructure from traditional income sources, it had to 
tum to selling off resources bit by bit. This created a situation in which, 
for example, the western part of Solomon Islands presently has nine 
logging companies extracting some 500,000 cubic metres of round logs 
annually, twice the sustainable rate according to international experts. 
Large-scale forest exploitation with round log export is now the 
main commercial activity in Solomon Islands. The government relies 
heavily on income derived from it, and there is also substantial 
personal income from logging going into the pockets of politicians and 
other influential people. The economic and political situation of 
Solomon Islands enables overseas logging companies to gain a strong 
grip on the national government through bribery and corruption. Of the 
official national income from round log export, 76 per cent is derived 
from logging operations in the two western provinces--Choiseul and 
Western Province, the project area of SWIFT. 
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The role of the U nited Church i n  development work 
This is the context in which SWIFT was started, as an initiative to 
counteract socially, economically and environmentally disastrous 
development. We will briefly touch on the set of beliefs on which the 
concept and practice of SWIFT is based. The United Church, the local 
Methodist church of the western Solomon Islands, has established an 
Integrated Human Development Programme (IHDP) to co-ordinate its 
involvement in education, health and village-oriented economic 
projects. Its contribution to education is mainly through vocational 
training in short and longer term courses, mainly for drop-out youth. 
Health involvement is through a small hospital, a few clinics and 
health touring. Solomon Western Islands Fair Trade (SWIFT) was 
established by the United Church in August 1994 to create a legal 
structure for its economic programs. The three first words of the SWIFT 
acronym represent the geographical area of the operation, Western 
Solomon Islands. This is an area of some 500 small and 10 bigger 
islands, 800,000 hectares with 90 to 100,000 inhabitants. The words 
'Fair Trade' were chosen because unfair terms of trade are at the root of 
underdevelopment and exploitation, internationally, but also at the 
local and national levels. SWIFT strongly believes that economic 
development in our project area can only take place under fair terms of 
trade and with a strong emphasis on the sustainability of economic 
activities. In the Solomons as a whole the subsistence economy is still 
predominant, with a rapid transition to a cash economy in areas closer 
to the few bigger villages. Economic development in such a context 
tends to cash in on whatever is at hand, without any long-term 
considerations. Facing the dominant issue of destructive logging 
operations, SWIFT's first priority has been to facilitate marketing and 
transport of sustainably produced sawn timber. 
Between 1985 and 1992, the IHDP supported several so called 
'socioeconomic' projects such as piggery, poultry, cattle, cocoa, fishery 
and pineapples, initiated by local communities. The IHDP five year 
review (1993) revealed ineffectiveness in these· projects. As a result of 
the review the Board of IHDP advised the United Church Synod to stop 
supporting such projects, scattered over too many islands and in too 
many different economic sectors. Insufficient know-how was available 
and all projects suffered from serious imperfections in infrastructure. 
During the review, which included extensive travelling in remote 
areas, people asked the IHDP to assist in marketing and transporting 
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timber. They were being cheated by traders and middlemen and 
suffering from a lack of transport facilities. Certain skills in timber 
production were clearly present and people had access to land and 
trees through their customary rights. Timber itself as a product has 
advantages; it is not perishable (when well kept), it has a good price 
and there is a good demand locally as well as internationally. The 
United Church had to consider whether to embark on economic 
programs at all. Is the IHDP equipped to support commercial activities? 
Are these activities not more appropriate for financial institutions like 
the Development Bank of Solomon Islands? 
The Church, however, has a long history of opposition to large-scale 
logging. From 1982 onwards, Bishop Boseto conducted 'land 
workshops', aiming at settling land disputes through reconciliation, to 
re-enforce the consensus on customary landrights. These workshops 
focussed on 'worthy customs' (the guiding principles of community 
leadership), the influence of Christianity, and on restoring consensus 
about land rights and boundaries. The land workshops, however, also 
discussed and subsequently opposed socially and destructive large­
scale logging activities. The reality was that more and more villages 
were being visited by logging company representatives trying to buy 
allies in the village leadership in order to obtain access to village 
resources. The importance of basic legal and environmental awareness 
amongst church members was recognised by the United Church, but 
the moral opposition had yet to put in operation a realistic economic 
alternative. In a few cases villages started to give in to the companies 
because they had no other options for cash income. 
The SWI FT eco-timber program 
This was the historical context of the United Church decision to embark 
on this ambitious socio-political and economic program. The long-term 
political aim of SWIFT' s timber program is to enable people to say 'no' 
to offers from logging companies by empowering them economically. A 
second aim is to promote sustainable timber production for community 
needs and for earning a cash income by selling sawn timbers to local 
and export markets. This economic aim focuses on the direct, short-term 
interests of the people. For the United Church this economic program 
must first and foremost effectively enable people to throw greedy 
logging companies from their lands. After preparations to increase 
economic awareness and introduce small-scale sustainable forest 
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management, there was an enormous response when resource owners, 
realised that they could achieve a high price for their timber. 
SWIFT' s fair trade approach to pricing is to calculate the costs of 
timber transport and handling in the Solomons (now at SI$400 per 
cubic metre) and deduct that margin from the free-on-board price that 
SWIFT would receive on the eco-timber export market. Purchases 
included second grade timber which could be used for local (IHDP) 
construction activities. Instead of the expected 50-60 groups, within six 
months some 240 groups had produced and sold sawn timber to 
SWIFT. After organising several courses in Sustainable Forest 
Management and courses in Timber Grading, SWIFT started on 2 
September 1994 to purchase timber from these groups. At that time 
SWIFT did not check the production methods in the bush for each and 
every lot of timber. Only so called 'environmental impact reports' were 
produced at random by trained 'barefoot' foresters. The reason for this 
was that SWIFT had to know the strength of the 'economic engine' of 
the program and be absolutely sure that the production of timber was 
the result of sustained interest, not just temporary enthusiasm for a 
novel project. In the first nine months of buying timber SWIFT bought 
some 1,100 cubic metres of sawn timber, after which we adjusted the 
annual volume from 500 cubic metres to 1,500 cubic metres. 
Our next step was to start to safeguard the sustainability of the 
scheme. Although the SWIFT courses were on 'sustainable' forest 
management, there is a natural preference for ' convenient' forest 
management, for instance milling the nearest big tree and then the next 
nearest one. From 25 March 1995 SWIFT only purchased timber from 
producers who had made a management plan for designated one 
hectare blocs of forest. From then on the SWIFT foresters were in great 
demand to assist producers in making forest inventories and plans. 
Gradually the forest management plans became better, although SWIFT 
was still unsure about the annual allowable cut in �erms of 
sustainability. As a second step, towards certification under the Forest 
Stewardship Council principles and criteria, we requested the 
producers to be properly licensed for felling and milling and for 
business. Almost all producers use a chainsaw and frame; only in three 
cases is a group using a so-called wokabout (portable) sawmill. Group 
composition varies: some are clan groups, most are families working on 
allocated blocs of forest, and some are occasional community groups 
that mill a tree for communal income generation, for example to 
purchase roofing iron for a church or clinic. 
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The crux of the program is a specific set of interests that must 
somehow all balance out. These interests may be private or communal, 
short term or long term, environmental or cash generating. The players 
are private people or families, clan groups, the United Church 
leadership, the SWIFT Board, and the critical consumers of so called 
eco-timber. The big issue is to make sure that SWIFT continues to 
balance these interests. It promotes slow and careful forest operations, 
not easy money for no effort, but a good fair price to encourage hard 
work. As a direct result there has been a substantial decrease in logging 
agreements between clan groups and companies, in our view, 
improving the long-term development prospects of the Solomon 
Islands. We also certify the method of timber production. This is 
important in order to find a niche market for this timber at premium 
prices, but the certification must not become so restrictive to the 
landowners that they feel their short-term interests are damaged. 
Can SWIFT serve as a model? 
There is nothing new in the SWIFT concept and there are other and 
earlier efforts to organise community forestry. But SWIFT was not 
started as a forestry project per se. From the very beginning timber 
production was the essential means for achieving the main objective: to 
enable land and tree-owners to say 'no' to the logging companies. For 
that reason SWIFT started with action, rather than by preaching. 
However, it had several built-in advantages. Solomon Islands had 
already gone through many programs and projects which resulted in a 
basic environmental awareness among a considerable group of people, 
so SWIFT' s sustainable forest management courses did not have to start 
at square one. Economic awareness about the potential value of forest 
resources through fair trade was the real eye opener for all landowners. 
It was the fair market and the fair trade price, serving the immediate 
interests of the people, which caused the massive response. 
Besides, Solomon Islands and Melanesia in general offer certain 
favourable conditions for such projects. In Melanesia rights to land are 
solidly secured in national constitutions. In Malaysia and Indonesia, 
the bumi putra, the 'children of the land' are recognised as living in the 
forest, but they have to leave all decisions to a foster parent, the state, 
which claims to serve their interests. In Solomon Islands, timber rights 
procedures in principle allow clan groups to grant or refuse access to 
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their land. SWIFT aims at changing uninformed decision-making to 
informed, and empowered, decision-making. 
The church network can ensure that such projects are rooted among 
the people. It provides a basic administrative infrastructure in almost 
all villages in the provinces where SWIFT operates. This is a big 
advantage compared to an introduced NGO that depends entirely on 
paid staff. Solomon Islanders have experienced unfair trade for too long 
and are ready for the alternative of Fair Trade. SWIFT is building trust 
by providing transparency, building on a basic trust in the United 
Church. If individuals or a third party were to claim to operate on a 
non-profit basis, people would definitely question it. Even with SWIFT 
organised by their church, people have some doubts and they expect 
the United Church to derive certain unknown benefits from the SWIFT 
operations. But the project benefits from the commitment of the SWIFT 
staff and management and solid support from the church leadership. 
Then there are good quality timber species, and a good standing 
volume in the western part of Solomon Islands with fairly good soils, 
regular rainfall and good re-generation. Milling skills were already 
present and hard work is not avoided. People enjoy producing timber 
when they are working and making decisions for themselves. The 
project area is a small island territory with long coastal lines: once 
SWIFT organises shipping the transport problem is basically solved. 
There are hardly any alternatives for cash income since copra prices are 
low and introducing other products such as cocoa has been vexed. 
Starting up the timber transport and marketing scheme was possible 
because of some available financial resources in the IHDP and it was 
further facilitated by very adequate responses from the Interchurch 
Organisation for Development Co-operation (IODC) in the Netherlands. 
IODC' s funding flexibility has been particularly important in starting 
this process. From the very beginning the transport and marketing 
services in the project have been treated as a business on strictly 
commercial lines, though not for profit. All investment and operational 
costs must be financed either through loans or from the operational 
margin. The calculated margin of SI$400 per cubic metre for all 
handling costs by SWIFT still proves to be adequate, although it has to 
be recognised that the establishment of a timber yard and the purchase 
of a three tonne truck (together SI$367,000) was done with IHDP 
contributions. The landing craft presently under construction in 
Honiara will be fully financed from the trading margin, while some 50 
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per cent of the amount will be furnished as a loan from the 
Development Bank of Solomon Islands. It is completely impossible to 
obtain working capital for the trading activities themselves from 
commercial banks such as the National Bank of Solomon Islands, due 
to the bad reputation of eco-timber exports. Again SWIFT benefits from 
being part of the IHDP structure, because short term internal loans can 
be made from other projects. Computerised financial administration 
allows a strict separation of educational activities, which are 
subsidised by development funds, and economic 'commercial' 
activities, that have to be fully self-financing. If SWIFT were to allow 
subsidies to go into the trade, this would obscure the viability of 
marketing and transport activities of the fair trade scheme. 
This clear distinction between commercial and educational 
activities is now expressed in SWIFT' s organisational structure. In 
SWIFT's Board meeting of 9 February 1996 it was decided to have a 
Marketing and Transport Division (MID) and a Services and Education 
Division (SED). The SED will provide the forestry services and organise 
all educational programs, the legal aid and awareness programs and 
the small feeder roads program. These activities are funded through 
IODC with additional funds from the European Union. The MID has to 
work with commercial loans without external support. However, to the 
outside world, both in the Solomons and abroad, there is only one 
SWIFT and these divisions will not present themselves separately. 
Certification of sustai nabil ity 
In order to present a complete picture on SWIFT we have to focus on the 
sustainability question. SWIFT' s main aim is to stop disastrous large­
scale logging in the interests of future generations. Sustainable forest 
use under commercial exploitation can only be guaranteed through 
forest management plans and controls on the implementation of these 
plans. SWIFT has opted for certification according to the ten Principles 
and Criteria of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). The FSC was 
founded in 1993 by a diverse group of representatives from 
environmental bodies, indigenous peoples' organisations, community 
forestry groups and forest products certification organisations from 
twenty-five countries. It supports environmentally appropriate, socially 
beneficial and economically viable management of the world's forests 
by evaluating and accrediting certifiers of forest managers and 
products. Certification, which forces SWIFT to be clear and strict on 
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sustainability, has a positive effect on the production process in the 
Solomons, but it also improves the marketing and the prices on the 
export market. This explains SWIFT's strong commitment to the FSC. 
SWIFT aims to be accredited as a producers' association, either directly 
with the FSC or through Societe Generale de Surveillance, a certification 
institute. SWIFT has to control the producers after approval of their 
forest management plans. These certification bodies ensure compliance 
with SWIFT's own procedures and policies and implement random 
checks in the forest areas. In a pilot phase (February 1996) nine 
producers were certified through SGS assessments and in the process 
SWIFT had to elaborate the Principles and Criteria of the FSC. 
Forestry concepts such as 'annual allowable cut' and 'natural re­
generation' need to be interpreted to fit the social and cultural setting of 
Solomon Islands. In accordance with land rights and customary rules 
for decision making, SWIFT developed an Environmental Pledge and 
the Mutual Trust Memorandum of Agreement. These two documents, to 
be signed by the traditional leaders of the clan or village, commit the 
land and sea resources of the people to sustainable development. In 
return SWIFT commits itself to provide the services enabling the 
community to develop its resources. The documents help to settle 
questions of land and boundaries and provide a degree of legally 
sound documentation to deal with problems such as a small sub-group 
of a clan trying to deal with a logging, mining or fishing company. The 
documents signed with SWIFT may contribute evidence on behalf of 
disadvantaged groups if such disputes come to court. 
Land disputes, court injunctions and clan or inter-family rivalry are 
difficult matters to settle in the FSC certification process. Labour 
conditions and especially safety measures also have a long way to go 
before the Solomon Islands' reality meets global FSC standards. For 
larger forest areas, forest inventories need accurate calculations of the 
standing volume and the plans need reliable assessments of potential 
natural re-generation. Is it realistic to assume that SWIFT, as a 
campaigning church organisation, can achieve the required level of 
forestry professionalism? 
SWI FT's t imber on the market 
We should also consider the challenges and problems that SWIFT is 
facing in finding a good, fair and reliable market for the 1,500 cubic 
metres of sawn timber annually, of six species. The local market for 
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timber in the Solomons is a difficult one. Demand tends to be slightly 
higher than supply, long delivery times are common, and delivery 
outside Honiara is troublesome because of poor transport and 
communications. This local market cannot be developed fast enough to 
respond to the marketed volume of the SWIFT project. With SWIFT' s 
own landing craft, it is envisaged that the local market in the Western 
Solomons will improve. It will also become possible to supply the 
Honiara market, although lack of facilities for re-sawing in the SWIFT 
yard will remain an obstacle for some time. It was because the local 
market was not strong enough in the short term and because of 
premium prices for so called 'eco-timber ' on the export market, that 
SWIFT looked at opportunities on the export market. 
Information campaigns on the impact of large-scale logging on the 
global rainforests have had the effect of reducing demand on the 
international market for tropical hardwood. Timber produced carefully 
in the context of a campaign against large-scale logging could therefore 
start by aiming at the special niche market of critical tropical hardwood 
consumers. With FSC certification adding credibility to SWIFT' s eco­
timber, it should certainly find that niche market. But although the FSC 
trademark may satisfy the critical consumer and bodies such as local 
authorities seeking a solution for their tropical hardwood policy, it is 
not enough. Timber species of the Solomon Islands are largely 
unknown in many Western countries, and that market is used to a strict 
first grade timber selection. Quality standards are for a large part 
determining the price level. Also the quality of SWIFT timber, no matter 
how sympathetic the production process, has to meet the same 
standards as timber from large companies coming from unsustainable 
sources and milled in modem high technology mills . This problem is 
now being tackled by timber research on all six species according to 
European standards, commissioned by SWIFT, the results of which 
should facilitate official approval of the Solomons species. The other 
issue, that export timber must be strictly first grade, is being tackled by 
improved grading in the Solomons and professional re-sawing in the 
Netherlands, an expensive process which also increases waste. 
However these costs are unavoidable in creating a competitive quality 
product, for the market will not accept 'beautifully harvested' timber 
when it is poor quality. In the long run SWIFT will also need the Max 
Havelaar hallmark, a system of 'fair trade' certification widely used in 
the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Switzerland. When large­
scale professional suppliers tum to FSC certified production, which we 
88 I Environment a nd development in the Pacific Islands 
hope they will, SWIFT will find it hard to compete in terms of price and 
quality. In that situation SWIFT will need to attract those consumers 
who want to support village-based, small-scale timber production, 
which has a certified fair trade chain. 
Because existing eco-timber traders could not respond to SWIFT' s 
large and, in terms of volume and specifications, uncontrolled 
production, SWIFT was forced to get directly involved in selling on the 
European market. This shifted the priority of SWIFT' s activities towards 
developing a market that can use the six species, six lengths and eight 
sizes. Producers need that flexibility to avoid unnecessary waste and 
are even requesting SWIFT to accept another three species and are 
drawing up forest management plans accordingly. Broadening the 
range of species gives producers better opportunities to select trees 
according to micro-ecological criteria, rather than having to override 
such considerations for the sake of economic interests. SWIFT will have 
to develop a market for additional local tree species. 
The market outlet established to respond to this situation was 
SWIFT Hout bv (SWIFT Timber Ltd), wholly owned by SWIFT in the 
Solomons. SWIFT Hout also works on a non-profit basis and tries to 
achieve the highest possible price for its beautiful timbers, because a 
higher price in Europe means a higher price paid to the producer. If it 
succeeds, the producer in the Solomons should be able to achieve his 
gross target of say SI$5,000 per annum by cutting only two or three trees 
(minus chainsaw costs and depreciation). The same income from 
royalties needs 70-100 trees to be felled by logging companies, with no 
prospect of future harvests. 
SWIFT Hout started with a rather large stock as SWIFT Solomons 
could not afford to stop buying sawn timber from the community 
groups for fear of threatening confidence in the project. So SWIFT 
Solomons continued buying timber by chartering local vessels, mainly 
to promote its scheme, to strengthen its campaign and to keep the 
SWIFT alternative visible and economically attractive for the village 
groups. This meant that SWIFT Hout in the Netherlands continued to 
accept containers of sawn timber, and this meant considerable working 
capital was needed. Furthermore SWIFT did not, yet, have its own 
timber yard so SWIFT Hout was renting space in various places 
according to the orders and the specific processing requirements of the 
timbers. Another basic issue that SWIFT had to resolve was getting the 
Solomons timbers formally accepted by the timber product 
manufacturers association. Besides, the research mentioned earlier 
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takes time. On 1 July 1996 SWIFT Hout became the owner of a 9,370 
cubic metre capacity timber yard in Dieren, near Arnhem, with existing 
re-saw equipment and dry stocking facilities for 3,500 cubic metres. 
This reduced SWIFT's stocking expenses considerably. SWIFT is 
establishing relationships with housing corporations and with public 
works departments of municipalities in the Netherlands. These 
customers will account for the majority of SWIFT' s marketed volume. 
SWIFT also wants to serve the individual critical consumer, producing 
small quantities on specifications, as this provides a concrete means for 
the public at large to opt for sustainable development with their own 
purse. The new yard will be developed with this in mind, for individual 
consumers to come to the yard and pick their own pieces from our wide 
range of sizes and species. Fortunately this yard has the potential, the 
size and the facilities for this. In the long term SWIFT will continue to 
need their loyalty and support for this small-scale initiative. 
Looking back, the forced involvement in marketing in Europe by 
SWIFT has been a blessing in disguise. If SWIFT had been able to sell 
the containers to the existing timber traders, first of all we would have 
remained dependent on their one-sided orders, with a preference for 
two or three species and specific s izes. Villages and islands with poor 
communication would have had problems meeting such prescriptive 
orders, which would also have imposed major constraints on the 
Munda yard. By establishing a SWIFT Hout company and a yard in the 
Netherlands we have shifted this problem to the SWIFT people in the 
Netherlands. Costs are high, but it will produce a better marketing 
structure for the future. These high costs are now the main problem for 
SWIFT Hout in the Netherlands. With sales coming up gradually, 
official admission to the Dutch and European market by the end of this 
year and increased experience with crucial technical questions like kiln 
drying of these unknown species, SWIFT may breathe more easily from 
the end of 1996. The high demand for FSC certified timber is the basis 
for our optimism, while we continue to struggle to clear all obstacles. 
With this determination SWIFT will continue to develop this model for 
sustainable local development, which is supported by international fair 
trade. 
90 I Environment and development in the Pacific Islands 
The Melanesian way of menacing 
the mining industry 
Col i n  Fi ler 
The big Austral ian bites the mud 
In June 1996 Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd, operators of the Ok Tedi mine 
in Papua New Guinea, finally reached an out-of-court settlement with 
Slater and Gordon, the Melbourne law firm which represented the 
claims of various landowning communities living downstream of the 
mine whose subsistence resources had been extensively damaged by 
the discharge of waste material into their river system for more than a 
decade. Under the terms of the settlement, the mining_company agreed 
to fund a substantial compensation package, to pay the legal costs of 
their opponents, and to find new ways of mitigating the physical 
impact of the waste material. The settlement has been widely regarded 
as a victory for what one commentator described as a 'global alliance of 
landowners, ecological activists, anthropologists and lawyers [who 
had] mounted a worldwide campaign to stop the mine from polluting 
the Ok Tedi and Fly Rivers' (Kirsch 1996:14). 
This was only the second episode in the recent history of the local 
mining industry to receive substantial publicity outside of Papua New 
Guinea, the first being the closure of the Bougainville copper mine by 
militant landowners and local secessionists in 1989. The amount of 
publicity which it received was largely due to the fact that it could be 
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readily portrayed and digested as a classic David-and-Goliath struggle 
between downtrodden indigenous peoples and monstrous 
multinational companies. Indeed, this was one of the reasons why 
Slater and Gordon chose to present their case in an Australian court 
and one of the reasons why one of the company's senior executives was 
forced to make the public admission, some time before the settlement 
was reached, that 'BHP had failed in the management of its public 
position over the Ok Tedi issue and that the company could only blame 
itself for its failure' (Post-Courier 29 September 1995). 1 But one of the 
reasons why the company had misjudged its public posture, and thus 
become an easy target for the global green alliance ranged against it, 
was because it had been locked into a national policy process, inside 
Papua New Guinea, where the waters are normally as muddy as those 
of the Ok Tedi river. 
The most determined opposition to the green alliance did not come 
from the company's Australian executives, but from members of Papua 
New Guinea's own national elite or 'ruling class' who resented the 
threat to their own conception of national sovereignty and economic 
priorities. In August 1992, when the German Greens were already 
persuading the German shareholders to sell their own stake in the Ok 
Tedi project, the Minerals and Energy Secretary maintained that 
The State's approach has been to put its cards on the table and 
formally agree to a certain amount of environmental damage as being 
acceptable. The government is in control of the situation and I very 
much resent the attempted interference by outsiders who do not have 
the knowledge or background information to understand. If these 
environmental fanatics were able to have a free hand in PNG, they 
could stir up the mining area and river villages into believing all 
manner of supposed grievances, recruit the odd politician who might 
see some short term selfish gain, and destabilise the whole situation 
(Post-Courier 10 August 1992) . 
In May 1994, when Slater and Gordon explained their decision to 
sue BHP in the Victorian Supreme Court by claiming that the company 
had 'made all the relevant decisions, in particular the environment 
decisions, about the mine at all times', and therefore expected the action 
to receive the support of the PNG government, the leader of PNG' s 
parliamentary opposition described it as the work of 'foreign spivs, 
crooks and carpetbaggers' (Post-Courier 4-5 May 1994). And in 
September 1995, when an Australian philosopher accused BHP of 
making 'fundamental ethical errors', the company's most senior Papua 
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New Guinean manager was said to have replied as follows. 
So people who have never seen my country say they believe that we 
do not have the right to progress. Australians still feel they can tell us 
what to do. They want us to live in a museum, to make countries like 
ours a zoo for them to visit the past. What people on the river want is 
to get rid of the mosquitoes from the marshes, to have houses that 
don't need rebuilding every three months, they want to live longer. 
These are things that come with progress (Thomas 1995) . 
The policy process surrounding the Ok Tedi project was thus seen to 
exemplify, in an especially acute form, the recurrent argument between 
representatives of developed and developing countries on all manner of 
'environmental' issues. But the intensity of this particular dispute owed 
as much or more to the 'moral economy' of the mining industry in the 
colonial and post-colonial relationship between Australia and Papua 
New Guinea as it did to the actual physical impact of this particular 
mine. While Australia and Papua New Guinea both have mineral­
dependent economies, and Papua New Guinea is still dependent on 
Australian economic support, the national elite of Papua New Guinea 
might be forgiven for wondering why they should also be expected to 
buy into the world view which one journalist ascribed to the 'chattering 
classes' of Australia-'that mining is, basically, a filthy rotten business' 
(Callick 1995). 
Now what we seem to have discovered here is not the Melanesian 
way of menacing the mining industry, but a form of national resistance 
to the Western way of doing so. BHP' s Australian executives made the 
mistake of thinking that they could profit from, or hide behind, this 
form of national resistance, while their Western opponents were able to 
paint the Papua New Guinean national elite as pawns and clients of 
the mining company, thus permitting the rest of the national population 
to be portrayed as the natural allies and beneficiaries of the struggle to 
clean up the company's act. 
I do not propose in this chapter to discuss the actual history and 
relative merits of the various ways of dealing with the physical impact 
of large-scale mining operations on the natural environment, for the 
simple reason that I am not qualified to assess either the economic or 
biological costs and benefits of such measures. My concern is with the 
structure of the policy process which embraces such issues, and 
especially with what I take to be a disjunction between the local, 
national and international dimensions of this structure. The central 
question at stake in this multiple process of debate concerns the 
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relationship between ' compensation', 'development' and 'governance' 
within the nation state of Papua New Guinea and-to some extent-the 
wider Melanesian ' culture area' with which its people commonly 
identify themselves. In Papua New Guinea's case, this relationship is 
constructed around a single problematic fact-that 'customary 
landowners' own nearly all the land on which resource 'development' 
takes place, and yet the state claims ownership of nearly all the mineral 
resources which that land contains in order to maintain its right to set 
the terms of that development. 
If I might be allowed to play the devil's advocate, my argument 
would be that the Melanesian way of menacing the mining industry 
has not so far borne much resemblance to the grand struggle of 
indigenous peoples which takes place in the 'collective conscience' of 
coffee shop politicians in Melbourne, London or New York. Of course, 
Melanesian stakeholders can and do sometimes make appeal to this 
collective conscience or form alliances with overseas activists in order 
to pursue their own claims against the multinational mining 
companies. But the indigenous people of Papua New Guinea make life 
unusually difficult for multinational mining companies, not because 
they share philosophical assumptions or oppositional strategies which 
merit the special sympathy or applause of Western environmentalists, 
but because of the characteristic diversity and instability of political 
relationships between Melanesian persons, institutions and com­
munities which constitute their national policy process. 
The recent history of mi neral resource development 
Although the history of the mining industry in Papua New Guinea 
reaches back to the beginnings of the colonial period, a new beginning 
was made with the discovery of the Panguna copper deposit on the 
island of Bougainville in 1964. In the year preceding the formal 
declaration of national Independence in September 1975, the first 
Somare government successfully concluded its renegotiation of the 
1967 Bougainville Copper Agreement and then caused Kennecott to 
abandon the Ok Tedi prospect by insisting that it be developed on the 
basis of the same 'new deal' . In 1981, six years after Independence, 
when the Chan government delivered a new version of the new deal 
with the official birth of Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML), it 
simultaneously failed or refused to undertake the seven-year review 
which was anticipated in the Bougainville Agreement of 1974, despite 
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the loud noise of protest emanating from North Solomons Province. 
From the Bougainvillean (or North Solomons) point of view, one can 
certainly say that what began in 1964 was only redirected or diverted 
by the deals of 1974 and 1981 and was, more obviously, physically 
terminated by the outbreak of the Bougainville rebellion in November 
1988 and the shutdown of Bougainville Copper Limited' s (BCL) mining 
operations in May the following year. But even in the wider national 
perspective, it can be said that these calamitous events inaugurated 
another new phase in the economic and political history of mineral 
resource development. 
In 1988, Papua New Guinea's mineral exports (gold, silver and 
copper) were valued at 861 .5 million kina (equivalent to US$1042.4 
million), which represented 70.5 per cent of domestic exports and 27.2 
per cent of gross domestic product. The bulk of this output came from 
the two major mines at Panguna and Ok Tedi. In 1988 the national 
government's Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund collected 91 .8 
million kina from the mining industry, nearly all of which came from 
BCL in the shape of corporate income tax, dividend withholding tax, 
and the dividends paid on the government's own equity stake in that 
company. These receipts alone represented 13.9 per cent of the 
government's non-grant revenues, but a variety of other taxes levied on 
BCL and 01ML would probably have raised at least another 40 million 
kina, thus making the mining industry responsible for something 
between one fifth and one quarter of all non-grant revenues. 2 
Despite the twelve-year gap between the start of mining operations 
at Panguna (1972) and Ok Tedi (1984), both these mineral deposits were 
initially discovered by a single burst of exploration in the 1960s, which 
in tum was prompted and encouraged by the colonial administration, 
and aided and abetted by the World Bank, as one of several ways to dig 
the economic foundations of an independent nation state. The next 
main burst of mineral prospecting did not occur until the mid-1980s, 
and it was this new wave of exploration which did so much damage to 
the building which had been erected on those earlier foundations, for 
the institutional capacities of the state have been no match for the 
proliferating struggle between all sorts of stakeholders over the 
distribution of real and imaginary mineral revenues. In other words, if 
it is true to say that the PNG mining industry has entered a new phase 
of development (or underdevelopment) since 1988, then it is not 
because there has been any major transformation in the technical, 
economic and occupational structure of the industry itself, but because 
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there have been more dramatic changes in its political surroundings. 
And these are all the more remarkable because so much attention had 
previously been paid to the formation and maintenance of 'national 
mineral policy' as one of the truly distinctive achievements of the post­
colonial state (see Mikesell 1975; Jackson 1982; O'Faircheallaigh 1984; 
Pintz 1984) . 
From this point of view, the flurry of talks and thoughts which bore 
fruit in the Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Act of 1974 and the 
Mining (Ok Tedi) Act of 1976 was the climax of a process of economic 
decolonisation which had already started when Bougainvilleans first 
took issue with the mining plans of CRA and the Australian 
administration. While the Bougainville question loomed large in the 
process of political decolonisation which passed through the 
deliberations of the Constitutional Planning Committee and the design 
of the Organic Law on Provincial Government, and while the Bougainville 
question was also a question of national economic policy, questions of 
national economic policy could not be settled by new constitutional 
arrangements. Nor were they. The architects of the new mineral policy 
were more interested in learning from the mistakes made by 
governments in other mineral-export economies, from Zambia to 
Australia, than from those made by the local colonial administration in 
dealing with the vagaries of Bougainvillean secessionism. 
From their point of view, the 1967 Bougainville Copper Agreement 
was not the detestable tombstone of colonial mineral policy, but an 
imperfect solution to the problem of achieving the best of all possible 
deals between a developing national economy and an industry 
dominated by large foreign companies. But their own solution, like the 
one which it displaced, was based on the assumption that the nation's 
interests would have to be defined and guaranteed by certain central 
bureaucratic institutions of the state engaged in a continuous 
relationship of regulation and negotiation with their foreign capitalist 
counterparts (Garnaut and Clunies-Ross 1983). And this assumption 
was the cornerstone of a 'technocratic consensus' which, until fairly 
recently, allowed or enabled a central bureaucratic elite to secure 
general acceptance of its right to manage the development of the mining 
industry for the long-term benefit of the new nation. 
The Bougainville rebellion was by no means the first sign of a 
decline in the force of this technocratic policy regime. In light of the 
recent episode which I described at the beginning of this chapter, we 
could date the beginning of this process to the night of 6 January 1984, 
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when a catastrophic landslide permanently halted construction work 
on the Ok Ma tailings dam, thus ensuring that the Ok Tedi mining 
project would only proceed in defiance of the safeguards announced in 
its original environmental plan Gackson 1993). This was the first big 
scandal to afflict the local mining industry since Independence, and its 
scale was magnified by rumours that the landslide was deliberately 
engineered to cut the construction costs of the project. Since that time 
the popular fear of physical pollution, especially water pollution, has 
continually combined with the idea that mining companies are by 
nature bound to operate in bad faith to create an undercurrent of public 
suspicion, and occasional whirlpools of public outrage, in which the 
'wicked multinationals' have been construed, in customary terms, as 
king-size sorcerers consuming the vitality of hapless Melanesian 
villagers. 
During the four years from 1982 to 1986, while the ups and downs 
of the Ok Tedi project produced occasional headlines or features in the 
local press, the local technocrats were quietly warming their hands on 
the 'exploration boom' which, in their own minds, symbolised the 
continuity and consistency of their efforts to attract foreign investment 
to the industry. The broader symbolic possibilities of this process only 
began to be revealed when, in October 1986, it produced a scandal of its 
own in the shape of the Placer Pacific share issue. Several 'leaders of 
the nation', most notably the Minister for Finance Sir Julius Chan, were 
accused of taking windfall profits from a 'share float' which the mining 
company had organised precisely (or ironically) with a view to giving 
Papua New Guineans a bigger stake, and thus attracting their political 
support, in the development of its gold prospects at Misima and 
Porgera. The Placer Pacific share issue was front-page news for more 
than two months-long enough to generate a news momentum which 
had a significant effect on the conduct of the 1987 national election 
campaign and induced a sort of mental 'mineral boom' in which the 
production and distribution of mineral resource rent became the subject 
of continual public debate. 
The exploration boom has already produced a succession of new 
developments which arrived just in time to save the state from serious 
financial trouble following the closure of BCL's Panguna mine, but 
which have also provided fresh fuel for public debate over the 
distribution of the benefits. Placer Pacific secured a Special Mining 
Lease and Mining Development Contract for development of the 
Misima mine in Milne Bay Province in December 1987, and Misima 
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Mines began production of gold and silver in June 1989. Placer also 
became the operating partner in the Porgera Joint Venture whose gold 
mine in Enga Province was granted the necessary approvals in May 
1989 and started production in August 1990. The Kutubu Joint Venture 
received its Petroleum Development Licence in December 1990, with 
Chevron as its operating partner, and this project started exporting oil 
in June 1992. The national government has taken a minority equity 
stake in all these ventures, just as it did in BCL and OTML. 
In 1995, Papua New Guinea's mineral exports were valued at 
2435.4 million kina(equivalent to US$1837.5 million), which 
represented 71 .6 per cent of domestic exports. Crude oil exports from 
the Kutubu project accounted for roughly one third, gold for another 
third, and copper and silver together for the remaining third of this total 
export value. Exports from the Ok Tedi, Porgera and Misima mines were 
worth about 916 million kina, 431 million kina, and 172 million kina 
respectively. In 1995 the Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund collected 
281 .7 million kina from the mining and petroleum sector, most of it (91 
per cent) in the form of corporate income tax. These receipts represented 
18.9 per cent of the government's non-grant revenues, which suggests 
that the government's overall dependence on revenues from this sector 
had increased quite considerably since 1988, to the point where they 
must now account for something between one quarter and one third of 
all non-grant revenues. 
Given the current extent of known mineral reserves, the Kutubu, Ok 
Tedi, Porgera and Misima projects are all destined to cease operation 
before the year 2010. On the other hand, a number of new mining and 
petroleum projects were still in the pipeline at the end of 1995. Two 
'medium-scale' gold mines (Tolukuma and Wapolu) both started 
production in December of that year, and two or three more are in 
various stages of development. Of far greater significance, in both its 
scale and its duration, is the development of the Lihir gold mine in New 
Ireland Province, where production is due to start in May 1997, and the 
value of output is expected to average about 287 million kina a year for 
the first fifteen years of a 30-40 year mine life. The Gobe petroleum 
project, a virtual extension of the existing Kutubu project, received its 
development licence in 1996 and thus extended Papua New Guinea's 
role as an oil exporter for another few years. There has even been talk of 
developing a liquid natural gas (LNG) project whose capital cost would 
be greater than the combined cost of all existing mining and petroleum 
operations. 
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Despite these signs of buoyancy, there is also some evidence to 
suggest that the current pattern of mineral resource development may 
not be 'sustainable', even if our definition of 'sustainability' is one 
which allows for the continual discovery of new mineral reserves. For 
example, the Papua New Guinea Department of Mining and Petro­
leum's own figures reveal that hard-rock exploration expenditures have 
declined from almost 69 million kina in 1988 to just over 36 million 
kina in 1995-in real terms (and in US dollars), a fall of more than 60 
per cent over that period. In other words, the ' exploration boom' seems 
to have come and gone. And public statements by industry 
representatives have been increasingly preoccupied with those features 
of the local political environment which I have chosen to describe by 
the title of this chapter. 
The orig ins and i mpl ications of the Bougainvi l le rebell ion 
The outbreak of the Bougainville rebellion and subsequent closure of 
the Panguna copper mine generated a substantial literature over the 
period from 1990 to 1992, much of which was concerned with the ways 
in which the rebellion could be seen as a response to the social, political 
and economic impact of the mining operation, and the extent to which 
these linkages could be seen as characteristic features of the 
relationship between mining companies, local communities and the 
state of Papua New Guinea. All commentators recognised that the 
initial core of the rebel movement was a group of 'militant landowners', 
led by Francis Ona, who had for some time been demanding an 
enormous amount of money from the mining company as compen­
sation for the environmental damage caused by its operations. The 
question was why the demand had arisen at this particular time, what 
the militants really wanted, whether and how they might have reached 
a settlement of their claims, and where they stood or what they 
represented in the regional or national society of which they were a 
part. 
My own answer to these questions (Filer 1990,1992) was to say that 
the rebellion had been nourished by a process of 'local social 
disintegration' which had been magnified to explosive proportions by 
the accumulated economic impact of the mining project, especially by 
the inability of the local community to distribute the economic benefits 
of mining in an equitable manner. Although it was necessary to 
recognise a wide variety of contingent factors which were bound to 
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affect the form and extent of this problem in other parts of the country, it 
could still be said that mineral resource development had a general 
tendency to exaggerate the political fragmentation of local landowning 
communities and the larger national society. The rebels therefore 
represented one section of a community (and a society) whose divisions 
had driven them to formulate a compensation demand which almost 
meant the opposite of what it said, because their real aim was to abolish 
the social conditions of their economic dependency rather than to make 
a new deal with the mining company which had been damaging their 
natural environment. 
Some commentators (notably Griffin 1990) agreed that the rebels had 
an ulterior motive, but regarded the claims made against the mining 
company as an excuse for the resurrection of earlier demands for 
Bougainvillean independence from Papua New Guinea. No-one would 
deny that Bougainville's political status was added to the rebel agenda 
at a fairly early stage in the proceedings, and once the mine had been 
closed it became the main bone of contention in the continuation of civil 
strife in different parts of the province. But this line of argument can 
only explain the original social and economic concerns of the militant 
landowners as a cunning concealment of the truth, even though 
substantial doses of truth were quite obviously present in their own 
formulation of these concerns. According to Larmour (1992), the 
rebellion was fuelled by some potent mixture of ethnic identity and 
class consciousness, but the timing of this chemical reaction remains 
something of a mystery. One of the few academic analysts with first­
hand knowledge of recent developments on the 'strife-tom island' has 
suggested that Francis Ona and his original followers traded their own 
'compensation' agenda with the 'secession' agenda of other 
Bougainvillean groups to form a coalition whose social support was 
then enlarged by the ham-fisted actions of the national 'security forces' 
initially sent in to quell the rebellion.3 
Other commentators took the compensation agenda at face value, as 
a direct and justified response to the fact of massive environmental 
damage, and therefore took issue with the point in my own argument at 
which I had suggested that 'the degree of strife within a landowning 
community ... is proportional to the size of the packages which have 
been delivered to the community by a mining company and the various 
agencies of government' (1990: 104). From case studies of compensation 
agreements in Australia and other parts of the world, O'Faircheallaigh 
has argued that damage to the physical environment is itself a major 
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cause of social conflict within landowning communities, and that it 
goes to the heart of the politics of resource development, because it 
raises starkly the question of power: power over land use, project 
design and environmental regulation, and over the distribution of 
benefits mining can offer, at least on a material level, compensation for 
destruction of land, and wildlife (1992:262) . 
We shall never know what might have happened if the Panguna 
landowners had obtained a larger amount of this power before they 
finally blew their tops. But we may still wonder whether Papua New 
Guinea has the kind of political environment in which their search for 
economic justice could have reached a satisfactory conclusion, largely 
because the state resembles the landowning community in its apparent 
lack of institutional capacity to set the standards for this search. 
Amongst the other arguments which have been used to explain the 
relationship between the mine and the rebellion, most tend either to 
adopt a voluntaristic perspective, in which BCL's surplus product 
figured as the prize in a typical Melanesian 'power game' which 
somehow got out of control (Quodling 1991; Wolfers 1992), or to 
'theorise' the relationship by locating it in a local, national or global 
context portrayed with traditional Marxist concepts like 'class struggle' 
(Thompson 1992), 'mode of production' (Wesley-Smith and Ogan 1992), 
or 'capital logic' (Gerritsen and Macintyre 1992), none of which 
appears to throw much additional light on the matter. All these authors 
recognised the rebellion as a concrete illustration or extreme example of 
a more general phenomenon, and in this sense they shared the views of 
those mining company executives, government officials, and members 
of the general public who all agreed, in the early stages of the rebellion, 
that it taught some kind of lesson about the politics of mineral resource 
development in Papua New Guinea. On the other hand, the long 
duration of the fruitless search for peace on Bougainville seems to have 
induced a revival in the popularity of Griffin's argument that it really 
was a 'special case', either because BCL' s corporate image has lost its 
symbolic value in national political debate, or else because people in 
positions of power and authority believe that they have already done 
what they can to avoid a recurrence of such violent conflict in other 
parts of the country. 
Does the continuing history of conflict between mining companies 
and local communities provide new evidence to support, disprove or 
modify my own inference from the timing of the Bougainville rebellion, 
'that mines in almost any part of Papua New Guinea will generate the 
The Melanesian way of menacing the mining industry I 1 01 
same volatile mixture of grievances and frustrations within the 
landowning community, and, all other things being equal, blow-outs 
will occur with steadily increasing frequency and intensity until there 
is a major detonation of the time-bomb after mining operations have 
continued for approximately fifteen years' (Filer 1990:76)? If there is one 
piece of evidence which should relate to the validity of this hypothesis, 
it might appear to be the recent compensation dispute between BHP 
and the people living along the Ok Tedi and Fly rivers. But 
consideration of the Ok Tedi case also serves to reveal the variety of 
local contingencies which are bound to affect the operation of any 
'general laws' or 'tendencies' in a country like Papua New Guinea. 
The occurrence of the Bougainville rebellion certainly inspired some 
of the people harbouring a grievance against Ok Tedi Mining Limited to 
express their feelings in terms remarkably similar to those which had 
previously been used by Francis Ona and his supporters. One letter 
written to a national newspaper shortly after the Panguna mine had 
been shut down included the following sentiments. 
We, the people who live along the Fly River, will make sure our river 
system is brought back to normal . . .  rinsed clean by the blood of the 
greedy foxes upstream. We will make sure they drink the waste 
themselves, and their blood will be poured into the Fly to bring it back 
to normal if the National Government continues to ignore us . It was 
ignorance of the same kind that the Government is displaying over Ok 
Tedi that has led to the Bougainville crisis. The government never 
listened to the landowners' calls, but treated them like rubbish. And 
now what has happened? Francis Ona's mob is on the move and the 
government is shivering like a sick monkey, hiding at the back of the 
empty safe for which it sacrificed its country. So-a job well done, 
Francis Ona : Keep it up and get rid of those greedy whites and the 
mentally affected government. You've got silent supporters from 
Western Province (Post-Cou rier 9 October 1 989) . 
At the same time, 01ML and its partners in government had drawn 
their own conclusions from the rebellion and agreed that the company 
should establish a new funding mechanism (the Lower Ok Tedi Fly 
River Development Trust) to compensate the people living downstream 
of the mine. This may have moderated the form and extent of local 
hostility, but it obviously failed to prevent the litigation which 
eventually forced the company to make a far more generous settlement. 
If the local landowners resorted to court action rather than armed 
struggle, this choice might be explained by the fact that the mine had 
been operating for less than ten years when the action began, so their 
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grievances had not yet reached the pitch of intensity which existed on 
Bougainville, but it might also have been due to the moderating 
influence of the various foreign stakeholders responsible for interna­
tionalising the dispute. There was certainly no history of secessionist 
sentiment in Western Province which could have served to aggravate 
local feelings of environmental injustice, but there were substantial 
numbers of West Papuan refugees living in the area most seriously 
damaged by the discharge of mine waste, and their presence un­
doubtedly compounded the pressure on subsistence resources (Kirsch 
1989,1993) . 
The one feature of the Ok Tedi dispute which is least consistent with 
my own model of local social disintegration is the absence from this 
dispute of those communities which have so far been the main 
recipients of those mine-related benefits which are dedicated to 'local 
landowners' .  These are the people, roughly 1,500 in number, who hold 
customary title over the Special Mining Lease, the Tabubil town lease, 
and a tailings lease which is restricted to the area around the ill-fated 
Ok Ma dam site. These people have no reason to complain about the 
discharge of waste material into the river system because they are living 
upstream of the damage, but even in 1989, five years after the 
government had allowed OTML to begin mining operations without the 
tailings dam which has previously been required, these were still the 
only people receiving any form of compensation from the company. 
Furthermore, the relatively small size of this landowning group meant 
that each of its individual members had been getting a larger share of 
the whole range of benefits reserved for local landowners than their 
Bougainvillean counterparts. If the intensity of feeling behind the 
Bougainville rebellion was partly due to the inability of the local 
community to distribute the economic benefits of mining in an equitable 
manner, then we might expect to find a higher level of resentment 
amongst these upstream 'landowners' than amongst the downstream 
people who had a very much smaller share in the economic benefits of 
the Ok Tedi mine. 
It is certainly true that the 'upstream people' have launched the 
occasional 'strike' against the mining company-most notably in 
March 1988, when their action incidentally provoked Francis Ona and 
his followers on Bougainville to a new level of aggression in pursuit of 
their own claims. However, in the first five years of the mine' s 
operation, their protests were primarily directed against the presence 
and behaviour of the outsiders hired by the mining company, not 
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against the fact or value of the damage done to their physical environ­
ment. It was only after the outbreak of the Bougainville rebellion, in 
June 1989, that the Ok Tedi landowners began to demand a substantial 
increase in their compensation and rental payments from the company, 
and even then the demands were not motivated by any obvious desire 
to emulate the Bougainvillean example, but rather by the national 
government's own stated desire to renegotiate the whole spectrum of 
landowner benefits in all its mining and petroleum projects. In this case 
also, the company learnt its own lesson from the Bougainvillean 
example, and began to distribute the cash benefits to individual 
landowners rather than to clan agents or community leaders who 
might later be accused of misappropriation. Although the mine has not 
yet reached its fifteenth year of operation, there is very little evidence to 
indicate a recent intensification of social conflict within the upstream 
community, nor much sign that they shared or supported the justified 
resentment of the people who bore the brunt of the downstream damage 
and proved most resolute in their pursuit of a new compensation deal. 
The Ok Tedi case lends rather more support to O'Faircheallaigh' s 
claim that social conflict within landowning communities is a direct 
outcome of damage to their natural environment and can be mitigated 
by the success of their own struggle for reasonable compensation. 
However, the validity of this point depends in part upon the definition 
of the groups involved, since traditional political communities in 
Melanesia are much smaller than the 'landowning groups' whose 
identities are forged by the process of mineral resource development. 
The series of ' deals' between the government and OTML were framed in 
terms of an abstract exchange of economic benefits for environmental 
losses which signally failed, for many years, to take account of the 
spatial distribution of these gains and losses amongst the local 
populations most directly affected by the operation of the mine. The Ok 
Tedi case reveals a complex and enduring pattern of political and 
economic fragmentation within the general category of 'project impact 
area people' which may create a greater menace to the mining industry 
than any process of social stratification within their 'natural' political 
communities. This process of spatial polarisation, extending across the 
boundaries of those areas which the 'landowners' and the government 
have agreed to set aside for mining and related purposes, may also help 
to explain the spread of support for the militant cause on Bougainville 
in ways which previous analysis has overlooked. 
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Mount Kare: the mine that got away 
Mount Kare, located obstinately on the border between the former 
colonial territories of Papua and New Guinea, is an excessively remote 
and miserable place which became famous overnight when a passing 
'landowner' discovered large nuggets of gold along the banks of a 
nearby creek in January 1988. During the course of the next two years it 
was the scene of a remarkable 'grassroots gold rush' in which a small 
army of 10,000 Papua New Guinean prospectors and camp followers 
removed gold worth an estimated 150 million kina with simple tools 
and bare hands (Ryan 1991) .  While some people saw this as a splendid 
demonstration of self-reliance, others were more concerned by the 
inability of the government to either regulate the lucky strike or divert a 
portion of its output into the long-term development of the adjoining 
districts and provinces. 
All this activity took place within the boundaries of Prospecting 
Authority 591, which the government had granted to CRA's local 
subsidiary, CRA Minerals (PNG), back in 1985. Indeed, it is most 
unlikely that the discovery would have been made if CRA had not 
already established its exploration camp in the area. On one 
interpretation of the Mining Act, the company also had a legitimate 
claim to some of the gold which was being removed so brazenly from 
beneath its nose. Given the numbers of people involved in the removal 
exercise, the pursuit of this claim with a distant and visibly impotent 
government would not have made much sense. CRA' s executives 
therefore decided that their best option was to form a joint venture with 
the 'true landowners' of the gold rush site in order to mine those 
quantities of alluvial and colluvial gold which had not already been 
taken by these landowners and their 'guests' .  In this way they also 
hoped to reduce the extent of outside interference with their exploration 
work in the much larger territory covered by PA 591, where it was now 
reasonable to assume the existence of a substantial hard-rock deposit 
associated with the new-found wealth of surface material. 
Since the gold rush site was located in wild alpine grasslands 
which formed a substantial (though not impassable) barrier between 
the settlements of the Paiela people in Enga Province and the Huli 
people in Southern Highlands Province, the number of people who 
could (and did) claim some share of its ownership was much larger 
than it might have been if the fact of ownership had previously had any 
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significant economic value. Nevertheless, the company's consultants 
were able to establish the existence of sixty-one 'landowning sub-clans' 
from both sides of the border, and on this basis to construct and register 
an elaborate hierarchy of business groups and landowner companies 
whose peak body, the Kare-Puga Development Corporation (KDC) was 
duly incorporated in May 1989 and entered into the necessary joint 
venture agreement with its own architects in April 1990. The new joint 
venture company, Mount Kare Alluvial Mining (MKAM), was a cost 
and profit-sharing arrangement in which CRA's own subsidiary, 
Mount Kare Holdings (the holder of PA 591)  held a 51 per cent 
controlling interest. In September 1990 the State granted a Special 
Mining Lease (SML) to Mount Kare Holdings and entered into a Mining 
Development Contract with MKAM.4 
By this time, the easy pickings of the gold rush had been largely 
picked. But these had only served to wet the appetites of several local 
businessmen whose own coffers had swelled by their participation in a 
range of ancillary activities. This group of local capitalists had excellent 
political connections: most of them were either past, present or potential 
members of the National Parliament or the Enga Provincial Assembly. 
They saw no reason why their participation in the development of the 
Mount Kare prospect should be jeopardised by CRA' s determination to 
erect a metaphorical fence around the 'true landowners' of the area and 
a real fence around their own mining camp. In sundry combinations 
and alliances, they did all they could to wrest the fabled golden prize 
from the wicked multinational monster in its mountain hideout. 
They first sought to dissuade the government from granting the SML 
by claiming that CRA had 'caused' the Bougainville rebellion-hardly 
a novel idea but one which was guaranteed to raise additional support 
in the national political arena. They also took a leaf out of Francis 
Ona' s book by complaining that CRA had manipulated the definition 
and organisation of 'landowners' to exclude its own opponents-an 
argument which persuaded the Justice Minister to suggest that 'all CRA 
applications should be stopped and careful landowner studies made' 
before another mining lease was issued to the company (Post-Courier 20 
August 1990). Meanwhile, in July 1990, an Engan politician persuaded 
Parliament to amend the Mining Act by granting 'landowners' an 
automatic right of ownership over all minerals which lay within a 
certain distance of the surface of the ground. Some MPs may have 
supported this amendment because they thought it merely gave legal 
sanction to what had already taken place at Mount Kare, but the KDC 
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directors published a full-page advertisement in the national daily 
newspaper in which they claimed that it was part of a 'conspiracy' by 
certain politicians 'to break up the KDC-CRA negotiations and tempt 
landowners with promises of a better deal with companies with which 
they have business dealings' (Post-Courier 16 August 1990) . 
Perhaps the advertisers already knew what was about to happen 
when the SML was actually issued. In the following week, the KDC 
Chairman jumped the metaphorical fence and initiated legal action to 
challenge the validity of the lease. This was done at the instigation of 
two other dissident landowners who rapidly added their own names to 
the proceedings and threw in an extra constitutional challenge to 
Section 7 of the Mining Act, which declared that all mineral resources 
were the property of the State. While this case was bouncing back and 
forth between the National and Supreme courts, the dissidents 
persisted in their efforts to win over individual members of the KDC 
board while making loud complaints about CRA's 'divide-and-rule 
tactics'. To reinforce their point, in March 1991, they organised an 
armed raid on the MKAM mining camp and forced the manager to sign 
a written undertaking that CRA would build a road from Paiela to 
Porgera. And in August 1991 the Minister for Minerals and Energy told 
Parliament that he had asked Cabinet to deal with CRA's application 
for a renewal of its prospecting authority (PA 591) because he and his 
departmental secretary had both been subject to death threats and he 
felt that 'certain elements of Mt Kare landowners were threatening 
another situation similar to Bougainville' (Post-Courier 29 August 1991; 
Times of PNG 12 September 1991). 
The dissident landowners had lodged their own application for the 
same glittering prize through a company called Amadio, which had 
entered into an agreement with two small Western Australian 
prospecting companies, Ramsgate Resources and Menzies Gold, to 
share the costs and benefits of removing CRA from Mount Kare. In 
effect, Ramsgate and Menzies had agreed to foot the bill for the various 
court battles in which Amadio' s directors were engaged, and had 
promised their 'landowning' partners a 50 per cent share in any 
mining operation which they managed to establish in the wake of 
CRA's departure. When Cabinet decided to renew CRA's hold on PA 
591 for a further two years, the validity of the decision was naturally 
added to the list of issues in the litigation which Amadio' s new 
benefactors had agreed to fund. 
Impatient perhaps with the slow progress of their legal action, the 
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dissident landowners organised another, bigger raid on the MKAM 
mining camp one night in January 1992. This time they forced the 
workers at gunpoint to set fire to the installations and equipment, stole 
all the gold and cash they could find in the company safe, and left 
behind a note telling CRA to get out of the area. The Prime Minister, 
Rabbie Namaliu, asked for 'the reaction of those Opposition leaders 
who have sought to be involved in the question of mine ownership' 
(Post-Courier 13 January 1992), but the only reaction he got was a series 
of verbal attacks on his own government's failure to address the 
demands of the 'true landowners' or prevent CRA from using its 
customary 'divide-and-rule tactics'. As in the case of the earlier raid, 
some of the truly divided landowners were duly arrested and charged 
on a number of counts, but most of the charges were eventually 
dropped or mislaid. One of the individuals charged in connection with 
the second attack was also one of the plaintiffs engaged in the legal 
battle over the mining lease and the prospecting authority, and the 
publicity generated by his encounters with the law may have helped to 
secure his entry to Parliament in the national election of June 1992. 
By this time the dissidents were also claiming control of Kare-Puga 
Development Corporation-a somewhat hollow victory (even if it was 
real) because the company was almost immediately placed in 
receivership by its main creditor, the PNG Banking Corporation, on 
account of ' grave concerns held by the bank over the much publicised 
litigation which has contributed to delays in re-opening the mine site' 
(Post-Courier 29 June 1992) . Yet this was only a minor setback when 
compared with the political complexion of the new coalition 
government formed in the wake of the national election. Not only had 
the new Prime Minister, Paias Wingti, been the Opposition Leader who 
refused to condemn the January raid, but his Eng an Minister for Mining 
and Petroleum, Masket Iangalio, appointed as his personal adviser the 
very man who had brokered Amadio's deal with Ramsgate and 
Menzies. The Minister made noises about his sincere desire 'to help the 
landowners settle their differences', but CRA' s executives could see the 
writing on the wall. They offered to transfer the whole of CRA' s stake in 
MKAM to the 'properly identified landowners through their originally 
established ownership structure' on condition that Amadio and its 
Australian 'financiers' were persuaded to desist from their legal 
challenge to CRA's hold on PA 591 and excluded from any beneficial 
interest in the alluvial mining operation which had recently been 
recommissioned in an effort to clear KDC' s debt to the bank. 
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The Minister at first seemed sympathetic, for he could see that 'CRA 
was a bit fearful that the West Australian crowd might get in there and 
manage this on behalf of the people' and therefore gave his 'under­
taking that this will not be the case' (Post-Courier 12 November 1992) . 
But two weeks later he made a statement in Parliament accusing CRA of 
bribery, corruption, manipulation and misrepresentation, and would 
clearly have nothing more to do with them. In February 1993 the com­
pany announced that it would suspend the alluvial mining operation 
'as an act of goodwill in accordance with the wishes of the Minister ' 
(Post-Courier 25 February 1993). By the end of March they had grown so 
weary of the whole business that they declared force majeure and 
literally walked (or rather flew) away from both the mining lease and 
the prospecting authority. With a nice touch of irony, the Minister 
described this as a 'provocative act' and an 'ill-conceived move' (Post­
Courier 29 March 1993) . 
Within a few days of CRA's evacuation, Ramsgate's Managing 
Director announced the conclusion of a new 'management contract' 
under which the Australian partners would help KDC to pay its debts 
as soon as the hard-rock rights were in the bag, and apparently had 
some reason to think that 'it would be futile for anyone else to apply for 
the exploration licence' (Post-Courier 14 April 1993). But he was wrong. 
Come October there were three different 'landowner groups' in 
competition for the licence, each with its own joint venture partners, 
and the Mining Registrar therefore conducted a ballot under Section 
100 of the new (1992) Mining Act to determine which of the applications 
would be dealt with first. The company which won the ballot, Matu 
Mining, was the local subsidiary of another Australian company, 
Carpenters Pacific Resources, which had picked up the support of a 
landowner faction which had previously been on CRA's side of the 
fence. Not to be outdone, Amadio's supporters in government produced 
an amendment to the Mining (Transitional Provisions) Regulation which 
would have the effect of invalidating the issue of the licence to anyone 
except the holder of the Special Mining Lease which KDC had inherited 
from CRA. And so began another round of lucrative employment for the 
lawyers of Port Moresby. While the matter has remained before the 
courts, there has been no further exploration or development of Mount 
Kare' s mineral resources except for what little remains to be captured 
with buckets and spades. 
There are two morals which I should like to extract from this 
tortuous saga. The first is the cumulative absence of any distinctive 
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moral value or any sign of 'indigenous heroism' from the mutually 
frustrating and denigrating endeavours of the various stakeholders. 
And the second is the sheer variety of ' strategies and tactics' by which 
the actors brought about the stalemate none of them had wanted. The 
Melanesian way of menacing the mining industry is thus revealed as 
one which has a multitude of menaces but very little in the way of 
moral messages or purposes. 
In your  face or beh i nd your back 
After the second armed assault on the Mount Kare mining camp in 
January 1992, the national government decided to create a special 
police mobile squad, to be known as the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) 
to provide 'round-the-dock' security for the country's mining and 
petroleum projects. The first members of the new squad graduated from 
their three-week training course at the beginning of June and were 
promptly deployed to Porgera, whose proximity to Mount Kare was 
assumed to create a special need for their services. This caused a good 
deal of confusion in the local community because Porgera already 
boasted a regular police force and a police mobile squad, as well as the 
company's own security force. The mining company agreed to 
accommodate the new squad (with an appropriate deduction from its 
tax bill) in the absence of any spare government housing. But the 
management had cause to regret their act of hospitality in October 1992 
when an RDU member allegedly shot and killed a local 'landowner ', 
thus provoking an armed assault on the company's residential 
compound which cost about 1 million kina in repairs and 
improvements to security installations, and which also frightened a 
number of staff and workers into tendering their resignations. 
Whether or not the victim of this random yet typical act of police 
violence was a 'landowner ' in the strict sense of the word is not clear. 
Many of those who joined in the attack were recruited from the large 
number of 'squatters' or 'outsiders' attracted to Porgera by its wealth of 
economic opportunities and social services, and who now greatly 
outnumber the original inhabitants of the area. In this overcrowded and 
volatile social formation Bonnell argued 
There are plenty of Porgerans with grievances against the mine and 
vast numbers of idle outsiders ready to fuel these grievances or join in 
demonstrations . . .  Many come for the excitement and form the bulk of 
the ever ready rent-a-crowd that join in the fights and riotous 
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behaviour which have become a standard feature of pay day (Bonnell 
1994:90-1) .  
The author of this comment spent three years working in PJV' s 
Community Affairs Division, and most people familiar with the work of 
that outfit will attest to the accuracy of her analysis. The 'rampage' of 
October 1992 is only an extreme example of the episodic violence which 
is a hallmark of 'political' relationships between all sections of the local 
community, and over which it is the function of the company's 
community liaison staff to pour large quantities of metaphorical cold 
water. 
Many commentators, inside and outside of the industry, would say 
that the 'siege mentality' which has been typical of the corporate 
posture at Porgera and Mount Kare is simply a response to the regional 
political culture of the central highlands of Papua New Guinea, where 
the constant threat and occasional use of violence is the normal form of 
'negotiation' or ' dispute settlement' . In the period since Independence, 
central highlanders seem to have developed a form of 'law and order ' 
which features a combination of excessive compensation claims, 
criminal acts of extortion, riotous mob behaviour, punitive police raids 
on local villages, and the conduct of 'traditional' tribal feuds with hand 
grenades and M16s. Although this may sound like a recipe for anarchy, 
it is a situation in which mining companies can and do continue to 
operate by bargaining their way through successive confrontations as if 
they were unusually wealthy tribes or clans whose wealth contributes 
in equal amounts to the creation and resolution of additional public 
order problems. 
There is certainly much less evidence of outright confrontation 
between company and community representatives in other parts of 
PNG. For example, the anthropologist who was engaged to assess the 
social impact of the Wapolu gold mine in Milne Bay Province wrote that 
the local villagers had a 'colonial history of neglect and quiet 
disillusionment' and a 'cultural disposition to be mild and unassertive' 
which was liable to disguise and prolong the growth of their 
resentment at the damage caused by the mining operation. 
The outburst, if and when it comes, might seem distorted, 
disproportionate, and not necessarily directed at a solution to the 
problem. Their anger is unproductive and inclined to be self­
destructive. Being hurt, they will hurt themselves further to try and 
hurt the cause of their resentment. How this could manifest if there 
was a deep groundswell of resentment against the Company I can 
only speculate. But it would not generate (as in the Highlands) a 
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decorated threatening mob. More likely one would see a campaign of 
resentful obstruction: the withdrawal of labour and services, studied 
avoidance of the camp, and quietly sabotaged roads (Young 1987:4) . 
The superficial or initial absence of hostility need not imply a 
different level, but only a different form, of resentment and resistance. 
Some of the company and government personnel who negotiated the 
development of the Porgera mine would say that it is easier to strike 
meaningful agreements with the leaders of a '  decorated threatening 
mob' than with people whose reticence borders on passive resistance. 
And the eruption of the Bougainville rebellion suggests a '  deep 
groundswell of resentment' may prove much harder to manage. 
Although Papua New Guineans themselves contribute to the 
maintenance of such stereotypical contrasts between highland and 
lowland (or island) cultures, the volume and form of violent action 
against mining and petroleum companies is not simply a function of 
this regional diversity. First, the movement of people and ideas between 
different parts of the country provides a constant source of novelty or 
unpredictability in the approaches which local community leaders can 
make to the negotiation of mineral resource development. And second, 
the mining industry, like other sectors of the modem capitalist economy, 
is constrained by forms of violence which owe more to the current 
formation of national institutional relationships than to the vagaries of 
regional custom. It was not only the pent-up anger of militant 
landowners but also the institutionalised violence of the 'security 
forces' which put an end to the mining industry on Bougainville, just as 
it provoked the armed assault on Porgera Joint Venture's (PJV) 
residential compound in 1992. Wildcat 'strikes' by mineworkers also 
tend to involve a measure of personal intimidation and physical 
destruction which would be regarded as a serious threat to public order 
in many other national settings, but which Papua New Guineans seem 
to accept as part of the definition of a 'strike', even if their leaders still 
deplore the 'strikes' of workers and landowners alike as part of a 
lamentable decline in people's 'respect for leadership and authority'. In 
this respect the mining industry is menaced by a general breakdown in 
'law and order ' which both reflects and reinforces a national crisis of 
governance. 
The resou rce dependency syndrome 
It is not difficult to construct a definition of dependency which allows 
us to describe Papua New Guinea as the owner of a mineral-dependent 
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economy. Such descriptions have often been related to a version of 
'dependency theory' which seeks to explain the backwardness or 
underdevelopment of certain developing countries in terms of their 
subjection to specific forms of multinational capital-in this case 
mining capital (Girvan 1976; Cobbe 1979; Tanzer 1980). The substantial 
presence of mining capital in Papua New Guinea clearly does have 
some negative effects on other sectors of the national economy, mainly 
because of the way that it affects the domestic market in various factors 
of production, but if we can therefore say that the mining industry 
constitutes an economic menace in its own right, it is not this economic 
form of resource dependency which threatens the industry itself. 
The Melanesian way of menacing the mining industry includes a 
psychological or cultural form of resource dependency which partly 
reflects the simple economic fact that an ever-increasing proportion of 
Papua New Guinea's national income has been collected in the form of 
mineral resource rent, but which also draws part of its inspiration from 
the cargo cult mentality which post-colonial anthropologists are no 
longer allowed to talk about, and which, for the sake of political 
correctness, we might choose to describe as a millenarian desperation 
for development. Stiirzenhofecker has provided a graphic illustration of 
this state of mind in her portrait of a Duna community whose male 
members 
blend received notions regarding powerful spirits with rumours 
regarding the finding of oil resources, in such a way as to move from 
the picture of a sacred landscape, whose fertility must be preserved for 
the future, to a picture of an exploitable landscape available for 
manipulation by a company . . .  Their peripheral location, coupled with 
rumours of the centralizing potential of company development, have 
given them an almost apocalyptic vision of what such a form of 
development could bring to them, regardless of the likely ecological 
consequences (1994:27) . 
Although there may still only be a minority of the rural population 
which actually does receive some form of resource rent, the vast 
majority now seem to subscribe to the belief that their land does contain 
some valuable resource--whether gold, oil, diamonds, or the truly 
visible logs-and that their only chance of development lies in their 
share of the rent to be collected from the extraction of these resources by 
some multinational company. If and when the company comes, the 
expectation of deliverance within its field of operations is far too great 
to be satisfied by the actual conduct of its business, however many 
special deals or preferences are bestowed upon the local population, 
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since the business it is doing (unlike business in the Melanesian sense) 
is bound to be directed to the bottom line and not to the consumption or 
destruction of excessive wealth in the creation of new personal 
relationships. But while people may not like the experience of 
development which they actually get from the mining companies (or the 
logging companies), and can readily be drawn to express their feelings 
of disappointment, anger and frustration, they are not cured of their 
addiction to the drug, they do not choose the path of self-reliance or 
alternative technology, they simply want the 'company' to give them 
more, or else to have another company to keep them company. 
Bougainville probably was a special case in this respect, because 
CRA' s arrival was not seen as a sign of impending deliverance by any 
significant fraction of the local population. In the sunset of Australian 
colonial rule, independence was the natural focus of their aspiration for 
development, just as it was in many other parts of Papua New Guinea, 
with or without the addition of millenarian overtones. In those parts of 
the country where the experience of colonial rule had been more limited 
and less oppressive, as it had been in the vicinity of the Ok Tedi project, 
people had other ideas (or no idea) of the relationship between self­
govemment and large-scale mining when they first encountered these 
two distant concepts. And by the time a foreign mining company made 
its appearance on Lihir island in the early 1980s, many people there 
were seriously disillusioned with the institutions of their nation-state 
and saw the company's arrival as the outcome of their own communal 
cargo cult. To understand why mining companies have taken (or been 
given) more and more of the responsibility for meeting local 
expectations of development which have been less and less amenable to 
corporate manipulation, one needs to recognise the existence of a 
vicious circle connecting the resource dependency syndrome to the 
apocalyptic elements of Melanesian Christian culture and the secular 
decline in the legitimacy of the post-colonial regime. 
An unstable pol icy environment 
One of the more perspicacious remarks made in the wake of the Mount 
Kare raid in January 1992 came from the national Police Minister, who 
said it confirmed police predictions that 'terrorist activities on mines 
and petroleum installations were going to happen about this time 
before and after national elections' (Post-Courier 16 January 1992). The 
national election of June 1992 did take place almost exactly mid-way 
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between this raid and the rampage through PJV' s residential 
compound in October that year. National elections in Papua New 
Guinea have been held at five-yearly intervals since 1972. The political 
cycle which has developed over this period is one in which all matters 
of public policy have increasingly become the hostages or victims of an 
unstable succession of coalitions between national politicians whose 
own electoral survival commonly depends on their ability to reward a 
very small local constituency with the maximum possible share of 
government resources. Each successive election has witnessed an 
increase in the total number of candidates, a corresponding reduction 
in the proportion of votes required to win a seat, an increase in the 
number of sitting members who have lost their seats, an increase in the 
number of winning candidates who have claimed to be independent of 
the growing number of political parties, and an increase in the intensity 
of the 'horse-trading' by which a new coalition government has been 
formed after the declaration of results (Saffu 1996). And in each of the 
quinquennial political cycles since 1977, the ruling coalition 
established after the election has been defeated by a parliamentary vote 
of no-confidence when one or more of its component factions has 
crossed the floor and joined the previous Opposition. 
In this form of parliamentary democracy, the fluctuating personal 
interests of individual ministers and their own political patrons and 
clients have come to undermine the capacity of public servants to 
maintain the coherence of existing sectoral development policies. In the 
year preceding an election, all Members of Parliament, whether in 
government or opposition, try to outbid their prospective opponents by 
repudiating all existing policies for which they have no personal 
responsibility in order to recapture some of the permanently 
disenchanted voters in their own electorates. And in the formation of 
new coalition governments, the main economic portfolios are often 
allocated to individuals who have already built their political 
reputations around a commitment to radical innovations in 
departmental policies. Successive Ministers of Minerals and Energy (or 
Mining and Petroleum) have alternately supported or opposed one or 
more of the major multinationals which dominate the industry in 
Papua New Guinea, while candidates standing for election in the 
growing number of electorates which actually host some form of 
mineral resource development will almost invariably seek to make some 
political capital out of the distinctive nature of their own relationship to 
the developer. Although this form of political competition gives mining 
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companies good cause to perceive the country's policy regime as a cross 
between a revolving-door and a roller-coaster ride, in which they can 
expect to be described as 'wild pigs', 'golden rats' or 'economic 
terrorists' at certain points in the national political cycle, it has also had 
the effect of destabilising or decomposing the technocratic policy regime 
which was designed to maximise the share of mineral resource rent 
being invested for what the National Constitution describes as 'the 
benefit of future generations'. 
Back in 1989, as part of its own effort to avoid a repetition of the 
Bougainville rebellion and secure a greater degree of local support for 
the development of new mining and petroleum projects, the national 
government established a tripartite process of negotiation between 
national, provincial and local stakeholders which soon came to be 
known as the 'Development Forum' (West 1992). The price which has 
since been paid for this new level of 'popular participation' has been 
the development of a zero-sum, short-term, adversarial pattern of 
relationships between government agencies and local communities as 
they continually struggle over the distribution of material benefits 
which can be debited to project revenues. 
Each new forum has increased the share of these benefits which accrue 
from a specific project to its own 'landowning community', and has 
correspondingly reduced the share which is retained by the national 
government. This means that each new mining and petroleum project 
is liable to be developed under terms and conditions which 
immediately threaten the deals already done to facilitate the 
development of all existing projects. In this context, the government is 
unable to exercise its legitimate role as an agency of effective 
development planning in project impact areas, but normally stands 
condemned for its own failure to keep whatever promises it has made 
in some previous round of negotiations. This kind of failure provokes 
a corresponding resentment on the part of local communities, whose 
leaders are thus encouraged to make additional demands on the 
developers who have increasingly become the surrogate for 
government itself. And so the wealth, power and authority of the State 
appears to be trapped in a permanent crisis of governance. (Filer 
1 996:23) 
Other policy measures, most notably the provisions of the new 
Organic Law on Provincial Government and Local-level Governments (1995), 
have taken further steps to redistribute mineral revenues from the 
national government to a small elite of 'lucky-strike' communities and 
the various 'unofficial stakeholders' who function as their advocates or 
parasites. Industry spokesmen now complain at regular intervals about 
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,-the consequent growth of economic inequalities and political conflicts 
between 'landowners' and other 'project impact area people', even 
while they chafe under the government's expectation that the 
companies themselves should carry more of the financial burden of 
maintaining social order in their fields of operation. This is not 
something which the companies really want to do, nor something for 
which they are well prepared, but it happens either at the insistence, or 
due to the neglect, of the other stakeholders in the policy process, even 
while these same stakeholders reserve the right to criticise, sue or 
assault the mining company's executives at the same time-activities in 
which they receive a good deal of encouragement from the climate of 
public opinion in Australia and the other countries where these 
companies are domiciled. 
Conclusion 
Speaking at a seminar in Germany convened by radical church groups 
and non-governmental organisations to reflect upon the problem of 
environmental degradation in Papua New Guinea, especially the 
damage caused by the Ok Tedi mine, the Chairperson of the Papua New 
Guinea Council of Churches described the problem of governance in 
her country as one in which local loyalties and traditions inhibit the 
capacity of politicians and public servants to follow the maxims of 
distributive justice at a national level. 
Thus they may opt for the personal morality of service to kin and 
friends first rather than the impersonal morality of service to the 
nation-which in fact means service to non-wantoks. In this sense 
corruption can be seen as a moral act, or at least not simply an 
immoral act, in that corrupt politicians are often opting for one set of 
moral duties rather than another (Muingnepe 1994:104). 
And that presumably is why 
Papua New Guinea's politics is so fragmented, parochial and insular 
and produces political behaviour and attitudes at the national level 
which in most cases appear incomprehensible and contradictory to 
national interests (ibid:lOS). 
She might have added-though this would certainly have put the 
cat amongst the pigeons-that those Papua New Guineans who have 
proved themselves best able to pursue the maxims of distributive justice 
are more likely to be found in the management of 'foreign' mining 
companies than in the ranks of government at any level. In other words, 
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the corporate sector-including even the mining sector-has ethical 
standards which may not be as lofty as those of the Papua New Guinea 
Council of Churches, but seem to be somewhat higher than those 
practiced by the various agencies of government. 
Once we consider the mining industry to be one of the last bastions 
of bureaucratic rationality in the State of Papua New Guinea, then we 
should perhaps be less inclined to represent the multinational 
companies as unscrupulous and dirty beasts, and think of them instead 
as tame elephants performing in a circus without a ringmaster, or wild 
elephants consuming the resources of a national park whose 
gamekeepers are all ivory-hunters in disguise. It is fairly easy to 
conclude from such analogies that Melanesian society has an in-built 
tendency to resist any form of bureaucratic or corporate regulation, 
whether by the state or multinational capital, but rather more difficult to 
conjure up a sustainable alternative. Although we may detect a 
superficial resemblance between the way that Melanesian villagers and 
Western environmentalists perceive the pollution of the mining 
industry, we need to bear in mind that the Melanesian perception (and 
the actions which stem from it) owes much less to the desire for a 'clean 
natural environment' than it owes to the search for a new social and 
economic order. 
Is there another form of development whereby the people of Papua 
New Guinea can (if they wish) escape the clutches of the resource 
dependency syndrome? In theory (and in the discourse of the coffee 
shop), there may be something beautiful and small and user-friendly 
which will do the trick. But in practice it is not so clear. In the discourse 
of the coffee shop, indigenous peoples living in harmony with nature 
should not really need development of any kind, since we all know that 
'development' is an unfashionable social construct ripe for 
deconstruction (Escobar 1995). If the people of Papua New Guinea are 
crying out for development, shall we then declare that they are suffering 
from some form of false consciousness, that they do not know their own 
true needs, and what they do need is a serious dose of such new­
fangled medicines as participatory rural appraisal to open their eyes to 
the wonders which they have inherited from their stone-age ancestors? 
The technocrats in the mining industry and the environmentalists in 
the coffee shop are both liable to beg the question posed in the aftermath 
of the Bougainville rebellion-whether mining projects in Papua New 
Guinea have a uniform and predictable impact on their local social 
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environment, or whether the vagaries of local and national history 
dictate that there can only be a series of unique relationships between 
projects and communities, or between a set of stakeholders whose own 
identity is constantly at stake. Any attempt to construe the real needs 
and desires of the national population will normally be based on the 
assumption that these relationships do have regular and general 
features from which deductions can be made about the merits of 
specific policies, but when we actually document the multitude of 
menaces to the corporate strategies of mining capital at national, 
provincial and local levels, it is much harder to figure out the general 
direction in which this history of resistance is leading the various 
stakeholders. 
My own conclusion would be that the struggle of these indigenous 
peoples is not a conscious or deliberate battle against the demons of 
mineral imperialism, but an internal struggle which threatens the fabric 
of their state and has the accidental or unintended effect of creating an 
increasingly problematic investment climate for the mining companies. 
The problem here is not the contemporary fact of capitalist exploitation, 
but the very limited scale of cooperation which has always been 
characteristic of Melanesian society, and which Papua New Guineans 
nowadays refer to with the one word 'politics'. Despite the best (or 
worst) efforts of Western colonialism, the political fragmentation of 
Melanesian society has continued to defy the binding powers of fear, 
trust, shame or guilt. The Melanesian way of menacing the mining 
industry is not just a failure to cooperate with the industry itself, which 
many people might applaud as a heroic act of resistance, but a lack of 
mutual cooperation in the pursuit, and even the definition, of that 
'development' which everyone agrees they want. 
Notes 
All references to the Post Courier are to the daily English-language 
newspaper of that name. 
These figures are all taken from the Bank of Papua New Guinea's 
Quarterly Economic Bulletin. Confusion sometimes arises because the 
mining companies record their payments to government as being 
made in the year before the government records its receipt of them. 
Government records show that BCL contributed substantially more 
to non-grant revenues in 1989-the year in which it ceased 
operations-than it did in 1988. 
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Tony Regan, personal communication, 1995. 
CRA had already submitted its own development proposal and 
environmental plan to the relevant government authorities at the 
end of 1988. 
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Fisheries and coastal resources: 
knowledge and development 
Edvard Hviding 
The South Pacific region, as described by the noted Samoan 
anthropologist Epeli Hau'ofa (1993, 1994), 'is a sea of islands', not a 
widely scattered multitude of isolated 'islands in a far sea'. Contrary to 
the notion (informed by an overenthusiastic application of island 
biogeography) that island life is above all characterised by splendid 
isolation, the ocean expanses between the islands and archipelagoes of 
the Pacific should be seen as linkages between these small land masses. 
For those who live on the island coasts of the South Pacific, the sea does 
not divide, nor is it a deterrent to contact (Hviding 1994) . Indeed, as 
commented by a scholar on Pacific Islands navigation, and as attested 
to by the well-documented accomplishments of Pacific Islands seafarers 
through many centuries, the open ocean expanses between seemingly 
distant archipelagoes are ' . . .  highways rather than barriers' (Lewis 
1972:15) .  
Epeli Hau' ofa' s reappraisal of the maritime interrelatedness of the 
South Pacific world also serves as a reminder that, ancestral seafaring 
aside, it is the sea that holds the key to the future of Pacific Islands 
peoples, as custodians of as much as 12 per cent of the world's oceans 
(South 1993:106) . Pacific Islanders are, with good reason, concerned 
about the wellbeing of their vast ocean and the living things in it, as 
evidenced by very recent fears related to me by telephone from friends 
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in Solomon Islands that radioactivity and other harmful effects of the 
French nuclear tests in Eastern Polynesia, 5,000 kilometres away, 
would eventually damage not only migratory tuna stocks (on which the 
Solomon Islands national economy depends) but also, by way of 
prevailing currents, reach Melanesian reefs to the detriment of the so far 
relatively poison-free fish and shellfish stocks there. Beyond their role 
as highways for contact, the seas of the South Pacific contain some of 
the richest, most abundant living aquatic resources of the world. The 
huge, globally important migratory stocks of skipjack and yellowfin 
tuna that roam the South Pacific and represent enormous economic 
potential are one facet of this resource abundance. The successes of the 
Forum Fisheries Agency in exercising and protecting island nations' 
combined sovereign rights over tuna resources, against the opposition 
of formidable distant-water fishing nations such as the United States 
and Japan (Bugotu et al. 1990; Herr 1990), point to the continuing key 
role played by the sea and its resources in forging and maintaining 
links throughout the South Pacific region. 
In this paper I will not deal with the much-publicised international 
legal, economic, and biological matters relating to industrial fishing on 
the high seas of the South Pacific (Doulman 1987; Herr 1990). Instead I 
will focus on the coral coasts of the region, and discuss Pacific 
Islanders' own knowledge and management of the multitude of 
nearshore marine resources on which their small-scale, village-based 
fisheries are based.1  Islanders' close relationships to the coral reef and 
lagoon environments, and their time-honoured social institutions for 
regulating the usage of these environments, constitute probably the 
most important set of parameters for future sustainability of small-scale 
reef-based fisheries in the South Pacific. Few Pacific Islands coasts do 
not support a coral reef of some sort (Wright 1993), and around many of 
the larger islands there are very extensive barrier reef and lagoon 
systems, while other areas are dominated by coral atolls with only tiny 
strips of land. The extensive coral reef ecosystems around Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands and Palau help to make the Indo-West Pacific 
region one of the world's 'hot-spots' of marine biological diversity 
(Norse 1993). 
Although the nearshore fisheries resources of the region are rather 
small in global terms, their past, present and future importance to 
Pacific Islanders are, to quote Bob Johannes, a leading authority on the 
small-scale fisheries of the South Pacific 
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of greater importance per capita than in perhaps any other region in 
the world. As well as being the main local source of animal protein, 
fisheries are also often viewed as the main potential source of foreign 
exchange (other than foreign aid) in much of the region, since land­
based resources are often very limited Qohannes 1989:86) . 
In assessing the prospects and challenges for sound future develop­
ment and management of small-scale fisheries in the Pacific Islands, 
Johannes additionally notes that there are 'unusual opportunities . . .  in 
the form of an indigenous framework for marine resource management 
and an undervalued but sometimes very rich indigenous knowledge 
base' Oohannes 1989:85) . In this paper I aim briefly to illuminate these 
unusual opportunities. Let us first tum to some prevailing views of 
fisheries management and their tenuous, even conflicting, relationship 
to the ways in which the coastal peoples of the South Pacific relate to 
their fisheries. 
Fisheries management: diverg i ng perspectives 
Many long-established biological approaches to fisheries management 
have largely ignored the role of fishing people, considering them to be 
somewhat alien elements in otherwise well-ordered statistical models. 
It goes without saying, however, that people, both those who fish and 
those otherwise involved in fisheries, contribute directly and 
importantly to the fisheries systems themselves, as recognised by more 
recent ecological or 'bio-economic' approaches to fisheries 
(McGoodwin 1990) . Still, there has been a tendency to give a rather 
static role to people, most notably in the kind of analysis that takes for 
granted the eventual destruction of fish stocks by overfishing. A further 
dominant assumption of Western approaches to fisheries management 
has been that access to the resource, fish, is free and that no single 
participant in the fishery can prevent others from exploiting the same 
fishing grounds. This view also takes for granted that any fishery must 
be characterised by intense competition which will inevitably lead to 
overfishing and the eventual depletion of the resources, the so-called 
'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin 1968). 
However, recent debates on the management of so-called 'common 
property' resources, not least with reference to fisheries, have revealed 
the historical and geographical specificity of 'open access' to resources 
(Ruddle and Akimichi 1984) . For small-scale nearshore marine 
fisheries, which on a global scale have a productive output for human 
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consumption roughly equal to that of industrial marine fisheries, some 
degree of regulated access actually appears to be the rule rather than 
the exception (Hviding and Jul-Larsen 1995) . These regulations are 
invariably enforced at the local level, from a basis of community 
institutions and social practices. Research by social scientists and 
marine biologists during the past 15 years has documented the 
widespread existence of local, traditional systems of marine tenure, 
where defined areas of inshore seas and reefs are owned or otherwise 
controlled by local communities (Ruddle and Johannes 1990) . By 
regulating access to and use of marine resources, such systems function 
as fisheries management systems. A particularly large variety of marine 
tenure systems is found in the Pacific Islands. More often than not in 
this region, coastal villagers claim and exercise strong traditional rights 
over nearshore fishing grounds within recognised marine boundaries. 
Such institutions of customary marine tenure2 regulate fishing in a 
number of ways-by limiting access to resource areas, by restricting the 
use of various fishing methods, and by regulating the capture of certain 
species. Co-existing in Pacific Islands societies with often highly 
sophisticated local knowledge of the marine environment, customary 
marine tenure systems guide and constrain villagers as to where they 
may go fishing and how they may do so; whereas environmental 
knowledge tells them where and how they ought to fish to obtain the 
best catches. 
Customary mari ne tenure in the Pacific Islands 
A notable aspect of customary marine tenure in the South Pacific is that 
the associated institutions are multi-purpose in nature and not usually 
tied solely to fisheries. In fact many local institutions and traditional 
practices (such as conflict resolution mechanisms or religious taboos) 
may have positive implications for the management of fishery resources 
even if their explicit purpose is a different one, and so their potential 
contributions to the sustainable management of marine resources 
should not be dismissed. However, many of the relevant community­
level institutions also contain practices that from an outside perspective 
are similar to the main principles of Western, scientific management. 
Examples of such practices are the delineation of exclusive fishery 
zones with limited entry, specific fishing gear, species and size restric­
tions of seasonal and/ or spatial extent, prior appropriation rights, and 
concepts of sole ownership based on communal or cooperative 
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institutions. In the Pacific Islands many such strategies existed long 
before their adoption in Western fisheries management, and these 
intentional and unintentional management mechanisms overall tend to 
be firmly based in the long historical evolution of customary law. 
Only a few of an increasing number of documented customary 
marine tenure systems in the Pacific Islands can be mentioned here. On 
Yap in Micronesia, trespassers who fish without permission in an area 
not controlled by their own group are stopped and punished by clan 
leaders. Such conflicts, and requirements to ask permission before 
entering the fishing grounds of others, are very common throughout the 
island Pacific. On the remote atoll of Ontong Java in Solomon Islands, 
the local council has devised a system where stocks of trochus shell 
and beche-de-mer are tabooed for one year at a time in an alternating 
fashion. In the large lagoon of Marovo, also of Solomon Islands, local 
clans variously enforce a number of prohibitions on fishing that 
involves nylon gill nets, plant poisons, dynamite and even underwater 
spearguns, and certain prime fishing locations where reef fish 
aggregate are subject to temporary closures. 
These examples are far from unique. A comparative research project 
carried out at the University of Bergen by the author in collaboration 
with Kenneth Ruddle and RE. Johannes has compiled and synthesised 
information on customary marine tenure systems in more than 100 
locations throughout the Pacific Basin (Ruddle et al. 1992) .  Several 
documented cases involve challenges of a contemporary, 'modem' 
nature, such as the intensified exploitation of marine resources through 
commercialisation, and the introduction of new potentially over­
efficient technologies. Increasingly, it is being asked whether customary 
marine tenure systems may form a practical basis for achieving 
sustainable development and management of inshore fisheries in the 
Pacific Islands. 
A strong awareness not just of the existence of customary marine 
tenure systems, but also of their potential relevance, is to be expected in 
a region where most national fisheries officers have themselves grown 
up in coastal villages. This awareness concerns the need to include 
customary marine tenure, and traditional knowledge of marine 
resources, as important factors in today's fisheries development. 
Indeed, customary marine tenure in the Pacific Islands may be 
considered an inescapable factor, in that it is so deeply embedded in the 
wider aspects of cultural identity and community life. As commented 
very pragmatically by two experienced biologists with a long-standing 
Fisheries and coastal resources I 127 
involvement in the management of small-scale coastal fisheries in the 
South Pacific and other regions: 'It is important to note that the social 
and political setting of a fishing community is not a problem; rather it is 
a situation. It would prove very costly and time-consuming to try to 
change that situation' (Munro and Fakahau 1987). Consider that, 
unlike the European legalist concept of ownership, where property is 
private and alienable, fishing grounds contained within Pacific Island 
customary marine tenure systems are generally communally-held 
property, inherited as ancestral title through generations, and cannot 
simply be sold, or otherwise transferred to outsiders. This close 
association between groups of people and their resource areas, and the 
resulting social and political initiatives and mechanisms, has profound 
implications for the development of fisheries and coastal aquaculture 
and for the licensing of larger-scale resource development enterprises, 
and can hardly be escaped by those who wish to develop and manage a 
fishery subject to customary marine tenure. While customary marine 
tenure systems certainly may inhibit the development of large-scale 
capitalist enterprises and the wholesale transfer of fishing rights to 
non-locals, it can conversely be argued that customary marine tenure 
systems have considerable potential for furthering locally appropriate 
development, decentralised and low-cost management, participatory 
planning, and other such popular goals of the present development 
debate. 
The dynamics of customary marine tenure:  a Solomon 
Islands case 
To highlight such opportunities and constraints posed by customary 
marine tenure for the contemporary management and development of 
fisheries and related activities, I here present some information on one 
particular system, of the Marovo Lagoon of the western Solomon 
Islands (cf. Hviding 1988, 1996a; Hviding and Baines 1994) . In many 
ways, the Marovo system, involving a local population of some 10,000 
people, and 700 square kilometres of reef and lagoon, is typical of 
traditional resource management systems in Oceania in that a number 
of defined clans control resource use within defined areas of land and 
sea, termed puava (territory, land, nourishing soil) . Thus, the tasks of 
village resource managers are not confined to fishing, but closely 
integrate the domains of land and sea through complementary and 
overlapping systems of land and marine tenure. Such integrated land-
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and-sea 'estates' are known from many parts of Oceania and include 
the Fijian vanua (Ravuvu 1993), the Yap tabinau (Lingenfelter 1975) and 
the Hawaiian ahupua 'a (Meller and Horwitz 1987) .  The situation in the 
Marovo Lagoon is of considerable interest in that traditional guardians 
of puava increasingly occupy themselves with a variety of large-scale 
issues relating to contemporary resource development. Lately, 
commercial fishing enterprises, tuna baitfishing, coastal aquaculture, 
tourism, and even land-based activities, such as logging and mining, 
have all involved the Marovo system. At the same time, inter-village 
regulations on access, technologies and species continue to unfold and 
adapt to changing economic and ecological circumstances (Hviding 
1996a; Hviding and Baines 1994) . 
Among Marovo villagers, a number of requirements apply in asking 
permission before entering fishing grounds other than one's own. 
Often, commercial canoe-based fishing by villagers is subject to stronger 
restrictions than is subsistence fishing. A number of fishing methods 
are subject to a variety of prohibitions and restrictions, and varying 
restrictions apply to the exploitation of resources like trochus, pearl 
shell, beche-de-mer and other commercial marine products, as well as 
to turtles, crayfish, giant clams, important reef fishes in spawning 
aggregations, and even freshwater eels.3 
During the 1980s, the people of Marovo engaged in negotiation and 
conflict with representativ�s of a diverse number of outside commercial 
enterprises. Among them was a Taiwanese vessel catching giant clams, 
originally invited into the lagoon through a joint venture with an urban 
Marovo entrepreneur, but quickly expelled by village resource 
managers. In a subsequent case, a fishery development enterprise 
initiated by the Seventh-day Adventist Church, involving a fish freezer 
and at first having somewhat narrowly defined goals in terms of 
increasing the flow of tithe money from villagers to the church, was 
greatly modified after confrontation with traditional resource 
managers. These modifications, all stemming from local initiatives, 
included: a more equitable sharing of decision-making power; quotas 
on certain easily depletable fish; a prohibition on purchasing fish 
caught by dynamiting; accommodation of seasonality in fishing 
intensity; explicit roles given to women's groups and youth groups; 
and a division of responsibility whereby each reef-holding clan would 
enforce infrastructure not provided for by the customary marine tenure 
system, such as storage, transport and marketing facilities. 
Throughout the 1980s and until today, the intensive use of the 
Fisheries and coastal resources I 129 
Marovo Lagoon by the Solomon Islands' industrial tuna fishery as a 
major source of live baitfish has been subject to much heated 
discussion. Some sections of the lagoon have at various times been 
declared off-limits for the tuna catcher boats. Issues at stake have been 
the distribution and amount of royalty payments to reef-holding 
groups, social conflict with tuna boat crews, and concerns over 
ecological consequences of baitfishing. Another permanent non-local 
presence in the Marovo Lagoon is represented by the modest 
development of diving-based tourism. This has increasingly involved 
local demands that expatriate diving operators seek permission and 
pay fees for entering reef areas. Among more ephemeral foreign visitors, 
foreign yachts sailing through the lagoon have repeatedly been told not 
to anchor in certain areas, partly because these areas may have a 
traditionally sacred status and should not be disturbed, and partly 
because tourists were suspected of the uncontrolled gathering of rare 
shells and precious coral. 
The Marovo puava represents but one example in which traditional 
practices of natural resource use and management in the Pacific Islands 
take an integrated view of terrestrial and marine resources. Islanders 
held such a view, and practised resource management accordingly, 
generations before the Western world realised the importance of what is 
now called 'integrated coastal zone management'.  Indeed, in a number 
of locations in seaboard Melanesia, strong contemporary resistance to 
foreign mining and logging companies has its roots precisely in the 
explicit concern that river-carried pollution from land-based resource 
extraction will be detrimental to the inshore marine environments of 
reef and lagoon. In 1987 the multinational giant Unilever was forced to 
close down its logging operations in Solomon Islands after resistance 
from land-holding clan groups reached a climax involving the 
dynamiting of machinery and violent threats. The moving force behind 
this resistance was erosion of topsoil in logged areas and consequent 
sedimentation of nearshore reefs and mangroves, highly important 
sources of fish and shellfish for village subsistence. Logging has since 
commenced on a tract of government-held land but remains disputed 
by the groups that control the lagoon and the adjacent customary land 
areas. Those same concerns have repeatedly prevented mineral 
prospecting by foreign companies in the steep valleys and mountains 
facing the lagoon (H viding 1993b) .  
It  is  important to note here that the conflicts between Marovo 
resource managers and outside parties have not necessarily ended up 
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halting or prohibiting the outsider 's activities. In a number of instances, 
such as tuna baitfishing, diving tourism and commercial fishing by 
locals, the community-based initiatives carried through the customary 
marine tenure system have led to mutual accommodation by both 
parties, and often to a type of commercial development considered more 
in line with local preferences. In many ways, the local insistence on 
autonomy in deciding on development issues involving the lagoon and 
its resources has led to a form of participatory planning, where local 
communities play a major role in the continuous process of formulating 
goals, organising activities and monitoring consequences. This 
approach also characterises several Marovo communities' increased 
collaboration since the early 1990s with varied representatives of 
conservationist NGOs. 
It is also notable that local initiatives involving reefs and marine 
resources in some instances come prior to any concrete negotiations 
with outside parties, basically being fishermen's responses to new, 
perceived possibilities. A fairly recent issue, that of giant clam 
mariculture and seaweed cultivation, has produced a variety of new 
marine tenure arrangements from reef-holding clan leaders, involving 
the zoning of reefs and allocation of blocks to individual families, and 
based on the assumption that coastal aquaculture will be increasingly 
adopted in the near future (Hviding 1993a) . Also, in early 1991 the 
leaders of one clan proposed that an ecologically complex barrier reef 
passage controlled by them be closed to most fishing and set aside for 
purposes of scientific research. 
All this points to the fact that customary marine tenure systems are 
not just institutions involved with traditional village fishing: they also 
constitute part of Pacific Islanders' mechanisms for handling the wider 
world, in economic and political terms. Further, the Marovo situation 
emphasises the need to view fisheries management in the Pacific 
Islands in relation to a number of contexts that are not specifically 
fisheries-related, both with regard to the traditional perceptions and 
politics of resource use and to modem development issues. The 
ecological integration of terrestrial and marine ecosystems and the 
economic complementarity of land and sea res·ources are cornerstones 
of indigenous world views. Also, it is clear that fisheries management 
and marine tenure has to be seen in relation to land resource 
management and land tenure. It should be pointed out that in the South 
Pacific there are few fishing villages as such, with most coastal 
villagers leading a lifestyle where fishing and agriculture are combined. 
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In project designs, however, fisheries development is often 
considered as something separate from the wider concept of rural 
development. The case just described from the Solomons of 
participatory planning in a fishery development project is an example 
where villagers themselves insist on a more integrated rural 
development approach. To illustrate these points further, it is worth 
going down to the grassroots (or reef flat) level for a view of the issues of 
gender and age in relation to customary marine tenure and other forms 
of traditional resource management in Oceania. 
Gender, age and the management of coastal resou rces 
It may appear that traditional fisheries management is the sole privilege 
of chiefs and other elderly men but this interpretation should be treated 
with caution. Whereas the traditional division of labour often dictates 
that men spend more time fishing than women, neither fishing nor 
gardening is usually the exclusive domain of either gender. Women 
certainly fish, though frequently closer to the village and with less 
visually impressive technology than men do. And in the highly 
important reef-gleaning for shellfish and other invertebrates, which 
often supply a major proportion of protein in household diets, Pacific 
Islands women are undisputed masters of both knowledge and 
practice. This intensive use of coastal shallow waters by women, and 
by children, both girls and boys, is much more significant to the wider 
issues of customary marine tenure than may be apparent at first sight 
(Hviding 1993a) . 
Returning to the Marovo Lagoon, it is the women who often voice 
the strongest concerns over pollution of reefs and mangroves by land­
based logging and mining. So in the daily local discourses that lead to 
decision-making and initiatives in the enforcement of marine resource 
management, women tend to play a major role in focusing on the future 
well-being of the entire coastal zone. Further, decline in quality, mean 
size or abundance of food fish is quickly commented on by Marovo 
women, who usually gut and prepare the fish brought ashore by the 
men, as is common in the Pacific Islands. When perceiving such 
declines, women voice their concerns to the decision-making men and 
suggest management measures that give better protection to the fish 
stocks in question. It is also notable that women's knowledge of lunar 
spawning cycles is often very precise, relating to the fact that they 
observe the gonads of gutted fish and relate what they see to their 
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intimate knowledge of lunar stages tied partly to menstrual cycles. This 
important potential source of information appears to have been 
overlooked by most, including those directly engaged in traditional 
fisheries research. 
The question of age should also be addressed briefly. I suggest that, 
in a majority of Pacific Islands customary marine tenure systems, it is 
the young men who are usually the more active and far-ranging 
fishermen, and who thereby monitor stocks, confront trespassers, and 
handle traditional fishery regulations on a day-to-day basis. The 
experience of younger generations, then, informs and strongly 
influences the fishery management decisions made by senior men. 
Knowledge and management of coast resources 
From some descriptions of customary marine tenure systems, it might 
appear as if they were aiming at regulating the exploitation of marine 
resources according to 'scientific' criteria. This is not the case, since the 
specific criteria of Western science are embedded in the heads of 
Western scientists and not generally in those of local fishers. This in no 
way implies that people who fish lack ideas and concepts about causal 
connections and processes in the natural environments upon which 
they depend. On the contrary, ample documentation exists to prove that 
fishing people know a lot about the behavioural patterns of fish and the 
consequences which environmental processes entail for fish stocks. In 
fact, local people often have much more detailed and elaborate 
knowledge about fish behaviour and its relations to environmental 
processes than Western scientists. Some biologists who have spent 
considerable time with fishing populations have documented 
environmental knowledge of staggering complexity and accuracy (for 
example Johannes 1981). In fact, this is only to be expected, considering 
how intimate daily observations are accumulated, verified and 
expanded over decades and centuries and transmitted as oral 
traditions. However, local people's observations of natural phenomena 
are not always interpreted in the same way and according to the same 
criteria as those of a Western scientist. What is significant to a local 
fisherman is not necessarily so for the scientist and vice versa. Each 
will therefore often tend to interpret their observations differently, and 
to classify the aquatic environment and its inhabitants in different 
terms (Carrier 1987). 
For example, turning again to the Marovo Lagoon, the people there, 
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who depend on a coral reef environment of great biodiversity, have 
names for more than 400 fish taxa (Hviding 1995) .  A large number of 
these are very specific and in a one-to-one correspondence with 
Western-scientific species definitions. However, Marovo people apply 
but one single term, kepe, to a myriad of 'Western' species of 
butterflyfish, coralfish and similar small, flat-bodied colourful fishes of 
the reef. In contrast, they use more than a dozen distinct names to refer 
to the Skipjack Tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis), while recognising that these 
are all varieties of one and the same fish. While the multitude of small 
colourful reef fish subsumed under kepe are insignificant in terms of 
food and otherwise, the Skipjack Tuna is the most highly-prized food 
fish of Marovo people, to the extent of being considered a marine deity, 
and its capture is dependent on complicated knowledge of its seasonal 
movements and schooling and feeding patterns. We might expect 
people to have complicated classifications for the Skipjack while giving 
little attention to naming largely similar and locally unimportant small 
coral reef fish. On a more unexpected note, the small catfish eel (Plotosus 
anguillaris) and the stonefish (Synanceia horrida) share the same name, 
nou, in Marovo. This seems strange until one realises that they are both 
equipped with highly venomous spines: the fact that they are both 
venomous and potentially dangerous for fishermen diving or walking 
on the reef is the reason for assigning them to the same local 'species'. 
No one in Marovo would actually suggest that they are one and the 
same fish. Finally, the Marovo people classify two different species of 
the mangrove bivalves Geloina as the male and female variety of one 
local species. These mangrove molluscs, collected in large quantities by 
village women, are among the most important daily protein foods of 
many coastal households, and it is important that the two main 
varieties be distinguished in terms of their somewhat different habitats, 
seasonal abundance, and taste (Hviding 1993a). 
The Marovo Lagoon examples represent widespread patterns 
whereby 
one Linnaean, Western-scientific species may be classified as 
one local 'species' 
a large number of Western species may be lumped together 
under just one local taxon 
dissimilar Western species are assigned to the same local 
'species' category 
a male-female distinction is imposed on two rather closely 
related Western species. 
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There are many more possible permutations of these patterns, and 
the Marovo example should just serve as a cautionary note to, for 
example, fisheries scientists and fisheries officers in their discussions 
with local people about the composition, state and other aspects of the 
aquatic resource base. 
Moving beyond local fish taxonomies, we come to the question of the 
accuracy and validity of local people's observations of and statements 
about aquatic environments and resources. Again, biologists have 
pointed out the high degree of accuracy in such knowledge of coral reef 
and pelagic fish in the Palau archipelago of the Western Pacific, and 
shown how fishermen are able to predict and pinpoint accurately the 
time and location of seasonal and lunar aggregations for spawning and 
other purposes for several dozen important food fishes. Much of this 
was previously unknown to Western science. However, the fact remains 
that local people's observations, though generally correct, may be 
misinterpreted by outsiders. Pacific Islanders' observations of events 
and processes in the natural environment do not take place in a void. 
Phenomena are perceived and interpreted according to people's more 
general conceptions about human life and its relationship to nature. 
Through this, models of environmental relationships are being 
constructed, maintained and changed in ways that combine what 
people 'know' about natural and social processes with what they 
'know' about supra-natural ones. Often the different phenomena are so 
closely interrelated that it becomes necessary to question whether the 
distinctions between nature, society, religion, magic and science 
represent the way people think (Hviding 1996b ). However, the last cited 
example points to possible overlaps and convergences between 
Western-scientific and non-Western approaches to environmental 
phenomena, despite the widely different foundations of their 
approaches. We shall see that this question of convergence and possible 
compatibility may be carried over into specific management issues. 
Outsiders confronted with the multitude of types of aquatic 
resources management models represented by customary marine tenure 
systems and their inland, riverine counterparts may be struck first of all 
by the 'non-natural' aspects of these systems, mainly because Western 
(or Western-trained) scientific observers tend to think about and relate 
to nature and its resources in a very different way from that of the local 
managers and fishermen. Consequently the local or 'folk' models of 
aquatic resources and their management may be refuted and dismissed 
as superstition based on something other than 'scientific fact' . 
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Such ways of thinking and speaking about things are in no way 
incompatible with the fact that these same people have well-developed 
environmental and fisheries-related knowledge which informs their 
decisions to prohibit the fisheries in these specific locations. From a 
number of locations in the Pacific Islands, available documentation 
indicates that certain coastal areas are considered taboo because of the 
presence of dangerous spirits may also be important spawning 
grounds and nursery areas for key species of food fish (for example 
Johannes 1978; Wright 1990) . Some open-minded scientists do state that 
in spite of all their 'exotic' attributes 'folk' models contain and are 
inspired by 'real' scientific knowledge and understanding. It is 
therefore logical to assume that customary marine tenure systems not 
only may function as management tools, but also that to some extent 
they are really about management as such, reflecting a genuine concern 
among indigenous people to preserve natural resources. 'Local' and 
'scientific' models for resource management may thus be compatible 
despite having different underlying foundations. In this respect, it is 
interesting to compare management models developed by scientists for 
the preservation of coral reefs in Australia to customary marine tenure 
systems that exist in very similar ecological conditions. 
Local and scientific coral reef management models 
compared 
The people of Marovo Lagoon have for centuries practised forms of 
marine resource management that show great similarity to the 
management plans recently devised by Australian scientists and 
politicians for the Great Barrier Reef. The 120 kilometre chain of barrier 
reef enclosing the Marovo Lagoon's 700 square kilometres of inshore 
waters is divided into a number of named zones, also embracing 
adjacent lagoon areas. Each is owned by a distinct kin-based group 
whose members and affiliates may fish and collect reef animals within 
the zone, subject as we have seen to fluctuating restrictions pertaining 
to fishing gear, target species, and other variables. Such zones, 
delimited by known boundaries marked by reef and underwater 
topography and identified by the fisherman through visual 
triangulation, are subject to limited entry. This implies that anyone not 
a member of the owning group must seek temporary permission to fish 
there, or alternatively obtain longer-term use rights akin to a fishing 
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license. Within each zone of general usage, there are certain areas in 
which all fishing and collecting is permanently excluded, in 
consideration of sea spirits and fishermen's ancestors, whose powers 
are believed to reside in the area. This, with reference to management 
plans for the Capricornia Section of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
(an area slightly larger than the Marovo Lagoon), is strikingly similar to 
what the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA), though 
for different reasons, designates a 'Reef Appreciation Area' (Kelleher 
and Kenchington 1982). Also distributed throughout the barrier reef of 
Marovo are specific sites where spawning aggregations of important 
food fishes are known to occur seasonally. These may be closed to all 
fishing, or to fishing for the particular species in question, during the 
spawning season. This, by comparison, is what the GBRMPA calls a 
'Seasonal Closure Area' .  Then there are temporary closures in the 
Marovo Lagoon of larger areas of reef within a tribal zone, either 
pertaining to all fishing and collecting activity or to target species such 
as trochus shell, in order for stocks to build up. This is what the 
GBRMPA would call 'Replenishment Areas'. 
From the perspective of Pacific Islanders such as the Marovo Lagoon 
people then, the modem management plans for the Great Barrier Reef 
could actually be interpreted as approximations of their own 
traditional systems. This case of overlap in substantial form between 
customary and modem, 'scientific' management systems is far from 
unique. A rather similar picture would emerge if material on traditional 
management of the coastal lagoons of West Africa (for example Weigel 
1985) were to be compared with GBRMPA plans, and, for that matter, 
the Marovo Lagoon system. It is a sobering thought that Pacific 
Islanders, West African lagoon dwellers, and Western fisheries and 
coral reef managers independently came to design similar measures, 
and furthermore that the Pacific and African villagers, from their own 
specific view of the world, reached this result generations before 
Western scientists, planners and politicians did. 
Thus both 'scientific' and 'local' models of the environment and its 
management may have certain shared fundamental attributes, despite 
having emerged from strikingly disparate foundations in terms of social 
and cultural contexts. In the argument about fundamental similarities 
between 'scientific' and 'local' models, we find that their forms have so 
many similarities that it becomes impossible to refuse the management­
related character of one without also dismissing it for the other. 
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Custom, development and national pol icy 
Moving away from the village reef flat, some remarks on the wider 
political context of customary marine tenure in the contemporary and 
future South Pacific are required. Customary marine tenure systems do 
not exist in a political or legal vacuum. On the contrary, their capacity 
for handling emerging development issues is subject to some level of 
government recognition of traditional rights. In their government 
policies, a number of Pacific Island nations state in various ways that 
tradition or 'custom' must be given due attention in matters of 
development. Such recognition is important for promoting 
decentralised village-level handling of important issues involving the 
sea and its resources. In the case of Solomon Islands, for example, the 
devolution of power from national government to Provinces facilitates 
local management initiatives from customary resource managers 
through the Area Councils. 
Although customary marine tenure in the Pacific may be referred to 
as systems of 'traditional resource management' based in ' customary 
law', this does not mean that tradition is something static, rigid and 
non-changing. Rather, tradition, as it exists in the rapidly changing 
worlds of indigenous peoples, is a system of knowledge and rules 
which has strong roots in local history and experience, but being 
unwritten and not codified, also has the flexibility to adapt to changing 
social, political, economic or ecological circumstances. Thus, far from 
being overwhelmed by commercialisation and resource scarcity, many 
customary marine tenure systems in Oceania appear to have 
considerable capacity for handling and adapting to new circumstances, 
thereby becoming potentially important tools in the contemporary 
management of fisheries and of the coastal zone in general. 
Development of fisheries in countries refusing to recognise 
customary marine tenure systems clearly demonstrates that these 
systems do not vanish. Rather, they continue to evolve and change 
according to the new political conditions that emerge. Confronted with 
local realities, government representatives simply cannot overlook 
customary resource management institutions. They exist, as pointed out 
by Munro and Fakahau (1987), as a 'situation', and unless government 
is in a position to impose its policy fully and convincingly people will 
continue to think, act and relate according to the frameworks of 
customary systems. 
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Significantly, a number of Pacific Island nations have given formal 
legislative recognition to customary resource rights. For example, 
elements of the Constitutions and Fisheries Acts of the relatively young 
Pacific states of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and 
Fiji provide considerable recognition, either implicit or explicit, of 
customary marine tenure and associated marine resource rights (Pulea 
1993; Hviding and Ruddle 1991) .  Under such circumstances, being 
recognised as a form of customary law, customary marine tenure 
systems may function as powerful mechanisms for maintaining local­
level, community-based control over inshore marine resources and their 
management and development. The systems may also have 
considerable potential as decentralised management measures, 
enforced in a flexible manner by the groups that are directly involved in 
the long-term use of the resources. 
The Pacific Islands region does indeed offer unusual opportunities 
for the sound development and management of nearshore small-scale 
fisheries. 
Notes 
For an exhaustive description of the nearshore marine resources of 
the South Pacific, as well as analysis of their usage, management 
and future potential, see Wright and Hill 1993. 
In customary marine tenure (CMT), 'customary' refers to a system 
considered by its practitioners to have emerged from 'traditional' 
and to have continuous links with the past even though it adapts to 
handling contemporary issues; 'marine' refers to the system as 
dealing with coral reefs, lagoon, coast, and open sea and including 
islands and islets contained in this overall seaspace; 'tenure' refers 
to political control through a social process of interacting activities 
concerning decision-making with regard to territory, access to 
resources and regulations of their exploitation (Hviding 1991).  
The latter points to the importance of taking an integrated approach 
to aquatic resources and their management in a diversity of Pacific 
Islands contexts, embracing the large river systems found in 
Melanesia. 
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From taro garden to golf course? 
alternative futures for agricultural 
capital in the Pacific Islands 
Ti m Bayliss-Smith 
Pacific Islanders who wanted a glimpse of their future were once given 
Bible stories, but today a more useful gift would be an air ticket to 
Honolulu in the Hawaiian islands. There Pacific Islanders would find 
a realisation of, on the one hand, all their wildest dreams of material 
wealth and freedom from customary restraint, and on the other, all their 
worst nightmares of demographic submergence and loss of cultural 
identity. In Hawaii it is not just peoples and cultures that have been 
transformed by the process of globalisation. It is also the agricultural 
landscape-the focus of this chapter-that has been transformed, not 
once but many times. We can summarise the landscape's trans­
formation as being, in extreme cases, a transition from taro garden to 
golf course. Taro and golf can be seen as the first and the latest stages of 
transformation, in a distinctively Hawaiian type of 'ecological 
succession'. Through this succession the natural capital of the 
undisturbed tropical rain forest is converted into the cultural land­
scapes of indigenous horticulture, alien agriculture, and global leisure 
(Table 10.1) .  
In this chapter I focus on the earlier stages in this transformation. 
Not everywhere in the Pacific is threatened by the golf course and 
tourist resort scenario. Indeed, in the western part of the region, 
particularly in Melanesia, traditional agroforestry systems are still 
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being maintained and extended in preparation for the new needs of the 
twenty-first century. What controls the ecological succession is not 
really time ('stage reached') or space ('location', 'land resources') so 
much as socio-political structure. The taro garden, the golf course, and 
indeed the stages in between, are all cultural landscapes in which large 
amounts of capital are invested. What varies between these landscapes 
is the form of capital that people are investing, and that in turn reflects 
major contrasts on the scale at which they are mobilising capital, in 
terms of both social and spatial mobilisation. I argue that the key 
variable in explaining contrasts in Pacific Island land use today is 
socio-political organisation. To be more explicit, what matters is not the 
environment or how much time has elapsed since European contact, 
but how widespread has been the adoption of those types of social 
organisation that allow different forms of capital to penetrate into the 
agricultural sector. 
Table 1 0. 1  The land use succession in Hawaii  
S uccessional Time 
stage (chronology in 
the Hawaiian islands) 
Tropical rain forest Before i nitial 
settlement 
H awaiian agro Polynesian 
forestry (taro) settlement 
u nti l  circa 1 850 
Chinese market Late 1 9th centu ry 
gardens (rice, 
vegetables) 
American Early to mid-20th 
plantat ions centu ry 
( p i neapples) 
J apanese Post 1 980 
busin ess 
(hotels,  
golf  courses) 
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Space 
(equivalent examples 
in present-day Pacific) 
Remote corners of 
some of the larger 
islands, especial ly 
Papua New Gui nea 
Outer islands of 
Polynesia and less 
developed parts of 
Melanesia 
Smallholders i n  the 
hinterland of towns and 
tou rist resorts 
Patches of alienated land 
under coconut, cocoa, 
sugar cane, oil pal m  
T h e  New Pacific? 
What is 'capital ' ?  
Capital exists in a variety of  forms. In the Pacific before European 
contact, as elsewhere in the world, men and women used their spare 
time not only for ritual, family life and the enjoyment of leisure, but also 
to invest their efforts and skills in order to safeguard their future 
livelihood. They did this by creating new productive capital in the form 
of tools, hunting equipment, fishing nets, boats, baskets, mats and 
many other things. None of these products should be thought of as 
having an exclusively 'economic' rationale. From Tikopia, a Polynesian 
outlier in the eastern Solomon Islands, Raymond Firth provides for us 
an example of the multiple forms of capital in the pre-industrial, pre­
European era. On Tikopia manufactured items were sometimes used as 
the equivalent of 'productive capital', but sometimes they were used for 
purely social or political purposes, as cultural capital. 
Pandanus mats, used for sleeping purposes, and bark-cloth, used for 
blankets and clothing, are employed to facilitate the production of such 
articles as canoes, troughs and sinnet cord; food, both cooked and raw, 
and food-plants such as coconuts, are essential elements in the 
maintenance and reward of producers. On the other hand sinnet cord, 
used in fo:hing and for the lashing of canoe and house timbers, and 
wooden bowls, used in the preparation of food, are sought and 
accumulated for transfer in large amounts on such non-productive 
occasions as funerals, marriage, and initiation ceremonies. Even such 
fixed productive items as canoes, troughs and bonito hooks can be 
handed over as indemnity for services of a non-economic kind. It is as 
if in our society clothing, bedding and plates and dishes were poured 
into the productive system to pay for the making of tables, chairs, 
boats, and motor-cars; while on the other hand the habit of giving 
kitchen utensils as wedding presents were extended to embrace the 
presentation of ploughs and workmen's tools, and business men 
accumulated machinery partly for the purpose of meeting their social 
obligations (Firth 1939:237-8) . 
All forms of capital perhaps need to be considered in this way. It is 
not only on remote islands that gifts and prestige are important motives 
that lie behind the reproduction of wealth. Indeed, the capital invested 
in a golf course is an entirely 'non-productive' use of land, labour and 
wealth. It is partly a business, designed to make money out of the rich 
and famous, but to own such a thing is partly a display of social 
position. Like productive capital that is diverted to become a wedding 
gift on Tikopia, tourism investments tell us much about the relentless 
pursuit of social status in human affairs. 
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Throughout human history, wherever agriculture becomes the 
predominant mode of subsistence, capital formation begins to focus on 
the land itself. Investments to improve the productivity of land can be 
regarded as creating landesque capital when the more secure or more 
substantial production that results is a benefit that is enjoyed not just in 
the short-term but also in the longer-term future. Terracing, land 
drainage, tree planting and irrigation works are among the more spec­
tacular forms of landesque capital formation, and there are good 
examples of these landscape improvements in almost every part of the 
Pacific. 
European contact bought with it the market economy, and this 
meant new opportunities to use money to build up capital in other 
forms. Productive capital was streamlined by the access provided in the 
colonial period to new technology-steel axes, new crops and tools, 
larger boats, better types of fishing tackle, new domestic animals par­
ticularly the horse, and later mechanisation in various forms. 
Ultimately money could allow access to finance capital, although at 
first banking services, stocks and shares and the other tricks of 
capitalism were introduced to the Pacific for the benefit of the colonial 
settlers. Those settlers who remained and became more integrated into 
local communities have served as role models for a new pattern of 
entrepreneurial activity available to those islanders most anxious to 
embrace new forms of agrarian 'capitalism'. 
If we revert to our simplified 'successional model' of Hawaiian land 
use and its changing social organisation, we can see that the four 
stages identified signal a switch in the predominant forms of capital 
employed. These changes are connected to the ever-increasing scale of 
economic organisation, as land use serves first local, then urban, then 
regional and finally global needs and values (Table 10.2). 
What exactly is landesque capital? How was it formed in the Pacific, 
and why have some island landscapes that were once so rich in this 
indigenous form of wealth been transformed, whilst others still 
survive? This question will be tackled in this chapter, first by means of a 
theoretical discussion, and then through a selection of case studies 
from three different parts of the Pacific. 
Landesque capital and sustai nable development 
'Save the forests: save the planet'. This headline, printed in large red 
letters on the front cover of The Ecologi.st magazine for October 1987, 
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Table 1 0.2 Forms of capital :  natural, landesque, productive and 
finance 
Land use Main form of capital Social organisation 
Taro garden Landesque Local subsistence and 
surplus fo r chiefs 
Market garden Landesque and Peasant production for 
p rod uctive u rban markets 
P i n eapple P roductive and fi nance N ational ag ri-business 
pl antatio n  
Resort and Fi nance M u lt inational tourist 
golf course industry 
provided the caption for an evocative photo image of tropical rainforest 
destruction. The picture might have been taken in Brazil, or perhaps 
Thailand, or even Papua New Guinea. But it didn't matter exactly 
where in the world it was happening. The global forests represented the 
planet's natural capital, and in the late 1980s environmentalists of all 
kinds were united in growing alarm about the loss of biodiversity, 
global warming and sea-level change. The planet's capital needed 
urgent protection, and the conversion of rain forests into window 
frames, hamburgers or even rice fields provided a convenient symbol 
for the escalation in mankind's self-destructive capacity. Radical 
'green' action was needed for the protection of nature, by means of 
nature reserves, carbon taxes, exclusion zones, and the policing of 
nature reserves. Those prevented from realising income from natural 
capital as a result of these conservation policies would be compensated 
through the process of 'sustainable development', the term that was 
suddenly on everyone's lips following the publication of the Brundt­
land Report in that same year, 1987. In this way environmentalism 
emerged, in the late 1980s, as the new moral discourse of the West. 
Ten years later none of the planet's environmental problems have 
gone away and some have become even more urgent, but the emphasis 
on environmental policy is now much more on how sustainable 
development can be achieved than on how natural capital can be 
protected. 'Manage the forests: save the planet' is perhaps a less 
attractive slogan, but the consensus now is that management, not 
protection, is more likely to achieve at least part of the green agenda. 
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Actions based on this slogan would change the tropical rainforest's 
status from self-sustaining wilderness to a regulated cultural land­
scape, in much the same way as the boreal forest of Scandinavia now 
accommodates, simultaneously, sustainable forest, hydro-electricity 
generation, reindeer herding, tourism, hunting and fishing, and, to 
some extent, the conservation of biodiversity. If we really have to reduce 
complex arguments into slogans, then I would argue that instead of this 
focus on the forest, a more useful slogan would be 'sustain landesque 
capital: save the planet'. 
It was also in 1987 that two geographers, Piers Blaikie and Harold 
Brookfield, published an influential book entitled Land Degradation and 
Society which pointed the way towards understanding some of the 
concepts of sustainability that we now so urgently need. They intro­
duced into the environmental debate the term 'landesque capital' 
(Blaikie and Brookfield 1987:9), with a discussion from which the 
following definition can be distilled. 
Landesque capital is formed when land management is designed to 
secure future production beyond the present crop or crop cycle through 
improvements in land capability, in the form of investments that have a 
long life such as stone walls, terraces, field drains, water meadows, 
irrigation systems and regional drainage, and reclamation systems. 
By implication Blaikie and Brookfield (1987:74) also saw tree­
planting as a form of landesque capital investment, which extends the 
concept beyond the various engineering structures that they listed, and 
into the field of forestry and agroforestry. In tracing the origins of tree 
cultivation in the Pacific, Yen (1990: 262) has emphasised the relative 
permanence of planted groves and orchards and their dependability. 
Tree capital reduces the risks of relying upon slash-and-bum 
agriculture, which can fail because of its vulnerability to drought, flood 
or pest attack. 
A decade has now passed since the publication of Blaikie and 
Brookfield's (1987) book, and in all regions of the world, not least in the 
Pacific Islands, it is becoming urgent that we look hard at the pre­
conditions for landesque capital formation. We need to understand 
better how and why people make successful investments. We also need 
to know whether success comes more easily when the people concerned 
act as individuals or when they act collectively within communities, or 
perhaps are encouraged to act because of interventions by larger-scale 
institutions, by external agencies, or by government. It is becoming clear 
that in large areas of the world such investments will provide the only 
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secure basis for soil conservation and sustained production. Some 
societies and environments have made such investments in the past, 
creating what we might call 'cultural landscapes of landesque capital 
formation'. These also deserve careful study, so that we can uncover the 
social, ecological and institutional circumstances in which such 
investments took place in the past, in societies whose current land use 
practices may be much less sustainable. 
Why should anyone invest in landesque capital, when the societal 
forces responsible for non-sustainable development (including golf 
courses) are so powerful? For example, under what circumstances have 
the men and women who manage small slices of the global commons in 
Polynesia or Melanesia been willing to invest effort, organisation and 
ingenuity in the formation of landesque capital, leaving behind them 
swamps, soils and slopes with an enhanced value for future pro­
duction? The historical experience of land managers in a region such as 
this is not trivial, idiosyncratic or irrelevant to the huge global 
dilemmas that we now face. 
Landesque capital and despotism 
Despite the new emphasis in economics on the management of 'natural 
capital' (Jansson et al. 1994), at the theoretical level the formation of 
landesque capital is a relatively under-developed concept. However, at 
the empirical level there is, not surprisingly, an abundant literature on 
particular landesque investments such as terracing, irrigation and 
afforestation. From this literature it immediately becomes clear that 
strictly economic explanations may not be sufficient to account for the 
creation of landesque capital, and that we therefore need to expand our 
investigation to consider other factors. 
In this connection irrigation has received the most attention, 
stimulated by the polemical writings of Karl Wittfogel (1955, 1957) .  His 
thesis was that a large-scale system of irrigation requires complex 
management, which in tum requires a pre-industrial form of 
'despotism'. Authoritarian control emerges in embryonic form as a 
means to re-order the landscape so as to boost production, but then the 
very success of irrigated agriculture in tum helps to magnify the 
powers of authority, creating what Wittfogel calls the 'despotic 
hydraulic society'. According to most accounts, the reality of some 
Pacific Island societies at the time of European contact was that, in 
some ways that we choose now not to emphasise, they were also 
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despotic . In Hawaii the intricate taro pondfields that were later 
abandoned to Chinese rice farmers and market gardeners, and which 
today are being drained for shopping malls and golf courses, came 
about originally in a highly stratified society in which a rigid division 
of labour between the sexes, drastic taboos, and the divine rule of chiefs 
were integral parts. Was this a form of agricultural intensification 
driven by Oceanic (rather than Oriental) despotism? 
Wittfogel proposed that these 'hydraulic civilisations' emerged most 
strongly in circumstances of semi-aridity and where social control was 
exercised by a bureaucratic and managerial elite. Using examples from 
the Sumerian civilisation in Mesopotamia, the Ind us Valley, Ancient 
Egypt, and the Shang valley civilisation of China, he argued that 
initially some form of hydro-agriculture can emerge without coercion, 
being based instead on local co-operation. However all of the larger­
scale forms of irrigation require management at a level higher than that 
of the individual farm. Landesque investments of this kind can 
therefore only occur in the presence of a stratified social system and 
some degree of coercion. 
Moreover, this incipient stratification is likely to be magnified 
further by the opportunities provided for hydraulic control. Water can 
be provided to downstream users by the managerial elite, or water can 
be withheld. Once a society is dependent on irrigated agriculture, those 
who have control over the water can use it to their advantage. 
Maintenance of the irrigation works and the extraction of surplus 
production will require extra work from the agrarian population and 
this they may be unwilling to provide, but in this situation of hydraulic 
control the necessary increase in labour input can be enforced.  
Wittfogel claimed to build his ideas on the proposal of Marx and 
Engels, that there existed a distinctive 'Asiatic' mode of production. In 
the Pacific some scholars have come close to claiming the existence of 
an 'Oceanic' type of agriculture, based on root crops, agroforestry and 
the pig, and a conceptual and gendered separation of the 'wet' (taro) 
from the 'dry' (yams, etc.) sphere of production (Barrau 1965; Yen 1990; 
Kirch 1994). In relation to the Asiatic mode, there is in fact a major 
dispute among Marxist scholars about the status of some of Marx's 
own writings on this theme. Maurice Godelier, for example, would 
regard Marx's statements about 'Oriental despotism' and the 
stagnation of Asian societies as the 'dead parts' of Marxist theory 
(Bailey 1981) .  Theoreticians like Hindess and Hurst (1975) see nothing 
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in the relations of production under the supposed Asiatic mode that is 
not also present in Marx's feudal mode of production, and furthermore 
they see nothing in Wittfogel' s account that is actually based on theory. 
Instead, they regard it as an empirical description and generalisation 
that is supposed to correspond to historical realities in Asia. Their 
review of the numerous empirical critiques of Wittfogel show that his 
model probably should be dismissed as unreliable speculation, or even 
as Orientalist distortion, an attempt to give the East an alien character 
different from the West in every respect. 
If we leave on one side the Marxist theoretical debate, it seems that 
the empirical controversy has focussed in particular on the institutions 
of power within the state which, Wittfogel claims, gain increasing 
control over the use of water. In this model, 'the limits of intensification 
are determined by the ability of one class to force members of another 
class to work' (Brookfield 1984: 20) .  The managerial elite enforces its 
hydraulic despotism through sheer necessity, rather than enforcing its 
will through ownership of land or the possession of military force: 
'government-led hydraulic enterprise is identical with the creation of 
agricultural life' (Wittfogel 1957: 109) . The formation of landesque 
capital is seen as something that requires particular coercive relations 
of production, and without these relations the investment cannot be 
maintained. The idea is provocative and capable of expansion to 
include gender relations, for example. However, empirical testing of this 
model in China and Sri Lanka suggests that we should question 
Wittfogel' s assumption that all complex activities that need some sort of 
co-ordination also need heavy-handed managerial control (Hindess 
and Hurst 1975: 215). Perhaps, as Leach (1959) argues for the Dry Zone 
of Ceylon, irrigation agriculture is compatible with other forms of socio­
economic relations than the particular one which Wittfogel identifies. 
In Melanesia we have examples of agricultural terracing and water 
control systems that could be interpreted in terms of coercion, especially 
if we enlarge the concept of coercion between social classes to include 
the mobilisation of female labour to serve the interests of male prestige. 
Some of the landesque capital found in the Central Highlands of New 
Guinea falls into this category, for example ditching and mounding for 
the production of sweet potatoes. Similarly in Fiji we find today traces 
of large-scale systems of water management, creating raised fields for 
growing taro in deltaic and valley-floor swamps. These systems were 
constructed in pre-European times under chiefdoms that are perhaps 
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not far from the Wittfogel model of social control. But even these 
examples of landesque capital may need to be interpreted differently. 
Even though some of them are substantial in extent, most of the 
water control that we see in Melanesia is actually the functional 
equivalent of Wittfogel's (1957: 18) 'hydro-agricul�re' based on small­
scale operation, rather than corresponding to his 'hydraulic 
agriculture' based on major works. Terracing, ditching and pondfields 
are usually minor works, and as such can be built up incrementally 
through the efforts of individuals or small groups of people who work 
together co-operatively without needing coercive social control. The 
presence of such features might therefore be the outcome of quite 
different processes. We need to consider landesque capital as perhaps 
just a more visible form of technical innovation, designed to shift 
agriculture towards a higher level of intensity. The motive of the family 
unit or the community responsible could simply be to achieve 
subsistence security, perhaps in circumstances of population pressure 
or in a situation of political insecurity because of endemic warfare. 
Landesque capital 's transformation : three case stud ies 
To investigate the diverse forms in which landesque capital investment 
has taken place, and perhaps to demonstrate its diverse rationale, 
requires that we move from the theoretical to the empirical level. The 
Pacific Islands provides many examples of the ingenious ways in 
which different ecological niches have been successfully exploited, to 
meet various social needs. Three examples are considered here, taken 
from Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Fiji. In each case the 
system of land use is examined from a historical perspective, to see how 
and why landesque capital has been formed in the past. This per­
spective is then used to assess the extent to which current land-use 
practices involve either old or new forms of landesque capital. History 
is interesting for its own sake, but it seems possible also that we can 
learn from the past, which in the Pacific was a time when sustainability 
was not a political slogan but a matter of everyday survival. To achieve 
sustainable development today we must devise land use practices 
which absorb improvements and so encourage re-investment, but 
preferably in the context of existing cultural norms and agricultural 
practices, rather than being imposed from the outside. This may require 
a synthesis of the old and the new. 
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The upper Wahgi Valley, Papua New G uinea highlands 
In January 1933 Michael Leahy, his fellow gold prospectors and their 
long line of carriers were trekking through the broken terrain of what is 
today Simbu province in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea. When 
Leahy reached the top of yet another grass-covered ridge, he at last 
gained a view westwards into what he called 'the Promised Land' of 
the Wahgi valley. 
Beyond the thickly populated grass ridges in front of us stretched a 
wide, flat grass-covered valley with clumps of trees planted by wood­
hungry villagers. The western end was lost in the blue haze of distance 
and smoke from the hundreds of villages, new garden clearings, and 
grass fires ... New Guinea's unknown interior was not, after all, an 
uninhabited jumble of cloud-shrouded mountain ranges but the most 
thickly populated and fertile area of New Guinea . . .  (Leahy 1991 :70) . 
Leahy's main interest was in gold not agriculture, but repeatedly he 
remarks on two of the characteristic features of this Wahgi landscape: 
intensive sweet potato cultivation, and plantations of yar trees, or 
Casuarina oligodon. Both represented investments in landesque capital 
made necessary by the density of population, and the resulting intense 
competition for land and resources. The people were, as Leahy 
recognised 'wood-hungry' because of the destruction of montane forest 
cover in the valley. The valley was also densely settled, and to feed this 
population the main staple food, sweet potato, was planted in 
'distinctive gardens laid in checkerboard squares' (Leahy 1991:75). 
This account suggests that the intensification of sweet potato 
gardening in the Highlands was the result of a 'Boserupian' crisis of 
subsistence. Ester Boserup (1965) showed that pre-industrial culti­
vators using manual techniques encounter diminishing returns to 
labour as their fallows become shorter. In order to minimise self­
exploita tion they will choose the most extensive land-use system 
possible that matches both their subsistence needs and their resources 
of underused land. Intensification is therefore seen by Boserup as a 
reluctant response to population pressure or land shortage. 
Accompanying this process, or instead of it, most scholars would 
now recognise also some role for surplus or 'social production' 
(Brookfield 1972). In New Guinea the role of big-men in mobilising 
labour, in particular female labour, in order to achieve surplus through 
landesque capital investments is a key factor. A surplus of sweet 
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potatoes was absolutely necessary if a man was to engage in large-scale 
pig husbandry, which in tum became the means for him to participate 
in regional exchange systems (Golson and Gardner 1990) . In other 
words landesque capital formation in the Waghi valley was partly the 
outcome of local population pressure, but in part too it was organised 
so as to boost the prestige of a big-man and his faction. The subordina­
tion of women to achieve the necessary labour input was an integral 
part of this process. Anthropologists have disagreed about the extent to 
which the large work load imposed on women really represents 
'exploitation' in a situation of distinctively Melanesian 'despotism' 
(Donaldson 1982; Sillitoe 1984) .  However it is clear that draining, 
mounding and mulching practices did create 'capital' in the sense that 
they did improve the land for more than one crop cycle. Moreover, for 
such investments to take place usually a pre-condition was the capacity 
of men, often big-men, to mobilise female labour on quite a large scale. 
The first white men in the Highlands soon recognised that these 
valleys promised the possibility of wealth from other forms of 
investment: 'Even if no gold or mineral deposit was eventually found, 
high-priced tea and coffee could be grown here, as they were in the 
Kenya highlands' (Leahy 1991:75). In pursuit of these goals, the first 
Australian colonists gained access to land and labour through superior 
control over sources of symbolic wealth in the form of shell valuables. 
Tons of shells were flown in by aeroplane, and until their value was 
debased by hyper-inflation, they became the means for the white men to 
acquire almost any goods or services. Leahy recalls paying compen­
sation to a girl who had been raped by three of his native carriers, and 
also compensation to the girl's father. 
I gave to the father a gold lip shell, a fabulous present in that society, 
and the girl a handful of small shells. Everybody appeared satisfied at 
our very proper sense of propriety and concern with preserving 
female chastity . . .  The next morning the old man brought along all the 
female youth and beauty of the village and said that if we had any 
more gold lip shells we could rape the lot (Leahy 1991 :77-8) . 
The type of cowrie shell called giri giri was purchased on the New 
Guinea coast, one pound weight costing six pence and yielding about 
300 shells. A few handfuls would buy the prospectors all the daily food 
they needed. When the Leahy brothers were panning gold near Mount 
Hagen in 1936 they employed over 200 highlanders, and they needed 
about 500 of the large kina shells every month to meet their food and 
labour bills (Connolly and Anderson 1987:51, 250) . 
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In the 1950s highlands big-men began to tum away from traditional 
valuables and towards money, as a better way to achieve status. Coffee 
trees, which originally were grown in plantations by the Australian 
colonists, were soon being planted by highlanders in their mixed 
vegetable gardens. Coffee production put some money into everyone's 
pockets, but in particular it began to enrich those big-men who gained 
control over the land and the female labour needed to pick the berries, 
or organise marketing (Brookfield 1968; Bourke 1985). In the Eastern 
Highlands cattle projects appeared equally successful, until destabi­
lised by disputes and problems caused by damage to gardens because 
of the absence of secure fences (Grossman 1984) .  The planted groves of 
Casuarina that Leahy had noted in 1933, which were needed then by 
every local clan to provide for its needs of fuel wood and timber, became 
less vital to the domestic economy. Pacification, chainsaws and road 
transport made accessible the montane forests that grew at higher 
altitude, and instead of Casuarina the better soils were planted with 
coffee. The needs of big-men began to include such items as beer, 
clothing and transport. 
Meanwhile on the valley flats an expansion of the exchange 
economy, the improved sweet potato varieties now available, and steel 
spades all encouraged a move into the wetlands that previously had 
been little used. New landesque capital was formed by reclamation of 
land that, the archaeologists discovered, had actually been the focus of 
much earlier drainage activities, some of them dating back at least 6,000 
years (Golson 1977; Bayliss-Smith 1996). The earlier phases of drainage 
were probably based on crops like taro (Colocasia esculenta), a wetland 
species that seems to have been largely abandoned when the sweet 
potato, a superior dryland crop and a better source of pig fodder, was 
adopted two or three hundred years ago (Golson 1982). Calculations 
show that a phase of intensification of taro cultivation through 
drainage activity, which took place 1,200 years ago, could have 
sustained local population densities of up to 157 persons per square 
kilometre, as high as those that have become widespread in the Wahgi 
valley since the spread of sweet potato cultivation (Bayliss-Smith and 
Golson 1992). 
What motivated this drainage activity? Population pressure was 
originally assumed to be the explanation, by observers such as Clarke 
(1966) and Golson (1977). However, in the past as in the present, the 
production of surplus for the prestige economy is as plausible an 
explanation for landesque capital formation as explanations which 
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emphasise environmental degradation, population growth and a 
subsistence crisis (Golson and Gardner 1990; Bayliss-Smith and 
Golson 1992) . Almost certainly we should envisage both processes as 
taking place side by side, and mutually reinforcing each other. 
The upper Wahgi valley today continues to be the focus of agricul­
tural intensification, involving not just more and different inputs but 
also land improvements, especially through drainage, mounding and 
tree crop planting. The process is fuelled by growing shortages of land 
and by escalating ambitions for wealth, but it is made possible by a 
social organisation which facilitates a division of labour. The divisions 
between big-men and followers, and those between men and women, 
are long established features of Highlands society. The societies 
encountered by Europeans in the 1930s were only 'egalitarian' in a 
certain sense. Variations in social status were substantial, but status 
had to be achieved by men rather than it being inherited. However, to 
remain prominent, a big-man had to prove his merit by repeated 
demonstrations of political skills, bravery, oratory and charisma, and 
his capacity to attract loyalty from his followers would not long survive 
the eclipse of these powers. 
Today, as wealth takes on more permanent and more tangible forms 
(land planted with coffee, herds of cattle, consumer goods, money in the 
bank), the status of leaders may be changing towards a system in which 
the sources of power are to a large degree inherited rather than 
ascribed. In the Mount Hagen area Andrew Strathem (1971 :209) 
showed that already by 1965 a surprisingly large number of big-men 
were actually the sons of former big-men, rather than being self-made 
through a pure system of 'meritocracy'. In his sample of 61 minor big­
men half (31 men) were the sons of former big-men, while in a sample of 
36 major big-men, only nine had not 'inherited' their position from their 
fathers. In the 1960s it was kinship rather than capital that was being 
manipulated by fathers, because of their ability to arrange favourable 
marriages for sons (especially in the case of only sons). Today, the 
evidence suggests that other assets may well be involved in the 
formation of this more stratified society of inherited privilege. Perhaps 
only the continuing strength of communal land tenure prevents a full­
scale 'enclosure movement' taking place, in which estate owners 
privatise their capital assets and begin to employ labour, imitating the 
exploitative model of capitalist labour relations that was provided by 
the Australian plantations in the colonial era. 
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The Marovo Lagoon, Solomon Islands 
In the New Guinea Highlands the effect of European contact was to 
'democratise' access to wealth, and the system of values was able to 
shift from symbolic wealth in shells to bankable income from coffee in 
the space of one generation. One rather intensive system of production 
gave way to a different, but equally intensive system, and the social 
structures and agricultural landscapes of the past were able quickly to 
adjust to the new circumstances .  Elsewhere in the Pacific the same 
opportunities for adjustment have presented themselves, but inter­
mittently and over a much longer period. In between short periods of 
opportunity and eager innovation the islanders have often experienced 
long periods of stagnation. 
Typically, quite soon after European contact the former social 
structures and value systems began to be transformed under the 
combined onslaught of traders, missionaries and government officials. 
However, in many areas secure replacements for the old sources of 
prestige, value and cultural meaning have been slow to arrive. As a 
means to generate the new wealth various cash crops have been 
adopted, but all too often their success has been short-lived. The 
innovation is then abandoned, following boom and bust in the world 
economy, or epidemics of pests and diseases, or the collapse of 
marketing arrangements because of abrupt changes in colonial policy 
or the outbreak of war. The Dutch and Germans, Australians and 
British, have come and gone. Japanese or American soldiers appeared, 
and then just as suddenly disappeared. In the age of ' development' 
strange and exciting projects spring up, but then abruptly the funding 
is withdrawn. Today the Japanese are back, but as an economic 
superpower offering fabulous prices for forest trees that formerly had 
so little value that they were left to rot when felled as part of shifting 
cultivation cycles. Marovo Lagoon in Solomon Islands can provide for 
us a case study of these vicissitudes, which ultimately have led to a 
stagnation in the agricultural economy and the virtual abandonment of 
all forms of landesque capital other than that which is invested in trees. 
Marovo Lagoon is the name given to the eastern part of New 
Georgia island, the adjacent islands of Vangunu and Gatokae and the 
barrier islands that enclose the lagoon itself. Today there are about 
10,000 people in Marovo living in small villages situated on the fringes 
of a lagoon that covers more than 700 square kilometres, and with an 
extensive hinterland of forested lowlands, foothills and mountains 
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covering about 2000 square kilometres. In terms of land area alone the 
average population density was just 3 persons per square kilometres in 
1969 (Wall and Hansell 1975), although this figure has probably 
doubled over the past 30 years. However, the nineteenth century wit­
nessed such an extreme depopulation that even now the present 
Marovo population may not have reached its pre-contact level. The 
account that follows is mainly based on a forthcoming monograph that 
focuses on the use of Marovo forests, past and present (Hviding and 
Bayliss-Smith, in preparation), based in part on baseline surveys of the 
village economy and diet (Bayliss-Smith 1993). In addition Hviding 
(1995) has published an environmental dictionary in English and 
Marovo languages, and in another recent book (1996) he provides a 
magnificently comprehensive ethnography of Marovo with a particular 
focus on the use of the sea. 
Our account of the agricultural system begins with the situation as 
reconstructed at European contact, circa 1840. Marovo society was then 
divided between 'people of the coast' and 'people of the bush', with an 
active exchange system between the two groups based on taro-for-fish 
transactions. Since about 1910 all settlement has been coastal, but this 
coast/bush dichotomy is still quite pervasive in Marovo even though 
everyone today, men and women, participate in both spheres. Everyone 
fishes in the lagoon and also gardens in the forest, but it is in the former 
bush communities that knowledge of the forested interior is most 
extensive. The oldest informants today in 'bush' communities such as 
Bisuana confirm the picture that is painted by historians such as 
Bennett (1987), in stating that agriculture in the past was radically 
different from the present system of semi-permanent gardens domi­
nated by sweet potato and cassava cultivation. It was formerly the taro 
gardens that were the main source of food, together with cultivated 
pana (Dioscorea esculenta) and other yams and bananas. Other impor­
tant foods were Canarium nuts, both wild and planted, and many wild 
leafy greens and fruits. The bush people's lives revolved around daily 
agricultural tasks: in those days, said one old man, 'before the coming 
of mission and government [that is before about 1900] there was time 
for garden only'. The most labour intensive of the agricultural tasks 
was the cultivation of taro. 
Some taro was grown in swiddens, but the greater part of 
production derived from terraced pondfields known as ruta, into which 
water was led from small streams. The planted beds were surrounded 
by wooden fences or stone walls, to retain the water. The irrigation 
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channels were sloping and the pondfields were compartmentalised so 
the cultivator could manipulate the flow of water. The irrigated taro 
pondfields had adjacent hamlets and ancestral shrines, and the taro 
gardens were also associated with cultivated groves of Canarium nut 
trees. These clusters of agriculture and settlement were located up river 
valleys and sometimes deep in the forest, and even high up in the 
volcanic crater of Vangunu. There were in addition more open sites of 
dryland taro swiddens and yam gardens, where the land would be 
rotated in a typical agroforestry cycle. 
This process of forest 'domestication' results in the land being 
enriched with scattered groves of useful trees, and with permanent 
'hotspots' of taro production. It represents a build-up of landesque 
capital, but one that depended on a continual investment of effort for its 
maintenance .  Another old man from the bush people of south Vangunu 
expressed it as follows. 
Taro is big work to keep it productive. Growing taro is like feeding a 
child . It is hard work to maintain ruta, and that is why people stopped .  
Cassava and sweet potato are easy-you just hoe and plant, and they 
grow everywhere. The people of old worked hard. And they had time 
to work (Cited in Hviding and Bayliss-Smith, in preparation) . 
Traces of ruta that were mapped by Tedder (1976) in Kusaghe, north 
New Georgia, cover about 100 hectares. She estimates that this Kusaghe 
system was cultivated alongside an approximately equivalent area that 
was under swidden cultivation, and together the agricultural system 
could have supported at least 1,000 people at a population density of 
42 per square kilometre. In addition to meeting subsistence needs, ruta 
are remembered as having supplied a surplus for feasts and for barter. 
As in the case of intensive agriculture in the New Guinea highlands, a 
considerable mobilisation of labour was required, which must have 
involved some centralised leadership and sophisticated small-scale 
engineering work. Some degree of coercion can also be inferred in 
Marovo from linguistic distinctions between chiefs and commoners, 
and from the existence at least in coastal communities of foreign 
captives who were kept as slaves for forced labour. As in New Guinea, 
socio-political explanations for the formation of landesque capital are 
more convincing than the strictly economic rationale implied by 
Boserupian models of intensification. 
The abandonment of ruta in Marovo coincided with a number of 
changes in the late nineteenth century. If we were to seek economic 
explanations we would emphasise the role of population decline in 
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agricultural disintensification, in the context of dryland swiddens 
becoming more attractive. They were easier to clear with the new tech­
nology of steel axes, and if planted with sweet potatoes their swiddens 
were now capable of producing food for several years without a fallow. 
A socio-political model would emphasise the collapse in the authority 
of chiefs in the new colonial world of gunboats and missionaries, and 
the decline in the exchange value of taro as copra, calico, tobacco and 
money began to dominate exchange transactions. A basic geographical 
factor was the fact that the Marovo bush people, many of them depleted 
and demoralised by the effects of warfare, had migrated to new coastal 
sites, protected by the Pax Britannica but remote from the ruta. The last 
remaining bush population on New Georgia was a community in 1923 
of less than fifty people in Kusaghe, and they were then still practising 
ruta cultivation but it was soon afterwards that they abandoned the 
terraced pondfields (Tedder 1976). In their coastal villages the 
gardeners focussed their efforts on the new root crops, in particular 
sweet potato, and it was in these gardens that they planted coconuts in 
order to make copra. 
If we consider these changes in terms of capital formation, we see an 
investment that had become relatively expensive and unrewarding to 
maintain (irrigated pondfields) being abandoned, in favour of the much 
greater perceived benefits obtainable from new forms of investment. The 
low labour requirements of the new subsistence regime (sweet potato 
and cassava cultivation) subsidised new activities. Initially this sub­
sidy may have helped in the escalation of canoe construction and 
warfare (McKinnon 1975), but later on we see the establishment of 
copra production, the commercialisation of marine resources, church 
building, and for some people periods of absence working on planta­
tions. In the new market economy of the twentieth century, the whole 
basis for prestige began to change with new roles and new forms of 
value. Access t<;> prestige was, in a sense, democratised by the money 
earned from cash crops and wage labour. Some of the money was 
frittered away, but some was re-invested in small items of domestic 
capital (knives, bowls, pots and pans), in larger items such as houses 
and boats, and in communal projects such as schools and churches, 
which can be seen as urgently needed for the restructuring of cultural 
capital. Spare time was being invested in expanded patterns of mobility, 
in new forms of trade and exchange, and in the formation of some new 
landesque capital through the planting of coconuts as a cash crop on 
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coastal land. In this situation the maintenance of ruta became a luxury 
that Marovo society could no longer afford. 
In the last twenty years this new economy has begun to falter. The 
price of copra has fluctuated and fallen. Education, the growth of urban 
employment elsewhere in Solomon Islands, and the much higher levels 
of consumption associated with modernity have, for some, made rural 
incomes seem inadequate and village life styles unrewarding. In this 
context the Marovo people see great potential for realising value by 
logging rainforest trees, many of which have grown up in the past 
century on the abandoned fields and settlements of the former bush 
population. With the Marovo people having adopted a more coastal 
orientation since about 1910, the natural capital of the neglected forests 
has been accumulating. The present generation are determined to cash 
in on this accumulated investment that is really a by-product of the 
twentieth century coastal economy. In the absence of government help 
in organising small-scale 'walkabout sawmills', realising this benefit is 
likely to occur through agreements with overseas logging companies. It 
is unfortunate that the logging companies seem destined to retain such 
a high proportion of the value of the logs that they will export from 
Marovo to Asian markets, but in a sense this unfair division of profits 
merely repeats the injustices perpetrated by European traders and the 
copra economy of the early twentieth century. 
The Rewa Delta, Viti Levu, Fij i 
In Oceania the most spectacular examples of landesque capital in pre­
history are to be found in the area south and east of the 'Anopheles 
line', which separates Polynesian, Fiji and New Caledonia to the south 
and west from the islands of west Melanesia on the other side. One of 
the ways we can rationalise this distribution of capital formation is to 
correlate it with the distribution of large-scale political/linguistic units, 
centred on chiefdoms. This political geography in tum is correlated 
with features in prehistoric demography, in particular the prevalence of 
malaria north and west of the Anopheles line and its absence to the 
south and east. Groube (1993) has pointed to the devastating effects on 
human demography of the different forms of malaria spread by Ano­
pheles farauti in west Melanesia, in particular in lowland New Guinea, 
the Bismarck archipelago, the Solomon Islands and northern Vanuatu. 
In this zone of endemic malaria it is clear that the agricultural 
resource base could have supported much larger populations than 
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existed at European contact. Without such dense populations, it is 
argued, neither subsistence demand, nor the intensity of exchange 
activity, nor the stability of leadership were such as to encourage 
investments to secure greater levels of agricultural production. Even 
though relatively sparse populations, for example those in Marovo, had 
the technical means to produce surplus taro from irrigated and terraced 
pondfields, in this region of endemic malaria examples of such intensi­
fication are relatively few and the scale of capital formation is always 
somewhat limited. However, as soon as we move to higher altitudes 
beyond the climatic tolerance of Anopheles, as in the New Guinea high­
lands, we find intensification on a grander scale, and when we tum to 
those areas of Oceania that were beyond the Anopheles mosquito's 
biogeographical range we find evidence of very substantial terracing, 
irrigation and wetland drainage. The most famous examples include 
New Caledonia (Barrau 1956; Sand 1996), the high lands of Polynesia 
especially Hawaii (Kirch 1984, 1994), and Fiji (Parry 1977, 1981; 
Bayliss-Smith et al. 1988). It is the Rewa delta in Fiji that provides our 
third case study. 
Our knowledge of the agricultural economy of Rewa comes from the 
work of John Parry (1977), a geographer who was the first to identify on 
aerial photographs of the delta evidence of over 600 defended 
settlement sites and associated areas of intensive cultivation. The Rewa 
river drains the wetter half of the largest island in Fiji, Viti Levu, and its 
delta covers an area of 250 square kilometres. The prehistory of this 
area is poorly known, and is likely to remain so as early occupation 
levels are buried beneath the silt that the Rewa deposits when in flood. 
Because it is so low-lying the area can be hazardous and difficult to 
cultivate, but the soils are potentially highly productive. In the 
nineteenth century this was one of the most densely populated areas in 
Fiji, or indeed in the whole of the south Pacific (Parry 1977: 1) .  It was 
noted for its fertile and intensively cultivated land, for its powerful and 
well organised chiefdom, and for its endemic state of warfare. The 
characteristic Rewa settlements of this period were ring-ditch 
fortifications, which were linked by natural channels and canals dug to 
provide access for canoes. Seeman visited the area in 1860, and he 
described one canal that connects the Navuloa river ( distributary) with 
the Navaka. The canal measured two miles long and sixty feet wide. 
[It is] probably the greatest piece of engineering ever executed in these 
islands, affording a proof of how thickly they must have been 
populated to allow such an undertaking, at a time when there was 
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nothing but staves to dig the ground, hands to shovel it up, and 
baskets to carry it  away .. .It was made long ago [circa 1810, according 
to Parry], and for the purpose of carrying out a military stratagem 
(Seeman 1862:83) . 
The Rew a chiefdom, after long wars with Bau, was only overthrown 
because of an overwhelming attack in June 1845, launched treach­
erously on the political nucleus of the polity by sixty double war canoes 
arriving from Bau. Parry (1977:72-3) used two methods to estimate the 
population of the Rewa delta before the area was conquered and laid 
waste by Bau. His survey of the number of nucleated settlements in 
various size categories suggested a population of 35-40,000, while a 
second method using the carrying capacity of the cultivated area of 
wetland produces a figure of 36,700. These population figures represent 
a density of 260-300 per square kilometre, which might seem excessive 
until the scale and productivity of the agricultural system is considered. 
To avoid the problems of a persistently high water table, over vast areas 
ditches were dug and the spoil heaped up to form island beds, which 
were then maintained and fertilised by cleaning out from the ditches 
the accumulated organic debris and mud as a rich source of compost. 
Two different types of garden are distinguished by Parry on two dif­
ferent soils types. The grid-iron beds were probably for dalo or taro, 
while reticulated beds were probably for via kana or giant swamp taro 
(Cyrtosperma chamissonis) and via (Alocasia macrorrhiza). 
These raised fields produced a surplus of taro and other food that 
was a source of tribute, and the means for sustaining an elaborate 
structure of local chiefs, regional chiefs and a paramount chief, with 
privilege and status finely graded at each level in the hierarchy. 
'Despotism' does not seem too strong a word to describe the discipline 
imposed by the divine power of the chiefs, although co-operation and 
self-interest as well as coercion were obviously important, particularly 
in the construction of the engineering works associated with ring-ditch 
fortifications. Those defeated in war were almost always either 
enslaved or cannibalised. Parry (1977:7 4) speculates that the intensi­
fication process in Rewa was driven by a Boserupian process of 
population growth, but all of his evidence for the system's maintenance 
in the mid-nineteenth century relates to the relentless organisation by 
the chiefs of surplus production and the communal construction of 
canals and defence works. 
Capital was also invested in trees, including sacred groves: in the 
case of vesi (Intsia bijuga), 'no trees are allowed to be cut down, lest the 
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anger of the gods should be involved' (Macdonald 1857:234) . The 
dearth of population and absence of trees on the Wai Levu (main) river 
between Navuso and Naitasiri was noted in August 1856, eleven years 
after Rewa had been defeated by Bau, when the Royal Navy made their 
hydrographic survey of the delta. 
Very few cocoa-nut trees are to be seen, although their importance 
and value are well known to the people. This is attributable, however, 
to the continued warfare of former times: when a town was besieged 
the resources of the people, including bread-fruit and cocoa-nut trees, 
were cut off by the enemy (Macdonald 1857:237) . 
Macdonald also noted (1857: 235) that a high-ranking Bauan chief, 
Roroi Ravulo, had recently cut down a particularly sacred vesi tree at 
Mhuretu in order to provide an upright post for a new Methodist 
chapel. This would appear to be an attempt by Roroi Ravulo to trans­
plant the symbol of the god Bureru into the house of the new Christian 
god. We can see this as an example of how, at a time of traumatic 
change, the cultural capital of pre-colonial Fiji was hastily being 
converted into new forms. However, in the case of Rewa the pace of 
change was overwhelming. Its defeat in 1845 was followed by a long 
period of political decline and depopulation through disease, followed 
by land alienation to European settlers. In 1877, two years after the 
catastrophic measles epidemic, Home (1881) describes the Rewa delta 
as being a cultural landscape in transition. 
The greater part of it belongs to settlers, some of whom have fields of 
fine healthy looking sugar cane, and others have herds of well-fed 
cattle. The land which lies between the two rivers . . .  had been 
previously cultivated by the Fijians; but it is now covered with a thick 
young forest. These, together with the many abandoned dalo or taro 
patches, lead to the belief that the country was once more populous 
than it is now (Horne 1 881 :30-31) .  
Some disintensification was inevitable, but what in fact happened 
was a wholesale abandonment of the intensive system of agriculture. 
The collapse of the Rewa polity that organised this system was so 
complete that its geographical extent now has to be reconstructed from 
aerial photographs, and its political basis must be pieced together from 
historical accounts and oral histories. The actual agricultural system of 
Rewa has either been converted to cash crops (initially sugar cane, 
today vegetables or rice), or it has reverted to swamp grassland, 
invading bush, and (in the twentieth century) an economy of extensive 
cattle grazing. 
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The alienated land in Rewa is now mainly settled by Indo-Fijians 
growing a range of commercial crops. The Fijians in the delta have also 
become more commercially oriented, benefiting from the proximity of 
Suva as a market. John Overton (1988, 1993) studied changing land use 
patterns in two Fijian villages, Draubuta and Cautata. In addition to the 
usual mixed cropping centred on root crops and bananas, rice was also 
being grown on the floodplain as a new cash crop in bunded paddy 
fields. In the 32 households that were starting to grow rice, Overton 
(1988: 156) found that this crop occupied on average 1 .35 ha out of total 
farm holdings of around twenty hectares. To encourage farmers with 
this initiative, the land regarded as suitable for rice had originally been 
drained and levelled by the Ministry of Primary Industries, but the 
paddy fields that had originated in this way were then owned and 
managed on an individual basis. 
Increasingly the Fijians in Rewa retain as communal (mataqali) land 
the hilly terrain on the edge of the floodplain used for growing root 
crops, whereas the wetland of the delta is sub-divided into individual 
holdings. This change in land tenure reflects the formation of a more 
individualistic society, in which a proto-peasantry and a rural prole­
tariat have emerged despite the rhetoric of communalism (Bayliss-Smith 
et al. 1988) . The maintenance of landesque capital in rice paddies is 
now a matter for the individual farmer, and John Overton has shown 
that farmers must now look to capital in other forms to facilitate the 
process of wetland management: 
Capital is a major constraint [in Darubata and Cautata] . Bullock teams, 
ploughs, and, occasionally, the cost of land clearing are major costs for 
villagers who have few savings and often restricted access to other 
sources of income. The shortage of implements ranked on a similar 
level to land shortage as a barrier to future expansion (Overton 
1988:157) . 
Labour was recruited by farmers locally, and was being paid either 
in cash or in kind: cigarettes, meals, kava (yaqona), and more rarely a 
share in the rice harvest. The willingness of some labourers to accept 
non-cash payments within a structure of kinship-based reciprocity, was 
something that assisted the 'capital-scarce' rice farmers to get estab­
lished. 
Although these farmers are now de facto peasant proprietors, de jure 
they have no land title. Therefore they cannot use land as security to 
raise capital, not even to obtain loans from the Fiji Development Bank. 
The unavailability of credit and the lack of productive capital have 
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become obstacles to progress, and these constraints together with low 
prices discouraged many of the smaller rice farmers in the late 1980s 
(Overton 1993). Agricultural investment no longer depends on the 
heroic efforts of labour organised by more or less despotic chiefs. 
Today's Rew a farmers must seek new ways to generate surplus to 
satisfy their aspirations to status, by finding new strategies for capital 
formation. For major engineering works they now look to central 
government for assistance, but for their everyday sources of productive 
and finance capital they are very much on their own, each farmer acting 
as an increasingly autonomous entrepreneur. In this brave new world 
of capital restructuring, the agricultural achievements of the past are so 
remote as to be not even a distant memory. 
Concl usion 
The empirical evidence from the three case studies seems to suggest that 
a combination of environmental constraint and socio-political coercion 
is the best explanation for why landesque capital was formed in the 
past. Difficult environments certainly stimulate agricultural 
intensification, as Brookfield (1972, 1984, 1986) has emphasised. Our 
case studies show that the difficulties can stem from an absence of 
forested land for swidden agriculture, timber and wood supplies 
(Upper Wahgi valley), from a lack of access to marine resources except 
through barter arrangements (Marovo bush), or from soils having low 
agricultural potential in waterlogged wetlands (Rewa). The precise 
agricultural response differs, but in each case difficult environments 
have to be substantially reworked : swamp drainage and Casuarina 
groves; taro pondfield systems and Canarium orchards; and raised 
fields, ditches and canals, in the three areas respectively. In each case it 
is tempting to view this evidence in the light of Wittfogel' s hydraulic 
model, if we enlarge the concept of despotism to include subordination 
to the power of big-men and chiefs, and to the emergence of marked 
inequality in gender roles. Nor should we forget that the organisational 
requirements of wetland drainage and valley-side pondfields are 
actually quite different from those of large-scale irrigation, and that 
much can be achieved by the incremental efforts of individual house­
holds working co-operatively, without centralised control (Brookfield 
1986). 
The landesque capital formed in the colonial period are agro­
ecosystems that are perhaps the most productive and sustainable that 
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have yet been devised in the Pacific region. There is much in the agro­
technology that we should admire, but it is quite apparent from our 
three case studies that these systems need to be substantially modified 
if they are to fit the Pacific societies of the twenty first century. It is 
striking how quickly the old forms of landesque capital have been 
modified or have collapsed once the socio-political conditions of its 
formation were altered in colonial times. Therefore, to study the way 
these intensive systems have changed in the historical period is 
probably going to be more profitable than trying to reconstruct their 
prehistoric origins. The story of their maintenance, modification or 
abandonment can tell us much about the changing role of 'capital' in 
Pacific agrarian societies. The example of Hawaii, where Japanese­
funded golf courses are now spreading across bankrupt commercial 
farms that in a bygone era were intensively cultivated for surplus taro 
production, shows that the restructuring of landesque capital in the 
islands is continuing at an accelerating rate. This restructuring is now 
just another symptom of the globalisation of the Pacific, and therefore, 
in a sense, it is just the latest episode in a very long saga. 
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Pacific values and the economics of 
land use: a response to Bayliss­
Smith 
Paul Si l l itoe 
Land-use is an issue that exercises humans everywhere. It is necessary 
to choose, wherever you live, between different possible uses, whether 
to use land as a golf course, crop field, conserved forest, or whatever. 
But it is quite another issue to assume that these land-use choices are 
informed by the same maximising logic the world over, which is the 
danger in employing Western economic concepts. The consideration of 
land as primarily a productive resource and the use of the notion of 
capital, as suggested by Bayliss-Smith's use of the landesque capital 
concept, prompts this caution. 
While socio-political organisation features prominently in land-use 
decisions in the Pacific, as elsewhere, it does so in a quintessentially 
Oceanic fashion, reflecting the emphasis placed on egalitarian as 
opposed to hierarchical relations. In this regard Pacific attitudes to land 
stand in stark contrast to Western ones, which reflect a hierarchical 
capitalist order in which land is seen as an economic resource to be 
exploited to produce goods for sale at a profit on the market. Bayliss­
Smith' s use of the term capital for land resources intimates this 
perspective in the Pacific too, where the local political economy is of a 
radically different kind, based largely on subsistence production 
(domestic mode of production or DMP) with the surplus channelled 
into gift exchange (socio-political mode of exchange or SME).  The 
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implications of this difference for land use and investments in land 
improvement are profound, and we should beware of underestimating 
them by using technical terms drawn from studies of capitalist market 
economies, which might lead us to make inappropriate assumptions. 
Many of the things produced in Oceanic cultures are not capital 
assets in an economic sense but social assets with political import. The 
difference in emphasis is critical and if misplaced it invites confusion. 
A look at Raymond Firth's monumental corpus on Tikopia, prompted 
by Bayliss-Smith's reference to it, provides a salutary lesson in the 
problems of reading Western values into Pacific economic behaviour. 
Firth is well known for his opinion that capitalist economic concepts 
have universal applicability. But his interpretation of material objects as 
capital assets results in some supposedly economic behaviour 
appearing embarrassingly uneconomic. He assumes that Pacific 
exchanges have an underlying material raison d'etre, prompted 
ultimately by the desire to have some object to use or consume in a 
primary economic sense, although his interpretation is not of course 
this starkly straightforward. The Tikopia do not engage in exchange in 
an impersonal way to obtain the material objects they require: for 
instance if someone loses a canoe paddle they rarely, if ever, simply 
approach a stranger who has a spare and barter food for it. The buyer 
and seller are frequently related and social considerations, not mere 
economic ones, influence their behaviour and exchange rates. Here, as 
Firth observes; 'an element of interest in social advantage rather than 
material gain plays a large part' (1965:345), but he still tends to 
interpret their dealings as materially motivated exchange transactions, 
with calculation of prices made awkward because they fluctuate with 
relationships. 
This, as I understand him, is largely how Firth interprets Tikopia 
exchange, underplaying the use of the same objects in more obviously 
ceremonial exchange transactions. While he is aware of ceremonial 
exchange as we would expect in a student of Malinowski, and tells us 
that the concept of reciprocity ' . . .  is one of the foundations of Tikopia 
social relationships' (1965:348), he pays relatively little attention to this 
important aspect of their social life. His material-orientated approach 
prompts him to point out that ceremonial exchange is a significant 
channel for the distribution of goods, reducing the volume of utility­
motivated or economic transactions (where our price notions might 
apply) because it involves goods which also feature in everyday 
production and consumption. But the effect he notes 'is not so much to 
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provide the necessities of life as to give a stimulus to production above 
the subsistence level' (1965 :320) .  This contravenes materialistic 
economic assumptions. It would be analogous to us stepping up our 
production of cars not to use them but to hand them around as gifts! 
The nearest parallel is prestige car production to advertise material 
success. Why should ceremonial exchange stimulate production above 
the subsistence level? According to Firth because 'it embodies 
satisfactions not directly arising from the nature of the goods 
themselves, but from the fact of exchange in itself' (1965:358). 
In other words, we have production stimulated above subsistence 
needs to supply goods to satisfy some ill-defined urge to exchange. This 
must have far-reaching consequences for the economy as a whole. It 
would be like us buying up large amounts of food, electrical goods, 
footwear or whatever and then giving them to relatives not for them to 
use or consume necessarily but to reaffirm social relations with them 
and those from whom we purchased the items. Our gift purchasing, as 
Firth notes, is considerably more modest, only comprising a tiny 
proportion of the total volume of our economic transactions (Davis 
1972) . Here I think lies the reason for him overlooking the significance 
of ceremonial exchange on Tikopia. Roughly comparable transactions 
feature negligibly in our lives and consequently our capitalist-economic 
model, which he is concerned to apply to Tikopia, virtually omits them. 
He fails as a result to pay them sufficient attention in their own right, 
omitting to follow through the significance of the distinction between 
the symbolic value of social exchange and the utilitarian value of 
economic exchange. 
Although Firth senses that there are incongruities between classical 
economic thinking and Tikopia behaviour, he fails, I think, to explore 
their implications. While he can write 'that it is impossible by formal 
economic analysis to understand either the exchange system of these 
people or how the uneven distribution of goods tends to be levelled out. 
Social norms at every tum condition the economic situation' (1965:318), 
he repeatedly slips back into a formal analytic frame. He ends up with 
some embarrassing apparently uneconomic-economic behaviour, 
which he cannot adequately account for. For instance, when someone 
gave two betel mortars to a man who needed them to present in a 
funeral payment (an SME transaction), the borrower repaid him with 
two newly made mortars, one for himself and the other for his father, 
plus a basket of food. According to Firth this 'is the equivalent of goods 
for goods with a basket of food as an acknowledgment of . . .  the loan' 
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(1965:316).  But when the lender 's family repaid this basket of food the 
day after they received it, returning the interest on the loan so to speak, 
Firth calls it ' a good example of the operation of exchange on two levels 
of economic and of social interest' (1965:316) . There is more, I think, to 
be accounted for here than this micro-economically-informed statement 
suggests. Similar inadequacies become apparent when we consider the 
payment of men who work on the building of a canoe. They receive food 
and various objects (such as bark-cloth, sinnet, and so on) in payment 
for their labour, which Firth interprets as their 'wages' .  But the men 
who receive these goods have contributed many of them to the payment 
in the first place, and have, in effect, brought along their own 'wages' .  
This results, Firth says, from the 'concept that to put one's labour at the 
command of another is a social service, not merely an economic service' 
(1965:303) . It would clearly revolutionise our economic system if people 
not only worked for no pay as a social service but also brought along 
their own reward: obviously we need to rethink some of our capitalistic 
assumptions. 
A crucial difference between the objects that the Tikopia exchange 
and the shell ornaments handed around by the Trobriand Islanders in 
the much discussed kula exchange system is that they have both a 
utility and a social value. For example, the prized bonito-hooks of the 
Tikopia, their sinnet cord and carved objects like bowls, betel mortars 
and canoes, all have utilitarian functions and so can be conceived in 
some contexts as unambiguously falling into the material economic 
domain. But the Tikopia exchange exactly the same objects in 
ceremonial, kula-like contexts, where the main focus of interest is not 
their utilitarian value (although this must be present in an implicit 
sense) but their symbolic social value as tokens of relationship and 
sociability. The Tikopia make no distinction between utilitarian and 
ceremonially exchanged objects and when they receive or make them 
they do not know whether they will in the future give them in exchange 
or put them to ordinary technical use. Their wealth production is 
mundane property manufacture too. 
What about the production of the objects exchanged by the Tikopia? 
These are all locally made, many persons having the skill and available 
resources required. Capitalist economic theory would lead us to expect 
people to be busy making them for their own daily use, to 'purchase' 
other consumable goods and to enhance their social reputations by 
generosity in ceremonial exchanges, but strangely enough this is not so 
for the Tikopia. Hence there is no monopoly on the production of bonito 
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hooks, which the Tikopia value highly; anyone can make them and the 
raw materials required are common (with the possible exception of 
turtle-shell which must anyway be in more than sufficient supply 
because, as Firth tells us, the Tikopia use it to make ear-rings, which are 
of considerably less value). After outlining the manufacture of bonito­
hooks, Firth says, 'I have always thought it remarkable that the Tikopia 
do not make more bonito-hooks. The question why some sharp 
individuals do not accumulate a stock for trading purposes and why 
all men do not put in more labour in the production of them is difficult 
to answer ' (1965:342). This question may be difficult to answer from the 
viewpoint of formal economic theory, which Firth insists on applying 
so closely to the Tikopia, but it is one which we have to answer to 
understand their political economy. Unfortunately he did not 
investigate the production of material objects with such questions in 
mind, and can only offer us an hypothesis relating to the Tikopia 
philosophy of life that dulls what he sees as this otherwise 'natural' 
human urge, for the acquisition of material goods. 
Without the necessary ethnographic evidence we cannot follow up 
this issue any further. But clearly we have revealed a crucial gap, 
which, so long as it remains unfilled, frustrates our understanding of 
Tikopia society. This might stand as a general comment on Firth's 
account, which is not always convincing in its attempt to apply the 
concepts of capitalist economic theory, deploying them in contexts 
where they are either inapplicable or demand considerable rethinking. 
The Tikopia economy, Firth tells us, 'is complex along its own lines, rich 
in personal relationships and in concepts of exchange of goods and 
services, but arranging these to fit a scheme of wants dictated by a 
variety of cultural values' (1965:354) . He fails, I think, to pay enough 
attention to these 'cultural values' and how they condition Tikopia 
behaviour in ways that mark them off from us, to whom capitalistic 
economic theory applies. Instead we have only a tinkering with bits 
from the classical micro-economic model, the taking of some 
assumptions about human behaviour and related theory and an 
attempt to match these to a culture previously foreign to capitalism, 
ignoring embarrassing contradictions and questions that appear to fly 
in the face of these ideas. The bonito-hook example illustrates what I am 
driving at. Neither the raw materials nor the skill to make these highly 
valued objects is scarce in any sense but, enigmatically, regardless the 
Tikopia are not busy producing them. Capitalist economic theory is not 
going to prove helpful in explaining what they are up to, for their 
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behaviour turns this on its head. Imagine us all having gold in our back 
gardens which we cannot be bothered to dig up, other than very 
occasionally. An economist would say that this is a stupid analogy 
because if we all had gold in our gardens it would no longer be scarce 
(a crucial assumption in the deductive model) and so would no longer 
be valuable. In that event, why do the Tikopia value bonito-hooks? 
The situation on Tikopia regarding the manufacture of bonito-hooks 
or other transactable goods is not strange for the Pacific. The position is 
strongly reminiscent of the production of the shell armbands in the 
Trobriand Islands, which feature in the renowned kula exchange 
institution, and are less manufactured than brought into transactional 
existence through exchange (Malinowski 1922). Likewise the wealth 
objects in the Highlands of New Guinea, such as shell valuables and 
stone axe blades, are transacted into existence and not produced 
(Sillitoe 1988; Burton 1989). The implications for Melanesian political 
orders are of paramount significance, and cast doubt on the application 
of Marxist concepts, as Bayliss-Smith attempts, which assume the 
existence of hierarchies and exploitation. The notions of Marx relate 
directly to capitalism, as reflected in the title of his most influential 
work, Das Kapital, concerning primarily the control of capital by a few, 
so affording their exploitation of the labour of the majority. This concept 
of capital is not applicable, I think, to the Pacific, being antithetical to 
egalitarian political economies, and rendering inapposite speculation 
about despotic leadership. Despots do not go with such decentralised 
acephalous orders, just as political and economic equality are 
unachievable in class societies. The productive arrangements of 
Oceania concern the diffusion of economic and political power, 
working against its concentration in a few hands. 
These comments have a further bearing on property relations in the 
Pacific, as intimated in the examples of the Tikopian betel mortar and 
canoe construction transactions, which relate to notions of capital. 
While there is some debate over the applicability of concepts drawn 
from Mauss' s classic work The Gift (1990), particularly pertaining to 
inalienability or otherwise of exchangeable goods (Carrier, in press, 
Strathern, in press), it is generally agreed that ideas relating to the 
possession of property in the Pacific are of a notably different order to 
those found under capitalist economic conditions, where the notion of 
privately owned property is prominent. In the Pacific, people entertain 
more flexible ideas about property ownership, often allowing a wide 
range of relatives the use of some things while restricting the right of 
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disposal to one party. And regarding the objects that feature as wealth 
in ceremonial exchanges, the notion of property ownership is unhelpful 
because in an important sense nobody ever owns these things but only 
enjoys temporary possession of them, and the social renown that this 
brings, before passing them on to someone else in another exchange 
transaction. In a sense they 'are owned' by everyone who handles them 
on behalf of their society, both living kin, deceased ancestors and 
unborn descendants, on through time. This attitude to things has some 
significant repercussions regarding notions of capital, as it does on 
arguments about the alienability or inalienability of the products of 
people's labour. And it is compounded when the manufacture of objects 
occurs in an interminable series of steps which obfuscate production 
and give the impression that people transact them into existence. 
The issue of property brings us to land, which together with capital 
and labour comprises one of the factors of production of classical 
economics .  It raises another issue, to which Bayliss-Smith's use of the 
concept of landesque capital in the Pacific (after Blaikie and Brookfield 
1987) draws our attention, namely land tenure, where Pacific practices 
again stand in stark contrast to Western capitalist concepts. Land is not 
only a factor of production in an economic sense, for although central to 
subsistence livelihoods it is also important emotionally, as a component 
of people's identity. In a sense they belong to the land as much as it 
belongs to them, having a sense of identification with their land which 
has profound implications-far beyond its place as an essential 
productive resource in a particular land use regime. Land is a 
permanent resource which Pacific Islanders manage in a highly 
effective and generally sustainable way. New Guinea Highlanders, for 
example, cultivate land repeatedly with fallow rests of varying 
duration, without apparently exhausting its potential to produce 
(Sillitoe 1996). The land has an eternal aspect, connecting them with the 
past and the future, imbuing human life with meaning, giving it 
continuity with what went before and what is to come. All kin, 
including dead ancestors and unborn descendants, depend on and use 
the same land. As a powerful symbol as well as an essential resource, 
connection with the land gives people a sense of eternal existence, as 
links in an everlasting chain anchored in that location generation after 
generation. This is also frequently manifest in a strong spiritual 
connection with place, often featuring ancestral spirits who continue to 
frequent the land on which they lived. When people view a 
neighbourhood they see a landscape of social relations connecting 
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them to those who occupied the land in the past and those who are 
currently there, with social relationships embedded in place as an 
aspect of their identity. 
The theme of continuity also serves to promote the stable existence of 
local communities. A considerable degree of informality and mobility 
characterises Pacific society, and land acts, anchor-like, to extend a 
sense of continuity to communities. Although community relationships 
shift and change as people come and go, the land goes on forever, a 
never changing location. While the land tenure system nominally 
controls access to land, it scarcely constrains families' choices and is 
not restrictive. If a family wishes to garden an area for some reason but 
has no rights to it, its members will probably be able to secure 
temporary rights to do so, for the broad land tenure rules ensure that all 
families can find adequate cultivable land to meet their needs. This 
more or less open access to land, under a tenure system laying down 
only broad rules to guide behaviour, makes inappropriate capitalist 
notions of market competition over land as a scarce resource. Rights to 
land are one of the principal arenas in which people activate relations 
of kinship to one another, which define obligations controlling access. 
Another arena already alluded to concerns the direction of, and 
responsibility for, wealth transactions on prescribed social occasions. 
In these kin-structured exchange contexts personal identity is created 
and status validated in the present, whereas issues pertaining to land 
rights root social life in the past and give it continuity. The activation of 
rights to cultivable land features centrally in the constitution of local 
groups, as people come together on land where they can claim 
cultivation rights through kinship or marriage to the land holding 
corporation. Land and resource management is an important feature of 
kin relationships. 
People may claim rights to cultivable land in a number of ways. 
They may cultivate any land unclaimed by others on the territories 
where access rights belong to a community kin group to which they are 
related. This may include virgin forest and areas of secondary regrowth 
to which no one claims prior rights, that is where no relatives have 
gardened in living memory. Once a man clears and gardens an area, 
use title passes to his kin and descendants, so long as the title is 
remembered, which presupposes recultivation at intervals to keep it 
alive. Kin may stake a prior right to any such garden land, perhaps 
sharing it with siblings or other close collateral kin, depending on 
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genealogical connections with the previous gardener. Claims by 
children to land cultivated previously by their parents usually take 
precedence. When necessary, other claims are nominally negotiated 
according to the closeness of the relationship between previous and 
aspiring gardeners. While the principles of descent supply a framework 
for controlling access to land and ordering people's claims, they are not 
absolute and do not restrict them to particular areas of land (Panoff 
1970; Brown et al. 1990; Carrier, in press). These priority rights to use 
land may pass through either or both males and females, with persons 
claiming rights to land cleared before by their father 's, mother 's or 
wife's parents, often through as many generations as can be 
remembered and acknowledged, or even through relationships which 
are not considered strictly appropriate for such claims. Sometimes 
families ask to garden land to which they have no rights as defined by 
these principles, usually because it is convenient for them, for example 
the land is near to their homes or other gardens. The granting of such 
requests depends upon circumstances such as whether or not the 
owners have plans to cultivate the areas themselves and their 
relationship with those making the request, but commonly permission 
is granted. If no descendant gains prior rights to an area farmed by a 
forbearer, his successors do not formally forfeit their claim on the land. 
The loss of first-claim rights is a gradual process. So long as some 
members of the community recall the site's previous cultivation, any kin 
descended from the gardener(s) could potentially claim the right to 
cultivate it, and only when such rights slip from the collective memory 
does the land pass back by default into the general community pool. 
Some disagreement over who has priority access to land is 
inevitable, given the flexibility of these principles, and a certain level of 
disputation is integral to the land tenure systems, publicly resolving 
differences and reaffirming the legitimacy of kin corporation 
guardianship. But the number of serious disputes, as opposed to 
earnest negotiations, over rights to land are relatively few, considering 
the broadness of the options facing farmers and the system's 
dependence on oral traditions and memory. Furthermore, even when 
disputes occur and the consensus of public opinion finds against those 
intending to cultivate any parcel of land, they are unlikely to forgo the 
opportunity to farm the site as long as they publicly acknowledge that 
they have no inheritable rights. This correlates with the generally broad 
and flexible land tenure system, that while certain principles control 
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people's rights to land, in actuality they can gain access to nearly any 
site which they are likely to want to cultivate. 
The up-shot is that certain small groups of people do not have 
exclusive access to large tracts of arable land and any tendency 
towards a land-holding monopoly is subverted both by the expectation 
that temporary cultivation rights are likely to be granted on request, and 
also by the dispersal of land holdings across any region. This open 
access to land flies in the face of Marxist assumptions about certain 
social groups struggling to gain control over this factor of production, 
particularly fertile and highly valued areas. The position of political 
leaders, persons and families of higher social standing also promotes 
questions about the notion of authoritative leadership, let alone despots 
exploiting the labour surplus of others by controlling access to land. 
The families of men who differ in their social standing evidence no 
difference in the rights through which they claim access to cultivable 
land. While people recognise certain renowned persons above others, 
such as the big men of Melanesia and chiefs of Polynesia whose social 
standing depends in large part on their roles in the ceremonial 
exchange and redistribution of wealth, the claims of these people to the 
areas their families have under cultivation are no different to those of 
others. They all behave the same in this respect, regardless of status. 
Regarding development, or rather changes to more commercial land 
uses, whether plantation crops or golf courses, the traditional land 
tenure practices of people in the Pacific are commonly cited as barriers 
by those favouring market intervention. The attitudes of people to their 
land, particularly that they cannot own it as individuals but only claim 
rights to use it, are thought by some to be major obstacles to economic 
development (Acquaye and Crocombe 1984; Knetch and Trebilcock 
1981) .  In the opinion of many politicians, local land tenure hinders 
development and needs to be changed (Barrows and Roth 1990), some 
planners maintaining that individual tenure is essential to promote 
people's incorporation into a monetary market economy. It is assumed 
that traditional tenure systems discourage people from making 
improvements to land, putting in the labour and investing capital to 
increase productivity in the landesque capital mode, to integrate 
themselves into a cash-crop market. Another commonly cited drawback 
is that they result in numerous small fragmented holdings, individuals 
having plots dotted about a territory, not arranged contiguously, 
militating against economy-of-scale developments such as 
mechanisation (Rimoldi 1966; Rutz 1978). But some of these ideas are 
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founded on a misinterpretation of local land holding practices as 
graphically illustrated by Bayliss-Smith's discussion of certain land 
management practices in the Pacific, notably the sophisticated 
irrigation arrangements found in some regions for taro cultivation 
(Kirch 1982; Spriggs 1984) . There is no practical difference between 
traditional and freehold land ownership, as no one can usurp 
continued use from one generation to another. The claiming of priority 
rights to parcels of land on the territories of the kin-founded 
corporations to which they have a legitimate relationship, which they 
maintain so long as they use the land, results in the land effectively 
belonging to people. But the tenure systems differ significantly from the 
capitalist one in not placing in the hands of any individual land-user 
the right to dispose of land. Nobody can sell land to someone who is 
unrelated to the kin-group in which ultimate trust over it resides when 
priority rights lapse. Developers think that holding land in this way 
impedes economic change further because it cannot be used as 
collateral to secure loans to finance developments (enabling financial 
institutions to seize the land to cover the debt in case of default) . 
These 'problems' with indigenous tenure arrangements reveal 
genuine and profound differences between local subsistence orders and 
capitalist industrial economies, the former depending on a kin-group 
constitution and kinship obligations, and the latter on company law 
and individual contracts (Sack 1974; Simpson et al. 1971;  Walter 1978; 
MacWilliam 1988). Pacific Islanders act as if they belong on their land, 
not own it. We can anticipate conflict in attempting to interpret the kin 
ordered system according to the commercial image, where they stand 
on antithetical assumptions and promote opposed values. One strategy 
is to offer people the opportunity to convert their rights into legally 
registered individual ownership, (for example Papua New Guinea's 
Tenure Conversion Ordinance removing land from the entailments of the 
customary land tenure system). But people are reluctant to change their 
land rights, being unwilling to interfere with their entitlements because 
this would interfere with their social position too, changing their place 
in their community (Epstein 1969).  Land for these people is not merely 
an economic asset, it is a fundamental component of their social and 
political orders, underpinning the continued existence of their local 
communities. To meddle with customary land tenure; to try and 
individualise rights to land so that it can enter the market and change 
hands in economic transactions, is to attack the continued existence of 
social groups and communities (McKellin 1991).  
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These observations should not only urge caution in attempting to 
apply formal economic concepts like capital to these socio-political 
orders, but also compromise attempts to use Marxist inspired 
interpretations of capitalist economic theory. The kinship identity and 
sentimental value placed on land puts this resource into a context 
where notions of landesque capital demand careful appraisal, for we 
are not just considering any changes to be improvements to a 
productive resource as a capital asset. In the same vein, people produce 
and handle many things not as economic capital but as social assets, 
objects of tremendous symbolic value that feature centrally in their 
socio-political orders, which are so constituted as to thwart the 
emergence of political-economic hierarchies of despotic control and 
exploitation. Even the ritually founded hierarchies of Polynesia were 
benign in this respect and, as Bayliss-Smith intimates, Wittfogel's 
hydraulic Asiatic despotism is as misplaced as Friedman's free market 
monetarism. While land, labour and artifacts are universal features of 
human society, their relationship to one another, and people's 
relationships through them, is multifarious. The process by which 
different cultural traditions interact with and transform one another 
over time is likewise one of kaleidoscopic variety. Whether an 
appreciation of Pacific Islanders' attitudes to their land can save the 
planet from our technological depredations and contain our species' 
burgeoning population explosion is altogether another issue, although 
it has the merit at least of being a sanguine alternative in the face of the 
usual doom and gloom commentaries on these issues. 
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Building on local culture for 
development: community 
participation in natural resource 
management1 
Hugh Govan 
The ancient un iversity of Melanesia 
The last few decades have seen increasing calls for changes in the 
approach of the industrialised nations towards development (Cernea 
1991;  Chambers 1983, 1992; Moris and Copestake 1993; Pomeroy 1994) . 
Calls have been made for a shift from the assumption prevalent in 
industrial countries that they know the best ways to achieve 
development towards an approach where local people are encouraged 
to be active in choosing their own strategies for development. Despite 
all the talk there is still much room for the application of such theories 
in practice, particularly in the Pacific Islands which often seem to be 
one of the last bastions of the old top-down approaches. Bernard 
Narakobi, one-time Papua New Guinea Minister for Justice put it 
succinctly: 'there is a need for those bringing change to study first with 
respect and humility at the eternal . . .  the timeless . . .  the ancient university 
of Melanesia, the village, where courses are offered in living' (Mcintosh 
1991 :5-7) . 
One of the reasons that these new bottom-up approaches have not 
been readily adopted lies in the training that many 'specialists' receive. 
Western scientific training does not usually encourage the sharing of 
control over technology or policy development. Where attempts are 
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made at all to incorporate the local human and physical situation the 
strategy is often to embark on extensive programs of physical and social 
data extraction. Thus large amounts of data are extracted in an attempt 
to integrate all the relevant factors. Ezekiel Alebua, Prime Minister of 
Solomon Islands in 1988, whilst welcoming a new technological aid 
project, staffed mainly by Western scientists, warned that they should 
' . . .  beware the paralysis of analysis'. 
One alternative is the full involvement of local communities, the very 
people that it is intended to help. This apparently obvious step to the 
non-specialist, represents a serious challenge to scientists and the like 
who have to consider a complete change of attitude. Although much 
has been written on these topics for the social science 'market' little has 
been published for or about the South Pacific region and virtually 
nothing for technical specialists there.2 The intention of this article is to 
start to address this lack and to offer an insight into the untapped 
potential for community involvement for the work of scientists and 
specialists . 
The cult of 'projects' 
The most commonly heard criticisms of conventional top-down 
approaches to development are that they lack adaptability and fail to fit 
local situations. Another problem is that such paternalistic approaches, 
1 by not fostering participation, create dependencies on implementing 
agencies. Who has not come across the local perception that 'projects' 
equal hand-outs?-a very tangible form of cargo cult. 
The much mooted advantages of involving local communities 
appear to be wide-ranging and convincing. Local communities may 
have the chance to define their own needs and objectives. The process 
prompted by community involvement may actually speed up the 
diffusion of the technology or strategy. This approach may be more 
efficient: local people can draw on existing, sometimes massive, funds 
of indigenous information specifically relevant to their surroundings. 
Local participation seems to be a very good way of achieving an 
integrated approach without massive programs of data extraction. 
Direct involvement of all the stakeholders across a wide cross section of 
the community ensures that decisions better reflect local social, 
economic and environmental conditions. Needs, values, local know­
ledge as well as economic factors are incorporated into the planning 
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process by the affected parties themselves, in other words the relevant 
factors are integrated from within rather than by outsiders. The scope 
for local involvement is wide, covering areas such as research, 
development and transfer of technologies and the development and 
implementation of policy and community education. A number of 
examples of activities in these fields taking place in Melanesia are 
discussed in the following sections. 
Community i nvolvement in technology development 
A first step towards participation could be for local people to be com­
pletely involved in the initial research into new technologies. However 
when projects do talk about participation this frequently takes the form 
of questionnaires or consultation with villagers on an agenda defined 
by outsiders. The outsiders are usually under no obligation to take on 
board the people's views. Although this approach may be better than 
nothing, it is superficial and does not represent real involvement. A 
similar situation arises when local people provide labour or other 
resources in exchange for material incentives but are not really involved 
in the learning process, for example in farming trials. In such a case 
people may have little reason to carry on the activities if the incentives 
end. In the following example of research and development carried out 
by local people in collaboration with outsiders a real attempt was made 
for participants to be involved in the experimentation process. 
Case study 1: local involvement in aquaculture development 
(Govan 1993, 1995; Hviding 1993) 
Situation. Giant clams have traditionally played an important part in 
the diet and culture of Pacific Islanders. By the late 1970s poaching and 
over-harvesting, driven by the high prices that the muscle of these 
clams fetched in South East Asian markets, had seriously threatened 
the survival of the larger clam species. In the early 1980s a number of 
aid-funded projects started up in the Pacific region, staffed almost 
entirely by expatriate scientists, with the aim of developing the 
technology to produce clams in hatcheries. The idea was that baby 
clams could then be farmed by coastal villagers and eventually sold on 
the international market thereby generating much needed revenue and 
reducing the pressure on wild clam stocks. 
One such project started in Solomon Islands in 1986 and by late 
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1987 the first batches of baby clams were being produced in the 
hatchery. At this stage virtually nothing was known about how to farm 
these clams in the sea or what methods if any would be most acceptable 
to coastal dwelling Solomon Islanders. In order to investigate these 
issues it was decided to involve local villagers early on in the project 
through a number of farming trials. 
Action. The first issue faced was who the participants should be, 
how they were to be selected and what commitments should the project 
and participants make to each other. A number of options were 
examined-ranging from paying participants selected by the project to 
opening up the scheme to anybody who was willing to make a 
financial commitment. 
Ultimately the method adopted was to publicise the project on 
national radio, in the papers and during extensive field trips. Interested 
villagers were encouraged to express their interest and show their 
commitment to participating through written letters of application. In 
an attempt to avoid bias towards literate applicants it was emphasised 
that letters need not be in the applicant's own handwriting. A large 
number of letters were received, many written for the applicants by 
local government officials, students, plantation foremen and so on. 
The letters were answered further explaining the experimental 
nature of the trials and the commitment the project and participants 
were expected to make. This was followed up as soon as possible by a 
visit from project staff in which discussions were held with the village, 
local chiefs or reef owners as deemed appropriate by the local people. 
The project undertook to supply baby clams, cage materials and regular 
advice and support. The participants agreed that if the operation was a 
failure the materials and clams would be returned, otherwise they 
became their property. 
Results. Within a year 12 trials had been established in a number of 
different areas over a wide geographical and cultural range. Soon a 
large amount of information was flowing, concerning not only aspects 
of clam growth and survival in a variety of habitats, but also local 
knowledge of the biology and ecology of giant clams. This was the 
product of generations of 'research' by people whose livelihood de­
pended on intimate knowledge of resources surrounding the islands. 
Farmers were enthusiastic and appeared to be not only motivated by 
the prospect of financial gain but also in a number of cases were 
interested in conservation of the larger clam species. In general the 
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technology involved was quickly understood, in part because of the 
local know ledge participants had of the ecology of the clams and the 
animals likely to prey on them. 
Initially the learning curve was steep, after a year almost half the 
participants had withdrawn from the program, in some cases because 
of unpredicted rearing problems such as high predation or storm 
damage and in other cases because the participants did not feel the 
inputs required justified the potential gains. However, the lessons 
learnt were applied in further rounds of trials, most of which are still in 
progress. A number of participants have now received substantial 
amounts of cash from their first harvests. The framework for 
establishing participatory trials is still in place and is now being used 
for work on other aquaculture projects such as pearl oysters and sea 
cucumbers. 
The benefits for the research project were clear, not only was a 
wealth of biological data obtained but the technology being developed 
was modified in order to be more appropriate to local farmers. The 
benefits to the local farmers were not so clear for the early years, 
especially to those whose trials had failed. The experimental nature of 
the trials had been clear to participants and by and large they were all 
content with the traem nomoa (try it and see) approach and did not 
grudge the effort invested. The project did appear to have an impact in 
terms of clam conservation, not so much due to re-stocking as to 
increased awareness of marine conservation and management issues. 
A number of problems with the approach were identified, both by 
the researchers involved and in a review by a social anthropologist 
commissioned by the project. The research institution had difficulties 
incorporating the 'soft' data obtained from villagers into existing 
conventional research frameworks. This lack of flexibility was 
compounded by similar attitudes from donors who were looking for 
hard results to an established timetable. Another problem was the 
delicate balance between collaborating with the participants and using 
them, which could have easily been upset by changes in project 
personnel or approach. Finally, most of the early participants were male 
entrepreneurs. The approach used did not make it easy for women and 
other groups to be involved. 
In the coastal aquaculture example much depends on the eagerness 
of local people to be involved. Although they were involved at an early 
stage in the research they had relatively little input into the conception 
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and planning of the overall project. The project was keenly accepted 
even though the short term material incentives were negligible. Other 
incentives may have to be taken into account such as the prestige of 
being involved in a development project. 
The question of participant selection is a thorny one. For the stated 
objectives of the project in this case it was acceptable and possibly 
preferable that the process was biased towards entrepreneurs as these 
were more likely to be able to carry out experimentation of their own 
and accelerate the research process. Sooner or later, though, the project 
had to face up to the conversion of the research into a development 
package that would have to be distributed more equitably. 
Trying out giant clam farming was not viewed as being particularly 
labour intensive and it used small areas of reef that would not 
otherwise be productive. Whether the technology comes to form an 
important option in the repertoire of money-earning opportunities 
available to villagers remains to be seen but will depend to a great 
extent on the economics of the operation and the returns to villagers on 
their investment in money and labour. 
The following example of community involvement in the use of new 
technology hinged on village level economics as well. Here the local 
processing of forest timber had to prove itself not only desirable in 
environmental terms but also in terms of the income generated 
compared to the sale of logging rights to large foreign companies. 
Case study 2: Wokabaot somils for sustainable forestry 
(Mcintosh 1991) 
Situation. In the early 1980s it became apparent that logging operations 
carried out in the Melanesian Pacific Islands by large overseas 
companies were causing immense damage not just to the environment 
but also to local culture. Initially it was this social damage, in the form 
of introduced corruption, financial rip-offs and accelerated loss of local 
culture, that prompted the South Pacific Appropriate Technology 
Foundation (SPATF) in Papua New Guinea to look for alternative and 
less damaging ways for local people to benefit from their timber 
resources. 
Action. The response of SPATF was to develop a portable saw mill 
which could be dismantled into modular parts, carried to a tree and 
used to saw timber of a quality acceptable at least for domestic use. The 
wokabaot somils were manufactured locally (in Papua New Guinea) and 
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between 1982-1989 more than 400 had been manufactured and 
distributed, mostly in Papua New Guinea but a few were in operation 
in Solomon Islands. Typically villages worked together to raise half the 
price of the somil and formed a business group to take out a loan for the 
other half. The somil was often used in the building of a community 
building such as a school or a church or in the construction of local 
housing. Other spin-offs also developed. 
Results. The program was considered a success. At its best the somil 
became a program in integrated development. The income generated (or 
the savings on the purchase of milled timber) meant that the young men 
operating the somils had less reason to move away to the city in search 
of paid employment. By keeping it small-scale and local other social 
problems caused by large-scale logging were largely avoided. The 
reasons given for the success of the program were, the rapid pay-back 
on capital investment, the common ownership of land, the availability 
of local financing and spare parts backup and training by SPATF 
workers of users in maintenance and marketing. Stress is placed on the 
fact that the program must be market driven-if the market insists on 
sustainably produced timber then the producers will follow. 
In order to assess the environmental implications of the program an 
external review was commissioned. The study pointed out that, 
although the mills by their very size and method of operation, were one 
of the best ways of harvesting tropical forests sustainably, they were 
still open to abuse, albeit on a smaller scale. To counter this it was 
recommended that sustainable forestry techniques be added to the 
training course as village people had little previous experience of 
modem logging or indeed first hand experience of western technology. 
The review recommendations resulted in the formation of the Village 
Development Trust which provides the sustainable forestry training in 
conjunction with provincial forestry departments and forest related 
institutes as part of the somil purchase price. A recent environmental 
audit found no adverse environmental impact where the sustainable 
forestry techniques were being used. 
There are currently over a 1000 somils in Papua New Guinea alone. 
Many villagers have turned down offers from logging companies 
because they would rather harvest timber themselves-getting longer 
term profits and protecting their environment. The technology involved 
in the portable sawmill project fills a need that local people have 
identified. Although the project is environmentally and socially more 
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sustainable than the sale of harvest rights, the move towards a cash 
economy means that Melanesian rainforest villagers do measure results 
in monetary terms. The strength of the project is that it is based on this 
principle. 
Community development of policy and management plans. The 
strong community and family ties that prevail in Pacific cultures and 
the systems of land and sea ownership seem like excellent building 
blocks for community involvement in development. However, these 
apparent strengths have often been cited by colonial masters and, more 
recently, by national government as obstacles to development. 
Traditional resource management strategies have either been ignored or 
disregarded on the basis that they would not stand up to modern 
commercial pressures. The following example suggests that this is not 
true, given a flexible people-oriented approach. 
Case study 3: Vanuatu co-operative fisheries management 
(Amos 1991; Johannes 1994) 
Situation. Recent international fishery disputes in the North Atlantic 
and elsewhere highlight the general failure of western fisheries 
management methods to work even in the areas where they were 
developed. It comes as no surprise then that these methods are even less 
successful in the South Pacific where nations can ill afford the costs 
entailed in data collection and enforcement. 
However, marine resource management has been practised in many 
Pacific Islands for centuries in the form of customary marine tenure 
although this has not always been recognised by central government. 
Apart from this lack of support, village-based management has also 
been hindered by certain gaps in biological knowledge, gaps which 
became more important with the advent of commercial fishing which 
placed pressures not commonly encountered on the traditional systems. 
Furthermore, although much information has been gathered by western 
and local scientists on different marine resources such as baitfish, giant 
clams and trochus, little of this has filtered down to the villagers. In 
recognition of the factors listed above, Vanuatu' s Fisheries Department 
has started to develop a co-operative approach to fisheries 
management. The initial focus was the economically valuable and 
locally important trochus (topshell) fishery which was threatened by 
over-exploitation . 
.Action. The seeds of co-operative management were sown in 1990 
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when Moses Amos, a trochus specialist of the Fisheries Department, 
offered to provide advice to local trochus fishers and reef owners. The 
response was enthusiastic and soon Moses was combining local stock 
surveys with informal sessions in which a two way flow of information 
was established between the resource owners and the Fisheries 
Department. Based on the information available the villagers could 
decide what measures to adopt to ensure that trochus did not become 
seriously over-fished. Measures included stricter enforcement of 
government size limits and the establishment of trochus refuges and 
closed seasons. The Fisheries Department did not try to force rigid 
management on the villagers but left the final decisions to be worked 
out locally based not only on biological knowledge but also on local 
social and economic concerns. 
Results. Within three years village-based marine conservation 
experienced a remarkable upsurge. This was evident in the application 
for the first time in living memory of fishing taboos which were 
explicitly conservation oriented. Although the Fisheries Department 
had concentrated on trochus conservation villagers had begun to 
introduce regulations controlling the harvest of many other species and 
were commonly introducing 1 to 5 year fishing closures. 
An external review of progress highlighted that village fishers were 
keen to experiment with management methods by trial and error but 
some important biological aspects were unknown to them and 
knowledge of these could save much time and effort. The same review 
also pointed out the need in the Pacific for better training in fisheries 
extension programs so that workers learn to ask and listen as well as 
talk and demonstrate, how to evaluate local information and how to 
provide information that villagers require. Also, an extension program 
must consider how to explain village fishers' customs and knowledge 
to the rest of the fisheries division and those higher up. This example 
adds support to the view that once people identify their own problems 
and instigate their own courses of action the resulting strategies are 
much more likely to be locally accepted and effective. 
The case studies examined so far all emphasised the need for local 
people to gain more awareness about issues that affect them. The in­
depth knowledge of local conditions is not sufficient in itself to allow 
interaction with the fast encroaching modem world. Villagers may find 
it difficult to plan for the future without enhanced skills in analysing 
their own situations and the range of options available. The last 
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example concerns one organisation which aims to provide villagers 
with access to just such skills by increasing awareness and community 
education. 
Case study 4: Solomon Islands Development Trust 
(Roughan 1990) 
Situation. In the years following the independence of the new Pacific 
nations, development accelerated. Non-government organisations 
(NGOs) played a major role and were by and large welcomed, partly 
because they had access to overseas resources which could be 
channelled into the emerging nations but also because they kept out of 
local politics, refraining from criticism. 
In the early 80s a new style of NGO started to appear such as Vanu­
atu's Nasonal Komuniti Development Trust and the Solomon Islands 
Development Trust (SIDT). These NGOs were indigenous organisations 
whose interests went far beyond small grass roots development projects 
to the tackling of environmental issues and ensuring sustainable 
development. They sought development through empowerment which 
was to be achieved by developing the villagers capacity in relation to 
the surrounding world. A major goal of SIDT was to encourage public 
discussion and build awareness in villages of problems, difficulties 
and issues that they faced. 
Action. SIDT operated through the recruitment of local people who 
received regular and intensive training to become mobile team 
members. The task of these mobile teams was to tour the country 
conducting village level workshops sharing their understanding that 
development should be a locally directed process based on local culture 
rather than the common perception of development as something 
driven from the outside with massive funding. Because one of SIDT' s 
main goals was the strengthening of village life and empowerment of 
villagers great care was taken to recruit local villagers for the mobile 
teams with an emphasis on women. 
As time went by SIDT extended its repertoire of development 
education tools including not only many graphic and visual techniques 
to be used at village meetings but also theatre and regularly produced 
and well-distributed newsletters and educational comics. 
Results. Thousands of village workshops have been conducted 
throughout the country. Such workshops were attended by 18,000 
villagers in 1988 alone. In many remote areas local people have more 
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contact with SIDT through the mobile teams than with government 
officials. SIDT publications have been distributed throughout the 
country and have been adopted in many schools for their social science 
curriculum. The extent of SIDT' s grass roots contact was tested when it 
was able to produce, at short notice, more than half the personnel 
needed to carry out a nation-wide disaster survey in the wake of 
Cyclone N amu. 
The extent to which SIDT has brought about increased awareness 
and better patterns of living is more difficult to measure but SIDT did 
undertake a review to determine the impact of their activities. They 
found that although the workshops were popular many people did not 
necessarily alter their behaviour as a result. SIDT has now altered their 
methodology, basing Village Demonstration Workers in the villages to 
provide ongoing support and training. 
The signs are that SIDT is having an effect not only in villages but 
also at the level of national development policy, recent government 
initiatives have included more villager participation and human 
resource development. SIDT is frequently consulted formally and in­
formally by other organisations setting up rural development projects. 
Indeed SIDT has devoted considerable time and effort to strengthening 
links between NGOs. Another measure of the perceived impact of SIDT 
may be the frequently strong reactions to SIDT from Government and 
large industrial interests such as logging or mining companies. One of 
the reasons for this reaction is of course the strong vested interests in 
natural resource exploitation but another reason may also be doubts 
about who is setting the development agenda for SIDT, whether 
outsiders or a radical local minority. 
This type of organisation has some of the closest grass roots ties that 
are possible to achieve. The creation of awareness and fostering the 
capacity of villagers to plan are keys to the involvement of the com­
munity in development. Ideally such an organisation would interact 
closely with other development projects. This is the case with SIDT but 
there is no real substitute for projects themselves making sure that they 
interact at the community level. 
Involvi ng people-means or an end? 
As illustrated by the preceding examples, local people can be involved 
in development at different levels. Community involvement can be used 
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as a tool to help design more appropriate technologies or, at the other 
end of the spectrum, it can be the objective, ultimately empowering 
people and enabling them to make their own decisions. Either way the 
complex array of factors affecting local communities are integrated by 
the most qualified people. Who better to build on local culture but the 
people themselves? 
Community participation can be extremely effective, even in what 
are essentially technical projects. From the scientist's point of view the 
advantages are plain in terms of achieving more appropriate and 
sustainable results. However it is important to be aware of the impor­
tance of the process as well as the output. At whatever level people are 
involved, the process enhances awareness and self-esteem, improves 
access to outside information and ultimately empowers. This is a fact 
that should not be ignored and if the developing agency is not prepared 
to take on board the full implications of this empowerment then the 
project should not be attempted as the potential for raising expectations 
and causing disillusionment is high. 
Some issues and concerns 
The case studies and discussion presented above raises a number of 
issues and concerns that should be considered before a program of 
participation is implemented. 
Role of outsiders. The role of outsiders has to be carefully 
considered. Too much presence, or in some cases any 
presence, may make the process of local empowerment more 
difficult. Outsiders may play a useful role in providing access 
to information and enhancing the exchange of information. In 
the case studies outside reviews provided much useful 
information that may not have been obvious from within. 
Participation empowers. Whether this is good or not depends 
on who is empowered and how they use their power. There 
may be a responsibility to check carefully who is involved 
and maybe even to ensure that the weaker are empowered. Of 
course this may have to be balanced against other objectives 
as for example in case study 1 .  
Politics of empowerment. The political implications of 
empowering local people, of reducing dependency on central 
and foreign governments and their agencies, may not be 
popular with existing power structures. 
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Communication must be good. Good communication must be 
emphasised, not only within the local groups and between 
these and the external agency but also within the external 
organisation itself. 
Flexibility of donors and external agencies. The fundamental 
concepts regarding involvement of local people should 
permeate through to the institutions and even the donors. 
There is a need for both to be more flexible and it is highly 
desirable, if not indispensable, for there to be adequate 
institutional support. 
Institutional support. Local groups interacting in a wider 
arena will need some support from national or regional 
organisation, government, legislation or policy framework. 
These concerns and fears of the consequences of failure should not 
discourage agencies from attempting to increase local participation. 
The concept of experimentation is not exclusively a Western one, indeed 
results from workers in the Pacific suggest that local people are com­
fortable with trying out new approaches, traem nomoa in Pijin, provided 
that these trials respond to perceived needs. 
Traem nomoa or fai l ing forwards 
The potential in the Pacific for local participation in development 
projects is enormous and so far largely unrealised. Owing to the 
benefits provided by the process as well as the potentially enhanced 
end-products it seems important to encourage agents of development to 
adopt more participatory methods wherever possible. If communication 
is good between the parties involved then experimental, trial and error 
approaches can be extremely valuable provided a flexible approach is 
taken, errors are acknowledged and lessons are learnt. 
This highlights, as do case studies 2 and 3, the need for new 
training and forms of education. Western-educated people often ex­
perience difficulty, especially if in authority, in observing and 
understanding the knowledge of the locals rather than advising or 
implying advice in their questions. Such training needs to counteract 
the tendency of Western science to produce general theories that miss 
out the reality in specific cases. It is necessary to learn self-critical 
awareness, how to share information and to avoid merely extracting 
information and how to be relaxed in these situations. In brief: outside 
know ledge should be 'on tap' 'not on top' .  
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The s ituation back i n  the West 
Recently an Indian student, after a study tour in the United Kingdom 
and a field trip to see community forestry initiatives in Wales, stood up 
in an inter-national workshop and asked: 'how come the UK 
Government is funding and providing expertise for community-based 
programs overseas when it fails to achieve even minimum standards of 
community involvement at home'.  The lessons learnt at the university 
of Melanesia could be applied fruitfully nearer to home as well. 
In fact, the benefits of community participation are not relevant just 
to the developing world. Resource managers, such as those of the 
coastal zone in the United Kingdom and North America, are attempting 
to involve local people actively in order to achieve sustainable 
development. Unfortunately local people in the West have usually long 
lost any traditions they may have had in community resource 
management making the task that much more difficult. Many Pacific 
societies are still in time to build on local culture. 
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Notes 
1Thanks are due to the following people for enlightening discussions, 
comments and support: Andy Inglis, Edvard Hviding, Dorothy 
Mcintosh, Manuel Alonso, Dee Atkinson, John Roughan, Abraham 
Baenisia and Hugo Tafea. 
2 See for example: Institute of Development Studies 1995 and 
computerised searches of the Institute of Development Studies library 
and database. 
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Ecotourism and national 
development 
Peter B urns 
This chapter discusses the pros and cons of using ecotourism as part of 
national development in the South Pacific. It commences with a wide­
ranging context-setting about the nature of tourism and tourism 
planning as it pertains to so-called developing countries. This is 
followed by a discussion about ecotourism itself, including certain 
symbolic meanings that the word seems to carry and the confusion 
that surrounds it. This leads on to what the 'hosts' and 'guests' expect 
from ecotourism. I will argue that, for the Pacific Island nations, 
ecotourism does have a role, but that this role has limitations, 
including a lack of planning expertise at a national level that is being 
exacerbated to some extent by the region's official advisers, the 
Tourism Council of the South Pacific. 
Planning for tou rism as a part of national development 
There are two main strands to the debate on the role of planning for 
tourism in national development since it began in earnest in the late 
1960s to early 1970s. These two streams can be likened to schools of 
thought. The first is the powerful and well-rehearsed argument con­
cerning the economic and growth benefits to be gained from tourism 
through various multipliers and high tourist arrival numbers. 
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Emphasis is on gross national receipts in a nation's tourism account. 
This I call the 'Tourism First' school and is best signified by Archer 
(1977), after his seminal work on applying the Keynesian multiplier 
mechanism to tourism. A classic example of this genre is to be found in 
the 1973 Tourism Development Programme for Fiji, where the Hawaii­
based consultants sought to tum Fiji into a mini Hawaii by recommen­
ding a visitor arrivals target of some 853,000 by 1981 (in fact the 
arrivals for 1981 were 152,000 with the arrival figure for 1991 being 
259,000). This type of brutalist approach remains the dominant 
paradigm for the European Union-funded Tourism Council of the 
South Pacific (TCSP) . While it is true that the Suva-based TCSP has no 
authority, their budgets (especially in relation to marketing) and the 
dominance of foreign advisors tend to legitimise and justify the 
economic approach to tourism. The slogan for TCSP and this school 
might well be 'Tourism is Good for You' .  The approach is underpinned 
by trickle-down economics, with the focus on developing tourism as 
opposed to developing regions, places or nations. 
The second school of thought, which I will term the 'Development 
First' school is epitomised not by a tourism planner, but this time by a 
development sociologist, de Kadt, who has visited tourism from time 
to time over the past two decades with an analytical eye, most notably 
in 1976 with his critique of tourism as a developmental agent for 
developing countries. This school of thought takes a multi-disciplinary 
approach to the consequences of tourism. De Kadt and his like place 
emphasis on the net benefits to the nation in question set against a 
broad range of costs , including the social, cultural and environmental. 
They seek to ensure that the whole story is told by considering eco­
nomic leakage and by highlighting the components of these financial 
outflows. Their approach can be described as holistic in that they 
acknowledge the difficulty of disaggregating economic impacts from 
other impacts of tourism. The focus here is on development seeing 
tourism as a means of achieving national social and economic goals. 
Defi ning tourism for the purposes of planning 
'Tourism is a fundamental force behind the production of new cultural 
forms on a global basis . . .  it is also an ideological framing of history, 
nature, and tradition that has the power to reshape culture and nature 
to its own needs' (MacCannell 1992). Given this kind of power, those 
that have any sort of responsibility for planning or managing tourism 
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need to have a holistic understanding of the phenomenon and its 
implications. This, together with an awareness of the emerging 
planning philosophies that are gaining ground within the tourism 
process, is the bedrock upon which long term responsibility and thus 
sustainability will be built (Burns and Holden 1995). 
It is important at the outset to clearly define our view of tourism. 
Should we simply call it a product? We might then include in this 
things that perhaps shouldn't be included, village life, unique 
religious ceremonies, and other private aspects of culture and lifestyle. 
The word 'product' implies something that is there to be marketed, 
wrapped and sold. In similar vein, if we define tourism as an industry, 
this implies that there exists a clear entity, things may be categorised 
as being part of the tourist industry or not. In complex, industrial 
societies, we know that this is simply not possible (Burns 1995). 
However, and somewhat paradoxically, tourism can be described 
both as an industry and a product, and needs to be so treated for the 
twofold reason that it is both multifaceted and holds a high priority in 
the economic development policies of many countries. For tourism to 
be successful, that is economically viable, environmentally sustainable, 
and socially acceptable, good planning is an imperative. But for fully 
comprehensive and integrated planning to be possible, the whole of 
tourism activity needs to be included. Hence, the practice of referring 
to all components of a tourist trip, which in combination make up the 
overall tourist experience, as a product. There is fragmentation of 
supply (tourism is characterised by its high composition of small 
businesses). Yet the many components are interdependent and 
complementary. Tourism planning then, (among other things) involves 
matching the supply of different parts of this tourism product, both in 
capacity and standard, to the various demands of the tourists 
themselves. To justify public sector investment (for example, for 
transport and other infrastructure, destination promotion, incentives, 
training schemes) and regulation (for example, development area 
zoning, enabling legislation), the many commercial and other 
components have to be treated as an industry or at the very least, as an 
economic sector. 
Tou rism planning:  a central dichotomy 
The central questions of tourism planning remain: who is it for, and 
what is its purpose? These should be answered through an integrated 
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set of responses. First, tourism planning is for the local residents, 
conducted within a framework set by the agents (planning authorities) 
of their elected officials (politicians) . But, second, it is also for the 
developer who wants to know what else is going to be built in the 
immediate locale (in terms of competition and suitability) and to 
ensure optimum land usage. Third, integrated tourism planning will 
optimise land use beyond the needs of one particular developer, or set 
of shareholders. Finally, tourism planning can insist on long-term 
environmental planning, and awareness of social/ cultural sensitivities 
(a kind of psychological conservation for the residents).  
It can be argued that this approach to tourism planning could act to 
preserve the long-term viability of tourism by protecting the 
components that make up the attraction of a particular area from over­
use. However, it should be noted that tourism plans are unlikely to be 
successful if prepared in isolation. They are most effective when set 
within the context of, and comprising one component of, overall 
regional or national physical and socioeconomic development plans. 
By aiming to produce a diverse economy, with tourism as one of a 
number of diverse economic sectors, there is a greater choice of 
stability. Over-reliance on tourism places destinations in a vulnerable 
position given the fluctuating and often fickle nature of tourist 
demand. This is especially the case for Pacific Island nations with their 
smaller-scale economies (including MIRAB economies shaped by 
Migration Remittances Aid and Bureaucracy, for example Milne 1992), 
limited domestic markets and other economic/ trading factors that 
mitigate against their competitiveness in exports. 
Planning for a sector like tourism necessitates government inter­
vention. The specific approach to planning will reflect the role which 
government assumes in respect to tourism. At one level there is 
passive involvement: the government neither discourages nor en­
courages tourism. It enacts basic enabling legislation, such as on air 
traffic agreements, and employment of expatriates (Burns 1993), and 
offers general development incentives, though not necessarily aimed 
primarily at tourism. At another level, a government may become 
actively involved in tourism development through adopting specific 
policies, aims and objectives for tourism, by offering investment 
incentives for resorts and other large tourism projects, by encouraging 
air traffic agreements aimed at increasing tourist flows (the ultimate 
being an 'open skies' policy) and through other measures such as 
increased marketing via an enlarged national tourist office. Finally, a 
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government may also pursue a developmental role by providing 
appropriate infrastructure and facilities for such development, initially 
constructing and perhaps even operating hotels and other tourist 
facilities and services if the private sector cannot be induced to do so. 
While governments take the lead in national or regional tourism 
planning, the process of planning involves a wide range of diverse 
interests, each of which have to be taken into account, including 
commercial interests (direct-developers, investors and 
operators; indirect-suppliers of goods or services to 
tourism enterprises or tourists) 
the international travel and tourism trade (airlines, tour 
operators, travel agents) 
the host population 
tourists themselves 
the destination's environment 'supporters'. 
The concerns of these various players are often summarised as 
sustainable economic development (including profit for the 
visitor industry) to ensure the stability and well-being of 
civil society 
the generation of a number of 'worthwhile' jobs (those that 
give reasonable returns in exchange for labour) so as to 
provide financial security, and personal satisfaction for 
individuals and families 
visitor satisfaction, so that tourists will enjoy their vacation, 
return and recommend the destination to friends. 
Often, however, the concerns of the destination's environmental 
supporters are either marginalised (so that they are seen as being 
'against development') or trivialised (for instance, with the perception 
that environmentalists are somehow 'hippies'). This is where eco­
tourism has an advantage. Because of its symbiosis with the natural 
and cultural environment, a broad swathe of society might begin to 
make links between environmentalism, sustainability and appropriate 
forms of business. So, ecotourism might, in the most optimistic sense, 
be seen as contributing to societal education: promoting the notion 
that the environment can, and must, be used on a sustainable basis. 
Whatever the role assumed by government, momentum in tourism 
development will only exist if there are satisfactory shareholder 
dividends and operating profits. Given that all politicians have re­
election as a priority, satisfying their constituents, whether these run 
tourism-related businesses, work in tourism jobs, or are simply voters 
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who encounter lots of tourists in their daily lives, is a key considera­
tion. A major challenge therefore, is to ensure that tourism planners 
develop schemes to encourage long-term commitment based on 
operating profits, rather than on inflated property prices or land 
speculation-neither brings advantage to the majority of residents. 
Ecotourism: the pros and cons 
The rise in popularity of ecotourism over the past decade has been 
due to both 'pull' and 'push' factors. Pull, in the sense that there has 
been a general recognition at all levels (governments, communities 
and individuals) of the need to protect and preserve the environment. 
Some of this increased awareness has been self-induced through the 
aesthetic consequences of pollution, while some has emerged through 
global pressures from NGOs and high level policy-setting such as 
Agenda 21 .  The push factors can be attributed to changing consumer 
habits, demands and expectations. The baby-boomer generation and 
their children claim a special awareness of the symbiotic relationship 
between use of place and space as a consumable asset and the need for 
a long-term view 'if the planet is to survive' .  The emergence of 
ecotourism is the travel industry's response to these factors. 
Ecotourism is defined as 'environmentally responsible travel to 
experience the natural and cultural areas of a region while learning 
about and promoting conservation and economically contributing to 
local communities' (Adventure Travel Society 1995) .  This is an 
interesting definition of what remains essentially an economic 
exchange. First there is the cynical viewpoint that part of the 
'responsible travel' will undoubtedly involve air travel by ozone 
depleting jetliners ! But even so, the linking together of nature and 
culture is something that is particularly well-suited to the Pacific 
Islands. Polynesians, Melanesians and Micronesians all hold views 
that reinforce the links between 'ocean, land and sky' seeing people as 
merely part of that continuum. 
There are at least five positive characteristics that can be attributed 
to ecotourism 
it is an activity based on experiencing natural resources 
it is a business based in the local community (and thus 
seemingly non-exploitative) 
it is underpinned by a philosophy of respect for place and 
culture 
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it can be seen as a strategy for rural development (and thus 
has possibilities of countering urban drift and village 
boredom) 
finally, it is symbolic of the debate that surrounds tourism 
and the environment. 
In a sense, those that choose to consume tourism through 
ecotourism are making a powerful symbolic gesture. 
On the other hand, there are certain negative aspects to the idea of 
ecotourism. In the first place (and as was alluded to in the intro­
ductory remarks about ecotourism) it is for the most part driven and 
dominated by a Western desire for self-fulfilment. Thus, as the method 
of self-fulfilment changes with fashion from lying on a beach to 
'experiencing nature' the method of consuming Pacific Islands 
changes. No longer satisfied with the beach, or duty free shopping, 
our post-modem tourist has to experience the authentic atmosphere of 
real village life and communicate with nature and unspoilt cultures. 
The second negative aspect is that ecotourism (given that it has no 
legal definition) is subject to abuse by market makers. 
Anyone can attach an ecotourism label to their business. The usual 
interpretation is that any business that takes place away from city 
centres or in a rural setting is given the label as a sort of market 
response to consumer fashion. There is no obligation to fulfil the social 
and economic philosophies promoted by the genuine ecotouristic 
businesses. A third potential failing of ecotourism is that the exchange, 
in the end, is an economic one. It cannot be a social exchange because 
for the most part the participants are unequal partners. It is unlikely 
that a Sepik Valley villager will be able to visit a rich tourist in 
Germany, Italy or Switzerland (for a fascinating insight into this aspect 
see Denis O'Rourke's film 'Cannibal Tours'). Ecotourism as a business 
(the ticket and accommodation have to be purchased) is framed by 
capitalist ideology, even if it doesn't wish to be. A particular problem 
facing governments and the issue of ecotourism is that it is, by its 
nature, low volume. The corollary of this is low taxes and therefore a 
low yield at a national level (though the net flows of income at village 
level are very useful to augment income). The final problem and the 
enigma of ecotourism is that while it has an intrinsic market value for 
certain consumers, its core characteristic (that of being low volume, 
low impact) means a concomitant characteristic of poor economies of 
scale when it comes to marketing the product. 
It can be seen that there are pros and cons to both the central 
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philosophies and practical implementation of ecotourism that in the 
end tend to balance themselves out when the business is carried out in 
circumstances of respect and openness. 
Ecotourism: the promises, aspi rations and expectations 
The promoters of ecotourism, which in the case of the Pacific are often 
NGOs of various sorts and government departments seeking to 
broaden their touristic base and to create economic opportunities in 
rural areas, imply that such development carries certain promises for 
local people. A parallel set of promises is developed between those 
who market ecotourism and their clients, the ecotourists. This section 
discusses promises, aspirations and expectations held by what can be 
termed 'hosts' and 'guests' in the tourism equation. However, before 
dealing with this matter, it is worth asking why it is necessary to put 
the two words 'hosts' and 'guests' in quotation marks. It is a question 
of definition and assumptions. The words themselves can carry 
symbolic meaning, in that a host may be one who gives freely and a 
guest is one who receives such hospitality without necessarily 
incurring any obligation. The difficulty in using the words without the 
quotation marks is that the transaction in tourism does not represent 
exchange of the kind the words generally imply. 
The first 'promise' of ecotourism insofar as the 'hosts' are con­
cerned is quite straightforward. It is to do with the creation of paid 
and unpaid employment and economic diversification (perhaps 
involving a shift of resource allocation) at a village level. This reflects 
ecotourism's potential for rural development. Second, there is an 
argument for seeing links between ecotourism and aspirations about 
cultural revival. Interest shown by outsiders in traditional ways may 
well revive cultural practices that are being marginalised under the 
shadow of modernity. This leads on to a third aspiration: that of 
natural resource awareness and conservation (which may come about 
for much the same reasons as cultural revival). In addition to these 
aspirations, there is often an expectation of what tourism professionals 
term 'low-impact, high-yield tourism', whereby tourists are given the 
maximum opportunity to spend money and contribute while causing 
the minimum social and environmental impact. Finally, there is a 
problem of boredom for villagers, especially rural youth. For them, an 
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influx of visitors to a village carries an expectation that interaction 
with 'guests' may help allay some of that boredom. Ecotourism thus 
has the potential to alleviate some of the tendency for urban drift. 
Insofar as the ecotourist is concerned, the set of promises, aspira­
tions and expectations is, I suggest, far more complicated. Ecotourists 
aspire towards recreation (a word with heavy symbolic attributes in a 
Christian context), life-enhancement and personal growth. As a part of 
this, they are promised 'educational encounters' and the expectation of 
going away from a place knowing more than when they arrived. The 
ecotourist may well be demanding in this desire for knowledge and 
anticipate high quality interpretation of sites and sights; wanting to 
know details of when, how and where. Finally, like any tourist they, 
will expect value for money. This does not mean cheap holidays, but 
the price/ quality ratio must be acceptable. 
Ecotourism: today's situation 
Given the characteristics of ecotourism and the nature and level of 
development within the South Pacific Islands, it is clear that, in 
principle, the Pacific is well placed to take competitive advantage of 
this market niche. For the more touristically advanced islands, such as 
Fiji  and Tahiti, ecotourism can be part of the tourism product mix 
(what marketing specialists might refer to as horizontal integration). 
In Fiji, this is already happening with the development of ecotourism 
policy statements. For the smaller island nations, such as Kiribati and 
Tonga, ecotourism can offer an effective tool for development, as its 
nature coincides with many of the development objectives currently in 
place. However, moves must be made at a regional level to protect the 
term 'ecotourism' from market abuses. This is a singular failing of the 
TCSP which has become dominated by 'go for growth' rhetoric that 
pays attention to the needs of the travel trade (including both visitors 
and transnational tourist corporations based in metropolitan 
countries) while ignoring the central development needs of the Pacific 
Island nations: in effect, encouraging a shift of development focus 
from the local (where it should be located) to the global. 
An overview of ecotourism thinking in five Pacific Island nations is 
presented in Table 13 .1 .  I now turn in a little more detail to the case of 
Fiji and the policies developed by its Ministry of Tourism. Four 
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ecotourism policy statements are used to illustrate the relatively 
advanced stage of planning that Fiji has reached. These state the 
intentions to 
bring to the forefront of our tourist product opportunities 
and activities in the area of Fiji's natural and cultural 
heritage so as to complement the existing attractions offered 
through existing plant 
set ecotourism in a synergetic relationship with natural and 
cultural heritage conservation and recognise it as a major 
driving force in achieving the sustainable development of 
the tourism industry and therefore a key component in the 
national program for sustainable development 
ensure that Fiji's indigenous communities are given 
encouragement and opportunities through government 
policy and training programs to involve themselves in the 
tourism industry at a responsible and senior level 
modify Fiji's existing tourism marketing strategy to provide 
further information on the intrinsic qualities of the country 
as a whole with sensitive inclusion of culture and nature as 
elements of significance and interest in their own right. 
These policies are interesting in that they demonstrate an aware­
ness of the principles of ecotourism as being more than a business 
function. The first policy is an attempt to recognise a fundamental 
weakness of ecotourism (as explained above), its lack of economies of 
scale and inability to generate sufficient tax revenue to help govern­
ment achieve national development objectives. Here, ecotourism is 
seen as part of a product mix. Fiji  is big enough to accommodate both 
luxury resorts and village-based ecotourism. The second policy fits 
comfortably with the Adventure Society's definition of ecotourism, but 
takes it further by bringing in the notion of sustainable development 
at a national level. The third policy has, given Fiji's recent political 
upheaval and the resultant inter-ethnic tensions, a potentially political 
or ethnocentric angle depending on the exact interpretation of the 
phrase 'indigenous communities'. Another problem with this policy is 
that the low-key nature of ecotourism means that it will not create 
many 'senior ' positions. Village activities (especially within a Mela­
nesian context) work best through co-operative arrangements with 
traditional leadership. The final policy is more ephemeral and has to 
do with promoting Fiji as a destination. While much of this work is in 
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Table 1 3 . 1  Ecotourism profiles for five Pacific Island nations 
Ecotou rism status 
Fiji H as tourism departments 
withi n  Min istry of Tourism; 
Native Land Trust Board; 
Forestry Department.  Room 
tor both 5-star resorts and 
ecotourism .  Clear 
recognition of ecotourism as 
a tool for rural development. 
Vanuatu Sees ecotourism as a major 
strategy i n  regional/rural 
development; as a factor in 
cultural revival and as a 
conservation tool .  Has an 
NGO working at grassroots 
level in  outer islands. 
Samoa Ecotou rism as a ru ral 
development tool 
especially tor the outer 
islands. Successful vi l lage 
stay program; 
successful ecotou rism 
operating framework and 
strong support from 
government. 
Kiribati Ecotourism offers one of few 
development alternatives 
(given general lack of 
resources) .  
New Ecotourism is seen as part of 
Caledonia a Melanesian cultural revival 
and is contributing to the 
amelioration of u rban d rift. 
Source: author's fieldwork. 
Ecotourism impediment 
Lack of co-ordination; 
too many rural tourism 
busi ness fai lures; too 
much 'bandwagon 
jumping' (for example 
anything ru ral is 
ecotourism).  
Lack of cohesive, 
comprehensive guidance 
from government (mixed) 
signals about tourism: lack 
of abil ity to promote 
product; serious land 
disputes; endemic malaria. 
Lack of tourism awareness 
hampering further 
development (giving rise to 
land issues, confusion over 
what tourists should give 
to individuals in vi l lages). 
Problems i n  rel iabil ity of 
air access; lack of business 
and marketi ng awareness 
may hamper development. 
Economic structure means 
price/qual ity ratio 
i mbalance: colonial 
problems sti l l  dominate 
development agenda; tourism 
is a sensit ive issue. 
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the hands of the Fiji  Visitor 's Bureau (which has its own governance) 
much marketing is also carried out by the private sector over which 
the Ministry has no control insofar as the images projected are con­
cerned. This last policy is unlikely to lead anywhere unless it is made 
clearer. 
Ecotourism: options and prospects 
It is an axiom of tourism planning that luxury, five-star tourism will 
create maximum employment, skill development and tax revenues. It 
is also a fact for developing countries that such tourism relies heavily 
on imported goods, services and very often management expertise, all 
of which create economic leakages. Ecotourism on the other hand, can 
be operated so as to virtually eliminate imports, thus maximising net 
gain. This is particularly important for rural areas, as the income (and 
net gain) is channeled directly to the village and leakage to middle­
men is low. However, equally low is the skill development (apart from 
the skills required in interpreting the natural and cultural environ­
ment) . If five-star tourism can be described as high-impact, then 
clearly ecotourism has the potential to be low-impact, provided that 
the ideals and rationale are not distorted in the face of the temptation 
to meet demand beyond sustainable levels. Ecotourism, of all business 
enterprises, must accept the notion of limits to growth. 
For most Pacific Island nations, a mixed product approach is one 
that satisfies government's need for tax revenue and foreign exchange 
and rural needs for development and employment. Horizontal 
integration also means a measure of protection against the vagaries of 
the market, with less reliance on a particular market segment. There 
are also two further advantages from ecotourism, first that it does not 
require elaborate (and thus expensive) infrastructure, and second, that 
it can be used in regional development, allowing a focus on areas that 
for historic or natural resource attribute reasons have lagged behind 
the rest of the country, such as outer islands in the case of 
archipelagos, or interior highlands in the case of the larger (mostly 
Melanesian) countries. As for any other form of economic activity, the 
responses should be as unique as each set of circumstances. 
Ecotourism is clearly a viable development option for many Pacific 
Island nations. However, it is not Gust as the 1970s mass tourism boom 
was not) a development panacea. Ecotourism should be seen as a 
development tool: that is, it should be people-centred, aimed at 
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poverty alleviation and the creation of productive employment, and 
framed by the ethos of sustainable economic growth (Bums and 
Holden 1995). The notion of social responsibility that frames 
ecotourism is an amorphous concept because there are so many 
players involved, with differing and often conflicting interests which 
link the motivating factor of success with the regulating factor of 
responsibility (Table 13.2). 
The problem is that the complexities arising from 'amorphous 
concepts' make tourism's success virtually impossible to secure to 
everyone's satisfaction. It is clear that definitions of both success and 
responsibility in respect to tourism have to be seen as kinds of 
balanced compromises, requiring qualitative as well as quantitative 
criteria. 
Table 1 3 .2 Players and their concept of responsibility and 
success in tourism 
Player group 
Governments 
P rivate sector 
Hol iday maker 
Resident 
com munity1 
Concept of successful tourism 
I ncreased standards of l iving i n  rural areas brought 
about through jobs, m icro-busi ness development and 
(to some extent) government revenues, each of which 
will contribute to social stabi l ity, long-term sustain­
abil ity and cultural i ntegrity. 
Generation of profits and returns on i nvestments with­
i n  an ethical framework at a vil lage level ,  ensuring 
that each member of the society has the potential to 
contribute and that the community as whole gains 
rather than the individual. 
A trip that fulfi ls expectations ( in terms of personal 
growth and self-fulfi lment) at a 'fair' price and with 
'appropriate' levels of service. For ecotourists, the 
trip should not damage the local socio-cultural 
environments and ecosystems. 
P rofitable (for those seeking financial benefit from 
tourism) but also unobtrusive, causing minimum 
disruption to psychological and ecological carrying 
thresholds while giving value fo r money vacations. 
1 Resident community includes entrepreneurs and those likely to benefit from tourism 
and envi roment supporters seeking to monitor progress. 
Source: author's fieldwork. 
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Concl usion 
The case of ecotourism demonstrates that economic growth and 
commercial gain are not the only essential yardsticks in tourism 
planning. Failure to preserve and protect the natural resources of the 
destination will serve to shorten its 'product life cycle', by reducing its 
drawing power for tourists attracted to any form of tourism. Ignoring 
the need to maintain cultural and social integrity can rapidly create 
negative attitudes towards the tourism industry, and tourists them­
selves in extreme cases, on the part of local residents. A simple credo 
for all tourism planning (including ecotourism) might be that each of 
the following three criteria need to be met 
economic viability 
socio-cultural acceptability 
environmental sustainability. 
Private profit is not sufficient ground in itself to justify tourism 
development nor will such a motivation shape a responsible and 
sustainable industry that is capable of making a contribution to 
national development. The priorities for those thinking their 
responsibility through to the next millennium increasingly are framed 
through viewing locations as having a natural carrying capacity, in 
much the same way as any fragile environment. There is a broader 
realisation that the value of tourism is measured by its net positive 
economic impact per visitor rather than by the aggregate number of 
visitors. This is an appropriate motto for ecotourism planners and 
consumers into the twenty-first century. 
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Public policy for a better nourished, 
healthier South Pacific population 
consistent with sustainable 
environments and ecologies 
John Cameron 
The relationship between undemutrition and poor health status has 
been emphasised in international conferences (FAO /WHO 1992; Asian 
Productivity Organisation 1991) .  But availability of sufficient calories is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to break the link between 
diet and ill-health. Although the South Pacific is generally not an area 
of calorie shortages, changing diet has been perceived as a major cause 
of development dilemmas and ill-health in the region since the late 
1970s (Bonnemaison 1978; Hau'ofa 1979; Thaman 1983). The region 
has been going through a dietary and life-style revolution which has 
brought with it a number of health problems which resemble those of 
richer economies but often with greater intensity and significant local 
variations. Generally, Pacific Islanders appear to have significant 
vulnerability-perhaps even genetically based-to diseases linked to 
diet (FAO 1991-the statistics in the rest of this chapter rely on this 
source). 
Malnutrition or undemutrition in children is an issue of health 
concern in the smaller Pacific Island countries. However, there is no 
straightforward methodology to describe the magnitude of the 
nutritional problems, and thus it is difficult to make comparisons 
between countries. Child malnutrition can be caused by a lack of 
specific nutrients in the diet such as iron, vitamin A, iodine, or vitamin 
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B2. Specific nutrient deficiencies are probably rather uncommon in the 
Pacific region, although cases of vitamin A deficiency are consistently 
being reported in Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, and also the Federated 
States of Micronesia. Malnutrition or undernutrition can also be caused 
by an overall low quality of the diet of children: low in protein, low in 
various items, low in certain minerals, and also low in total energy 
content. The overall result of such diets, often in combination with 
infectious disease, may be relatively low height and weight for age. 
There has been patchy evidence of various forms of child malnutrition, 
notably around weaning, indicating the need to promote breast feedmg 
and adequately resourced, easily accessed, primary health programs. 
But in the Pacific region, the nutritional wellbeing of adults is as 
much a concern as the nutritional status of children. The concern is 
much more a problem of unbalanced diets and overnutrition, than a 
problem of undernutrition. While information on weights and heights 
of adults, in various age groups, has been collected in several Pacific 
countries, chronic problems in practice, such as selection of standards, 
cut-off points, and structure of survey samples make precise 
comparisons difficult. But there is widespread evidence that adult 
malnutrition is associated with a number of disorders, such as diabetes, 
hypertension, cardio-vascular disease, and also gout. Evidence 
indicates a very high level of diabetes in Nauru, and intermediate levels 
in Kiribati, Fiji and Niue, though there are relatively low levels in 
Tuvalu and Vanuatu. 
Understanding the causes of these worrying statistics must 
recognise that the study of human nutrition is not an exact science and 
there are debates over the most basic principles that should guide 
nutritional analysis and evaluation (Payne and Cutler 1984) . The 
nutritional wellbeing of individuals or a group of individuals depends 
on a large number of factors, but these can be divided schematically 
into three main areas: food supply, food consumption, and biological 
utilisation of food. 
The overall food supply in a country or region is composed of two 
main factors: total food production, and total food imports. For most 
Pacific countries, reliable information on food production is scarce. 
However, data on food imports is generally available and thus 
estimates of the average contribution of imported food to the diet can be 
made. A few examples can illustrate that data on food imports can be 
used as indicators for trends in agricultural production as well as 
dietary patterns. 
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Data on levels of food imports in French Polynesia over a period of 
forty years leaves little doubt that, on a per capita basis, food 
production in French Polynesia has been steadily declining over this 
period, and has reached almost negligible levels . Information on 
imports of various types of meat to Western Samoa strongly suggests a 
remarkable increase in imported meat consumption (in particular 
mutton and poultry). Information on the levels of various food imports 
in Kiribati in the period 1974-1983 indicates relative stability over the 
last 10 years, suggesting that locally produced food has at least 
maintained its average level of contribution to the diet of the people of 
Kiribati. But overall, an association between high food imports and low 
nutritional status has been noted by many commentators and positively 
links economic and nutritional policies. A cross-section of the overall 
level of food imports in some Pacific countries in the 1980s shows 
relatively low levels of food imports, expressed in US dollars per capita 
per year, for the Solomon Islands and Kiribati, intermediate levels for 
Vanuatu and Tonga, and relatively high levels for Fiji, and in particular 
the Federated States of Micronesia. 
Food consumption data, when available, provides more direct 
information on actual dietary patterns, as food import figures are 
aggregate international trade data and information on food 
consumption is collected at the individual or household level. Thus, 
utilising the data from food consumption surveys, it is possible to 
recognise differences in dietary patterns, including differences between 
regions. For example, information on the dietary pattern (in 1973) in an 
urban and a rural location in the Solomon Islands shows the rural diet 
was largely based on root vegetables, while the urban diet was based 
on rice, bread, and both fresh and canned fish and meat. While the 
urban diet seems to be poor in fruits and vegetables, the rural diet is 
likely to be rather low in protein. Further, a survey on Village 
Agricultural Activity, which was a component of the Vanuatu 1983/84 
Agricultural Census, revealed five-fold differences in expenditure on 
rice between the various Local Government Regions in Vanuatu. 
In urban areas, where most people buy their food from shops or 
markets, the choice of the types of food which will be purchased, 
depends on factors such as taste, convenience, and most importantly, 
relative prices. Information on prices per kilogram for rice, and for 
customary staple foods such as taro, cassava, sweet potato and 
breadfruit in Tonga, Solomon Islands, Pohnpei (Federated States of 
Micronesia, FSM), Vanuatu and Fiji shows that in terms of relative 
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prices, Tonga and Pohnpei were at the two opposite extremes in the 
mid-1980s, with rice, on a per kilogram basis, being four to five times 
more expensive than locally produced rootcrops in Tonga, and with 
Pohnpei as the only place where rice, on a per kilogram basis, is 
cheaper than locally produced taro or breadfruit. It is in this respect not 
surprising that rice consumption is very low in Tonga, but a dominant 
food in Pohnpei (FSM). 
Apart from food supply, and food consumption, there is a third 
factor which influences the nutritional status of an individual, the 
biological utilisation of food. In the case of diarrhoea, resulting from 
gastrointestinal infection, consumed food is inefficiently utilised. It is 
mainly because of the risk of infection that breastfeeding is of extreme 
importance for the protection of the growth of babies. In particular in a 
situation where clean water is not easily available, the feeding of 
improperly prepared infant formula, or other breastmilk substitutes, is 
one of the main causes of diarrhoea in small children, and, if this 
occurs repeatedly, growth retardation. Data from five countries suggests 
that retardation of growth in particular occurs after the first birthday, 
the period around when breastfeeding often ceases. Information on 
trends in breastfeeding practices in the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands in the period 1953-1973, and in Fiji  in the period 1977-1980 
reveal a strong tendency for breastfeeding to decline. 
It is clear that decisions in various sectors such as agriculture, 
education, and macroeconomic policy, will have impact on the health 
and nutritional wellbeing of the population. Nutrition is a vital health 
issue and actually needs little direct health action. 
In the area of food production, agriculture ministries and depart­
ments have an important role to play in providing extension services to 
farmers and assistance in the growing of food crops. Crucial decisions 
have to be made regarding the distribution of scarce government in­
vestment resources between cash crops for exports and food crops for 
local consumption. In the area of food consumption, much will depend 
on government food price policies. Tariffs are one instrument that 
influences relative prices between locally produced and imported food. 
It is in particular the role of national Departments of Health and 
Education, and also various non-governmental organisations, to 
provide information to the general public on the importance of healthy 
food for everybody. But most importantly, health and nutrition policies 
in the complex environments of the Pacific Islands will only be effective 
when objectives, targets and strategies are adjusted to the conditions 
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and needs at the various levels in the country, regions, provinces, 
islands, municipalities and villages. Only through a continuous 
dialogue between national and local governments and the mass of the 
people will national nutrition, and hence health policies be effective. 
Some specific examples will illustrate the variations on this common 
theme found in Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia. 
Health-nutrition stress and consumer choice 
Undernutrition in terms of low calorie intake over significant periods of 
time is rare in Tonga. An unpublished study in 1982 associated with 
Hurricane Isaac relief programs did find young children who were 
significantly underweight by the criteria of weight for age and/ or 
weight for height but no firm conclusions can be drawn on the exis­
tence of systematic undernutrition even on a small scale. 
If international weight for height criteria are used many adult 
Tongan men and women have weights in excess of 120 per cent of the 
standard. Also Tongans living in the capital Nuku'alofa show a 
tendency to be overweight in comparison with rural areas (Koike 1984). 
Even if a healthy but obese index is adopted with 'rural' Tongans as the 
standard, then the fact that 'urban' Tongans are significantly heavier at 
similar heights is a matter of concern. This is in the context of low 
energy output relative to energy input as much as energy intake in 
itself. Also it may be that ability to absorb nutrients differs due to 
environmental health differences between 'rural' and 'urban' areas. 
The question of obesity is entangled with observations on changing 
diet structure and concerns about morbidity patterns. Whether morbid­
ity is changing or is being better monitored in some areas is always an 
issue in analysing health statistics but the evidence in Tonga is 
worrying. Several serious non-communicable diseases do appear to 
show either greater prevalence in Tonga compared with other countries 
or in 'urban' compared with 'rural' populations in Tonga. Rates of 
incidence of hypertension, diabetes mellitus, coronary disease and gout 
as well as anaemia in pregnant women and dental caries in children 
are regularly attributed to changes in diet (Kagawa Nutrition College 
1981 ;  Johnson 1983). 
Thus, any analyst might be willing to accept the argument that 
reducing the consumption of calories, sugar, salt, saturated animal fats 
and refined carbohydrates in Tonga is desirable in terms of health and 
that such a general reduction will not expose large numbers of Tongan 
people to the risk of undernutrition. More research is needed into the 
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causes of current patterns of morbidity among Tongan people in Tonga 
and among Tongan people who have migrated to other countries 
(Coyne 1984). 
Tonga is not alone in the region in having large numbers of 
emigrants in richer economies and it is worth briefly considering at this 
point the impact of high levels of migration on dietary patterns in the 
island themselves. The process of change based on migration and 
remittances has implications for dietary choice in many of the islands, 
notably those in Polynesia and Micronesia. 
International migration is a fact of life for many smaller Pacific 
Island economies. For several countries, there are now more nationals 
living outside than inside the national boundaries. Migration is 
unlikely to decrease from those economies where it is already a signifi­
cant factor, such as Tonga, and new populations are likely to be joining 
the flows. 
The States of the Federated States of Micronesia were spared this 
drain of people during the Trusteeship period. But, even here, the risk is 
that the pressures felt at the household level, if new cash income­
eaming opportunities do not emerge, will engender an emigration 
response taking advantage of the right to migrate freely to the United 
States. From such migration will come a flow of remittances and invi­
tations for others to follow. The economy will move towards balance by 
losing consumers and gaining remittances. It will also lose potential 
producers of course and the process will tend to be cumulative. 
The food self-sufficiency and nutritional implications of such a 
response to economic pressure are clear from the experience of other 
Pacific nations. The migrants will have gone to the major source of 
imported food (about 80 per cent of food imports come from the United 
States). They will inevitably consume even less customary food with 
likely loss in nutritional and health status, especially as the migrants 
will be relatively poor by US standards (see Coyne 1984; Thaman 1983 
for attempts to summarise the literature on migration and nutrition as 
part of the general urbanisation issue). Also, migrants' remittances (and 
evidence from other nations suggests remittances will be substantial) 
will pay for more imported food in the FSM diet. Remittances will take 
over the role of a portion of the US government grants during the 
Trusteeship period. Continuing high levels of food imports to FSM and 
associated ill-health for Micronesian people (at home and in the United 
States) will be an undesirable feature of moves towards a remittance­
based economy. The migration feature of the Compact may prove to be 
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its most important economic restructuring element but with negative 
social and health side-effects . Avoiding, or minimising, this outcome 
through a 'virtuous spiral' of increasing local food production to 
provide more incomes to keep people in FSM eating nutritious local 
food is a better, though challenging, alternative. 
Migration, resulting remittances, aid inflows and the rentier 
incomes all play roles in encouraging and facilitating a dietary shift 
towards imported food and drink items combined with an associated 
tendency towards a more sedentary lifestyle. This shift is at very 
different stages in the various economies of the region but most 
advanced in Polynesia and Nauru. The drift is in the same direction 
everywhere with similar health implications, as can be seen in 
Melanesia, in the Solomon Islands in the 1980s. However, the health 
implications of shifts among people in Melanesia may not be as extreme 
as among people in Polynesia if genetic potential is part of the explana­
tion for the alarming health responses among Tongans. 
Food import penetration in the Solomon Islands 
This section uses data on household consumption which was 
systematically collected by the Solomon Islands Statistics Office in 
1982. The sampling basis was close to being representative of the whole 
of Solomon Islands society and thus allows a tentative national base­
line to be constructed against which policy measures could be 
evaluated in the future. Up to 1982, concern about diet and forms and 
extent of malnutrition in the Solomon Islands have been expressed 
primarily by health workers. Understandably such concern tended to 
concentrate on child undernutrition, especially around the 'weaning' 
period between one and three years of age, where clinical symptoms 
have been observed by health workers. This, and the closely related 
vital issue of limiting bottle feeding of babies to a minimum, must be 
high on any health policy agenda in the Solomon Islands and the 
Health and Education Ministries can justifiably claim that requests for 
resources to tackle these issues merit high priority in government 
spending. 
The focus of this section is on dietary differences and changes at the 
household level in the Solomon Islands and shows how levels of 
resource availability and involvement in the cash economy appear to 
affect dietary patterns. The central question asked is will there be an 
222 I Envi ronment and development in the Pacific Islands 
inevitable transition from one pattern of diet (often called traditional, 
local, rural) to another (often called Western, imported, urban) in the 
Solomon Islands as a result of economic growth and consequent 
monetisation of the economy? 
More imported food generally means a diet consisting of greatly 
increased proportions of refined sugar and saturated fats from fatty 
meat and dairy products, with higher energy intake. But more energy 
and less dietary fibre in conjunction with reduced physical activity 
places stress on the body which can produce ill-health, lower life-time 
productivity, and, in general, a lower quality of life. 
However, if the original diet contained little animal derived protein 
or was highly restricted in variety of foods, then the transition might 
have some desirable nutrition effects which may offset some of the 
undesirable ones. But there is no reason to believe that people living in 
the bio-diverse environment of the Solomon Islands are regularly 
deprived of energy or protein, except under extreme conditions such as 
post-cyclone situations. 
The changes that were occurring in the 1980s were uneven in terms 
of their impact on the various islands and among differing groups in 
the urban area of Honiara. These processes are continuing with the 
increasing commercialisation of the natural resource base in the 
Solomon Islands. Changes in economic opportunities and social status 
with respect to imported food tastes combine in complex processes of 
movement towards a new diet at differing rates with differing degrees 
of enthusiasm. A most worrying feature of the Honiara statistics is that, 
in terms of per capita consumption, carbohydrates, refined sugar and 
saturated fats appear to be still increasing at the highest income levels. 
On the more positive side, animal protein and the variety of fruits and 
vegetables is probably increasing and a fibre intake from local root 
crops is maintained, though at a very low level compared with the 
average rural intake. These results suggest that Solomon Islanders are 
at risk of what might be crudely defined as ' over-nutrition'. But it must 
be remembered that the measures here are in value terms, not in physi­
cal quantities so such a conclusion must be treated as only indicative. 
This conclusion can be examined further if we compare the Honiara 
1982 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) with the 
Honiara 1976 results of the survey for the retail price index. There was 
a 7 per cent growth in per capita GDP at constant prices between 1977 
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and 1982, assuming this income growth was operating proportionately 
to the 1982 cross-sectional comparison of income strata. The major 
points were 
canned meat maintaining its percentage 
fresh fish consumption expanding at the expense of canned 
fish more strongly than might have been predicted from the 
cross-section data 
root crops holding their own against rice in percentage terms 
sugar and dairy products reduced in percentage terms. 
There is a tentative explanation of these movements in terms of 
relative price changes between the last quarter of 1977 (when a new 
retail price index was implemented) and the last quarter of 1982. Those 
products whose prices went up by less than the overall food index 
seemed to have performed better in overall expenditure terms than 
might have been predicted on income change alone: those which went 
up in price more than the index performed marginally less well. Such 
results can only be treated as indicative but they suggest consumer 
decisions do have some relative price sensitivity, and that this effect 
operated in a nutritionally positive fashion between 1976 and 1982. 
The concept of a 'transition' from one diet to another due to impact 
of economic growth and monetisation does seems to fit the data 
presented in this paper. But this general conclusion must be qualified in 
a number of respects. 
Though every rural region consumes some imported food, 
there are still great differences in diet patterns between 
Provinces depending on natural resource availability, and 
probably even greater differences at more local levels. These 
diets may produce very different nutritional stresses putting 
different groups at risk. Concern about the 'grand dietary 
transition' should not dominate food and nutrition policy to 
the extent that it ignores people living on primarily locally 
produced food, who may face particular nutritional problems. 
Degree of monetisation is significantly associated with diet 
patterns. A more monetised rural area will be consuming 
greater proportions of purchased food-stuffs than a less 
monetised rural area. While there is undoubtedly an element 
of mutual causality, this result does suggest that the rural 
consumer demand for purchased food-stuffs is strong and 
that development programs which increase monetisation 
through cash crops or wages will result in reduced food-crop 
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production, more food imports, and nutritional risk unless 
countervailing action is taken. 
Increased incomes anywhere will lead to considerably more 
food being demanded in total with different items expanding 
more strongly at different income levels in different places. No 
absolute ceiling on consumption appears to have been 
reached for any other major imports which give rise to current 
nutritional concerns. 
Consumer decisions appear to have some price sensitivity 
and thus an active price policy in favour of more nutritious 
foods may have some impact. 
Some broad tentative policy recommendations follow directly from 
these conclusions. First, different poorer rural areas will need different 
food and nutrition policy initiatives. Livestock projects, artisan fishing 
projects, fruit and vegetable projects will be more appropriate to 
deficiencies in one area than another. Health, Agriculture and Lands, 
Education, Fisheries, Home and Provincial Affairs and non-govern­
mental organisations need to arrive at coordinated local plans which 
identify nutritional needs and feasible projects, and ensure local people 
are committed to projects as being in their own interest. 
Second, more affluent, monetised, rural areas need to be stimulated 
to put cash into chemical fertiliser, livestock feed, and improved 
planting material to produce more food in the future rather than 
directly purchasing food for immediate consumption. Getting the 
agronomically correct agricultural inputs distributed widely at the right 
price with appropriate credit conditions is an immense challenge for 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands, the Ministry of Commerce, Trade 
and Industry, the Development Bank, and the developmental non­
govemmental organisations. 
Third, people in Honiara and monetised higher income rural areas 
need health monitoring for undernutrition and overnutrition problems. 
Increased supplies of nutritious local foods may be produced by 
allowing enterprising producers to obtain higher prices and 
discouraging excessive food consumption, along with higher tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to non-nutritious imported foods. 
However, a simple higher food price policy will put poorer 
households at risk. Trade unions and other non-governmental 
organisations can play an important role in monitoring the impact of 
price policies on lower income, wage-earning households in Honiara 
and on plantations and other estates. Getting relative prices right for 
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rich and poor consumers must involve the Ministries of Finance, 
Health, Trade, Commerce and Industry. 
Are imported food items nutritionally essential? 
a case-study of The Federated States of Micronesia 
The First National Development Plan of the Federated States of Micro­
nesia claims that in 1983 the bulk of imported items were essential 
items (FSM 1983:77) . The definition of the term 'essential' is always 
difficult for an economist. Given any possibilities for local substitution 
in use, then, at some relative prices, local products will be substituted 
for imported products, especially in the food sector where such clear 
potential exists. 
Three different approaches to the term 'essential' in the specific area 
of food and nutrition may help clarify policy issues. First, an imported 
food item is qualitatively essential if it contains a nutritional 
component which cannot be obtained within the local environment at 
any price. Looking at high islands and atolls together in all the States of 
FSM, no imported food item is 'essential' in the sense of providing 
nutrients non-producible in FSM though the vitamins in imported fruit 
and vegetables may be highly desirable given local and seasonal 
production problems. Second, an imported food item is quantitatively 
essential if there is no hope of raising production of a nutritional 
substitute to a level where it is available to the whole population. 
Again, looking across all islands and all States, there is so much 
underutilised potential in agriculture (US Department of Agriculture 
1982) and fishing beyond the reef, that it is difficult to argue the case for 
proven necessity in the medium term even though imported rice has 
become a preferred staple which bananas, breadfruit, locally produced 
rice, and root crops will have problems completely displacing. Third, 
an imported food item is distributionally essential if local substitutes 
will only become theoretically available to households without land 
and with low cash incomes at a price they cannot afford. 
Existing data are not sufficient to assess how many people are 
exposed to risk in this way and no consumer price index exists to 
monitor the impact of price changes on low-income households. A basic 
nutritious diet for low-income households may need to be kept acces­
sible through pricing, welfare, and importing policies. However this 
can hardly justify permitting every kind of foodstuff to enter FSM or any 
other Pacific Island economy at nominal tariff rates regardless of 
nutritional content or place in a low-income diet. 
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If few food imports are in any sense 'essential' in nutritional terms 
and the overall economic situation demands a large reduction in all 
imports, then a policy to reduce food imports considerably is highly 
desirable. Two possible policy options exist. One, to ban or impose 
quotas on import items which are judged to be actually harmful 
nutritionally, this should not be ruled out though it is up to nutrition­
ists to make the case. Two, to raise duties differentially over time to take 
account of nutrition, production, and consumption factors. Duties have 
the advantages of raising government revenue even if they fail to reduce 
imports unlike quotas where financial benefits go to private traders. 
Without some data on trader and consumer price responsiveness it is 
impossible to predict the impact of increasing duties. 
Working from the consumer side with protectionist barriers to limit 
inappropriate food imports is only part of the action required to ensure 
a healthy population in the smaller Pacific Island economies. On the 
more positive side is the need for action to develop nutritious food 
production on an economically sustainable basis. Ministries of 
Agriculture and Land will have to improve knowledge of costs of 
production to help assess whether prices give producers a sustainable 
return. 
The need for i n itiatives in food production 
The desire to achieve a higher nutritional and health status for the 
people of the Pacific can be translated into a policy of substituting 
locally produced food for imported food. In Tonga, the substitution of 
fresh fish for mutton flaps and canned fish and canned meat, coconut 
oil for imported cooking oils, and a mix of root crops for wheat flour, all 
meet the criteria for improving the nutritional status of Tongan people, 
though the substitution of cassava for wheat flour is not as clearcut a 
question of relative nutrient content. Cassava has lower nutritional 
value per unit weight than wheatflour and nutritional status may be 
improved only because cassava has a greater bulk per calorie (that is a 
lower energy density), which may give an adult who is tending to 
obesity the feeling of being 'full' at a lower level of calorie intake 
(putting to one side the advantage that consuming cassava increases 
diertary fibre intake). 
Raising local food production significantly is a desirable condition 
for improving nutritional conditions, though it should be kept in mind 
that the mix of products is important. Also it must be remembered that 
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access to food is not guaranteed by increased production itself, and 
food security in a long term view may be put at risk by over ambitious 
short-term production increases which reduce soil fertility or fresh 
water availability. 
In the longer term, sustaining access to a nutritious diet means 
sustaining the ecosystem. Higher food prices may also encourage 
farmers to remove trees and bring new land into cultivation rather than 
intensifying production on existing land. Tree loss has been identified 
as a problem on Tongatapu (United Nations Pacific Energy Develop­
ment Programme 1985). Growing a variety of common food crops inter­
cropped or in rotation using non-mechanised techniques is generally 
less demanding on the soil than growing specialist crops using 
machinery and chemical agents. But if yields per hectare are to be 
increased this will require increased density and/  or increased fre­
quency of planting, given that yields per plant are unlikely to increase 
dramatically according to recent agronomic research (Breen 1985). 
Maintaining fertility may require appropriate fertiliser or the use of 
legumes (Wilde and Hewitt 1983) . Thus moving towards greater food 
crop production does not, in any sense, guarantee that the ecosystem 
will be protected. This protection requires its own monitoring system. 
This argument applies with even greater force to fishing. Catch rates 
and minimum size of species to preserve stocks are not known and 
higher prices may encourage over-fishing. Here again the impact of a 
higher food price policy will require careful monitoring. 
The problem of tree removal is seen in the rising cost of fuel for 
cooking in Tonga. Raising food production does not guarantee that the 
food will be in a convenient form for consumers at the time and place 
when they need it and in a variety of palatable forms. The convenience 
of wheat flour, bread, butter, canned fish, canned meat, and refined 
sugar for consumers with time or fuel shortages is obvious. There is a 
need to meet these demands by consumers through developing 
appropriate techniques of local food processing, preservation and 
presentation. Mixing cassava flour, wheat flour, and added nutrients in 
bread would be one way of achieving this. More widely, the Ministry of 
Labour, Commerce and Industries could encourage enterprise in private 
sector small-scale catering aimed at groups unable to return home for 
meals, assistance being on the condition that local foods were used to 
the maximum extent and nutritional advice was followed. 
All the islands of the South Pacific region have very different 
agricultural systems probably giving rise to distinctive diets. These 
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diets will have varying strengths, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses as 
far as nutritional values are concerned. Current diets in rural areas are 
probably not uniform in local food content nor equal in nutritional 
worth. In addition it can be said with less certainty, that in several rural 
regions the diet is not self-sufficient in the sense that imported food is 
consumed on a day-to-day basis . Local agricultural systems differ 
greatly in the amounts of staples, fruit and vegetables, and livestock 
available per household. Those regions at the lowest levels are likely to 
have significant numbers of households who are highly vulnerable to 
undernutrition if imported food is not consumed in significant amounts 
on a day-to-day basis. Overall, reducing the dependence of rural people 
on imported food does not only make macroeconomic sense, but is also 
important for household, regional and national food security, where 
transportation of bulk goods can be difficult in terms of emergency. 
The demand for imported food in rural areas is made effective 
through a variety of channels. Rural people get cash from a number of 
sources: copra, cocoa, food and kava sales, and remittances from 
money-earning urban-based relatives with or without reciprocation in 
kind. The notion of a self-sufficient, well-nourished, healthy rural 
society which could be benignly ignored at the macroeconomic level 
because it could never spend more on imported goods than what it had 
immediately earned from exports is to be questioned in all aspects. The 
case for an active, locally sensitive policy in the rural regions of a 
country like Vanuatu aimed at import-substitution and greater food 
self-sufficiency is strong in terms of the health of the population and the 
economy. 
N utrition i n  publ ic pol i cy and the project cycle 
Health planning in the South Pacific has had a strong nutritional 
component. Fij i's Eighth Development Plan highlighted the 'promotion 
of proper nutrition' (Fiji Central Planning Office 1980:267) as the first 
priority of primary health care. More generally, the 1980s saw signifi­
cant efforts in nutritional education as part of health policy across the 
region. In practice, however, health policy in general has been uneven 
in its impact, primarily in terms of spatial distribution, but also in terms 
of access for lower income households as market forces have been used 
increasingly to allocate health care resources. 
Overall, outside the formal health sector, nutrition as a vital aspect 
of a healthy society and a healthy economy has not been a resource 
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priority for the public sector. Specific policy development for nutrition 
has been largely allocated to Food and Nutrition Committees bringing 
together some civil servants from various ministries plus representa­
tives of NGOs and academics with interest in the health field. In 
general, the Health Ministry provided the secretariat, usually a trained 
nutritionist, and was regarded as the lead agency with the biggest stake 
in the field. 
If national Food and Nutrition Committees (FNCs), or their 
equivalents are to take appropriate responsibility for nutrition matters, 
it is crucial that they have opportunities to comment systematically on 
program and project proposals not only in the health field but in the 
broad sphere of agricultural and marine resource development. In order 
to achieve that position to comment, it is useful to think in terms of a 
general procedure which all programs and projects have to follow into 
which the FNC can be fitted. This procedure is commonly conveniently 
summarised in terms of a project cycle. 
In its most abstract form, the project cycle is seen as a number of 
stages through which all programs and projects must pass with move­
ments between stages involving distinct decision points on whether to 
continue with the program or project. The simplest model has sequen­
tial stages of identification, design, appraisal, implementation and 
evaluation. It is a cycle because final, impact evaluation is meant to feed 
back into identification of a new, appropriate project or a new, adjusted 
phase of a program. 
The term 'monitoring' is often placed between implementation and 
evaluation with a feedback flow into implementation. But for the 
purposes of this note, monitoring by the FNC as an activity is treated as 
desirable at any and every stage of the cycle and is therefore not in­
cluded in the cycle as a specific stage. More elaborate forms of the 
project cycle might distinguish between economic and financial 
appraisals. 
At its best, the elaborated project cycle ensures that programs and 
projects competing for resources come to precisely known, appropriate 
decision-makers act promptly and simultaneously. At worst, the project 
cycle introduces some administrative order into potential chaos at the 
cost of some speed in otherwise arbitrary decision-taking. 
Any agency on the fringe of decision-making with little or no 
independent resources, such as an FNC, has a real interest in establish­
ing a project cycle in which it has a specified position. Hopefully, many 
other agencies will also accept the principle of orderly decision-making 
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though this cannot be guaranteed for large Ministries or Departments 
with administrative autonomy and independent resources. 
The rest of this discussion will assume that the principle of a project 
cycle and an active planning role for government is accepted and 
shows how a FNC might monitor and evaluate programs and projects 
at various stages in the cycle in order to shift the emphasis towards a 
goal of greater self-reliance in food. The policy focus is not concerned 
with nutritional projects and programs directly initiated by the FNC 
itself but with exercise of influence on projects and programs in agri­
culture and marine resources conceived by the conventional agencies 
for developing these sectors. 
Program and project identification, design and appraisal 
FNCs are generally in no position to be able to identify agriculture and 
fisheries programs and projects for themselves. The Committee 
secretariat may be engaged in full-time ministerial or departmental 
posts often in the health or education sectors. Realistically, the best 
hope of FNCs influencing identification of agricultural and fisheries 
programs and projects is through playing a role in evaluation of current 
programs and projects and thereby influencing the often colonially 
acquired, externally oriented attitudes which filter out local food­
related objectives. 
However, the design stage is much more promising for FNC 
intervention. At some time in this stage, a document will exist which 
describes the components of a program and project and the broad 
objectives. If the FNC can systematically receive these documents for 
comment then there is a real opportunity for modifying the broad 
agriculture and fisheries strategies in the direction of greater food 
security and improved nutrition. The major problem probably will be to 
persuade the Ministries and/ or Departments involved to submit all 
proposed programs and projects rather than only those which are 
preconceived as being food and nutrition related. 
The point cannot be made too strongly that all agriculture and 
fisheries programs and projects have local food and nutrition 
implications. Resources such as cultivable land, marine resource 
stocks, labour time, credit, extension advice, management skills, 
entrepreneurial drive and community spirit are never all in such 
abundance that competition for resources between increasing exports 
and increasing local food availability can be ignored. 
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Exports are attractive to agriculture and fishery sector planners in 
smaller countries. The natural resource base in land or sea usually 
appears underutilised and there is often an assumption of actual or 
potential labour time underemployment. These assumptions suggest 
that exports can be increased at no cost to local food production. These 
extra exports will then provide the immediate foreign exchange which 
the country needs to improve the external balance of payments 
situation. The implicit example which lies behind this model is the 
copra model, copra has been the mainstay of many islanders' cash 
incomes for more than a century now. But copra as an example for 
possible exports, such as coffee, cocoa, spices, and sophisticated 
aquaculture or specialised marine products, has non-transferable 
characteristics. 
Coconuts are a tree crop which need little attention until the moment 
cash is desired. The trees and the coconuts have many domestic, 
including local food and drink, uses apart from being sold as copra. 
The export product is durable and can be sold in virtually any amount 
and at any quality if the producer is willing to accept a lower price. 
Copra is the exception rather than the rule for export products. Many 
export products do not have flexible local use and are vulnerable to 
rejection on grounds of quality, quantity, or punctuality. 
Furthermore, even where export products, including copra, have 
become well-established, there appears to be an increasing tendency for 
producers to use the cash incomes to purchase imported food and so 
the positive net impact of the export products on the agriculture and 
fisheries contribution to assisting the external balance of payments is 
less than appears in most export-oriented program and project 
documents. 
One response to these problems has been the renewed advocacy of 
plantations, estates, or fishing complexes for export production. 
Usually such programs and projects will involve a large 'nucleus' 
specialised facility plus an element of obtaining supplementary raw 
materials from non-specialist small-producers. The question of 
competition for resources then becomes much clearer and political 
conflicts emerge. Shifting cultivation and artisan fishing tend to range 
over areas now threatened with alienation to the nucleus facility 
leading to tension and conflict resulting in both unit costs of exports 
rising above predictions and local food production falling below past 
performance. 
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But it would be undesirable and unrealistic for FNCs to, in effect, 
repeat a dogma 'exports bad, local food good' to every proposal which 
came before them (Biswas and Pinstrup-Andersen 1983). Rather FNCs 
could seek to make suggestions which would give a better balance 
within every agriculture and fisheries program and project. This 
balance can be sought in a number of ways, but some objective indi­
cators to be explicitly stated in the program or project design could be 
natural resources allocation, for instance, garden plots for 
workers on plantations/ estates, a limited percentage of small­
holders' land assumed to be under export crops, continuing 
access for artisan fisherfolk to marine resources for food 
labour time allocation, for instance, assumed hours of export­
oriented work per day, number of days per week, piece-work 
payments arrangements to allow women to choose time 
allocation, seasonal complementarity between labour peaks 
for export and local food production 
institutions for community involvement, for instance, a local 
food and nutrition committee meeting regularly with program 
or project management, collective agreements which include 
nutritious food availability 
allocation of extension advice and credit, for instance, notes 
of guidance to field extension officers on time allocation, 
handbooks on improving both export and local food 
production, equivalent credit conditions and funds for export 
and local food production improvements. 
An FNC could seek to include any or all such elements at the design 
stage, arguing that local food production is desirable in itself or for 
improving nutrition (surely a universal development ideal) and that 
seeking a balance between increasing exports and local food products 
is a very practical recognition of the reality of day-to-day life for most 
people in the small Pacific Island countries. 
If this advice is ignored at the design stage then the FNC could still 
persist in asking to see a formal program or project appraisal document. 
Such documents are often difficult to interpret due to the use of 
technical economics and accounting terms. But with some technical 
assistance, which a representative from the Central or National 
Planning Office should be able to provide, an FNC would usually be 
able to look critically at the assumptions made. There are three usual 
areas of vulnerability. 
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Failure to properly discount flows of costs and revenues 
Programs and projects with large set-up costs, little revenue in the first 
few years, and a time horizon of ten to twenty years are liable to have 
low internal rates of return, that is they could only afford to pay a low 
rate of interest if the program or project were financed through a loan. 
By comparison appropriate adaptive technology for local food 
production may show a higher rate of return even if the annual 
revenues are lower, providing they come immediately. 
Failure to make sensitivity tests 
Export programs and projects are probably subject to greater risks than 
local food programs and projects. Yields are likely to be lower and later 
than predicted: prices of imported inputs are likely to rise faster than 
prices of exported outputs. A sensitivity test uses possible lower or 
upper estimates of values of major variables to give the range of 
possible outcomes. 
Failure to specify evaluation procedure 
As a last resort, an FNC can attempt to ensure that an undesirable 
program or project (from a food and nutrition view point) is rigorously 
reviewed as soon as possible. Too often, failing programs and projects 
are shored up by time extensions, resource additions, and amended 
objectives, which postpone full evaluation indefinitely. 
The i mplementation of pol icies 
Even if no formal monitoring personnel are attached to a program or 
project, the management will be collecting data for its own purposes 
during implementation. Any program or project will have to account for 
expenditure and larger programs and projects should be collecting 
additional data to make management efficient internally and effective 
externally. 
For programs and projects operating in food and nutritionally 
vulnerable regions or with vulnerable groups, an FNC has an interest 
in encouraging management to collect indicative data on food and 
nutrition status and feeding it regularly through to the Committee. With 
no resources of its own to collect data frequently, an FNC must use 
other eyes and ears to obtain information, which can then be integrated 
with occasional, representative statistics from, for instance, national 
nutrition status surveys and agricultural censuses. 
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To persuade even a sympathetic program or project management to 
collect and disseminate information which is not immediately required 
for financial accountability or managerial control requires arguments 
which show advantages to the management itself. Two arguments 
which might be advanced are 
the data needs to be collected anyway and all the FNC is 
requesting is that it be summarised, for instance, sales of 
inputs and purchases of outputs to small producers are 
recorded for financial accountability (these could be 
aggregated to indicate changing activity by location, size of 
transaction, regularity of transaction), diaries of visits by field 
extension officers could be similarly aggregated by location 
and purpose 
the data could assist management to defend itself if targets are 
not met, for instance, programs and projects oriented towards 
exports frequently meet obstacles from small producers 
because of failure to understand the producers' activity in 
their entirety, as a multi-faceted system, if management 
collects data on all the activities of the program's or project's 
target population then it may have explanations of below 
target performance, rather than subjective excuses along the 
lines of people's laziness, customs, or stupidity ! 
The project cycle stage of external/ objective evaluation is a real 
opportunity for an FNC to obtain information and influence future 
program and project identification. Evaluations can be seen as taking 
place at three levels. 
Evaluating effort of employed personnel. Did field extension 
workers visit producers as frequently as planned? Were 
productive inputs distributed as planned at the stated price? 
Were outputs collected and marketed efficiently? 
Evaluating effectiveness. Were the productive inputs 
appropriate for producers? Could significant variations in 
weather and prices have been anticipated? Was field 
extension advice actually useful to producers? 
Evaluating development impact. Does the target population 
have a higher quality of life at the end of the program or 
project than at the beginning? Are the people better fed? Do 
they have less risk of food shortages? 
Obviously an FNC has an interest in ensuring that particular impact 
questions are asked and that final impact evaluations are conducted. 
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Most external funding agencies will be sympathetic to such requests if 
they are using 'logical framework approaches' or modified versions to 
structure their analysis of programs and projects (Cameron 1993) . 
These approaches explicitly recognise the development 'impact' level of 
evaluation. Ministries, departments and project management are likely 
to be less sympathetic as evaluations become more expensive (and more 
potentially threatening) and the wider the terms of reference. 
Conclusion 
The argument here is that Pacific Island societies have unnecessarily 
high risks of ill-health because they are not making full use of the 
capacity of their environments to provide healthy diets suitable to their 
cultural, and possibly genetic physiological, potentials. Some of the 
factors, such as smoking and alcohol abuse and early cessation of 
breast-feeding, are recognisable in many societies, and issues of control 
over advertising and irresponsible promotions are virtually global. But 
South Pacific people do appear to face special problems, partially due 
to the peculiar form that the process of 'modernisation' has taken in the 
region. Nutritional factors put demands on health and other caring 
services, which, for instance, could be better used to enhance the quality 
of life of the disabled and women sufferers from violence (Coleridge 
1993; Heise et al. 1994). 
Action on producing for better nutrition offers many possibilities for 
economic and ecological policies which are rational in terms of 
sustainable development. Generally, these policies will tend to 
discourage use of low quality imported food. Where communities are 
strong and agriculture and fishing still have prestige, then greater self­
provisioning is an option. But access (and not just in terms of nominal 
affordability) to nutritious food produced can be in-region, and not 
necessarily in-community. More market-oriented ecologically sensitive 
changes in land use and innovations in nutrition-oriented 
preservation, processing and transport are consistent with nutritional 
improvement. On the consumption side, there are international models 
of interactive, community-based approaches which would be highly 
relevant to the region (International Course for Primary Health Care 
Managers 1991) .  Examples of innovative Primary Health Care and 
Rural Development practices can be found in the public and NGO 
sectors within the region (Bamford 1986). 
Changes in diet pose a grave health threat, perhaps the greatest 
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health threat, in the South Pacific region. Such self-induced ill-health 
and its related health care costs suggests a peculiar variation on the 
syndrome described by Illich in the 1970s (Illich 1976). The changes in 
diet are a reflection of more general cultural, economic and ecological 
pressures on overall sustainability. Thus, the policy response to 
improve health in this critical area has to be multi-dimensional and 
permeate the whole of the planning cycle as part of a general case for 
quality, service-oriented, locally sensitive, good governance, public 
sector action across the whole South Pacific region in the interests of the 
people and the ecology on which their all round health depends. 
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Cultural patterns in Pacific Islands 
health: a response to Cameron 
Andrea Tuisovuna 
John Cameron's paper explores many of the key health issues which 
face Pacific Islands nations today, including breast and bottle feeding, 
and the contrasts in nutritional value between processed, imported 
foods and locally grown natural foods. He also deals carefully with the 
need for a project-based and business approach to developments in 
health knowledge and practice. But this contribution would have been 
enhanced had it acknowledged the possibility that certain cultural 
practices in parts of the South Pacific, and their resistance to change, 
might be a factor in the prevalence of certain diseases and malnutrition. 
Although Ruth Lechte (1978) suggests that statistical inaccuracies 
might cause exaggeration of some differences in urban/ rural practices, 
it is useful to recognise differences in nutritional patterns between 
urban and rural communities. Attention should be paid to the dif­
ficulties of ensuring widespread and lasting health education, and its 
accessibility to all parts of the community. Margaret Mackenzie (1978) 
holds that . . .  experts from colonial powers, international agencies, and 
universities seem to have bequeathed the worst of all worlds in health 
and in food to the people they want to help'. 
Seventeen years ago, the Brandt Report (1980) drew attention to the 
relationship between macroeconomics, trade and finance and adequate 
food and nutrition. While he speaks about the need for a holistic 
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approach to nutrition and health, Cameron does not make the inter­
disciplinary connections which would have been particularly welcome 
at a conference on this subject. 
Cultural patterns of feeding are very persistent in parts of the 
Pacific, and in areas such as rural Fiji. It is not uncommon to find that 
children as old as five are still taking breast milk, to supplement local 
shortages of other foods. Such shortages may result from lack of money 
and employment, because food needed by the family has been used for 
some ceremonial purpose, or simply due to agricultural shortage. 
Whatever the underlying reason, when such shortages are combined 
with the custom of the men having first choice of the food, women 
second and children last (still the prevalent, though not the exclusive, 
pattern in many villages), the potential for undernourishment is 
evident. This pattern is repeated in other parts of the Pacific too, such as 
Vanuatu and Tonga. Studies in the 1970s and early 1980s of differences 
in nutritional patterns between indigenous Fijians and Fijian Indians 
also showed that while Indian children had a protein rich breakfast of 
pulses and bread (roti and dahl), many Fijian children had only boiled 
rice and tea. At the time this was linked to differences in school 
attainment levels between the two races. Many years later, these 
differences in practice still persist. 
The cultural pattern of 'more is better ', can also add to the risks 
where foods such as sugar are concerned. Most people who have 
worked and lived in the Pacific are familiar with the large amounts of 
food which people eat (for example the interesting concept of over­
nutrition which Cameron applies to Tonga and Nauru). Great store is 
set throughout the Pacific in quantity, whether in relation to food, gifts 
or anything else. Applied to Western processed foods, and sugar in 
particular, the potential dangers are clear. In both Nauru and Tonga I 
have witnessed as commonplace, the habit of putting three or four 
dessert spoons full of sugar in a piala (small bowl) of tea. Many of the 
people doing this know intellectually that it is bad for them, but the 
pervasive 'more is better ' element of the culture, dominates their routine 
day to day behaviour. 
Patterns of child discipline may not be unconnected with the re­
emergence of malnutrition. When only traditional foods were con­
sumed children could eat almost anything that was available without 
risk. It was all fresh, and was protein and vitamin rich, with the 
complex carbohydrates provided by taro yams and so on. Consequent­
ly, other than the pecking order referred to above, there was little need to 
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control in any active sense a child 's food intake. However, with the 
advent of the over-sweet and 'moreish' Western foods, children eat in 
the same way, that is whatever they want. So instead of being given a 
stick of sugar cane, they demand and get an ice-lolly (sugar-flavoured 
water) from the village co-op, common even in the rural areas. These 
small examples serve to indicate the importance of the cultural impact 
on eating behaviour and the pressing need for research. 
It would have been interesting to learn more about differences 
between rural and urban dietary patterns, and levels of sickness and 
nutrition. If differences exist, as common experience suggests, are they a 
result of greater affluence in towns, where the consumption of Western 
foods makes up a higher proportion of the total food intake, or are they 
a result of the townspeople being denied easy access to the nutritious 
traditional foods, which are increasingly expensive to purchase in the 
towns? In the villages, is it that people prefer trying to sell the local 
foods which they grow or catch, so that they have some ready money to 
buy Western foods or consumer goods, not recognising, as Cameron 
points out, that the tinned and processed foods have a much lower 
nutritional value than traditional foods? 
Much has been done on the health education front, some of it very 
successful, but even where the health trainers are local people, often as 
soon as they move on to their next posting or village, the old problems 
reassert themselves. 
Although many of the rural areas are difficult to access, even the 
most remote village usually has a radio. There is almost always a local 
language program (although this in itself is problematic in Melanesian 
countries which have hundreds of different languages)-but is there 
sufficient usage of local language programs for purposes of health and 
nutrition promotion? English language programs, or other publicity 
material such as the educational leaflets which proliferate in Western 
doctors' surgeries, are not adequate. Although most people throughout 
the Pacific Islands speak some English, and although it is the language 
of business and government in many countries, it is very much a 
second language, especially in the rural areas. People do not listen to 
English language programs, nor do they read any material written in 
English which reaches a village. It would be useful to consider 
suggestions about the best ways of reaching all parts of the population 
with sufficient intensity, conviction and duration for information about 
good nutrition and common, introduced health hazards to influence 
and change everyday eating habits. 
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Finally, it is worth reaffirming Cameron's point that there is a need 
for cross disciplinary consideration of health issues in all aspects of 
development. For instance, when the development of factory fishing 
began, was consideration given to how or whether this would affect the 
inshore fishing which is undertaken by islanders? On recent visits to 
Fiji, Vanuatu, Cook Islands, and earlier visits to Nauru and Tonga, I 
have heard complaints that there is now a scarcity of good-sized fish in 
the inshore waters. This means that people catch less and eat less, or 
they are faced with fishing farther afield, which in tum may mean that 
they need bigger boats, which they cannot afford to buy. In Fiji, for 
instance, much of the local fishing is done within the reef, and the boats 
used are not suitable for open ocean use. In the Solomons the mass 
logging that is currently causing concern is leaving soil unprotected, to 
be washed down into the sea where it is killing the reef, the fish and 
shellfish which make an important contribution to the local diet. In Fiji, 
on the drier side of Viti Levu, local people are talking about the effect of 
the many small stands of pine trees on the moisture levels in the soil. 
Whether or not there is truth in this is not yet established. But if it is 
true, what effect will it have on the sort of crops that can be grown, and 
hence on local diet? 
A fuller consideration of these cross-sector issues and their relative 
importance should be a priority in the formulation of future health 
policies in the Pacific. While Cameron shows that much has already 
been done, much remains to be done, and the real complexity, perva­
siveness and depth of some of the issues has still to be recognised. 
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Changes in the global environment: 
uncertain prospects for the Pacific 
Tom Spencer 
Over the last century global mean surface air temperature has increased 
by 0.3-0.6 °C. Over the next 100 years, as a result of human activities, 
increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other 
'greenhouse gases' are expected, in the probable absence of concerted 
international efforts to reduce emissions, to lead to a warming of 1-
4.50C (Kattenberg et al. 1996; Nicholls et al. 1996) . The ensuing 
environmental and socioeconomic impacts of this large-scale 
experiment in climate manipulation has made 'global environmental 
change' one-perhaps the major-research question on the scientific 
agenda into the next millennium. 
A major strand of this research effort has been the mathematical 
modelling of climate-ocean response to enhanced greenhouse gas 
forcing. 1 One outcome of this work has been the derivation of a series of 
sea-level rise scenarios covering a range of timescales to 2100 AD. This 
paper evaluates this 'sea-level debate', the environmental consequences 
of sea-level rise, and a suite of potential confounding factors in the 
context of the Pacific Ocean basin and its margins. It updates and 
builds on the author's earlier assessments which should be consulted 
for more detailed information on the structure and functioning of coral 
reef ecosystems (Spencer 1994, 1995). The approach is scientific: though 
what is described has important implications for human (and thus 
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policy) issues. There are a great variety of both continental and oceanic 
islands in this region but the focus here is on coral atolls. These 
structures, supporting on their rims islands of largely unconsolidated 
sands and gravels only a few metres above present mean sea-level, are 
thought to be particularly vulnerable to future sea-level rise and 
considerable concern has been expressed as to their environmental 
future (Pernetta and Hughes 1990; Wilkinson and Buddemeier 1994) . 
Nearly all 'popular ' sea-level rise scenarios-and many scientific 
ones-predict enhanced flooding (and ultimately island ' drowning'); 
reduction of coral island areas by increased wave attack on higher 
water levels, and saline intrusion into island freshwater lenses. Implicit 
in such assessments is the loss of ecological and geological 
performance by coral reef ecosystems. 
Futu re sea-level rise: a changing context 
On the timescale of interest (10-100 years), the linkage between global 
warming and sea-level rise results from 
the thermal expansion of seawater2 
the increased melt of land-based ice. 
Together these processes increase the volume of water in the world's 
oceans. In the 1980s, the combination of these effects was expected to 
raise the sea-level to between 56 and 367cm by 2100 AD, with many 
authors opting for a best guess estimate in the range 100 to 150cm 
(Buddemeier and Smith 1988) . It is on such figures that the scenarios 
outlined in the introduction have generally been based, although in fact 
more recent research has changed this basis. By 1990 the best estimate 
for sea-level rise to 2100 AD had fallen to 66cm and subsequently most 
reliable estimates have stabilised at about 50cm (Figure 16.1 ;  French et 
al. 1995; Warrick et al. 1996); it seems that the earlier calculations 
underestimated the complexities, and thus overestimated the 
magnitude, of the ice melt component (Meier 1990) . The uncertainties 
involved remain huge: little is known about how heat is transferred 
within the three-dimensional ocean and the detailed response of the 
Greenland and the Antarctic ice sheets to sea-level change is poorly 
understood. Thus the range from the current highest ( + llOcm to 2100 
AD) and lowest ( + 13 cm) estimates for near-future sea-level rise span 
an order of magnitude difference (Warrick et al. 1996). Nevertheless, in 
general the envelope of uncertainty has also been progressively reduced 
over the last decade (Figure 16. 1) .  Finally, these revisions suggests that 
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the detectability of the ocean-warming signal, previously estimated at 
2015 AD (Woodworth 1990) will be pushed back even further. No 
acceleration of sea-level rise has been observed this century (Gomitz 
and Solow 1991; Douglas 1992). 
Past sea-level rise:  i mportance of h istorical context 
One should not be seduced into the view that sea-level rise is no longer 
a significant concern for the twenty-first century. In fact, its continuing 
importance is clear from a consideration of predicted future rates of sea­
level change against the immediate historical record. Such an analysis 
is not straightforward as there is great difficulty in arriving at a global 
sea-level trend for the last 100 years. The historical database contains 
records from in excess of a thousand tidegauge stations worldwide 
(Woodworth 1991) .  Unfortunately, the geographical distribution of 
these stations is highly uneven (and does not favour the centres of the 
large ocean basins), many records are short (typically 30 years or less), 
a substantial subset of stations also record land movements resulting 
from on-going ice loading/unloading effects from the last glaciation, 
tectonics3 and coastal sedimentation, and, in a further subset, sea-levels 
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are affected by atmosphere/ ocean dynamics at inter-annual and inter­
decadal timescales. Indeed, several authors have been pessimistic about 
the possibility of estimating the rate of global sea-level change for the 
last 100 years (Pirazzoli 1993; Groger and Plag 1993). However, Gornitz 
(1995) concluded that the average rate of sea-level change over this 
period has been a rise of between 0.3 and 3.0 mm per year and Warrick 
et al. (1996) arrived at a figure of 1 .8 mm per year, with a range from 0.1 
to 2.5 mm per year. The latter author 's estimate that of the total rise of 
10-25 cm. 2-7 cm has been the result of thermal expansion and 2-5 cm 
from accelerated ice cap and glacial melting, with perhaps an 
additional contribution from the anthropogenic modification of the 
hydrological cycle4 (Gornitz et al. 1994; Sahagian et al. 1994) . 
Impl ications 
The implication of these findings is that although expected sea-level 
rise is now much less than previously envisaged, it nonetheless 
represents a 4 to 5-fold increase over the rate of change in the immediate 
historical period. Furthermore, it is clear that coral reef ecosystems 
show high 'responsiveness' to environmental change: evidence from 
Southeast Asia and the Great Barrier Reef reveals that even under 
relatively stable environmental conditions, inter-decadal shifts in 
dominant wind and wave climates lead to changes in the size, position 
and morphology of sedimentary accumulations on reef platforms 
(Spencer 1994) . Putting together these sea-level rise revisions and their 
historical context suggests that scenarios of future global 
environmental change which simply predict catastrophic inundation 
and erosion of low-lying coral islands upon rapid sea-level rise are 
likely to be inadequate. Rather than this essentially passive behaviour, 
coral reef systems will probably be modified in more subtle ways, as 
new relationships are established between more gradual sea-level rise 
and bioconstructional and bioerosional processes. 5 
Identification and analysis of these changes will be challenging for 
at least three reasons. 
First, it will be necessary to disentangle the signal of climate 
(and sea-level) change from the contemporary natural 
variability of the climate system. In some areas of the reef seas, 
these natural perturbations, such as the periodic ocean­
atmosphere reorganisations of the equatorial Pacific known 
as El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO), dominate the climate 
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and sea-level record. An added complication is the possibility 
that the frequency and magnitude of ENSO, and of other 
events such as the dynamics of tropical cyclones, might 
themselves be affected by climate change. 
Second, there is no reason to assume that reorganisations in 
reef systems will be smooth, progressive and irreversible in 
the face of environmental change. Sudden changes in system 
state may occur as internal thresholds are exceeded. Of 
particular concern is the potential for 'phase shift' (Done 
1992) between 'hard reefs' built by corals and coralline algae 
and 'soft reefs' characterised by fleshy algae;6 the former have 
the ability to track sea-level rise through building on their 
own foundations whereas the latter do not. Why some 
systems are more prone to these shifts than others, and why 
some systems recover coral cover rapidly after such 
perturbations and others do not, are questions that require 
more detailed investigation. 
Third, future sea-level changes will impact not on wholly 
natural systems but on reefs 'pre-stressed' by human 
activities, themselves highly subject to regional variation. 
The response of corals to sea-level rise 
Any analysis of the response of coral reefs to accelerated sea-level rise 
must start with the building blocks of the reef framework-the reef­
building corals themselves. Although it is possible to measure the 
growth of individual coral colonies directly, it is more meaningful to 
assess the response of complete reef systems to sea-level change. 
One way to do this effectively is to look at the performance of reefs 
with respect to sea-level change over long geological timescales. Major 
fluctuations in the sea-level over the last one million years have been 
controlled by the periodic growth and decay of major ice sheets. At the 
height of the last glacial period, 18,000 years ago, water locked up in 
land-based ice masses resulted in a sea-level 125m below that of today 
(Fairbanks 1989). Rapid ice melt after 14,000 years BP (all the extended 
ice masses had disintegrated by 6,000 years BP) was accompanied by 
rapid sea-level rise (Barbados: Bard et al. 1990; Papua New Guinea: 
Edwards et al. 1993; Tahiti: Bard et al. 1996). Thus this postglacial 
period can be used, at least as a partial analogue, to investigate the 
relations between coral reef growth and sea-level change. These 
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relations have been quantified through the radiocarbon dating of the 
tops and bottoms of vertical cores drilled into coral reef structures. 
Rates of time-averaged vertical reef accretion can therefore be compiled 
for a range of Pacific Island types for various time periods over the last 
8,000 years (Figure 16.2). This synthesis does not show those ' give-up' 
reefs (terminology of Neumann and Macintyre 1985) which were 
drowned out by postglacial sea-level rise. Recent drilling into two sets 
of failed reefs around the Caribbean island of Barbados suggests that 
these structures terminated their growth towards sea-level at 14,000-
13,800 and 11, 500-11,000 years BP, when sudden pulses of meltwater 
accelerated sea-level rises to maximum rates of 40-50 mm/ year (Bard et 
al. 1990). A second series of reefs were left behind by sea-level but were 
then able to 'catch-up' (Neumann and Macintyre 1985) as sea-level 
stabilised after 6,000 years BP. These reefs show a sedimentary record 
dominated by high rates of vertical growth; they characterise the right 
hand side of Figure 16.2. Reef platforms flooded towards the end of the 
period of postglacial transgression only had to cope with low and 
slowing rates of sea-level rise and were thus able to adopt a 'keep-up' 
(Neumann and Macintyre 1985) strategy; these reefs thus occupy the 
left hand side of Figure 16.2. 
This type of behaviour also characterises the contemporary 
behaviour of many reef systems on the Great Barrier Reef and in the 
Pacific basin. Measurements of variations in the chemistry of waters 
passing through reef systems can be used to infer calcium carbonate 
gains.7 Although there is a great deal of variability in such additions on 
any reef platform, spatial averaging suggests that complete reef systems 
are currently growing vertically at ea. 1 .0 mm/ year (Figure 16.3). This 
figure parallels that of the historical tide gauge record described above 
and thus indicates a 'keep-up' style to contemporary reef behaviour. 
This in tum results from the fact that atoll intertidal reef flats (from 
whence much of this data comes) are constrained in their vertical 
growth by subaerial exposure at low spring tides. If sea-level 
accelerates upwards, and water depths increase, over the next century 
will Pacific reef systems be able to switch to a more 'catch-up' oriented 
mode of operation? The recent geological dataset shows that these reefs 
undoubtedly have the potential to grow vertically at much greater rates 
than at present. Will this potential be realised? Or will other constraints 
come into play to prevent a full and rapid response to sea-level rise 
taking place and so reduce the effectiveness of these structures in 
protecting the fragile land areas of this ocean's atolls? 
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Constrai nts on reef system responses to sea-level rise 
There are two major sets of controls which may prevent Pacific coral 
reefs from reaching their growth potential and thus accommodating the 
effects of sea-level rise. Increased mechanical stress and increased 
physiological stress on reefs are both related not so much to sea-level 
change but rather to changing sea surface temperatures (SST). As in the 
case of sea-level rise, near-future temperature change is predicted to be 
significantly greater than that of the immediate past. Although 
'runaway' temperature change is thought to be unlikely as evaporation 
and cloud formation feedbacks come into play as ocean temperatures 
rise (Ramanathan and Collins 1991), recent models suggest that the reef 
seas may experience a rise in SST of 1-2°C by 2030-2050 (from 1795 
baseline; Mitchell et al. 1995). Although there are enormous difficulties 
in constructing a historical record of SST change, increases in global 
average SSTs on decadal timescales since the 1860s appear to fall 
between 0.3 and 0.6°C; as elsewhere, the upward trend in the Southern 
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Hemisphere dataset has been highly irregular (Figure 16.3; Nicholls et 
al. 1996). However, it is not mean temperature increases per se that will 
be important in the near-future but rather the fact that temperature rise 
will cause certain critical thresholds to be reached and then exceeded. 
Physical constrai nts on coral response to sea-level rise 
Tropical cyclones and ocean warming: models and predictions 
Tropical cyclones require a threshold SST, variously set at 26.0-28.6°C, 
for initiation and development. Thus-although temperature is by no 
means the only control on cyclogenesis8-the possibility of increased 
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storm magnitudes and frequencies on ocean warming has attracted 
both popular and scientific attention, not least because tropical cyclone 
impacts are an important determinant of coral reef growth histories and 
island morphologies in some regions of the Pacific Ocean basin (Figure 
16.4) . Simple models of the cyclone energy cycle permit the 
establishment of a relationship between potential storm intensity and 
SST. Thus an increase of SST of 3°C might lead to a 30-40 per cent 
increase in hurricane intensity (Emanuel 1986; Raper 1993) . This is 
important because while storms can be organised into hierarchies of 
increasing magnitude and decreasing return period, the relations 
between storm magnitude and reef response are not similarly linear. 
Thus tropical cyclones with windspeeds in excess of 120-150 km/hour 
generally produce limited storm damage which can be repaired in 2 to 
10 years whereas severe hurricanes, with windspeeds in excess of 200 
km/hour, are capable of flattening reef topographies such that more 
than 50 years may be needed for full reef re-growth (Stoddart 1985). 
Figure 1 6.4 Predominant cyclone tracks in relation to major 
coral reef areas 
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Predicted environmental impacts of changing cyclone magnitudes 
and frequencies on reef island corals and morphology have been 
considered with respect to two geographical settings. First, a decrease 
in the return period of cyclones of a given magnitude has been 
predicted for the core areas of the existing cyclone regions. Thus, for 
example, with ocean warming the 950 mb cyclone at Darwin, north 
Australia, currently a 1 in 100 year event, might become the 1 in 40 year 
event (Love 1988). Second, Emanuel's (1986, 1987) climate modelling 
(using a relatively simple doubling atmospheric carbon dioxide model) 
has suggested that increases in SST might extend the cyclone-affected 
regions into areas currently rarely affected by such storms. Impacts on 
coral reefs in these two geographical areas are likely to be different but 
both can be explained by reference to the relationship between cyclone 
frequency and coral growth rate (Massei and Done 1993). At a storm­
frequent site, a coral growing at a typical rate of 10 mm/year will 
encounter a wave capable of dislodging it within a decade. Increasing 
storm frequencies in such an environment will simply further reduce 
the size of colonies present and the contribution that they can make 
collectively to reef accretion (although coral debris may contribute to 
reef growth through the incorporation of storm debris). Somewhat 
paradoxically, therefore, increased storm incidence may lead to less 
storm-by-storm impact than before (Scoffin 1993) . At a storm-rare site, 
by contrast, a coral growing at the same rate should survive for 100 
years before encountering the wave that destroys it. When this event 
happens it may well be catastrophic for the reef as a whole because of 
the long period of preceding reef growth. This is well illustrated by an 
example from French Polynesia: between December 1982 and April 
1983, the Society Islands and the northern Tuamotu Archipelago were 
affected by six tropical cyclones after a largely storm-free period from 
1906. The destruction and transport of 75 years of coral growth on the 
atoll of Tikehau effectively removed and severely modified the deep and 
shallow reef communities respectively, leaving the prospect of a long 
recovery time for reef structure (Harmelin-Vivien and Laboute 1986) . If 
the climate-cyclone model of Emmanuel (1987) is correct-and there are 
conflicting arguments on this point (Lighthill et al. 1994; Bengtsson et 
al. 1985)-then this future awaits other coral islands lying just outside 
the current cyclone belts. 
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An ocean warming signal in the cyclone record? 
A rise in severe cyclone activity in the environs of Fiji, Tuvalu, Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu (Nunn 1990) and the southwest Pacific (Grant 
1981)  has led to speculation about the appearance of the ocean­
warming signal in the Pacific basin. However, a careful and 
comprehensive basin-wide analysis (Raper 1993) has suggested more 
complex ocean-atmosphere dynamics. For the Pacific Ocean, only the 
eastern North Pacific and the Australasian regions showed consistent, 
well-founded relationships between seasonal mean tropical cyclone 
frequency and SST for the period 1910-1980. Even in these regions 
there were difficulties: in the eastern North Pacific there was a spatial 
separation between the areas of SST influence and the storms 
themselves whilst in the Australasian region, increases in storm 
numbers may have been related to changes in data coverage and 
consistency (Nicholls 1992). Overall it appears that it is changes in 
atmospheric circulation systems which drive changes in storm 
incidence not simply variations in SST. 
ENSO complexities 
In the Pacific, a major perturbation to the ocean-atmosphere circulation 
system is that introduced by the operation of the El Nino Southern 
Oscillation phenomenon. The Southern Oscillation is a measure of the 
difference in atmospheric pressure between the South Pacific High 
(typicaHy characterised by pressure measurements at Tahiti) and the 
Indonesian Low (from pressure recorded at Darwin, north Australia) .  
In the 'cool', or La Nina, phase of ENSO, the Southern Oscillation is 
strongly positive and the pressure differential generates strong 
southeast Tradewinds. This easterly wind stress piles up warm water 
in the western Pacific and drives an upwelling process along the coast 
of South America. This results in anomalously cool surface waters in 
the eastern Pacific, extending westwards as a cool tongue along the 
equator. In the 'warm', or El Nino, phase, the Southern Oscillation 
becomes strongly negative and the reduced pressure differential causes 
the Trades to slacken (and even reverse to westerlies at times) . The 
warm waters of the western Pacific 'slosh back' across the ocean, 
capping the cool upwelling waters in the central and eastern Pacific 
Changes in  the global environment I 253 
(Figure 16.5). These oceanographic events are accompanied by major 
reversals in rainfall patterns and shifts in the locus of cyclogenesis and 
subsequent tracks of storm development. In a 'cool' phase cyclone 
formation occurs between 145° E and 180° W whereas in 'warm' 
phases cyclones originate in a broad band between 145° E and 120° W 
(Drosdowsky and Woodcock 1991) .  In the exceptional 'warm' phase of 
1982-1983, the median location for cyclogenesis was 11° S 162° W as 
opposed to the median co-ordinates for all cyclones on record of 14° S 
170° E (Revell and Goulter 1986; Figure 16.6). Thus any analysis of 
changing storm frequencies in the Pacific, and any prediction of near­
fu ture storm activity, must take these large scale oscillations into 
account. 
Figure 1 6 .5 Ocean-atmosphere characteristics of the El Nino­
Southern Osci l lation Phenomenon 
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Physiological constraints on coral response to sea-level 
rise 
ENSO events also bring into focus a second set of potential constraints 
on future coral responses to global environmental change: there appear 
to be strong relationships between ocean temperatures and coral health. 
Corals, like many tropical shallow marine organisms, have narrow 
thermal tolerances and live near the upper limit of that tolerance, being 
adapted to local mean maximum summer temperatures (Jokiel and 
Coles 1990) . When this threshold is exceeded (perhaps accompanied by 
associated changes in solar irradiance and/ or other environmental 
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factors) corals respond by whitening or -'bleaching' .  Bleaching is the 
visible manifestation of the loss of symbiotic unicellular algae, 
zooxanthellae,9 from coral tissues and/ or the loss of photosynthetic 
pigmentation from the zooxanthellae. The zooxanthellae play a key 
roles in photosynthesis and carbon fixation and their loss or reduced 
function is accompanied by reduced skeletal growth. Furthermore, 
bleached corals show reduced reproductive ability which may slow 
coral recruitment after disturbance (Glynn 1993). 
An ocean warming signal in the coral bleaching record 
Significant warm season ocean 'hot spots' ( + 1°C above long-term mean 
monthly SST) detected from satellite imagery for the period 1983-1991 
have been shown to have correlated with coral bleaching episodes 
(Goreau and Hayes 1994). These relationships have now been 
confirmed by in situ measurements of similarly elevated water 
temperatures and bleaching levels of 40-72 per cent of live coral 
colonies on the outer reef slope at Moorea in the Society Islands (Figure 
16.7; Hoegh Guldberg and Salvat 1995). After a comparable event at 
Moorea in 1991, 20 per cent of the bleached corals subsequently died 
(Gleason 1993). Larger temperature excursions of +3 to +4°C can 
produce mass bleaching of reef communities and coral mortality rates 
in excess of 90 per cent, as occurred in the ENSO-related warming in 
the eastern Pacific in 1982-83 (Glynn 1990). The aftermath of this 
extreme environmental perturbation has been to replace the eastern 
Pacific coral community with one dominated by crustose coralline 
algae and rapidly-expanding populations of grazing sea urchins. As a 
result, a system previously characterised by reef growth (for example, 
net deposition of calcium carbonate of 8, 600 kg/year at Uva Island, 
Pacific coast of Panama) has been replaced by a bio-eroding reef frame­
work disappearing at 4, 800 kg calcium carbonate per year (Eakin 1996) . 
It has been argued that bleaching episodes prior to the 1980s were 
related to small-scale, geographically isolated events whereas many of 
the bleaching events witnessed in the next decade were complex in 
character and covered large geographical areas (Williams and Bunkley­
Williams 1990). Furthermore, the frequency of coral bleaching episodes 
appears to have increased markedly in recent times. In the period 1876-
1979 there were 3 major events, in the1979-1990 period, 63 events 
(Glynn 1993), although this may be due to a more comprehensive and 
better trained network of reporting scientists rather than a real change 
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in event frequency of this magnitude. Nonetheless, there has been 
speculation that these episodes represent an early signal of global 
warming in the oceans. This may be so, but rather through a response 
to changing ENSO dynamics rather than a secular trend in sea surface 
temperature. 
Global environmental change and ENSO: complex feedbacks 
Warm phase ENSO events release considerable heat and thus affect 
global temperatures: during a typical 'El Nino' the entire global tropics 
warm by 1 °C. This warming shows up in changes in sea surface 
temperature on inter-annual timescales and is an important contributor 
to climatic variability on inter-decadal timescales. Might the global 
climate change signal manifest itself through the climatology of this 
phenomenon? 
Both instrumental and proxy environmental records suggest that the 
period from ea. 1920 to 1940/1950 was characterised by relatively few 
'moderate' to 'strong' warm phase ENSO episodes. However, the 
periodicity of ENSO fluctuations appears to have shortened from ea. 5 
years to ea. 4 years after 1965, with further changes after the mid-1970s 
(Nicholls et al. 1996). Since 1976/77 there have been more frequent 
warm phase events and few cold phase events (Wang 1995) and this 
trend has been further reinforced since 1989. The latest period has been 
highly unusual in showing consistently negative values of the 
Southern Oscillation Index and has no analogue in the 120 years of 
atmospheric pressure readings for the South Pacific region (Trenberth 
and Hoar 1996) . One effect of this pattern has been to keep sea surface 
temperatures anomalously high thus increasing the likelihood of 
bleaching events taking place. 
A key question for the future is how ENSO processes-and the 
patterns of ocean temperature, cyclone activity and coral bleaching 
clearly associated with them-will change with increases in global 
mean temperature. Modelling thus far has shown that ENSO-like 
fluctuations continue to occur with increases in atmospheric carbon 
dioxide and some models indicate the development of temperature 
differences between the western and eastern Pacific. These effects are 
small, however, compared to the overall warming present in the models. 
Detailed predictions are currently not possible, given the difficulty of 
resolving some of the key processes involved, such as equatorial 
upwelling (Gates et al. 1996; Kattenburg et al. 1996) . 
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Concl usions 
Where does the science of global environmental change leave us at the 
present time in assessing the environmental futures of the coral atolls of 
the Pacific Ocean? First, and in spite of a decade of sustained scientific 
effort, it is clear that there is still considerable uncertainty as to the 
likely course of environmental change over the next hundred years. 
This uncertainty becomes additive as one proceeds from atmospheric­
ocean processes, through sea-level responses, to the response of the 
bioconstructional system that is the coral reef (Figure 16.6) . Second, this 
uncertainty is overlain by an additional layer of complexity, how 
climate change will interact with the natural variability of the Pacific 
ocean-atmosphere system. Low-lying, shallow water island ecosystems 
appear finely tuned to ocean temperature variations which determine 
patterns of coral bleaching and storm damage but mathematical 
modelling of how these patterns will change in the future remains 
rudimentary. Finally, a third tier of uncertainty, that of the interaction of 
ocean-climate reorganisations with human activities must also be 
considered. The most important of these threats are likely to be 
degradation of water quality, by nutrient enrichment and 
sedimentation, and over-fishing and the resultant ecological 
imbalances between algae, bio-eroders and corals (Grigg 1994). These 
impacts, which can already be seen as severe in many locations, may 
tip reefs across the threshold from 'hard' framework to 'soft' ecosystem 
dominated by macroalgae10 or influence the recovery, or otherwise, of 
reef systems from the bleaching or storm perturbations mentioned 
above. 
Understanding environmental futures in the Pacific will, therefore, 
be necessarily complex and will require the disentangling of long-term 
change, regional environmental variability, and regional and local 
anthropogenic impacts. This will be a considerable challenge for the 
next generation of environmental scientists. 
Ed itorial notes 
'Enhanced greenhouse gas forcing'-refers to the way in which the 
increased presence of certain gases in the atmosphere (including 
carbon dioxide, methane, CFCs and nitrous oxide) acts to reduce the 
long-wave radiation ('heat') given off into space from the top of the 
atmosphere leading to global warming. 
Like other substances, sea-water expands as it warms. The increase 
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in the volume of sea-water through thermal expansion has probably 
made the largest contribution so far to the sea-level rising associated 
with greenhouse warming. 
'Tectonics' refers to movements in the outer layer of the earth's 
surface. 
'Anthropogenic modification of the hydrological cycle' refers to 
ways in which human activity may have altered the way in which 
the world's water is cycled. 
'Bioconstructional and bioerosional processes' are the processes of 
reef formation and reef erosion, which involve living organisms. 
Algae form a large group of plant-like organisms ranging from tiny 
single cells to huge seaweeds. Some have a close relation with 
corals and are involved in reef-building. But where 'soft' algae have 
become more prominent reef-building potential is reduced. 
Calcium carbonate is being taken up from the water by the reef­
building organisms, which use it to produce their external skeletons, 
adding to the reef structure. 
'Cyclogenesis' is the creation of cyclones. 
A lot of reef-building corals live in association with the small, round 
algal cells of zooxanthellae. Many tropical corals gain energy from 
them. The algae capture energy from sunlight by photosynthesis 
and pass it to host corals in energy-containing compounds. 
10 'Macroalgae' are the larger 'seaweeds' 
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Dealing with uncertain prospects: 
a response to Spencer 
Ch ristian Clerk 
Spencer 's contribution to this volume differs from other chapters in 
taking a natural science approach to one of the key areas in the 
assessment of the environmental future of the Pacific Islands. But he 
invites reflection on the human issues involved in environmental 
change. Approaching this task from a social science perspective, I find 
myself considering not only the human consequences and policy 
implications of the findings he ably summarises but broader issues of 
the way scientific data have been treated in decision-making on 
measures relating to climate change. 
Remaining scientific uncertainties, made more challenging to 
resolve by the complex interactions of physical, biological and social 
systems, are clearly laid out by Spencer. How uncertainty should be 
treated has been a key issue in the history of the debate over responses 
to predicted climate change. Earlier broad uncertainties about the extent 
of human-induced climate change brought many different responses. 
Those speaking from the perspective of existing economic interests have 
invoked them as justification for a 'business as usual' approach. 
Difficulties in predicting the extent and time scales of effects allowed 
governments to avoid pressing forward with fundamental changes in 
energy use, possibly seeking no-regrets solutions (where measures 
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effectively pay for themselves through energy saving). For 
environmental campaigners the uncertainties called for a precautionary 
approach to avoid the possibility of the worst outcomes. One writer 
(Meyer-Abich 1993) has compared decision-making on global warming 
to the philosopher-mathematician Pascal's famous 'wager ' on the 
existence of God. If I decide that God exists when he does not, I may 
avoid certain acts but will have lost little by it. If I decide God does not 
exist when he does, I invite damnation. So, belief is prudent and 
rational. 
Of course, the reality of assessment of options in environmental 
policy, is more complex than this. Much work has been done on the 
comparison of the costs of measures which might be taken to combat 
climate change-set against the likely costs, in damage and repair, of 
the impact of such change. Yet, even if one accepts a fairly narrow 
economistic approach to this problem there are difficulties for 
conventional cost-benefit analysis applied on a broad scale, especially 
when projecting into the increasing uncertainties of a more distant 
future. These difficulties have led some writers to seek other 
approaches, such as regret analysis. In this more relativistic approach 
choices are assessed in relation to a number of different possible future 
states of nature and 'regret' is calculated on the basis of the difference 
between the costs of a particular policies and their outcomes and those 
of the policy which would give the best outcome if the future state of 
nature had been correctly guessed (Read 1994) . Different approaches to 
assessment can lead to differing conclusions about the desirability of 
particular policies. But, however, assessments are made, there are clear 
differences between countries in their perceptions of the costs of policy 
and the risks and costs of impacts. To stretch the theological analogy­
the developed, industrialised nations tend to see themselves as having 
to make substantial sacrifices for unqualified belief. Many in the 
developing world feel that they are having virtue pressed upon them to 
atone for the sins of others, while certain countries feel themselves to be 
staring damnation in the face more directly than the rest. 
Understandably, the SIDS (Small Island Developing States) of the 
Pacific fall into the last group. The potential threats to them from the 
effects of climate change will be familiar to many readers. Sea-level 
rising poses a very direct threat, particularly to low-lying atoll-based 
nations such as Tuvalu or the Marshall Islands, the continued existence 
of which is questioned under some scenarios, raising the spectre of 
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forced migration from ancestral lands. Water supplies are threatened, 
both through salination of fresh water lenses and possible changes in 
rainfall distribution and frequency. Agriculture in low latitude 
countries such as Kiribati is thought to be the most open to the risk of 
pressures of reduced rainfall and heat stress. Further problems are 
raised by the likely changes in the range and frequency of extreme 
weather events such as cyclones and droughts. Spencer 's discussion of 
coral bleaching is a reminder of possible 'knock-on' ecosystem impacts. 
The perception of elevated risk can have other economic consequences, 
for instance, problems securing investment or arranging insurance 
cover. Western Samoa experienced this problem after the cyclones of 
1990 and 1991 (Leggatt 1994) . 
Spencer does offer some modestly encouraging news. The now 
favoured most likely rate for sea-level rising is considerably lower than 
once feared and coral reefs do have the potential for growth to keep up 
with such a rise. But his careful qualifications show that this is no 
cause for complacency. The rate of rise is still four to five times what it 
was in the recent past and the capacity of coral to respond to change 
can be compromised by a range of factors including the impact of storm 
damage, changing ocean temperature and the effects of human activity. 
Uncertainties remain about how different systems interact and what the 
final outcomes will be. 
In case the 1msiness as usual' lobby takes comfort from these 
uncertainties, it must be remembered that they are now to be read in the 
context of increasing scientific conviction about the general proposition 
of human-induced climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) in its second Assessment Report of December 
1995 concluded that the balance of evidence suggested a discernible 
human influence on the climate and recognised significant impacts 
from such change which would fall most heavily on the developing 
countries. Also, whilst noting the opportunity for most countries to 
apply no-regrets policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it 
suggested that consideration of the precautionary principle offered 
good reason for moving beyond no-regrets. 
As the Third Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) approaches, it is 
clearly important that the lobbying of the Pacific Island states and their 
supporters must continue with full voice. Membership of the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS) has been of importance in strengthening 
266 I Envi ronment and development in the Pacific I slands 
the hand of the Pacific nations in the major international negotiations. 
Although AOSIS has not been able to secure its target of a 20 per cent 
reduction in 1990 greenhouse gas emissions by 2005, its effective 
coalition with the European Union and 'green' members of the G77 
group of developing nations was important in pushing forward the 
process of agreement on future policy at the First Conference of the 
Parties in 1995. It may be so again. Meanwhile the message of the 
Pacific states and AOSIS can be spread through other channels. 
Greenpeace, for example, have been active in this, while the World 
Council of Churches have been promoting a climate petition campaign 
co-ordinated in Europe by the European Centre for Studies, Information 
and Education on Pacific Issues (ECSIEP) . 
In the Pacific itself the South Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme (SPREP) has played a major role in information gathering 
and sharing, co-ordination and planning in the region. Spencer 's 
references to the impact of human activities upon corals are a reminder 
that islanders do have a direct role in affecting the outcomes of climate 
change. It reinforces the importance of coastal management to the 
island states, of the need for environmental impact assessments, indeed 
of overall environmental planning which would consider the effects of 
such factors as agricultural run-off and sedimentation. There are 
opportunities here with the implementation of National Environment 
Management Strategies and in the implementation of the Rio Agenda 21 . 
Financial support for continued monitoring, information sharing, 
education and implementation of environmental planning will be 
essential. Here, again, pressure on the international community will 
have to be maintained. 
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International and regional links for 
sustainable development 
Akui la  Yabaki 
This chapter considers some of the many links which shape the pursuit 
of sustainable development in the Pacific. These links are at several 
levels and include those operating through international agencies, 
those between aid donors and recipients, and those between non­
govem ental organisations (NGOs). The examples given, which 
particularly favour Europe-Pacific connections, invite questions about 
which links can actually work to the benefit of the peoples of the Pacific 
in achieving goals of sustainable development. Colonial patterns of 
relations, the forms of the global economy and the changing patterns of 
'great power ' political interest have all been involved in determining 
the nature and form of the linkages. Here, the aim is to view them in the 
light of a Pacific understanding of sustainable development and 
environmental management. 
Towards a Pacific understanding of sustai nable 
development 
As Suliana Siwatibau points out in Chapter 4, many different groups 
seek to define development in their own terms, and if the demand for 
'sustainable development' has become commonplace there remain 
many interpretations of that term. One perspective recently endorsed by 
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many Pacific governments is that of the Suva Declaration on Sustainable 
Human Development in the Pacific (UNDP /Forum Secretariat 1994) . In 
this ministers and representatives of 14 members of the South Pacific 
Forum adopted a view of sustainable development which they held to 
be consistent with the interests and aspirations of Pacific people as a 
whole. The Declaration states that the pursuit of development should 
not be limited to economic considerations but rather that there should 
be 'people-centred' development, a position consistent with the 
communal values of the Pacific way of life. The document stresses that 
the pursuit of human well-being means 'maintaining the Pacific quality 
of life, which ensures economic, social and spiritual well-being 
irrespective of age, gender, racial origin creed and place of abode' 
(UNDP /Forum Secretariat 1994:2). 
The Suva Declaration recognises that sustainable human 
development requires action at different levels and the collaboration of 
many individuals and agencies. National governments are urged to 
support such development through its integration into policy, planning 
and programming. But, there is a declared aim to promote participatory 
and community-based development which enables 'the majority of the 
people to participate fully in socio-economic life and be owners of their 
own development processes' (UNDP /Forum Secretariat 1994:3). 
Traditional structures and institutions for community welfare and 
environmental management are a resource to be built on, drawing on 
their strengths. At the same time, the Declaration urges support for 
equity in the distribution of the benefits of economic growth and calls 
both for actions to support the advancement of women and for 
development programs which engage the needs of young people. 
It is suggested that, in devising and implementing policy and plans 
necessary for sustainable human development, Pacific Island countries 
should seek a close working relationship between government 
agencies, NGOs, churches, local and traditional institutions, 
community organisations, donors and other concerned bodies. The 
wide range of international links involved in the promotion of such a 
view of development is reflected in the Declaration's call for continued 
technical and financial support for island countries from 'concerned 
donor countries and funding agencies, United Nations bodies and 
specialised agencies, regional and sub-regional organisations and 
institutions, and non-governmental organisations' (UNDP /Forum 
Secretariat 1994:3). However, there is a recognition that if present links 
are to serve the best interest of each Pacific country then not only do 
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these links need to be maintained, but there has to be the political will 
to redirect policies, plans and programs towards well-defined 
development goals, seeking to achieve a more effective response. 
At the local level, the success of this approach rests on the widest 
possible sharing of the vision of people-centred development and on 
the will to implement appropriate policies. It calls for the greatest 
possible participation of people in any given society. The Pacific Way of 
arriving at decisions by consensus is worth preserving as it encourages 
such participation. Involving people in decision-making is a way of 
equipping them to be in charge of their own development, a kind of 
development which takes into account Pacific people's attachment and 
sensitivity to their natural environment. The word fenua or vanua (the 
Fijian form) recurs in slightly different forms in a number of Pacific 
languages. It is an inclusive word which embraces the totality of 
people, their origin, their community, their land, soil and fishing 
grounds, with the customs and traditions which bind people together. It 
follows that when the land is destroyed the life of a community is 
equally affected. There have been traditional techniques to regulate the 
relationships between people and the resources of the land. From time 
to time ritual restrictions could be imposed on fishing grounds or 
coconut plantations to allow time for regeneration. In these ways island 
peoples sought to live in balance with their environment, in a 
sustainable relationship with it. Different varieties of environmentalism 
are often classified as 'anthropocentric' -focused on human needs and 
interests, or ' ecocentric' -focused on the well-being of the broader 
ecosystem. These two approaches can be difficult to reconcile. The 
human welfare orientation of the Suva Declaration makes it a distinctly 
anthropocentric approach to issues of sustainability (though it does 
contain a section concerned with support for environmental 
regeneration). If, however, we understand it against the background of a 
Pacific perspective which sees development as 'human' insofar as it is 
to do with communities 'in relation to their environment', the potential 
gap between perceived human needs and the requirements of natural 
environmental conservation can be narrowed. 
Drawing on these ideas, the success of local and regional links for 
sustainable development rests on the degree to which they can help 
deliver a form of truly participatory development in which communities 
have a direct say in their future and control of their resources, and 
which enhances people's ability to live in a balanced relationship with 
the natural environment. 
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Internati onal and regional agencies 
The prominence given here to the idea of sustainable human develop-
. ment, as developed in the 1994 declaration, is a reminder of the major 
role assumed by UNDP in the promotion of a vision of sustainable 
development in the region. UNDP and SPREP (the South Pacific 
Regional Environment Programme) have been the two major agencies at 
the forefront of the search for sustainable development in the South 
Pacific. While UNDP is an autonomous arm of the United Nations, 
SPREP is an intergovernmental organisation owned and operated by 
the governments of 26 countries with direct interests in the region, 
including 22 Pacific Island states and territories. SPREP emerged from 
consultations in 1978 between the South Pacific Commission (SPC), the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP). It was formally established in 1980 as a joint South Pacific 
Commission and South Pacific Forum initiative. The history of its birth 
hints at the range and complexity of linkages, institutional and 
intercountry, that are involved in the development of policy and 
programs on environment and development. It also highlights the then 
emerging recognition of the need for cooperation and coordination of 
effort in the pursuit of environmental goals and sustainability. SPREP, 
now an independent regional organisation, aims to promote 
cooperation and to offer assistance for environmental protection and 
improvement and the achievement of ecologically sustainable 
development. The SPREP Action Plan (The Action Plan for Managing 
the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region), 
periodically reviewed, is central to the region's environmental 
planning. Coastal management, conservation of biological diversity, 
climate change and sea level rise, waste management and pollution 
prevention, and environmental education all feature among its 
concerns (SPREP 1992; Fuavao 1995). 
It was SPREP which organised the Pacific Island Developing 
Countries submission to the 'Earth Summit', the UNCED (United 
Nations Commission on Environment and Development) conference in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (SPREP 1992). From that summit emerged 
Agenda 21, the action program for the achievement of sustainable 
development in the twenty-first century. UNDP was given the lead in 
capacity-building to assist developing countries in producing policies 
and plans towards that end, its response being known as Capacity 21 .  
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The regional Capacity 21 'Programme for Sustainable Development in 
the South Pacific: building on national environmental management 
strategies' began in 1994. SPREP, already deeply involved in the 
formulation of National Environmental Management Strategies (NEMS) 
was the executing agency. 
The capacity-building program reflects many of the concerns found 
in the Suva Declaration and the Pacific Human Development Report 
produced in 1994 (UNDP 1994) . It emphasises participation and use of 
local knowledge, including the knowledge of women and of NGOs. But 
it also seeks to improve the capacity of governments in the promotion of 
land and sea resource management and to ensure the integration of 
sustainable development aims into development planning, particularly 
into the financial planning of Pacific island countries' development 
banks. The bulk of funding for the program came from Capacity 21 
resources, though SPREP, the 6 participating island countries, and 
NGOs in kind contributions (UNDP 1993). 
The UNDP /SPREP capacity-building initiative has run alongside 
other significant international programs. The South Pacific Biodiversity 
Conservation Programme (SPBCP) and the Integrated Conservation and 
Development Programme (ICDP) have backing from the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) the main financial mechanism for the 
UNCED agreements. The UNCED process was carried into the first 
global conference on sustainable development and the implementation 
of Agenda 21-the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development 
of Small Island Developing States, held in Barbados in 1994. This 
brought its own action program which has been reflected in develop­
ment promotion activities in the Pacific. FAO (the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organisation) and SPREP arranged a consultation on 
sustainable agriculture, forestry and fisheries for South Pacific Small 
Island Developing States in 1996 as a contribution to this program. 
Other recent UNDP activities include a Pacific Employment and 
Sustainable Livelihoods Initiative with an emphasis on the rural and 
subsistence economy as a source of employment (UNDP /RBAP 1996). 
International and regional bodies have continuing contributions to 
make. Not least, the international activity helps to keep environmental 
concerns and issues of sustainability to the fore in the consciousness of 
national governments. While ideally governments maintain environ­
mental awareness by sensitivity to and understanding of the needs and 
problems of the communities they serve, political realism suggests that 
there is a case for some 'top-down' influence here. In addition, where 
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there is a lack of institutional capacity at the national level, or a 
shortage of specific expertise or skills, whether scientific, legal or ad­
ministrative, the international and regional agencies are important 
channels for resources. Their significance increases to the extent that 
they can help achieve genuine local, national or regional capacity­
building. They can also be major sources or channels for funding. 
SPREP seeks donor assistance for its members. Two major SPREP 
projects assisted 12 island countries to develop National Environ­
mental Management Strategies. Funding was found from the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID), and the UNDP, with technical assistance 
provided by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN). Program profiles from NEMS, projects which further the NEMS 
strategies, are submitted by SPREP to possible donors in specifying 
assistance needs (SPREP 1994) . 
While the language of co-operation and participation has 
increasingly become part of the programs put forward by international 
bodies, islanders' recent experience of international fora has not always 
reflected this. Particularly in areas where Pacific Island concerns relate 
to global issues, such as climate change, there may be a sense of 
agendas being set without significant consultation, or full recognition 
of the Pacific perspective. It has been suggested that there is a form of 
'scientific neo-colonialism' -data gathered in the Pacific not being 
controlled or interpreted by local people, and, with government service 
privatisation and user charges, becoming less accessible (Hay 1996) . 
Such criticisms underline the need for the international agencies to 
make sure that the rhetoric of participation becomes felt as a reality at 
all levels. 
Bi lateral and multi lateral aid : Britain and the European 
U n ion 
It can be argued that the former assurance of 'favourable' aid and trade 
conditions was a double-edged sword, allowing island governments to 
defer difficult decisions on important issues of development planning, 
and, by creating dependency, undermining real control of development. 
Yet well-directed development assistance funding remains a vital 
component in the search for sustainability in the region, while the old 
certainties of aid provision are fading. British and European Union 
links to the Pacific reflect the changing conditions. 
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British development assistance 
The United Kingdom has a long history of association with the Pacific. 
Yet, in the past few years there have been reasons to question the level 
of British commitment to the region and to ask if the United Kingdom's 
recent decision to withdraw from the South Pacific Commission points 
towards further reductions in Britain's role in the South Pacific. 
In recent years British contributions to development aid have in­
creasingly been channelled through multilateral agencies. Mr Jeremy 
Hanley, then Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister, told Forum 
leaders in Port Moresby in 1995 that Britain contributed about 16 per 
cent of the funding for European Union aid, from which Pacific coun­
tries would continue to benefit. But he also said that, with financial 
strictures and increased multilateral flows, the Pacific was likely to see 
a drop in the volume of bilateral aid. Indeed, British bilateral aid to the 
region has been steadily falling, from about £8 million in 1995/96 to an 
estimated £3 million in 1998/99. 
Domestic policies of restraint in government spending helped to set 
the conditions for the redirection of the bulk of the more limited aid 
budget towards other targets, and it is difficult not to conclude that the 
distant Pacific, poorly reported in the British media, was seen as an 
easy target for cuts. UK-based NGOs connected with the Pacific have 
expressed concern about a funding gap which could not readily be met. 
In explaining plans for the reallocation of aid Mr Hanley said that, like 
other donors, the British government had become increasingly con­
cerned that programs in the Pacific were not as effective as they might 
be (PISUKI 1995). Need and effectiveness are seen as the two funda­
mental criteria for aid distribution. This raises questions about how 
and in whose terms we assess the effectiveness of aid and, with the 
drop in the volume of aid, about whether government-sponsored links 
with the Pacific will become increasingly investment and market-led. 
A continuing avenue for aid is the British government's Overseas 
Development Administration (ODA). Besides running its own program, 
ODA contributes funding to UK NGOs working in the region. This 
includes about 75 per cent of the funding of Voluntary Service Overseas 
(VSO), through which personnel are sent to work in a number of fields 
including education, social and business development, natural 
resource development and construction. The reduced British aid 
program to the Pacific now focuses particularly on the areas of edu­
cation and good government. A clear theme in recent years has been 
that of institutional development. This means, for example, assisting 
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the development of a Ministry of Health or a higher or primary 
education system, rather than building a hospital or a school. Such a 
policy echoes the proverb that it is better to teach someone to catch fish 
rather than to simply give a fish. The high level of participation 
required of the recipient government and the people who work within 
the institutions concerned in these arrangements do reflect an under­
standing of sustainable development with which many of us would 
agree. But success relies on the achievement of a local input, breeding 
commitment through involvement. 
The overall goal of the British aid program as implemented by the 
ODA has been described as 'the promotion of sustainable economic and 
social development in order to improve the quality of life and reduce 
poverty, suffering and deprivation' (Clerk 1994:6). An emphasis on 
sustainability has clearly become central to the definition of 'effective­
ness'. On a number of occasions ministers have presented the argument 
that significant parts of the aid budget to the Pacific have gone unspent 
because it has not been possible to agree with Pacific Island govern­
ments on programs of sufficient quality to be convincing contributions 
to sustainable development. The commitment of some governments to 
policies for sustainable development has been questioned (PISUKI 
1996). Such comments invite questions as to whether domestic policies 
in the United Kingdom and other donor nations would stand up to 
strong sustainability criteria. But, as other contributions to this book 
suggest, there have been very real failures among Pacific leaders in 
serving the development needs of the communities they represent. The 
vision of a near future in which donor governments with reduced aid 
budgets, using tighter sustainability criteria in their allocation, meet 
with governments of recipient countries unwilling or unable to develop 
and implement their own programs for sustainability is not a happy 
one. It requires effort on both sides to avoid such an outcome. 
An existing development seen in the British case is a move away 
from government-to-government aid. British funding has in part moved 
towards regional projects such as support for fisheries through the 
South Pacific Commission or a Regional Rights Resource Team Project 
focusing on the status of women. But there is also some evidence of an 
interest in finding 'cost-effective' ways of delivering aid through groups 
such as NGOs. Britain has recently been giving support to Wan 
Smolbag, a touring theatre group from Vanuatu which deals with com­
munity issues. The opening of channels of aid to NGOs and community 
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organisations should be encouraged as a way of ensuring greater local 
involvement in development. Pacific NGOs, if given due recognition, 
could be effective partners in a sustainable development process gen­
erating local participation, redistribution of resources and continuity. 
A rather different approach to development assistance is 
demonstrated by the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), 
the investment arm of the British aid program operating in about 50 
countries worldwide. CDC has had investments in the Pacific since 
1960, initially in Fiji but now also in Solomon Islands, Papua New 
Guinea and Vanuatu. CDC is clearly market-led, operating chiefly 
within the private sector in projects in which it can expect to add value 
to its investment. Its investment choices are made on commercial and 
development grounds. CDC sees its role being enhanced in the move 
from aid and dependency to investment and self-reliance. The 
organisation can attract funds from the European Union for project 
preparation, appraisal and training and has used resources in 
promoting investment opportunities in the South Pacific. Because of 
overheads, minimum investments are substantial (£1 million in 1994) . 
However, the use of financial intermediaries can be used to target 
smaller investments. One of CDCs investments in Papua New Guinea 
is the PNG Venture Fund, a company providing capital for medium­
sized businesses. 
CDC requires profit. Questions to be asked about this kind of 
approach concern the degree to which commercial priorities can be 
balanced with a sense of responsibility for sustainable development. 
Does the financial scale of operation undermine true responsiveness to 
local needs? To what extent can profitability and long-term community 
advantage be matched-up? To what extent can project appraisal be 
directed towards assessment of social and environmental implications? 
One of the CDC projects established in partnership with the Solomon 
Islands government and landowners involves a hardwood plantation 
on the island of Kolombangara, on land which had previously been 
logged. The move to start commercially viable hardwood plantations is 
an important development aimed at tackling the degradation of the 
environment caused by logging. But more fundamental challenges to 
purely market-led development must clearly come from elsewhere. In 
this case, what would be even more desirable is to have a Europe­
Pacific policy agreement fundamentally opposed to destructive logging 
which has no regard to the need for sustainable forestry. 
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The European Union-Lome and beyond 
Out of the 25 South Pacific states, 12 have special relations with the 
European Union, including 8 belonging to the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries who are signatories of the Lome Convention, 
one British territory and three French overseas territories. The European 
Union is the second largest donor for the ACP countries, after Australia. 
But as more than 80 per cent of Australian aid goes to Papua New 
Guinea, the European Union represents the largest donor for the other 
seven independent ACP states in the Pacific. 
The Lome Convention provides a framework of international 
linkages of which Europe-Pacific links are one dimension. The African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries concerned entered into contractual 
arrangements which have been in place since 1975. Basically the 
partnership is intended to promote trade and offer financial instru­
ments for development projects in these countries, which are by and 
large beset by problems of small economies. It accords an important 
place to the respect of human rights and human dignity. The fact that 
the Lome Convention has lasted two decades having weathered the 
changes in international relations demonstrates its usefulness as a 
framework for relationships for the regions concerned. Lome has pos­
sibilities for South-to-South sharing of expertise and could transform 
old patterns of relations which have tended to be North-to-South. The 
political potential lies in the presence of many ACP missions in 
Brussels who could together apply concerted political pressure through 
Lome on the countries of the European Union. This political pressure 
can be seen to have worked in mobilising a EU Assembly resolution on 
a peace delegation to Bougainville in 1992. 
In fact, there have been a series of Conventions contracted for set 
periods. The current convention Lome IV was signed in December 1989 
and runs over a period of 10 years. There is therefore considerable 
interest at this time in the assessment of Lome, and in its future beyond 
the year 2000. A recent NGO consultation on the Convention identified 
both benefits and limitations of Lome. Among the positive features 
identified were the provision of infrastructure in many countries and 
access to foreign exchange through trade preference. This is 
particularly important for Fij i from which, under a sugar protocol, the 
European Union undertakes to continue to buy a specific quantity of 
sugar at a guaranteed price. Other benefits specified were the provision 
of technical assistance, the generation of employment for women (in 
areas such as the Fijian garment industry or Kiribati seaweed 
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production), and the operation of the Stabilisation Fund for Export 
Earnings (STABEX) . In the Pacific substantial STABEX payments have 
been made for shortfalls in revenue from copra, palm products, coffee 
and cocoa. 
One of the basic problems identified was the sheer lack of readily 
available public information on the Convention, and of guidance on 
access to funding for NGOs. Negotiations with government and EU 
delegations had proved difficult for some NGOs. Besides the problems 
of accessing funds and slowness in project implementation, the large 
sums involved in EU aid could produce administrative problems for 
those implementing projects. Doubts were also expressed at the 
consultation as to whether the principles expressed in Lome IV, in areas 
such as sustainable development or the equity and empowerment of 
women, were being implemented in projects. There was a need for 
systematic project evaluation in relation to social benefits 
(Haij tink1997) .  
NGOs are pressing for a new Lome Convention which continues to 
offer a good basis for partnership between Europe and the Pacific, but 
which addresses the problems identified. It has been suggested that 
some funding might be identified for micro-projects implemented by 
civil society, with a greater flexibility to approve smaller projects. In 
1995 the European Union provided funds for a variety of projects in the 
Pacific; a cyclone warning system upgrade for the Pacific region, an 
Airport Development Program and Training in Kiribati, a micro-projects 
program including training in small business for women and a Design 
Study and Master Plan for Rural Water Supply Schemes. The total 
amount disbursed was 5,873,000 ECU. The largest portion went to a 
Pacific-wide cyclone warning system and training in Kiribati. There are 
some environment-related references in these projects and the micro­
project focus on enhancing the role of women is encouraging. But there 
is still much to be done in pressing donors such as the European Union 
to move beyond conventional projects into areas which extend 
prevailing development wisdom. 
Considering the broader economic links between Europe and the 
Pacific, I recall the debate in the 1970s over European sugar beet versus 
tropical sugar cane and arguments for 'trade not aid'. Aid is often tied 
to donor-related preconditions which entail widening the gap between 
rich and poor. Could there be more encouragement given to the Pacific 
to trade with European countries? Pacific states may seem prosperous 
in relation to some other developing countries, but there is a strong case 
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for trade in sustainable produce and for allowing more room for it in 
the European market, whether it be timber or tuna. It is not too late to 
talk about more sustainable trade rather than aid. At the same time, EU 
links with Pacific Island states might offer the chance to set examples of 
standards meeting the same safety and environmental requirements as 
those in Europe, making them binding on Western companies seeking 
to invest in developing countries. 
Non-governmental organisations 
The importance of NGOs in the promotion of sustainable development 
is apparent from what has already been said of their relations with 
other bodies. The term NGO is applied to a wide range of organisations, 
movements, or centres of initiative which vary in their relations with 
governments. Some are more politically active and specifically 
concerned with the environment (of these Greenpeace is the best 
known); most are committed to activity intended to improve aspects of 
social life. In the past 10 years there has been a great expansion in the 
role of NGOs on the international stage and a dramatic increase in the 
number of non-church NGOs serving the Pacific. In traditional Pacific 
societies NGOs may be seen as rather alien and as a threat to the 
existing chiefly hierarchical arrangements. But NGOs do provide 
alternative ways of reaching people at the grass roots, particularly the 
new generations who are looking towards a more open society and 
have a different approach to decision-making. 
International bodies such as the United Nations and Common­
wealth agencies have sought to maintain and strengthen contacts with 
NGOs seeing them in many cases as more clearly representing the 
ordinary people than do the elected politicians. They have looked for 
voices which have something to offer beyond the often predictable 
perspectives of national governments. At the same time politicians' 
electoral and other short-term interests are often not served in trying to 
promote policies needed for long-term environmental well-being, such 
as those aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. To achieve 
international agreement it is valuable to have the support of NGOs who 
can promote the ideas concerned and lobby domestic governments. 
The involvement of the European Union and UN bodies with NGOs 
could encourage those in power in Pacific states to act positively on 
issues which affect the future of the Pacific environment. Issues which 
need consideration include the formulation of a legal framework with 
provision for the protection of the environment; the funding of more 
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nutritional research and training in the exercise of healthy food choices, 
and the training of young leaders so that they may have a greater 
environmental awareness than that of some current leaders who are 
already hooked into relations of vested interest with overseas 
companies. The European Union could certainly be more proactive in 
working with NGOs to press Pacific governments to formulate positive 
economic and environmental policies. 
Whatever ' good government' might mean there is a need for a more 
informed populace, politically more literate and equipped with the 
campaigning and lobbying skills required to enhance their role in the 
democratic process. The Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT) 
has recognised this. Widely seen as the most effective Pacific NGO, it 
has defined development as 'empowerment' rather than in terms of 
North-South transfers of resources. Empowerment means increasing 
villager 's capacity to better their positions by using political, bureau­
cratic and economic systems. Relations with government have not 
always been easy, particularly with SIDT's efforts to publicise the 
unsustainable exploitation of natural resources and customary lands, 
in which politicians colluded with overseas companies. But it has won 
considerable official recognition-responding to government requests 
in areas such as a nutrition survey and a housing rehabilitation 
awareness project. It has worked to make effective communication links 
with government officials and village groups; so enabling development 
education to function as a 2-way process. Funding groups such as 
AusAID, UN organisations, USAID and the European Union have 
taken particular interest in SIDT's ability to reach out to village 
populations. Such abilities can be of great value when there is a trend 
for Pacific and other developing country governments to be urban­
centred with little or no outreach to rural areas and the grass roots in a 
sustained and creative way. 
Education and the dissemination of information is an important 
part of SIDT' s role. The same is true of many other NGOs. One which 
deals with environmental and development issues alongside broad 
concerns for the rights of Pacific peoples is the Pacific Concerns 
Resource Centre (PCRC). Based in Suva, this is the secretariat of the 
Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement. Besides environ­
mental campaigning and work on economic development, other key 
areas addressed include demilitarisation, decolonisation, land rights 
and sovereignty. It enjoys the goodwill of the post-coup Fiji government 
but receives financial support from Bread for the World and Christian 
I nternational and regional l inks for sustainable development I 281 
Aid. The Pacific News Bulletin which it produces offers an update on 
current Pacific issues and addresses developments in all its areas of 
concern. The work of PCRC does offer useful reminders about the 
broader political and economic contexts within which decisions about 
sustainable development in Pacific states are taken. 
Churches in the Pacific have for a long time been recognised for their 
potential role in promoting human development. Pacific Churches in 
their network of partnership within and outside the region, notably 
through the Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC), provide space for 
discussions and dialogue which can prompt constituent members to 
act on environmental matters and human rights. PCC, founded in 1966, 
was one of the first regional NGOs. Throughout its 30 year history the 
regional ecumenical organisation with Protestant and Roman Catholic 
membership has taken a consistent stand against French nuclear 
testing in French Polynesia and has been effective in rousing opposi­
tion from the World Council of Churches, its world wide constituencies 
and European based NGOs to this testing. Program Desks include 
Justice, Peace and Development, Women, Youth and Communication, 
Mission and Unity, and are staffed by individuals who are involved in 
carrying out training workshops on these issues throughout the region. 
Unfortunately the closure of the PCC Research Institute in Vanuatu 
during the 1980s has left the PCC bereft of its facility for research on 
development issues. Since Churches throughout the world need to be 
made aware of how such issues impinge on the lives of Pacific peoples, 
resources should be sought to assist in re-establishing such a facility. 
Significant contributions have also been made by NGOs based 
outside the region. For instance, the Foundation for the South Pacific is 
involved in education, health and environmental issues in countries 
including Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and 
Kiribati. It was founded on a philosophy of working with local 
partners, with a holistic approach to development. The United 
Kingdom Foundation for the South Pacific (UKFSP) has been trying to 
promote a sustainable forestry program. They have been involved in the 
promotion of the wokabout somil, a small, portable sawmill which allows 
villagers to harvest their own trees selectively and so not sell their 
rights to commercial logging companies. 
Two international organisations, World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF) and the Geneva-based International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN) have considerable importance as lobbyists for the 
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protection of the natural environment and the inclusion of 
environmental perspectives in development policies. IUCN prepared 
the World Conservation Strategy of 1980, which underlies many of the 
later developments in international thinking about sustainable 
development. Their involvement in providing assistance to SPREP has 
already been noted. The WWF runs its South Pacific program from a 
Program Office in Fiji and a Liaison Office in Papua New Guinea. This 
includes support for the establishment and development of local NGOs 
concerned with environmental issues through a small grant scheme. A 
central element in the overall conservation program is the notion of 
Community Resource Conservation (CRC), an approach which 
recognises the importance of customary resource tenure and aims to 
promote community-based conservation measures (WWF 1996). WWF 
pursues both commendably local perspectives on sustainable 
development and makes its views heard at the international level. 
The role of NGOs at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 illustrated their 
potential international influence. Not so encouraging was the backlash 
next year when governments and UN bodies, particularly ESCAP in the 
Asian and Pacific region, appeared less happy to have NGO 
involvement in the Vienna Conference on Human Rights. Yet, despite 
opposition, Asian and Pacific NGOs made great gains at the con­
ference, particularly in the area of human rights for women (Hill 
1994:127). As the value of NGOs in the global community comes to be 
recognised, there needs to be a clear definition of the criteria for their 
representation at the international level, to ensure a true partnership 
with governments and international organisations. 
Many factors contribute to the generally increasing significance of 
NGOs. In the new global economy new nation states run the risk of 
becoming pawns, their sovereignty within their own national 
boundaries being undermined. Such challenges to the state would be 
disempowering, rendering small Pacific states unable to control 
environmental degradation. In the region there is the emergence of 
global social problems such as the spread of AIDS, climate change 
effects, the rise in religious fundamentalism and the resurgence of 
ethnic conflict. More and more governments are conscious that in order 
to appear to be addressing these issues they need to enlist the support 
of their citizens. Pacific NGOs and their international partners have a 
role in enhancing the influence that civil society can bring to bear on 
governments. 
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The growth of networks 
Given the number and diversity of agencies, groups and individuals 
involved in activities related to sustainable development, and 
considering the dispersion, small size and shared concerns of Pacific 
Island countries, there is a clear need for co-ordination and networking. 
Regional organisations have played their roles in this. Environmental 
issues have long been part of Forum meetings and SPREP' s co­
ordinating role remains of central importance. The South Pacific 
Commission, Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) and the South Pacific 
Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) are other foci for regional 
resource concerns with their own webs of connections. 
Pacific NGOs have also recognised the value of linkages and 
networking. The Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement 
(NFIP) developed from a small group of isolated NGOs in the 1970s. 
The Churches have links which go back further. One important more 
recent development has been the formation of the Pacific Islands 
Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (PIAN GO), a regional 
umbrella for associations of NGOs at the national level. This had its 
origins in meetings in 1984 and 1986 arranged by the New York-based 
Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific and a meeting for NGOs 
from Commonwealth countries of the region organised by the 
Commonwealth Foundation. To avoid duplication in their networking 
efforts, the 2 initiatives came together to create PIANGO. Its founding 
conference, attended by delegates from 22 Pacific countries, was held in 
American Samoa in 1991 . PIANGO is made up from independent 
National Liaison Units (NLUs), one from each country. These include 
bodies such as Development Services Exchange (DSE) in Solomon 
Islands, the National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NANGO) in Papua New Guinea, TANGO in Tonga, and Hiti Tau in 
French Polynesia. In their early years, NLUs have varied in their 
effectiveness. But the formation of PIANGO has provided a basis for the 
forging and expression of a common NGO vision in the Pacific as a 
basis for sustainable development. 
PIANGO members at a 1994 meeting in Fiji stated that 
Dignity, respect and protection of Pacific peoples, their cultural 
heritage, land, sea and national resources, and effective management 
to pass on to future generations of the Pacific are fundamental to the 
NGO vision for the Pacific region (Pacific NGO Call for Action 1994:6, 
quoted in Roughan 1994:149).  
284 I E nvi ronment and development in the Pacific Islands 
This NGO approach cross-cuts national and subregional 
boundaries. PIAN GO has been able to promote regional preparations 
for major international conferences. It was, for instance, through 
PIANGO that the Pacific NGO Conference on Population and 
Sustainable Development was organised prior to the UN' s Inter­
national Conference on Population and Sustainable Development in 
1994. It has also tried to promote multi-centred projects related to 
sustainable development at the local level, focused on different NL Us. 
The existence of networking through PIAN GO can also help in the 
formation of links with organisations beyond the Pacific wishing to 
share common interests. 
Pacific-related organisations from outside the region have also 
forged wider connections. In Europe PIAN GO has links with the 
European Centre for Studies, Information and Education on Pacific 
Issues (ECSIEP). ECSIEP is the secretariat of the Europe-Pacific 
Solidarity Network, a network of NGOs and church organisations in 
six European countries (the Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom, 
Belgium, France and Switzerland) .  This network addresses issues and 
concerns in the Pacific region, especially those relating to environment 
and development. In the last seven years ECSIEP has promoted 
information-sharing through its Europe-Pacific Solidarity Bulletin , 
annual seminars and workshops. During the recent resumption of 
French testing at Moruroa, French Polynesia, it demonstrated solidarity 
with the Pacific people, in the collection of thousands of signatures all 
opposed to nuclear testing. ECSIEP has also been coordinating the 
European implementation of the World Council of Churches Climate 
Change Petition Campaign, aimed at persuading industrialised 
countries to agree on targets and timetables for the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions, and has been collaborating with the Pacific 
Concerns Resource Centre on consultations over the future of Lome. 
With the secretariat based in the Netherlands, ECSIEP is able to secure 
grants from the European Union in Brussels and is seen, despite limited 
staff, as an active campaigner on Pacific environmental and human 
rights issues. 
Can the Pacific-wide network and its extra-regional links be used to 
strengthen civil society and act as a watch dog for sustainable 
development? Hiti Tau, the NLU in French Polynesia, has taken a 
strong stand for the indigenous Maohi and against French colonialism. 
Following the end of nuclear testing in French Polynesia there is a 
comprehensive study underway of the possible consequences of the 
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tests on the health and well-being of the population which began in 
June 1996. The Eglise Evangelique, the main Protestant church, and Hiti 
Tau have collaborated in the survey with the support of the World 
Council of Churches in Geneva, the Peace and Conflict Documentation 
Centre in Lyon France, ECSIEP and the University of Wageningen in the 
Netherlands. Such broad-based co-operation to obtain data on the 
environmental and health situation amongst identified risk groups is 
imperative and can be a model for Europe-Pacific links amongst NGOs. 
New links could be formulated to help address the needs 
for an appropriate legal framework within which to challenge 
European and Pacific governments regarding use of the 
environment 
for developing nutritiona1 research and training in exercise of 
choice for good food 
for the training of young people and future leaders in 
sustainable development. 
There are also new dimensions to networking emerging. The 
concept of a Sustainable Development Network was included in 
UNDP's Capacity 21 response to the Rio Earth Summit. Such networks, 
combining electronic communication with face-to-face contact and 
other forms of communication were seen as a potentially valuable tool 
for implementing Agenda 21 . The intention was to establish links 
between governments, research bodies, NGOs, grassroots and 
entrepreneurial organisations, in part to connect information sources to 
information users, but also to allow dialogue (SDN Brochure 1992) . A 
pilot Pacific Sustainable Network was established in 1994, with host 
computers linking organisations in three countries, Vanuatu, Fiji and 
Western Samoa. This project has operated through Pactok, an electronic 
mail network run as a non-profit organisation, and is intended to serve 
the NGO movement in the Asia Pacific region. Pactok also has host 
computers in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. Computer 
access for regional NGOs also raises the possibility of access to the 
information resources of the global computer network of the internet 
and even of a presence on it. Hiti Tau has recently established its own 
internet web site. 
Concl usion 
No area could be more significant to the future of Pacific communities 
than that of sustainable human development. In pursuit of this existing 
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links will need to be actively maintained and new ones explored. The 
regional events which bring people together to explore shared 
objectives remain important. These include conferences, summits, 
training workshops and intergovernmental or NGO meetings. 
Continued financial and political support for these is necessary. 
PIAN GO needs to be strengthened as an instrument for regional 
networking and cooperation, able to bring members into consultation 
on environmental and development issues vital to the region and to 
explore possibilities of collaboration with other regional networks. The 
potential for networking is greater than ever before. There is a need in 
the islands for access to information on environmental issues, on 
markets for goods, and on the international economic interests that may 
be shaping their futures. But networking implies two-way flows. It is 
vital that networks be used to ensure that Pacific perspectives on 
environmental and development issues are heard more widely, and that 
those living in other parts of the world are helped to understand the 
significance of their own activities for the Pacific region. In the 
promotion of a truly participatory form of sustainable development the 
perspective of Pacific communities, perhaps expressed through NGOs, 
must also be heard at an early stage in international planning for 
development in the region. There needs to be collaboration in agenda­
setting, not just implementation. Ultimately it is the quality of links 
rather than their number and growing technical sophistication that 
counts. 
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Append ix :  Pacif ic I s lands l i n ks 
Some organisations concerned with environment and development 
issues which provide useful links between the Pacific Islands and 
metropolitan countries, especially in Europe. 
Vol u ntary associations 
Pacific Islands Society of the United Kingdom and Ireland (PISUKI) 
Society for people with an interest in the Pacific Islands. 
The Secretary, PISUKI, 2 Elm Walk, Raynes Park, London SW20 9ED, 
UK 
German Pacific Society 
Society for people with an interest in the Pacific Islands. 
President's Office, Dr. Fred Steinbauer 
Feichtmayrstrasse 25, D-80992, Munchen, FRG 
tel +49 089 15 1158 fax 0049 089 151833 
Papua New Guinea Association 
Society for people with an interest in Papua New Guinea. 
Jeremy Mansfield (PNG), 51 Bell Street, Shaftesbury, Dorset SP7 8AE 
tel/ fax +44 (0)17147 855078 
British Friends of Vanuatu 
Society for people with an interest in Vanuatu. 
Richard B. Dorman, Friends of Vanuatu, 
67 Beresford Avenue, Cheam, Surrey SM2 6ER, UK 
tel/ fax +44 (0)181 642 9627 
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Fiji-Europe Association 
Society for Fijian residents and friends in Britain and Europe. 
Phil Brown, 16 Marlow Mill, Mill Road, Berkshire SL7 1QD 
tel +44 (0)1628 486587 
Mwanean Kiribati Association 
Society for Kiribati residents and friends in UK. 
Myra Iererua, 12 Church Hill, Leamington Spa, 
Warwickshire CV32 SAY, UK 
Non-government organisations 
Foundation for the South Pacific 
Network of organisations linking metropolitan and Pacific Islands 
countries in support of local development initiatives. 
Constituent organisations include the following. 
FSP International 
FSP Regional Co-ordinator /FSP Regional Health Co-ordinator, 
PO Box 951, Port Vila, Vanuatu 
tel +678 22 915, fax +678 24 510, e-mail fsp@vanuatu.pactok.net 
FSP Papua New Guinea 
PO Box 1119, Boroko, NCD, Papua New Guinea 
tel +675 3 325 8470, fax +675 3 325 2670, e-mail fpsp@peg.apc.org 
Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT) 
SIDT, PO Box 147, Honiara, Solomon Islands 
tel +677 21130, fax +677 21131, e-mail sidt@welkam.solomon.com.fb 
FSP Vanuatu 
PO Box 951, Port Vila, Vanuatu 
tel +678 22 915, fax +678 24 510, e-mail fsp@vanuatu.pactok.net 
FSP Fij i 
PO Box 451, Lautoka, Fiji 
tel +679 662 535, fax: +679 663 414, e-mail kanaproject@is.com.fj 
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FSP Kiribati 
PO Box 43, Bairiki, Tarawa, Republic of Kiribati 
tel +686 28101, fax +686 28082 
UK Foundation for the South Pacific (UKFSP) 
4A Newmills Road, Dalkeith, Midlothian, Scotland EH22 lDU, UK 
tel +44 (0)131 663 7428, fax +44 (0)131 663 7433, 
e-mail ukfsp@cableinet.co. uk 
Counterpart/FSP USA 
Farragut Square, 910 17th Street, NW, #328, Washington DC 20006, 
USA 
tel +1 202 296 9676, fax +1 202 296 9679, e-mail info@counterpart .org 
Australian Foundation for the People of Asia and Pacific 
PO Box 12, Crows Nest, NSW 2065, Australia 
tel +61 2 9906 3792, fax +61 2 9436 4637, e-mail: afsp@mpx.com.au 
Tonga Trust 
Local NGO affiliated to FSP 
PO Box 519, Nuku'alofa, Tongatapu, Tonga 
tel +676 21494, fax +676 24898 
Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
International conservation organisation with a Pacific branch. 
WWF South Pacific Programme, Private Mail Bag, GPO Suva, Fiji 
tel +679 31 5533, fax +679 31 5410 
Friends of the Earth New Zealand-Aotearoa 
The branch of this international environmental campaigning 
organisation most involved in the Pacific Islands. 
P 0 Box 5599, Wellesley Street, Aukland, New Zealand 
tel/fax +64 9 303 4319, e-mail foenz@kcbbs.gen.nz 
G reenpeace 
Environmental campaigning organisation. 
Greenpeace Pacific, Private Mail Bag, Suva, Fiji 
fax +679 312 784, e-mail 
greenpeacep@pactok. peg.ape.erg 
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Appropriate Technology for Community and Environment (APACE) 
Volunteer-based organisation concerned with appropriate technology 
transfer, particularly low-impact renewable energy systems. 
APACE, c/-University offechnology, PO Box 123 Broadway, NSW 2007, 
Australia 
tel +61 2330 2554, fax +61 2330 2611 
URL http:/ /www.pactok.net.au/  docs/ apace/home.htm 
Forest Management Foundation 
Supports sustainable community forestry projects. 
47 Aubert Park, London N5 1TR 
tel/ fax +44 (0)171 359 7183 
Pacific Concerns Resource Centre 
Co-ordinates campaigns and disseminates information for the Nuclear 
Free and Independent Pacific Movement. 
PCRC Inc. Office, 83 Amy Street, Toorak, Private Mail Bag, Suva, Fiji 
tel +679 304 649, fax +679 304 755 
Pactok 
Electronic mail network serving the NGO movement in Asia and the 
Pacific. 
PO Box 49 Annandale, NSW 2038, Australia 
e-mail robg@pactok.peg.apc.org 
G reen Light Trust 
Environmental education organisation linking Britain with Papua New 
Guinea. 
Lawshall Green, Bury St. Edmunds, Suffolk IP29 4QS 
tel +44 (0)1284 828 754, fax +44 (0)1284 827 078 
Pacific Heritage Foundation 
Local sustainable community forestry project in New Britain. 
P 0 Box 546, Rabaul, Papua New Guinea 
tel +675 92 1294, fax +675 92 1381 
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National Community Development Trust 
Provides assistance to small-scale community projects in Vanuatu. 
P 0 Box 1511, Port Vila, Vanuatu 
tel +678 22969 
Ole Siosiomaga Society Inc. 
Western Samoan environmental conservation NGO. 
Matautu PO Box 744, Three Comers, Taufusi, Apia, Western Samoa 
tel +685 21 993 
Pacific Island Association of Non-G overnmental Organisations 
(PIAN GO) 
An information dissemination body for Pacific NGOs. 
c/ o Hiti Tau, BP 4611, Papeete, Tahiti 
tel +689 521371, fax +689 572880 
Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) 
British agency providing skilled workers in support of development in 
poorer countries. 
VSO, 317 Putney Bridge Road, London SW15 2PN, UK 
tel +44 (0) 181 780 2266, fax +44 (0)181 780 1326 
South Pacific Action Committee for Human Ecology and Environment 
(SPA CHEE) 
Organisation promoting environmentally sustainable development. 
c/ o University of the South Pacific, PO Box 1168, Suva, Fiji 
tel +679 313 900 ext 2465, fax +679 302 548, e-mail spachee@usp.ac.fj 
Church and ecumen ical organisations 
Pacific Conference of Churches 
Main inter-church body for the Pacific. 
PO Box 208, Suva, Fiji 
tel +679 311 277 /302 332, fax +679 303 205 
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World Council of Churches 
International Protestant ecumenical organisation involving many 
Pacific Islands churches. 
Unit 4-Pacific Desk, PO Box 2100, CH1222, Geneva 2, Switzerland 
tel +41 22 791 6087, fax +41 22 788 0067 
Pacific Forum of the Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland 
Anglican organisation linking churches in Britain and the Pacific 
Islands. 
Inter-Church House, 35-41 Lower Marsh, London SEl 7RL 
tel +44 (0) 171 620 4444, fax +44 (0) 171 928 0010 
Papua New G uinea Church Partnership 
Anglican organisation linking churches in Britain and Papua New 
Guinea. 
Partnership House, 157 Waterloo Road, London SEl 8XA, UK 
tel +44 (0) 171 928 8681, fax +44 (0) 171 928 2371 
Research organisations 
Centre for Asia Pacific Studies 
Academic and business studies for East Asia and the Pacific Islands. 
Dr. Neil Renwick, Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, Nottingham Trent 
University, Clifton Lane, Nottingham NG11 8NS, UK 
tel +44 (0)115 941 8418 fax +44 (0)115 948 6319 
e-mail roy.smith@ntu.ac.uk 
Avenir des Peuples des Forets Tropicales (The Future of Tropical 
Rainforest Peoples) (APFT) 
European Union-funded ethno-ecology research program with a Pacific 
section. 
Prof. Roy Ellen, APFT Pacific co-ordinator, Dept of Anthropology and 
Sociology, Eliot College, University of Kent at Canterbury, 
Kent CT2 7NS, UK 
tel +44 (0)1227 764 OOO, fax +44 (0)1227 475 471, e-mail 
R.F.Ellen@ukc.ac. uk 
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East-West Center Program on Environment 
Researches on management of renewable resources and the 
environment in Asia and the Pacific. 
1777 East-West Road, Honolulu, Hawaii 96848, USA 
tel +808 9444 7272, fax +808 944 7298, e-mail env@ewc.hawaii.edu 
International Institute for Sustainable Development 
Promotes sustainable development through policy research and 
information provision. 
161 Portage Avenue East, 6th Floor, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3B OY4, 
Canada 
tel +204 958 7700, fax +204 958 7710, e-mail iisd@web.apc.org 
National Centre for Development Studies (NCDS) 
Research and graduate training in environmental development and 
management with emphasis in research on Asia Pacific countries. 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National 
University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia 
tel +61 6 249 4705, fax +61 6 257 2886, e-mail ncds@ncds.anu.edu.au 
Pacific Islands Development Program (PIDP) 
Provides research data and services related to Pacific social and 
economic development. 
1777 East-West Road, Honolulu, Hawaii 96848, USA 
tel +808 944 7724, fax +808 944 7670 
United Nations University (UNU) 
Range of interests in environment and sustainable development, 
including sustainable resource management. 
Toho Seimei Building, 15-1 Shibuya 2-Chome, 
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150, Japan 
tel +81 3 499 2811,  fax +81 3 499 28228 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) 
Promotes sustainable development through research, policy studies 
and information provision. 
3 Endsleigh Street, London WXClH ODD 
tel +44 (0)171 388 2117, fax +44 (0)171 388 2826 
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Committe of Concerned Pacific Scholars 
Promotes collaboration between social scientists and conservationists. 
Kathleen Barlow, Department of Anthropology, 
University of Minnesota, 
215 Ford Hall, 220 Church Street, SE, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA 
tel + 1 612 625 2387, fax + 1 612 625 3095 
email barloOOl@maroon.tc.umn.ed u 
Government and intergovernmental organ isations 
Forum Fisheries Agency 
Marine conservation and fisheries management body for Pacific Forum 
states. 
PO Box 659, Honiara, Solomon Islands 
tel +677 21124, fax + 677 23996 
South Pacific Commission 
Provides technical advice, training, assistance and information to 
governments and administrations in the region. 
BP D5, Noumea Cedex, New Caledonia 
tel +687 26 2000 I 26 2011 fax +687 26 3818 
South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) 
Promotes co-operation in the South Pacific and offers assistance to 
members (including all Pacific island states and territories) to improve 
their environment and ensure sustainable development. 
PO Box 240, Apia, Western Samoa 
tel +685 21 929, fax +685 20 231, e-mail sprep@pactok.peg.apc.org 
Department for International Development 
British government agency for overseas aid. 
94 Victoria Street, London SWlE SJL, UK 
tel +44 (0)171 917 0950 fax +44 (0)171 917 0523 
US Peace Corps 
US agency providing development assistance. 
c /  o US Embassy, 31 Loftus Street, P 0 Box 218, Suva, Fiji 
tel +679 314 466 
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International agencies 
European Centre for Studies, Information and Education on Pacific 
Issues (ECSIEP) 
European Union-funded information organisation. 
ECSIEP, P 0 Box 151, 3700 AD Zeist, The Netherlands 
tel +31 30 6927827, fax +31 30 6925614 I 6927987, 
e-mail ecsiep@antenna.nl 
Netherlands Committee for IUCN 
Administers small grants for NGOs to implement Netherlands 
government tropical rainforest policy. 
TRP Secretariat, Plantage Middenlaan 2B, 1018 DD Amsterdam, 
The Netherlands 
tel +31 20 626 1732, fax +31 20 627 9349 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
UN body with special responsibilities under Agenda 21 for promotion 
of sustainable agriculture and rural development and combating 
deforestation. 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (RAPA), 
Maliwan Mansino, Phra Atit Road, Bangkok 10200, Thailand 
tel +662 281 7844, fax +662 280 0445, 
e-mail fao-rapa@fao.org 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
UN regional commission concerned with stratgy for environmentally 
sustainable development. 
ESCAP, Environment and Natural Resources Management Division, 
UN Building, Rajadammem Avenue, Bangkok 10200, Thailand 
tel + 66 2 228 1510, fax + 66 2 228 1025/228 1000 
United Nations Department for Policy Co-ordination and Sustainable 
Development 
Follow-up to the UN Conference on Environment and Development 
programme of action. 
United Nations, New York, NY1007, USA 
tel +1 212 963 4669, fax +1 212 963 1 712 
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United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
Multilateral development assistance organisation with offices in more 
than 120 countries. 
1 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY10017, USA 
tel + 1 212 906 5000, fax + 1 212 906 5364, e-mail sdnhq@igc.apc.org 
South Pacific Progamme Office, c/ oUNDP Private Mail Bag, Suva, Fiji 
tel +679 303 239, fax +679 304 942 
Small Enterprise Development Programme 
UNDP regional programme promoting indigenous small businesses. 
c /  o UNDP Private Mail Bag, Suva, Fij i 
tel +679 312 960, fax +679 300 248 I 301 718, 
e-mail sed@pactok.peg.apc.org 
Pacific Sustainable Development Networking Programme (PSNDP) 
Electronic network linking organisations concerned with sustainable 
development (currently for Vanuatu, Fiji, Western Samoa). 
Private Mail Bag, Nabua, Suva, Fiji 
tel +679 370 733, fax +679 370 021, e-mail ssesega@pactok.peg.org 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
Co-ordinates research and information for the United Nations. 
PO Box 30552, Nairobi, Kenya 
tel +254 2 621 234, fax +254 2 226 886/890 
internet http: / /www.unep.org 
UNEP Information Unit on Climate Change 
IUCC-UNEP, Geneva Executive Centre, CP 356, 
CH-1219 Geneva 10, Switzerland 
tel +41 22 979 9242/ 4, fax +41 22 979 3464, e-mail iucc@gn.apc.org 
Global Resources Information Database (GRID) 
Major international database for environmental information. 
PO Box 30552, Nairobi, Kenya 
tel +254 2 333 936, fax +254 2 520 281 
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Programme for the Protection of Oceans and Coastal Areas 
PO Box 30552, Nairobi, Kenya 
fax +254 2 520 711 
Commercial organisations 
Just World Trading Ltd. 
A fair-trade agency affiliated to the UK Foundation for the South Pacific 
importing sustainably produced timber and non-timber forest products. 
4A Newmills Road, Dalkeith, Edinburgh EH22 lDU, Scotland, UK 
tel +44 (0)131 663 7478, fax +44 (0)131 663 7433, 
e-mail ukfsp@cableinet.co.uk I 106341 .724@compuserve.com 
Forest Stewardship Council 
Forest conservation organisation promoting trade in sustainably 
produced timber, which can provide details of certified importing 
companies. 
FSC International, 502 Avenida Hidalgo, 68000 Oaxaca, Mexico 
fax +52 951 62110 
Solomon Western Islands Fair Trade (SWIFT) 
Timber fair trade organisation linking Solomon Islands Western 
Province with the Netherlands. 
SWIFT, PO Box 82, Munda, Solomon Islands 
tel/ fax +677 6125 Stich ting SWIFT Nederland, Postbus 80, 6970 AB 
Brummen, The Netherlands 
tel/ fax +31 575 564754 
Timber sales: SWIFT Hout bv, PO Box 291, 6950 AG Dieren, 
The Netherlands 
tel +31 8330 14364, fax +31 8330 20151 
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'. .. the conventional development model, followed by 
governments in our shared Pacific Islands region, is 
fundamentally inadequate for addressing the broad 
social, economic, environmental, political, and cultural 
development needs confronting the Pacific Islands 
today.. the present approach to development in the 
Pacific Islands requires fundamental reframing and 
redirection' (Halapua, chapter 2). 
This book consists of contributions from scholars all 
over the globe who are involved in particular 
development issues in the Pacific, whether locally or at 
a distance. But it begins, concludes and is in constant 
conversation with the voices of Pacific Islanders 
themselves. 
The resounding theme of the book is the way Pacific 
Islands' links with the wider world, the cause of so many 
problems for its peoples and environments, may also 
assist in solutions. The contributors come from an array 
of backgrounds, and internal tensions-subtle, overt, 
theoretical and pragmatic-are rife throughout. 
This book is supported by several organisations 
concerned to promote Europe-Pacific Islands 
relationships in support of sustainable development. 
• Pacific Islands Society of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland • United Kingdom Foundation for the South 
Pacific •European Centre for Studies, Information and 
Education on Pacific Issues. 
